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Coalitions In English Local Government: 
Party Political Strategies in Hung Councils 
This work takes a multi-method approach to the study of hung English councils. 
Insights and suppositions from a variety of approaches are utilised, including formal 
coalition theory and case studies of local authorities. A major aim of the thesis is to 
analyse questionnaire and case study data which will further improve our 
understanding of coalitional activity. Although the primary purpose is to inform the 
student of hung councils, formal coalition theories are also tested. 
This study provides the first clear evidence that elected political elites lose power to 
the body of councillors in most hung councils. However, the power of the 
bureaucratic elite, unlike their political counterparts, appears to remain relatively 
constant. Contrary to previous proposals, decision making is not characterised by 
uncertainty and confusion; a learning process takes place in hung councils, and the 
views of participants become more favourable over time. 
The influence of the centre party is a recurring theme of the study. Whether pay-
offs are office or policy, the Liberal Democrats are the primary beneficiary in hung 
English councils. Their commitment to a more open form of decision making and 
willingness to bargain with other parties may be contributing reasons for their 
success, but it is their ideological position in the middle of the two main parties 
which is offered as the primary reason for the influence they wield. 
None of the formal theories of coalition formation and duration perform well in 
predictive terms. Overall, the most accurate prediction of administrative formation 
would posit a minority administration formed by the largest party group, although 
majority coalitions are becoming more prevalent. Contrary to expectations, 
minority administrations are also more durable than coalitions. The large number of 
minority administrations demonstrates that not all politicians are *office-driven', 
and that policy pay-offs are crucial. Policy closeness appears to be a greater 
influence on duration than either ideological connectedness or coalition size. 
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BIBUOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
A Multi-Method Approach to the Study of Local Coalitions 
During the past decade the British political system, with little tradition of the 
phenomenon at either national or local level, has had to accommodate an increasing 
number of local authorities where no political party has an overall majority. Their 
number has grown during the 1980s and early 1990s. until between a fifth and a 
quarter of all local authorities are now hung.^ Hung councils necessitate the 
formation and maintenance of coalitions, however constituted, between political 
parties. Despite this, studies of hung councils have failed to utilise the huge body of 
research into coalitional behaviour, generally concentrating on the changes 
hungness brings to the 'normal' practices of British local government. The specific 
circumstances of the local authority or authorities under examination receive a 
great deal of analysis, while accounts of coalition politics from other political 
systems are rarely considered. Such an approach, far from contributing to greater 
understanding by concentrating on the very particular circumstances of English 
local government, militates against it. The study of political coalitions has received 
a great deal of attention over the last 30 years, and to ignore the research that has 
been carried out into the formation of, for example, laboratory game, legislative, 
executive, and judicial coalitions, is to minimise the chances of understanding what 
is happening when a council is hung. 
Formal studies of coalition formation and duration are the norm in the field of 
research into coalition behaviour. There are two strands of such research, one of 
which (the game theoretical approach) has tended to concentrate on laboratory 
games, using 'real-world' coalitions as essentially testing grounds for assessing 
game-theoretic insights, while the other (the European politics approach) has 
concentrated on attempting to build an inductive theory of European coalition 
government from empirical observations. These two strands should be 
complementary, yet what has been described as "an intellectual tragedy" has been 
taking place. It is argued that the two approaches are "by now so far apart in their 
^ Completely reliable data on council compositions is difficult to obtain, as there is no 
statutory requirement for British local councils to provide detailed election results. The 
results supplied often fail to identify political parties, and by-elections occur more 
frequently than at national level. In addition, changes of political allegiance by councillors 
are not uncommon. The assistance of the Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre at 
Polytechnic South West was invaluable in identifying hung councils. The most recent study 
of hung councils has suggested that the growth in hung councils is over for. the moment, 
*and an increase in the number of majority control authorities is taking place" (Leach & 
Stewart, 1992, p.2) . 
styles of analysis that they have almost nothing to contribute to one another" 
(Laver & Schofield. 1990, p.10)2 
The gulf between these two closely-related approaches reflects the problem In the 
wider field of coalition studies, with scholars from the 'mainstream' of political 
science often failing to utilise correlative developments in other approaches.^ To 
some extent, such problems are understandable, as formal studies present some 
difficulties for the mainstream political scientist. The mathematical nature of 
laboratory studies can act as a barrier to comprehension, and what are often seen as 
unrealistic and over-simplistic assumptions of political behaviour, made by 
theorists in both main traditions, exasperate those who see observation and system 
specific knowledge as essential to any real understanding of political processes. 
Formal theories have slowly modified their early postulate of the politician as 
driven solely by a lust for office, yet the insights made by theorists have often been 
minimised by students of politics. In particular, their search for a general 
explanation of coalition behaviour, applicable to all coalition scenarios, has been 
rejected. Much of the criticism misconstrues the nature and objectives of the 
formal approach, as the chapters which follow will point out. 
The tendency to ignore theoretical developments in coalition studies is very 
apparent in most academic studies of hung councils, which have largely failed to 
take note of previous research into coalition formation and duration. They have 
generally either concentrated on charting the differences between 'normal' and hung 
councils or. more recently, adopted a 'multi-dimensional' approach, where a 
knowledge of system specific variables, such as historical, social, and 
institutional.factors. is seen as crucial to understanding the coalitional process.^ 
Recent studies in both the 'mainstream* local government tradition and the 'multi-
dimensionar approach have provided some valuable information for this research, 
and many of the findings of such studies will be tested in this work.^ 
2 Developments in these approaches, and Laver & Schofield's criticisms, will be examined 
in depth in the opening chapter of this thesis. 
3 For example, there is a world of difference between the two schools of formal theory 
and the approach to coalitions of such distinguished scholars as David Butler (1978). 
Butler takes a totally descriptive approach, with no reference at all to the work done by 
coalition theorists. 
4 Chapter One (section 1.5.3.) explains the multi-dimensional approach in detail. Chapter 
Three (section 3.3.1) explores its application to English local government coalitions. 
5 Most notably, Leach & Stewart (1988) and Leach & Game (1989), with their detailed 
accounts of the arrangements in hung councils, and Mellors (1989) In his multi-
dimensional analysis of hung county councils. Also, the recent publication of Leach & 
Stewart (1992) reflects the growing academic interest in British coalition politics. 
However, while both these approaches have often given useful intimations of the 
central forces operating in English hung councils, they have been unhelpful as 
comparative guides. The studies are extremely system-specific, and attribute 
coalitional processes to a complex intermingling of many forces. It is quite correct 
to argue that the particular cocktail of social, economic, institutional, historical, 
motivational, and political variables present in a political system is crucially 
important to the coalitional strategies undertaken by political actors. However, 
formal theorists attempting to build general explanations of coalition behaviour 
cannot possibly build such all-embracing assumptions into their model. 
Consequently, such purely descriptive studies receive little or no attention from 
coalition theorists. 
Another common approach in the literature are anecdotal accounts of 'life in the 
balance* in British councils. Such accounts, predominantly by chief executives or 
party leaders, often provide a valuable insight into a hung council, but usually fail 
to deliver any but the most subjective judgements of behaviour. They are solely 
concerned with the events familiar to the observer, although conclusions are 
sometimes drawn for possible national hung parliaments.^ While anecdotal accounts 
do present some observations which can be tested in a wider universe of local 
authorities..most such studies are not particularly useful to coalition theorists. 
So. formal theorists ignore the findings of research not based on a well-defined 
analytical framework, while such work in turn takes little notice of the postulates 
of formal theory. Such strategies fail to increase our knowledge of the most 
fundamental of all political activities, the making and maintenance of coalitions. To 
say the least, this is unfortunate, as all of the approaches discussed above provide 
insights into coalition politics. Accordingly, all will be utilised in this study of 
hung councils. 
This research intends to take its hypotheses from a variety of sources; it is an 
attempt at a "multi-method approach" to the study of local coalitions. Wherever the 
insights of coalitional behaviour have come from, whether game theory, the 
European politics approach, empirical political theory, previous academic studies 
of both hung national legislatures and hung local governments (from whatever type 
of approach), or the observations of participants, they will be tested for their 
relevance to the English local government system. The primary focus of this 
® For example, see Wendl (1986). 
research is upon the factors impinging on the behaviour of actors in hung English 
councils, and observations connected with the English local government system will 
receive priority.^ However, it is not intended to follow the restrictive pathway of 
most approaches to the study of local government coalitions. Insights into the effects 
of hungness on the structures and actors of English local authorities will be taken 
(and tested) from any source. The main purpose of this research is heuristic; 
proving or disproving the various theories of coalition formation and duration Is 
not its central purpose. Neither Is It intended to demonstrate the superiority of one 
particular methodology or approach. All the ways of studying coalitions have some 
merit, and all of them tell us something about coalitional behaviour. The specific 
form this investigation takes will now be outlined. 
The Preparatory Chapters 
A multi-method approach means a considerable preliminary examination of the 
developments in coalition studies. Therefore, Chapter One will attempt to Introduce 
the reader to a comprehensive array of theories of coalition formation and duration. 
The early developments In coalition theories will be outlined, and some of the 
assumptions made by theorists about the actions and motivations of political actors 
(for example, the notion that political parties can be characterised as rational 
individuals, as much formal theory does) will be critically assessed. Developments 
In a number of different approaches will be outlined, and some challenges to the 
general direction coalition studies have taken will be introduced. 
There is little point in connecting these general theoretical developments to hung 
English local authorities until we have also examined the local government system. 
It is therefore essential to describe the relationship between the actors involved in 
English local government, and in particular, to address the question of where 
decision making power lies In non-hung local councils. In order to chart any 
changes from the 'normal' distribution of power when a council becomes hung. It Is 
also necessary to demonstrate the suitability of local government as an arena for 
studying the process of coalition formation, a process which becomes essential 
(whether the word 'coalition' is used or not) when a council Is hung. The structure 
of government may well be an Influence on the type of administration forming. 
^ The empirical chapters will largely utilise the findings of previous studies into British 
hung councils as the basis for the testing of a number of hypotheses. In order to avoid 
constant repetition, the findings of the majority of these works will be introduced In the 
relevant chapters; for example, previous findings of administrative durability in hung 
British councils will be introduced in Chapter Six, when the factors impinging on coalition 
duration are assessed. 
Therefore, a knowledge of both the internal structure, and of the constraints that 
might be placed upon local actors, is essential to an understanding of the tactics 
actors might pursue. 
Chapter Three will assess the insights both these introductory chapters bring to 
this specific study of local coalitions. The analytical assumptions of coalition 
theorists concerning the goals and cohesion of political parties will be assessed for 
their suitability in a study of sub-national coalitions. Problems of definition, in 
particular the appropriate criteria to adopt for deciding what constitutes both the 
formation and termination of an 'administration' at local level, will be dealt with in 
some detail. The main bulk of this thesis is an investigation of the data generated by 
questionnaires sent to 515 party leaders and chief executive officers in both hung 
and non-hung English local authorities, and Chapter Three will give full details of 
that exercise.® The questionnaires were designed both to generate information to 
examine the validity of a number of the assumptions raised by previous studies of 
hung councils, and to test formal coalition theories. The data will be assessed in five 
chapters, devoted to specific topics of concern. 
The Ennpirical Examination 
While recognising that political parties, as Pridham points out, "are usually more 
than just institution-bound actors" (1987, p.380), structural and institutional 
constraints inevitably affect political strategies, and an examination of such 
constraints must therefore precede a study of the tactics political parties pursue. 
Factors such as the local electoral cycle, which are out of the control of political 
elites, may be affecting the processes of coalition formation and maintenance. These 
potential influences on coalition activity in English local authorities, because they 
may well limit the choices political groups can make, need to be examined prior to 
an examination of party political tactics. Therefore, the empirical examination of 
the factors influencing local actors in hung councils will begin with Chapter Four, 
The Local Context, which explores the effects specific institutional factors may 
have on coalilional activity. 
However, while institutional constraints are undoubtedly important, arguably the 
most significant variable affecting coalition formation will be the strategies adopted 
by the main political parties. Whatever the institutional limitations placed on 
coalitional behaviour, their willingness or otherwise to 'make a deal' will be 
crucial. Accordingly. Chapter Five, Party Strategies and Coalition Formation, will 
® The appendix reproduce the four questionnaires, sent to various actors. 
assess the political influences on coalition formation. The impact of the national-
local party dimension, and the attitudes of the former opposition parties to the 
former rulers will receive consideration, but the general thrust of Chapter Five is 
an examination of the four major political parties at local level and the tactics they 
will endeavour to follow, and the specific political alliances they will tend to make. 
Different political alliances may have different chances of survival, and Chapter 
Six. The Stability of Administrations in Hung Councils, details the influences 
affecting the length of time a particular administrative arrangement will last. The 
first two empirical chapters have covered, first, institutional and, second, party 
political factors influencing coalition formation. This chapter looks at both these 
areas to assess the influence on duration of. for example, the 'institutional' 
variable of different electoral cycles and the 'political' variable of different inter-
party accommodations. 
These first three empirical chapters have been primarily concerned with factors 
connected with administrative formation and durability. However, the arrival of 
hungness will have a fundamental impact on the operation of local councils, and will 
inevitably affect both the decision making structures and the actors themselves. 
Therefore, the next two chapters will scrutinise these factors. Chapter Seven 
examines the effects of hungness on the structures and operations of local councils. 
In such conditions, the introduction of new administrative conventions appears 
inevitable, and such considerations as committee appointments and the access of 
politicians to chief officers are explored. 
Chapter Eight concentrates on the perceptions of local actors to the relationships 
between actors. If structures must change to accommodate the new processes of 
decision making, then the behaviour of actors must also change (and vice versa). 
The process of decision making is explored, and the levels of influence on policy 
between hung and non-hung councils is assessed. Finally, the changes hungness 
brings to the power relationships between actors and to the relative importance of 
the formal decision making tjodies of the council are examined. 
As well as these studies of the processes of political activity in hung English 
councils. Chapter Nine will conclude our examination of the data collected in the 
questionnaires by analysing the validity of some of the general theoretical 
proposals that have been made concerning the formation and duration of coalitions 
In a variety of settings. Minimum winning and ideologically connected theories of 
coalition formation and duration will be tested, a task which will necessitate the 
construction of a left-right policy scale for local parties. Also, the effects of policy 
closeness on coalition formation and duration will be analysed, and some 
conclusions will be drawn concerning the goals of local politicians. 
Overall, the empirical examination will scrutinise a large number of areas which 
have been identified as important by both coalition studies and by observers of hung 
English councils. This study is aware that political relationships are dynamic and 
that, inevitably, many of these areas overlap. However, if there is to be any clarity 
brought to the analysis, fairly rigourous demarcation is essential. 
The final chapter takes a different approach to the study of hung local authorities by 
assessing the activities of one hung council, Devon County Council, in some depth. It 
is not the intention of this chapter to produce a detailed 'history' of the 4 years 
Devon was hung between 1985 to 1989. but to garner the interpretations of the 
main actors on their response to the necessity of coalition government. Accordingly, 
all the party leaders and the chief executive were interviewed at length about their 
attitudes to the problems raised by hungness; their views of the tactics they 
pursued will dominate this case study. 
To reiterate, the main purpose of this research is heuristic; it is an attempt to add 
to our knowledge of the politics of coalition in English hung councils. However, it 
has another important function, and that is to contribute to the process of 'bridge-
building' between different approaches, a course begun by Laver & Schofield. It is 
often the case that game theoretical approaches are too abstruse for those in the 
European tradition, while the atheoretical approach of many studies of European 
politics alienates the formal theorist, but they are often talking about the same 
thing and "simply using different languages to do so" (Laver & Schofield. 1990, 
p.11). If the miscellaneous approaches to the study of coalitions are allowed to go 
different ways, uninformed about the insights of alternative methods of analysis, 
all of them will suffer from the loss and our knowledge of coalitions will be the 
poorer. Accordingly, this research will adopt a variety of approaches to the study of 
local coalitions. There is no existing paradigm for a multi-method approach to 
coalitions, and this study is not an attempt to argue the supremacy of the approach 
taken here. However, it is hoped that all students of coalition politics (whatever 
their methodological preferences) might find the results of this thesis not only 
interesting, but also of some relevance to their particular concerns. 
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Introduction 
The major purpose of this chapter is to detail some of the developments'^ that theory 
has contributed to the understanding of the forces shaping the construction and 
maintenance of political coalitions. It Is not the Intention of this chapter to construct 
a theory of local coalitions.^ The study of local coalitions, whether here or abroad. 
Is still in Its Infancy, and a great deal more research is needed before a coherent 
theory can be offered. 
Formal coalition theory has Its roots In the mathematical simulation of human 
behaviour found In the theory of games. In order to simplify analysis, game theory 
makes a number of assumptions about motives and behaviour, which section one will 
assess. Following this, section two examines the early development of coalition 
theories, which tended to concentrate on formation. A number of later studies 
examined possible Influences on coalition duration, and section three details the 
findings of this endeavour. Section four examines the increasing sophistication of 
game theoretical models, scrutinising some of the more Important research from 
this tradition. Finally, section five looks at recent attempts to address the need for 
policy concerns to assume a central role In coalition studies, and outlines the 'multi-
dimensional approach' which some recent studies have adopted. 
Together, this body of research constitutes a considerable achievement, although the 
task of constructing a coherent and realistic theory of coalition behaviour still 
remains beyond the bounds of current knowledge and methodology. However, as the 
following review should demonstrate, the first steps have been taken. 
Section One: The Creation of a Science of Politics 
This opening section will briefly examine the background to the early developments 
in coalition studies, and assess some problems of definition and utilisation. Coalition 
theory's roots in mathematical game theory are briefly examined, and some of the 
problems arising from that theoretical background are assessed. Whether the 
assumption of 'rationality' Is appropriate for political behaviour Is considered, and, 
In particular, the problems of using a concept of individual rationality to understand 
group behaviour are examined. Hopefully, the ground is prepared for the start of an 
^ 'Some of the developments' because 'coalition studies in particular are beset by far too 
many half-baked theories that are justifiably of little interest to anyone but their authors" 
(Laver. 1989. p. 18). 
2 For, as Mellors notes "any attempt to explore coalitional behaviour in local politics is 
likely, in the early stages, to raise more questions than answers" (Mellors, 1989. p,306). 
examination of coalition theory's progress towards a greater understanding of 
political interaction. 
1.1.1.The Fundamental Activity of Politics: Definitions of 'Coalition* 
The formation of coalitions is a fundamental activity of political life, ranging from 
the deals made by elites to the evolution of mass political parties, yet until the 
1960s there had been little research into this basic ingredient of politics. Such 
observations on 'coalition' behaviour that existed, were confined to party coalitions 
at national government level (a perspective still adopted by most students of 
coalitions) and the attitude of political scientists was overwhelmingly negative^. 
Blondel (1968. p.180) sums up the general feelings of political scientists, that 
coalition government appears to be incompatible with stable government. Such 
analysts, who from their normative perspective argued the value of stability in 
politics and government, appeared to miss the fundamental nature of coalition-
building to political activity. If coalition governments were inherently unstable, as 
they argued, then all political activity could be seen as unstable because all 
'decision-making' groupings were the result of coalition building."^ Given the 
preoccupation of post-war behavioural research on the causes and benefits of 
political stability, it is unsurprising that such an obvious step of logic was ignored 
or minimised. The early coalition theorists were well aware of the implications of 
their research for the traditional balance of power theories.^ 
Before examining the origins of coalition theory, a definition of 'coalition' is needed 
which meets the requirements of this study. One definition is provided by Gamson 
(1961). who defines a coalition as "the joint use of resources to determine the 
outcome of a mixed-motive situation involving more than two units", with a mixed-
motive situation defined as one in which an element of conflict and coordination exists 
(Gamson. 1961, p.374). An element of conflict exists because there is no outcome 
which maximises payoff to everybody, and an element of coordination exists because 
for at least two of the players there is the possibility that by coordinating their 
^ Lowell (1896) believed that strong and efficient government in a parliamentary system 
was impossible if more than one party ruled, and 20th century arguments against coalition 
government continued in the same vein of prejudice uninformed by empirical observation. 
Laski (1938) argued that coalition government was liable to be weak and lacking in 
principles and Duverger (1951) maintained that coalition or minority governments were 
symptomised by frequent cabinet collapses (see Dodd, 1976, pp.6-9). 
^ Cleveland (1991) demonstrates an understanding of this, noting the world coalition Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait "brought into being* and the instability such 'coalition building " 
generates in a 'world that has mutated beyond a Cold War* (Cleveland, 1991, p.24). 
^ For example. Riker argued that politics was inherently unstable, and that disequilibrium 
was probably a permanent political feature (Riker. 1962, pp.186-187). 
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resources they can improve their chances of receiving a payoff. Gamson's definition 
is succinct, but provides us with little idea of the stages which may be present in the 
complex process of coalition formation. Kelley (1968) gives a more detailed 
definition, which offers a clearer idea of the possible stages of development in 
coalition formation: 
"By a coalition we mean a group of individuals or groups of individuals 
who: 1. agree to pursue a common and articulated goal; 2. pool their 
relevant resources in pursuit of this goal; 3. engage in conscious 
communication concerning the goal and the means of obtaining it; 4. agree 
on the distribution of the payoff (benefits) received when obtaining the 
goal." (Kelley, 1968, pp.62-63) 
Such a definition demonstrates that there are a number of political situations in 
which coalitions can be studied. Kelley's definition covers everything from a deal 
between two people, to the formation of a political party, to a world socio-economic 
order. However, the emphasis in the study of coalition behaviour has been on the 
formation, composition, longevity, and distribution of benefits among cabinet 
coalitions in Western democracies.^ The parties forming such a coalition will 
necessarily have to agree on the distribution of payoffs when obtaining office. Given 
that coalition bargaining at local level in Britain will also be mainly between 
political parties.^ and even if such cooperation would appear to be more single-issue 
based and sporadic than at national level (see Laver. Railings & Thrasher, 1987). 
Kelley's definition appears an adequate starting point in the discussion of coalitions. 
1.1.2. Coalition Theory: A Failure To Study The *Real World'? 
Research into the formation and maintenance of political coalitions is still in its 
infancy. However, since Riker's (1962) proposition of the "minimal winning 
coalition" there have been considerable developments and modifications to Riker's 
hypothesis that winning coalitions will include only those members necessary to 
obtain a majority and no more. Research into the processes of coalition formation 
have normally adopted one of two criteria. Theories inspired by Riker's hypothesis of 
a size criterion, which assume that actors attempt to limit membership in order to 
6 Grofman (1982) offered a mode! which he believed to be "potentially applicable to 
coalition processes in such diverse areas as cabinet formation, Supreme Court opinion 
coalitions, legislative policy making, and trade route formation among networks of spatially 
separated potential trading partners" (Grofman, 1982, p.77). Also, Rohde (1972a, 1972b) 
examined Supreme Court decision making using coalition theory; In general, however, the 
emphasis has been on cabinet coalitions. 
^ The presence of significant numbers of 'Independent' groups (traditionally with lesser 
cohesion than other groups) could complicate the picture at local level, a problem addressed 
in Chapter Three (section 3.1.3.)- . 
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conserve benefits in the form of cabinet seats, can, with "some loss of historical 
accuracy", be seen as the "first generation" of formal models of coalition formation 
(Grofman, 1987, p.1). The 'second generation** of formal models concentrates on 
policy motivations, and presumes that actors strive to minimise the ideological 
distance or policy range of the coalition. ^ 
These developments constitute a considerable body of theory. Despite this, many, 
political scientists are dissatisfied with what is seen as a lack of empirical knowledge 
underlying the theories. Browne & Dreijmanis (1982) make the point that: 
"the major tradition in coalition studies has been the development of 
highly abstract and mathematical theories of coalition ... processes, 
proceeding often without the benefit of explicit reference to or connection 
with observational data pertaining to real experiences. Cast at such a 
general level, many of the attempts which have been made to confirm 
propositions associated with coalition theories have not proven to be 
particularly fruitful. It is our belief that such failures of application 
result from theoretical insufficiency caused by the general failure of 
analysts to systematically connect the major concepts of formal coalition 
theories with counterpart phenomena present in real coalition 
environments." (p.ix) 
The criticism is appropriate, although the emphasis on abstract and mathematical 
models is perhaps understandable, given that theories of coalition behaviour are, in 
general, founded upon models of n-person games.^The foundations of a theory of 
political coalitions will now be examined. 
1.1.3. The Roots of Coalition Theory: The Problems of 'Rationality' 
Game Theory began as an attempt by von Neumann and l^orgenstern (1945) to 
answer a fundamental and problematical question: "what is a rational outcome or 
'order of society' in a social state in which men disagree?" von Neumann and 
® Laver & Schofield distinguish between the European tradition, which concentrates on 
'empirical theory and research at a cross-national level", and the Game Theoretic tradition 
which is largely concerned with laboratory games and more "motivated by a desire to 
elaborate upon a particular body of theory' (Laver & Schofield, 1990, pp.8-10). However, 
it must be noted that research in the European tradition has largely been structured by the 
suppositions of the game theory approach which "has dominated the study of parliamentary 
government formation" (Strom, 1990, p.33). 
9 See for example. Von Neumann & Morgenslern(1945), Luce (1956) and Luce & Raiffa 
(1957). Davis (1983) gives a lucid and 'non-technical* introduction to the major 
developments in the game theory tradition. 
See Leiserson (1970b) for an examination of the developments of game theory apropos 
of coalition behaviour. 
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Morgenstern answered this problem of "strategic rationality" with their theory 
of games, a mathematical simulation of human behaviour which attempts to analyse 
the choices available to rational individuals or groups in conflictual and/or 
competitive situations. The probable action of all actors or 'players" in the "game" is 
analysed; in such situations, game theory can help define the strategy (or strategies) 
rational individuals should "play" in order to maximise gains or minimise losses. 
The game theoretical approach maintains that political activity is calculated choice 
making by group actors from a set of alternatives in order to achieve the most 
desired outcome for the members of the groupJ2 
There are a number of problems In attempting to operationalise such a model. In 
game theory situations, and much more so in actual political situations, outcomes are 
frequently indeterminate: there are usually a number of possible solutions, and 
attempting to determine solutions and payoffs will then depend on social or 
psychological factors which may be beyond the capacity of mathematical analysis."* ^ 
That is, the "correct" solution cannot always be decided by applying rational 
behaviour principles. In addition, as Simon (1957) has posited, in the 'real world* 
rationality may well be 'bounded' by the constraints of. for example, time and 
money, and 'rational man' will recognise this. Thus, as Laver (1981) has pointed out 
in a discussion on the problems faced by rational choice theory's characterisation of 
man as a 'maximiser of cardinal utilities', although the rational individual must 
"choose the course of action which realises his or her goals most effectively" (Laver, 
1981. p.23), they may well make a decision "in the knowledge that something better 
probably exists, having decided that it is not worth spending resources to decide what 
that something is" (Laver. 1981, p.26). Such limitations are less likely to occur in 
n-person laboratory games.'''* 
See von Neumann & Morgenstem (1945, Chapter Ten). There are two basic rational 
models, parametric and strategic. In parametic rationality, a player's environment is 
constant "in the sense that it does not adapt to his own actions", while "strategic 
rationality applies if the behaviour of each player depends on that of every other" (Strom, 
1990, p.33). As Strom notes, strategic rationality is clearly more applicable to the 
process of government formation, "where the decision of one party leader whether or not 
to participate in government crucially depends on those of other such leaders" (1990, 
p.33). 
^2 The ease with which actors and resources could be identified, and the existence of 
*clear-cut' payoffs and decision rules "suggested that coalition behaviour was particularly 
susceptible to the application of rational choice theories" (Luebbert. 1983, p.236). 
^3 In a criticism of the foundations of 'rational choice theory'. Rudebusch notes a range of 
problems in considering persons as "rational maximisers of their individual preferences" 
(Rudebusch, 1979. p.2). including how to specify ends and research postulates of 'perfect 
information* by actors. 
1^ A further difficulty is that even under controlled laboratory conditions, players do not 
always act to maximise their expected winnings (e.g.. see Davis, 1983, p.59). The 
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1.1.4. Can Groups Be Characterised As Rational Individuals? 
A further complication is that the actors in coalition scenarios are usually groups of 
individuals, that is, political parties.''^ However, these groups are modelled as a 
rational individual, by expressing a united preference for certain outcomes. Given 
that such a simplification greatly eases analysis, this Is not generally seen as a 
major drawback. However, informal factions exist in most political parties, and 
some parties (for example, the Christian Democrats in Italy) have formally 
organised factions. If internal party differences do affect the coalition bargaining 
process, and despite the lack of research into this potential problem it appears 
Intuitively probable that they do, then it is possible that, in such cases, the 
application of models incorporating principles of individual rationality may be 
Inappropriate if internal party differences continue into the process of negotiating 
with other political parties. In addition, it could be argued that the starting point of 
most studies is incorrect. By ignoring or minimising the probability of internal 
bargaining processes which precede negotiations between parties, analysts may be 
missing insights into the process of coalition formation."* ^ 
The majority of theoretical approaches ignore the possible influences of internal 
party factions, perhaps understandably, for it must be admitted that information on 
the effects of internal party differences to government formation or coalition 
agreements is sparse."*^ Norpoth has argued that political leaders in West Germany 
enjoy "great leeway" in their coalition behaviour, in that most voters attached to the 
two major parties (the SPD and the CDU/CSU) "favour heavily" the coalition 
preferences of party leaders (Norpoth. 1980, p.424). This might indicate that 
significant number of oversized coalitions which have been Identified in European 
parliamentary democracies (Taylor & Laver. 1973, see below) may indicate that the non-
maximisation of winnings is not confined to players in the laboratory. 
Rationality is a particularly problematical concept to apply to group behaviour. As 
Rangell notes, *the irrational, which is such a large factor in group decisions, needs to be 
taken fully into account* (Rangell. 1980, p.76). 
16 Daalder argues that, while it might be acceptable to consider a party as a unitary actor 
when the decision to enter a coalition is made, this 'does not pre-empt a need for 
continuous decision making on concrete decisions to follow* (Daalder, 1983, p.21) which 
internal party differences will almost certainty affect. Budge agrees that internal party 
differences can affect a government's policy output (Budge, 1984. p.101), and it is 
possible that such differences, in addition to affecting the process of coalition formation, 
may also affect the process of coalition maintenance. 
1 ^ Budge & Keman include the consequences of internal party factions in their 'general 
theory of party government" (1990, pp.42-43). noting that the consequences are 'most 
evident in the area of internal government change'.(p.42). The problems of internal party 
factions in coalition building have yet to be addressed adequately (see Laver & Schofield. 
1990, pp.28-30). 
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members of the parliamentary party will be under some public pressure, In addition 
to the pressure from their leaders, to support the elite preferences. Given that 
studies Into German political culture remark on the high degree of deference shown 
to the political elite (for example. Barnes & Kaase. 1979). It may be that In West 
Germany political parties could be treated as rational Individuals for the purpose of 
studying coalition formation. In addition, leaders of some political parties (for 
example, most "Conservative" parties) can enjoy a large degree of autonomy in 
policy-making, and considerable deference will be shown towards their decisions. 
Models employing principles of individual rationality may. therefore, be adequate 
for the study of coalition behaviour in some political systems, and for negotiations 
between some political parties.**^ 
However, despite Norpoth's supposition, and despite Browne's assertion that, In the 
main, parliamentary parties fulfil the requirement that they "exhibit stable and 
definite policy preferences and a uniform commitment to these positions by their 
Individual parliamentary members" and that parties are therefore, "reasonable 
approximations for the concept of actor" (Browne. 1982, p.346), doubts may still 
be expressed about the viability of treating alt political parties as individual 
actors.^^ Luebbert argues that "the failure of existing theory to address the 
profoundly important and interesting role of intraparty variables in the shaping of 
government formation outcomes is striking" (Luebbert, 1983. p.243),20 and it 
could be argued that more research into the intraparty stage of the coalition process 
is needed before the doubts about applying principles of individual rationality to 
political parties are fully assuaged. However, the disciplined and united front which 
modern political parties at both local and national level have increasingly attempted 
to present to their electorate, exemplified in the growing emphasis on election 
manifestoes, is an indication that assumptions of individual rationality may not be 
Laver & Schofield categorise parties in four categories, (i) clearly 'coherent' groups 
such as Communist parties, (ii) groups which are 'disciplined enough to be treated as 
unitary actors' at any "fixed point in time" (which appears to apply to most parliamentary 
parties), (iii) groups who are "clearly not unitary actors" (such as the Christian Democrats 
in Italy, and (iv) 'electoral coalitions of parties" such as the Liberal/SDR Alliance (Laver & 
Schofield, 1990. pp.26-28). Obviously, such a range of categorisations must eventually be 
integrated by any serious coalition theory. 
^9 For example, David Ben-Gurion, the former prime minister of Israel, when asked how 
negotiations for a new coalition were proceeding, replied; 'I have talked with all the other 
parties, and they have agreed. Now I must discuss it with my own party, and this will be 
difficult' (in Luebbert. 1983. p.243). 
An exception to Luebbert's criticism is Laver & Shepsle*s attempt, in an examination of 
the credibility of policy proposals, to open the 'black box" of "the politics of intraparty 
decision making over government formation" (Laver & Shepsle, 1990a, p.506). See Section 
Four of this chapter. 
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inappropriate. Most parties "do maintain a high degree of parliamentary cohesion, 
especially when they are in government ... thus treating them as single actors 
represented by their spokesman does not unduly distort reality" (Budge & Herman, 
1978, p.460)2'*. In general, the advantages of treating parties as rational 
individual actors outweigh the potential disadvantages, although the disagreements 
among coalition theorists will undoubtedly continue.22 
1.1.5. Alternative Interpretations of Motives 
The assumption of rationality underlying formal coalition models, despite its 
simplification of political behaviour, was not seen as a serious problem by Rapaport 
(1973).23 The assumption of rationality, argued Rapaport, was not a problem as 
predictions based on that assumption could be taken as a "base line" for descriptive 
theory. The extent to which actual political behaviour systematically deviated from 
rationality, however so defined, would enable additional or alternative assumptions 
to be made which could "serve to develop a 'realistic' descriptive theory of political 
behaviour" (Rapaport, 1973, pp.xv-xvi). 
In contrast to Rapaport, de Swaan argues that the refutation of most of the original 
theories indicates that "the rational decision model that has served as a point of 
departure is shown to be an inadequate approach to the study of coalition formation" 
(de Swaan,1973,p.7). De Swaan proposed an approach (examined in detail below) 
which was a fundamental departure from the rational choice approach of Riker. Its 
theoretical foundation was based on an incrementalist mode of decision-making. 
Other analysts are less certain than de Swaan that the rational decision model has 
outlived its usefulness. Luebbert suggests a "typological rational approach to 
theory", arguing that the failure of previous rationalist efforts "has not been in the 
irrational behaviour of politicians, but in our inability to comprehend the choices 
that politicians confront" {Luebbert, 1983, p.247). Luebbert maintains that his 
typological approach recognises the multiple, frequently conflicting, goals of 
2^ In support of Budge & Herman, it has been observed that 'from a European perspective 
we are ... primarily concerned with coalition formation ... in parliamentary systems in 
which party discipline is rigid' (Bjurulf & Berg, 1984, p.176). 
22 Although, as Laver & Schofield point out, when particular parties "are besX represented 
as coalitions of distinct factions ... accounts of the coalitional process must take intraparty 
politics into account' (Laver & Schofield, 1990, p.22, my emphasis). 
^^Neither. although they were acknowledged, were the ambiguities arising between 
'individually rational" and "collectively rational' decisions (Rapaport, 1973, p.xv). most 
famously represented in the 'prisoner's dilemma' game. Such ambiguities may have 
repercussions for coalitionat behaviour if intraparty factions fail to recognise their 
individual preferences may result in the worse result for the parly as a whole. 
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potential coalition actors. Policy preferences, and the need to retain party support 
and unity, are important considerations. In addition, emotional considerations, for 
example, loyalty to past allies, personal friendship between party elites who may 
hold widely differing Ideological positions, or refusal to enter a winning coalition 
because of personal animosity between individuals of different political parties, may 
be as Important in coalition formation as the desire of politicians to win. Such 
factors may be even more important in local government politics, as it is reasonable 
to assume a greater degree of contact between politicians In the smaller and more 
parochial world of local government.2^ 
To recap, we have seen that the roots of coalition theory lie within the mathematical 
tradition of game theory. In simple n-person laboratory games, winning or losing 
can be clearly defined, and rational behaviour is easily assessed. However, deciding 
what is 'winning' and what is 'losing' is more difficult in the 'messy' real world of 
coalition politics. Not only that, it has been suggested that a definition of rationality 
which treats political parties as 'unitary actors' may fail to capture the nuances of 
party group behaviour. As Luebbert (1983) suggests, political parties may have 
multiple and often conflicting goals, and such parties may neither behave as unitary 
actors nor have a shared definition of what constitutes 'winning*. The problems of 
applying a narrow definition of 'rationality are apparent, but a 'broad' definition 
weakens the rational model's explanatory power (Laver, 1981). 
A number of theoretical points have been addressed, and it is clear that disagreement 
will continue in those areas. However, despite the acknowledged problems of 
definition and method of research, in the last 30 years there have been many 
developments in our understanding of the factors influencing coalition processes. 
Section Two will now examine some of the early developments in the study of 
coalition politics. 
Sect ion Two: The C l a s s i c Developments in Theor ies of Coalit ion 
Format ion 
The early development of coalition theory was guided by the idea of limiting coalition 
size, in order that the benefits of coalition membership could be conserved. This 
Laver notes the dangers of confusing intrinsic and instrumental goals, and argues that if 
rational choice theories are not to be 'doomed to triviality' the assumption must be made 
that 'socially defined goals have no intrinsic value for the individual and are designed solely 
for instrumental reasons ... if any action can be rational (because there will always be 
some goal which it furthers) our core assumptions are Insufficiently constrained to 
generate more than truisms" (Laver. 1981, pp.28-29, emphasis in original; see also 
Laver. 1978. pp.253-256). 
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emphasis on size and maximisation of benefits indicates that the primary goal of 
"actors" (in this case political parties) was seen by early theorists as political 
office. The number of cabinet seats was obviously limited; therefore, it appeared to 
make sense that coalition actors would attempt to keep coalitions to the smallest size 
necessary to obtain a legislative majority, thus enabling each coalition member to 
obtain the maximum possible number of cabinet seats. 
1.2.1. Minimum Winning Coalitions: The Conservation of Benefits 
Von Neumann & fVlorgenstern had proposed that only 'minimal winning coalitions' 
would form, with a minimal winning coalition being one which would be made losing 
by the loss of any member. Gamson (1961) was the first person to forecast the 
formation of coalitions of minimum winning size in terms of seats gained, regardless 
of the coalition partners' places on the "policy continuum".25. 'Minimum winning 
coalitions' comprise a coalition which is the smallest number of seats above the 
number needed to win, a far more specific proposition than 'minimal winning* 
(which generates a large number of possible solutions to the game), fvlinimum 
winning coalitions are a 'subset' of minimal winning coalitions, and can be considered 
as 'bare majority coalitions' which comprise the smallest total weight of members in 
the legislature. Riker (1962) formalised the hypothesis in his size principle, which 
was formulated as: 
"In n-person. zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted, 
where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, 
only minimum winning coalitions occur In social situations similar to 
n-person. zero-sum games with side payments, participants create 
coalitions just as large as they believe winning and no larger"(Riker, 
1962. pp.22-23).26 
Riker modified his model to allow for the probability of imperfect information in 
social situations. Given such conditions of "imperfect information", he argued that 
subjectively estimated minimum winning coalitions may form, but this rejection of 
25 Gamson's hypothesis, while predicated upon von Neumann & Morgenstern's seminal 
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1945), was also strongly influenced by Caplow, 
who had proposed that coalition formation depended "upon the initial distribution of power" 
(Caplow, 1956. p.490). Caplow's proposal indicated that, given the right assumptions, a 
predictive theory of coalition formation could be formulated. 
26 Piker's definition of a 'rational player' was based on the premise that, "given social 
situations ... in which exist two alternative courses of action with differing outcomes in 
money or power or success, some participants will choose the alternative leading to the 
larger payoff. Such behaviour is rational behaviour, and it will be accepted as definitive 
while the behaviour of participants who do not so choose will not necessarily be 
accepted'(Riker. 1962. p.23). 
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an optimal payoff in favour of a subjectively estimated payoff "may be regarded as a 
rational act of maximisation in an uncertain world" (Riker, 1962. p.48). 
Riker acknowledges the existence of a problem with this modification, but his 
treatment of this problem demonstrates that using purely the notion of "winning" to 
specify rational political behaviour ignores other facets of human behaviour. Riker 
sees the problem solely in terms of how to distinguish between larger than minimum 
winning coalitions formed by the rational motive of winning in an uncertain world 
and those formed by "irrational" motives such as loyalty (Riker. 1962, p.49). The 
problem is surely that, whilst winning and conserving benefits are important 
considerations to most political parties, they are not the only factors political 
leaders must take into account when constructing possible winning coalitions. 
Loyalty to "old friends" can be a rational political act, especially if future chances of 
success are taken into account.27 in addition, Luebbert feels that "rationalist theory 
greatly overstates the role of information uncertainty" in coalition formation 
(Luebbert, 1983. p.242). In other words, politicians are more aware of the options 
open to them, and the limits on their choices, than rational choice theorists give 
them credit for, an indication, argues Luebbert. of the theorists* failure to study and 
link their theoretical findings to political behaviour in the real world. 
However, there is some support for Riker. particularly in his assertion of a 
correlation between the amount of information available and the size of a winning 
coalition^Q. it does seem intuitively probable that experience of dealing with 
opposition parties will generate the knowledge of which party or parties to trust, 
therefore leading to a minimisation of the legislative majority. Coalition partners 
previously included as a "safety net" to minimise the risks of losing a legislative 
majority, can, with this extra experience and knowledge, be excluded from the 
coalition with a decrease in the risk of losing minimal winning coalitions 
disintegrating. However, it may be. as Kelley argues, that unconsidered variables are 
affecting the coalition process. For example, it may simply be that the number of 
27 Again, the problem is. if anything can be a 'rational* act. then the notion of rationality 
loses all its explanatory power. 
2^ MerkI (1968) has shown that the average size of German Lander coalitions 
has:'progressively declined ... as the amount of information available has increased, the 
average size of the winning coalitions has approached the point hypothesized by Riker" 
(Merkl, 1968. p.68). Kelley, however, points out the dangers involved in accepting such a 
point. The variables for which information is known may not be relevant to coalition 
behaviour, and "the correlation could very well be spurious...other important variables for 
which data is not available may account for the observed correlations"(Kelley, 1968, 
pp.68-69). 
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seats held by traditional coalition partners has declined, or policy differences 
between previous coalition partners may have increased to the point where their 
participation in a coalition partnership is not feasible. 
1.2.2. Bargaining Theory 
The emphasis on minimising coalition size to consen/e benefits in terms of office 
payoffs was continued by Leiserson*s (1968) notion of "bargaining theory". 
Leiserson argued that, given two or more possible winning coalitions, the coalition 
with fewest parties would form because of the relative ease of bargaining. The 
process of maintaining the coalition was also examined by Leiserson. who noted that 
in Japan the members of the "Prime (Minister's support coalition" were not the only 
members of the cabinet; posts were given to others in order to encourage support for 
the future (Leiserson.1968, p.779). Leiserson argued that payoffs to actors not in 
the winning coalition could be construed as "required" for long term coalition 
maintenance (Leiserson, 1968. p.782), but the relevance of Japan's experiences to 
the formation and maintenance of cabinet coalitions in the "European tradition" is 
debatable. Japanese party politics is dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), which comprises of a number of non-socialist factions. The struggle for 
political leadership is waged between these factions, with the Prime f\/linister 
"chosen by a coalition of LDP factions which controls a majority of votes at the party 
convention" (Leiserson, 1968. p.770).*^^ 
Payoffs to those not in the support coalition can thus be seen more as, for example, 
the initial allocation of cabinet posts to "wets" by f^argaret Thatcher in an effort to 
satisfy party factions, minimise internal discord, and present a consensual image to 
the electorate, rather than the distribution of ministerial payoffs to opponents from 
other political parties in order to attract future support. In addition. Leiserson's 
argument that coalitions would form with the fewest parties (which seems 
intuitively likely) is partly contradicted by the former Danish prime minister Viggo 
Kampmann. Kampmann maintains that "a three-party government is easier to 
manage than one consisting of two parties since, if the large party and one of the 
small parties agree, the other must perforce go along" (in Groennings et al, 1970, 
2^ Merkl's (1968) examination made no allowance for policy considerations, and it may 
well be that the decrease in size of German Lander coalitions, attributed by Merkl to 
increased information, can be explained either by 'electoral arithmetic' or by irreconcilable 
policy differences between former coalition partners. 
30 The Recruit bribery scandal of 1988, and numerous allegations of financial corruption 
and sexual improprieties against leading party members (including past and present Prime 
Ministers), has threatened the LDP's hegemony in Japanese national politics. 
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f.n. 463). with the only alternative to compliance being a loss of its power and the 
dissolution of the coalition. Kampmann's observation could be seen as an example of a 
theoretical assumption being weakened by political know-how. 
1.2.3. The introduction of an Ideoioglcai Dimension 
The concentration by Leiserson on the variable of coalition size is surprising, given 
that in his doctoral dissertation he had proposed that political parties sought 
agreement with parties ideologically close to them, and predicted that coalitions 
would form with minimal ideological diversity. Leiserson's ideological theory of 
political coalitions was developed from four-person laboratory games, and was 
uninformed by reference to "real-life" coalition situations. Axelrod's (1970) 
derivative of Leiserson's theory was supported by reference to government coalitions 
in post-war Italy, and was a significant advance in the development of theories of 
coalition formation. 
Axelrod proposed that the less "conflict of interest" there was in a potential 
coalition, the more likely that coalition would form, other things being equal, and the 
greater likelihood that the coalition would last^^. Axelrod posited that "minimal 
connected winning coalitions" would be more likely to form than any other type, 
defining a minimal connected winning coalition as: 
"a coalition that is connected; is a winning coalition; and is minimal in the 
sense that it can lose no member party without ceasing to be connected and 
winning" (Axelrod, 1970, p.167). 
Axelrod examined Italian government coalitions between 1953-1968, grading the 
parties along an ordinal policy dimension. The relative size of the intervals between 
the parties on the ordinal policy dimension was assumed to have no significance. 
Axelrod found that of 17 coalitions formed during the period. 10 could be classified 
as minimal connected winning coalitions. Moreover, those coalitions lasted for 14 
months on average, compared to an average duration of 8 months for those coalitions 
which were not minimal and connected. In addition to his proposition of the minimal 
connected winning coalition, Axelrod thus proposed a relationship between the size of 
31 Michael Leiserson, Coalitions in Politics, University of Yale, 1966. 
32 Although his propositions took no account of a party's placing on an ideological 
continuum. Riker (1962. p.38) was aware that certain"imputations" might be inadmissable 
for ideological reasons; that is, some far right or far left parties might be excluded from 
the coalition formation process and that therefore winning coalitions including these parties 
would be effectively prohibited. 
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a coalition and its durability: once formed, minimal connected winning coalitions 
"are likely to last longer than other coalitions" (Axelrod, 1970, p.184). 
There has been a significant measure of support for both Axelrod's theory of coalition 
formation,33 and for his proposition of a relationship between a coalition's size and 
Ideology and its durability.^^ Against this. Browne, Gleiber & Mashoba (1986) 
point out while Axelrod's theory was "quite selective" in generating its prediction set 
it "need not be terribly accurate in predicting actual formations": they argue that 
Axelrod's testing procedure was a "blunt instrument" and that the claims made for 
the value of minimal connected winning theory were "ambiguous and expansive" 
(Browne. Gleiber & IVIashoba, 1986, p.14). 
1.2.4. The Importance of Policy Preferences 
A weakness of Axelrod's model is the reliance on an ordinal policy space, ignoring the 
possibility that a vast ideological gulf may exist between parties adjacent on an 
ordinal scale. De Swaan (1970) argued that a party attempted to minimise the 
ideological distance between potential coalition partners, by striving to bring about 
that coalition which would adopt policies as close as possible to their own "preferred 
policies" (de Swaan. 1970, p.429). De Swaan formalised this proposition in 1.973. 
He pointed out that the previous theories had all yielded a prediction of theories that 
were minimal in some sense, either "with respect to their membership weight, 
number of members, or their range on the policy scale", and posited a different 
perspective on coalition formation (de Swaan, 1973. p.9). De Swaan developed the 
idea of "policy distance". This suggested that an actor: 
"strives to bring about a winning coalition in which he is included and 
which he expects to adopt a policy that is as close as possible, on a scale 
of policies, to his own most preferred policy" (de Swaan,1973, p.88). 
Coalitions were formed among "neighbours" in the policy sense. A coalition between 
parties which excluded a party or parties located between the coalition partners 
For example, in an examination of coalitions in post-war Italy and Weimar Germany, 
Felker (1981) argued that it was 'definitely superior in predictability' to other theories 
considered (Felker, 1981, p.366) and Mahler & Trilling (1975) found that Axelrod's theory 
performed well in the case of Israeli parliamentary coalitions (Mahler & Trilling, 1975, 
pp.220-234). 
3^ Warwick (1979), in an examination of European parliamentary democracies, found that 
"minimal winning status is a very powerful influence on durability' and that coalitions 
straddling political cleavages "are less likely to endure' (Warwick, 1979, p.490). a finding 
verified by Felker (Felker. 1981, p.365). These findings are examined in more depth In 
Section Three (below), which assesses research into coalition durability. 
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would be inadmissable, as in Axelrod's model.^^ Coalitions formed which were 
"closed coalitions" (de Swaan, 1973, p.70). and parties attempted to be "pivotal" in 
the coalition (in the sense of holding the voting balance in a legislature) thus 
increasing the chances of their preferred policies becoming adopted (de Swaan. 
1973. p.119). 
In addition to introducing the idea of policy preferences, as opposed to Axelrod's more 
simplistic notion of connectedness along an ordinal left-right continuum, de Swaan's 
theory represents (as Section One of this chapter has already noted) a fundamental 
departure from rational approaches.^^. His adoption of incrementalism has been 
extremely influential in coalition theory.^'' and de Swaan describes the process by 
which he believes coalitions are formed with admirable simplicity: 
"An actor will not survey all possible outcomes and calculate his own and 
every other actor's preference for these states; the actor is much more 
likely to decide that, whatever the 'best' coalition may be, his aspiration 
level will be satisfied if he is included in a winning coalition. As a 
consequence, he will behave in a 'satisfying' rather than a maximising 
manner. His decision strategy will be incrementalist: since he is not in a 
majority on his own, he will remedy this by searching for partners in a 
majority coalition. The actor is likely to enter the process in a 'margin 
dependent' manner by looking for the partner with whom policy 
differences are minimal and require only marginal adjustment: his 
neighbour on the scale. If the two do not control a majority together, they 
will repeat the procedure with their respective neighbours, 'slep-by-
step' until a majority has been achieved: such a majority would consist of 
a closed, minimal range coalition" (de Swaan. 1973, p.287). 
De Swaan has argued that the "closed coalition proposition" can account for 19 out of 
22 Dutch government coalitions, although the statistical significance is low, as the 
number of predictions generated from this proposition is considerable (de Swaan, 
1982. p.231). When the closed coalition proposition is allied to a minimising 
criterion, i.e.. "that coalitions will not not contain a party that increases the range of 
the coalition along the policy scale, unless that party is necessary in order to control 
a majority", the success rate of de Swaan's proposition decreases to 12 out of 22, 
although the statistical significance greatly improves (De Swaan, 1982, p.231). 
35 Marradi (1982) offers support for both de Swaan and Axelrod, arguing that "the 
connectedness of partners along a general policy continuum is the criterion controlling the 
formation of Italian government coalitions" (Marradi. 1982, p.69). 
36 See Luebbert (1983) for an assessment of this break with the rationalist tradition. 
37 For example, see Grofman (1982) and Laver (1990). 
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As Norpoth (1982) points out, the requirement that coalition partners should be 
"neighbours on a policy continuum", is not "overly demanding", despite the 
difficulties of integrating economic policy, foreign policy, and religious/cultural 
policy, etc., into a uni-dimensional policy scale.38 The "neighbour requirement" 
rules out unnatural coalitions of far right and far left parties and still allows a wide 
variety of coalitions to form. 39 j ^ e requirement that coalitions are formed so as to 
minimise the policy distances between the actors involved is a far more demanding 
condition, and raises the problem of how to judge policy distance (see Norpoth, 
1982, pp.13-17). However rigourous the analysis is. assessing policy distance will 
inevitably involve a number of subjective judgements, and will, equally Inevitably, 
provoke disagreement among even the most expert observers of a political system.'^O 
Despite the undeniable problems of operationalising concepts such as policy 
distances, these early developments in coalition theory put forward by Riker. 
Leiserson, Axelrod, and de Swaan, appeared promising. The insights they apparently 
offered into political behaviour generated considerable interest, and suggested the 
imminent possibility of a coherent and convincing general theory of coalition 
formation. Such hopes were weakened by a simple piece of empirical political 
science, the impact of which will now be examined. 
1.2.5. The Difficulties Of A 'Winning* Criterion 
As the work of Axelrod (1970) and de Swaan (1970. 1973) above has indicated, 
empirical coalition studies have concentrated on coalition formation in European 
parliamentary democracies. In such multi-party legislatures where (more often 
than not) no party has an overall majority and where a majority is usually needed to 
pass legislation, coalition formation is a regular and relatively public occurrence. 
38 This might be particularly difficult in West Germany where the three regular coalition 
actors (SPD, FOP, CDU/CSU) will have different neighbours depending on which of the three 
most important policy continue (Economic, Cultural, and Foreign Policy) is used. The 
problem can only have been exacerbated by political union with East Germany. 
39 The application of the "neighbour requirement' may well be more problematic when 
examining coalitions in British local government, as some writers maintain that informal 
coalition arrangements between Labour and Consen/ative, designed to keep the Alliance out 
of power, are not uncommon (for example, see Mellors. 1983). 
Norpoth has suggested that considerations of policy are. in fact, secondary in West 
Germany, as the 'selection of coalition partners has always preceded the thorough 
examination of policies" and that differences arising during bargaining have never wrecked 
the planned coalition (Norpoth, 1982, p.20). but the absence of a Socialist Party may well 
make West Germany a special case; there appears to be little real disagreement on 
fundamental economic questions. Again,-political union with East Germany may change this 
state of affairs. 
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Payoffs in the form of cabinet seats are readily observable.'*'* Whilst policy 
concessions are more difficult to observe, it is possible to chart deviations from a 
party's manifesto and from their publicly stated policy objectives, in order to gauge 
the nature and extent of any possible policy concessions. In addition, changes in the 
policy of one coalition member are often pointed out by its partner(s). in order that 
the electorate will be aware of their influence. Of course, such action is capable of 
engendering negative, as well as positive, responses in the electorate if a party 
should become too closely identified with the policies of an unpopular government.^^ 
Whatever, it appears that, whether payoffs are in terms of office or policy, 
executive or legislative coalitions between political parties may be the most easily 
observable examples of coalitional behaviour.'*^ and, as such, have provided the 
main source of data in the development of formal coalition theory. They also provided 
the source of data for a destruction of the predictive capacity of the early theories 
described above. 
Taylor & Laver (1973), in an empirical examination of 132 different European 
post-war coalition governments, discovered that only 57 were minimum winning, 
and that none of the theories could be called successful in predicting which coalitions 
would form, although those theories concentrating on a minimum connected coalition 
with the least ideological divergency were the most successful.^'* Taylor & Laver 
argued that the size of the coalition was not an important consideration and that in 
several of the countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland) "few 
or none of the theories perform very well" (Taylor & Laver, 1973, p.226). 
41 While the emphasis by analysts on formal cabinet coalitions in Western democracies is 
understandable, it does offer a problem for studies of local coalitions. There is no format 
executive or 'cabinet* in English local government which means that payoffs may be more 
likely to be in the form of 'policy' than of 'office', a point examined in later chapters. 
42 For example, it is arguable that part of the reason for the decline in the Liberal vote in 
the British general election of 1979 could be attributed to their support for Labour during 
the Lib-Lab pact. On the other hand, the Free Democrats in West Germany have regularly 
changed coalition partners, on one occasion in mid-term, apparently without unduly 
incurring the wrath of the electorate or becoming too closely identified with either of their 
regular partners in government. 
43 The distinction between executive and legislative coalitions is an important one, as we 
shall see, and one which 'has not always been appreciated by coalition theorists. The most 
obvious consequence of this has been the reverence that has been accorded to legislative 
majorities in some accounts of the behaviour of coalition executives* (Laver & Schofield, 
1990, p.68). 
44 The relatively good performance of such theories in European parliamentary 
democracies is corroborated by the research of de Swaan (1982). The success of the 
minimum connected strategy is, however, mainly explained by its good pertormance in a 
small number of countries, especially Italy, which had been the empirical testing ground of 
Axelrod. In most countries, the minimum connected criterion pertorms no better than any 
other strategy (Schofield & Laver. 1985, p.l45). 
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Perhaps most significantly, the assumption that a party would prefer any winning 
coalition of which it was a member and be "indifferent to all coalitions which are 
non-winning or from which it's excluded (or both)" (Taylor & Laver, 1973, 
p.207) was challenged by their discovery that 45 of the 132 governments examined 
were minority governments, and none of the theories could explain this. Although de 
Swaan's idea of policy preferences was potentially capable of offering a possible 
explanation for the durability of some minority governments, the emphasis by the 
theories on "winning", with winning being narrowly construed as forming a 
legislative majority, was obviously challenged by the discovery of so many minority 
governments. 
A number of specific criticisms were made of the theories. For example, they were 
criticised as being non-dynamic.^^ Taylor & Laver highlighted the static nature of 
the theories and their failure to consider historical considerations: 
"each time a government leaves office it is as if the slate has been wiped 
clean...equilibrium governments are once again predicted to form, 
regardless of which governments had been in office previously" (Taylor & 
Laver, 1973. p.234). 
The treatment of political parties as unitary actors, with no acknowledgement either 
of the factions within parties or of the ideological overlapping that can occur between 
parties, was also criticised (Taylor 8i Laver. 1973, p.234).^6. 
Taylor & Laver put forward a possible explanation for minority governments. As all 
minority governments needed support or "critical abstention" from other parties, 
"this raises the question of whether the 'real' or 'effective' government coalition 
should be thought of as including the support parties as well as those which receive 
portfolios" (Taylor & Laver, 1973, p.232), but the authors confined the notion to 
"issues" (which could be considered short term and shifting, and therefore an 
unsuitable explanation for durable minority governments) rather than the 
possibility of a long term policy similarity between parties as the basis for long-
^5 As Budge & Fairiie note, no attempt was made in coalition theories to "account for the 
evolution of particular preferences or political tastes" (Budge & Fairiie.1977,pp.49-55). 
46 Despite this criticism. Taylor & Laver themselves made no attempt to represent 
parties spatially on the left-right ideological continuum, being "forced to rely on the 
judgement of experts...[and having]...to settle for merely ordinal measurement' (Taylor & 
Laver, 1973. pp.215-216). 
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term support.^^ However, Taylor & Laver's work was to be extraordinarily 
influential; coalition theory's obsession with a circumscribed notion of what 
"winning" constituted was shown to be inadequale.^^ 
1.2.6. The Baikanisatlon of Coalition Studies 
While it Is relatively simple to chart the development of coalition theory until 
1973. with each advance clearly building on the insights (and perceived 
shortcomings) of previous theories, the picture becomes less clear after this date, 
and a straightfonA/ard, chronological, picture of developments becomes more difficult 
to present. The predictive failure of coalition theories indicated that many other 
variables needed to be examined. The discovery of a large number of minority 
governments pointed out the importance of parties pursuing policies, whether inside 
or outside of the formal government coalition. Until then, models had addressed other 
stages of the coalition process only indirectly; there was to be more emphasis, for 
example, on the processes of coalition maintenance. The objective simplicity of 
Riker's first model was to be replaced by a greater subjectivity, as models of 
coalition formation sought to resemble the real world more closely. A simple piece of 
empirical research had exposed the predictive claims of the coalition theories, and 
there was to be no return to the overt simplicity of the early models. Mathematical 
models would become more complex, the predictive ability of all models would come 
to rely more and more on subjective judgement, and coalition theory would alienate 
many political scientists in the process.^^ 
Given this divergence of study, there are considerable problems in presenting a 
coherent chronological overview of developments. Therefore, as the introduction to 
this chapter indicated, the following two sections will each examine certain aspects 
of coalition studies since Taylor & Laver's (1973) challenge to the predictive 
accuracy of early theories. The following section (Section Three) will detail attempts 
to understand more about the process of coalition duration, while Section Four will 
briefly examine developments in the game theory tradition. Following this. Section 
A point later developed by Budge & Herman's (1978) criterion of 'government viability' 
(discussed below). 
Browne (1973) and de Swaan (1973) also tested the early office seeking theories of 
coalition formation; their findings generally support those of Taylor & Laver (1973). 
Straffin & Grofman (1984) note the lack of enthusiasm felt by many political scientists 
to the development of mathematical models of political behaviour; an academic colleague of 
theirs 'has been heard to complain with some bitterness that he can no longer read the 
American Political Science Review because it is full of mathematical symbols" (Straffin & 
Grofman, 1984, p.259). The authors seem to regard his remarks as those of a grumpy 
Luddile, but his reaction illustrates the feelings of many political scientists, who are 
otherwise interested in the study of coalitions, towards formal coalition theory. 
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Five Witt complete this anatysis of the devetopment of coalition theory, examining 
significant research in general approaches to the present day.^O 
The findings of Taylor & Laver (1973) and de Swaan (1973) on the poor fit of 
formal theories and the presence of so many minority governments indicated that 
policy considerations must be taken into account in any theory of coalition formation. 
There was also a shift from the primary concern with coalition formation to a more 
detailed examination of coalition durability and "hence to a greater appreciation of 
both the context and the complexities of coalitlonal behaviour" (Pridham. 1987, 
p .376) . 
However, despite the greater interest in other aspects of coalitions, the great 
majority of coalition studies still concentrate on the process of coalition formation. 
Even within studies of coalition formation, little attention has generally been paid to 
payoffs, which may also be an influence on coalition duration.^** Research has 
concentrated on the effect on coalition formation of initial weights (in the form of 
legislative seats) modified by location on (usually) a uni-dimensional policy scale, 
t^uch less effort has been devoted to the problems of coalition maintenance, the 
causes of termination receiving very little attention. The following section examines 
the research that has been carried out into the area of government maintenance. 
Sec t ion Three : Coa l i t ion Durabi l i ty 
Investigations of the factors which may be influencing coalition duration are not 
abundant; influenced by the focus of game-theoretic models on outcomes, coalition 
theorists have largely concentrated on the process of coalition formation. Although 
Laver & Schofield maintain "a lot of research has been done on the duration of 
coalition cabinets" (1990. p.144), the question of coalitional durability has 
received nothing like the attention coalition formation has attracted. 
1.3.1. Problems of Def in i t ion and Approach 
This lack of attention is understandable, as coalition breakdown and termination may 
be the most difficult aspects of governmental behaviour to analyse, "in part because 
While the 'segregation* of often complementary research is not an ideal approach, and 
fails to acknowledge the 'cross-ferlilisation' which has been a feature of coalition studies, 
it may be an accurate reflection of the current division between game theory and empirical 
studies. 
5^ Even a work conscious of the discrepancy between the attention paid to formation and 
duration, Laver & Schofield's impressive Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition 
in Europe (1990), has only 18 pages devoted to the question of cabinet stability. However, 
they do examine coalition payoffs in detail (1990, pp.164-194). 
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of the lack of previous research and in part because of the difficulties in pinning 
down and putting into focus such diffuse phenomena" (Budge & Keman, 1990, 
p.187). For example, considerable problems arise just from an attempt to define 
what is meant by the 'end of a government*. W has been noted that most authors 
permutate "a selection of the following criteria In their definition of the end of a 
government": a change In the party membership of a government, a government 
resignation, a change of leader, and an election (Laver & Schofield. 1990, p.145). 
Thus, there is no standard definition of when a government ends, and different 
writers adopt different criteria; indeed, the particular conventions of the system 
being examined may demand a certain criterion be included or excluded.^^ It follows 
that the results of research may well depend on the criteria adopted^ making 
comparisons of different studies potentially problematic. 
There are other, and perhaps more serious, problems for the student of coalition 
longevity. Even when the question of government breakdown /s examined: 
"coalition literature approaches the question ... in a curiously indirect 
way. dominated by its characteristic concern with how governments 
formed in the first place. This is because lack of success In specifying the 
form coalitions take (e.g. the existence of as many surplus majority and 
minority coalitions as minimal winning ones) can be excused by the 
lesser stability and shorter duration of governments not conforming to 
the prescribed criteria ... this leads to breakdown and termination being 
ignored as phenomena requiring explanation In their own right" (Budge & 
Keman, 1990, p.159). 
Dodd (1976), despite his study's status as the first exhaustive examination of 
cabinet durabil i ty^^. provides the classic example of such an approach, with its 
premise that durability is primarily related to closeness to minimum winning status 
(1976. pp.51-53) .54 
As Strom notes in a discussion of the problems of measuring duration, "operational 
definitions must be justified by the research problem at hand" (Strom, 1988, p.927). 
Earlier, Laver's (1974) "ideological diversity' hypothesis (first defined in Taylor & 
Laver, 1973. p.217), which refined Axelrod's notion of an ideological left-right continuum 
by introducing a numerical value to indicate distance between the parties, as well as 
supporting Axelrod's findings that 'the less diverse a coalition is, the more it is 
preferred", also found that the less diverse a coalition was 'the longer will be its duration' 
(Laver, 1974. p.260). 
54 QQfjfj yy,3S 3 | 3 0 \^XQf XQ argue that coalition durability needs to be seen as an 'independent 
variable in its own right' (1984, p.156). 
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1.3.2. Early Approaches to Coal i t ion Durat ion 
Dodd's was the first substantive research concerned primarily with the factors 
affecting coalition duration; he attempted to identify the conditions conducive to 
durable coalition government.55 Dodd argues that the quest for power can be 
perceived as "an attempt by each party to maximise its participation in the cabinet" 
and that the central motivation of parties is a desire for the best cabinet positions^ 
with each party seeking to obtain the maximum advantage.^^ He found that the 
durability of cabinets was positively related to coalitional status; "the durability of 
cabinets largely depends upon the degree to which they approximate coalitions of 
minimum winning size" (Dodd, 1976, pp.139-140). Minority and oversized 
cabinets were seen as unstable or less stable and as "cabinets depart from minimum 
winning status, cabinet durability decreases" (Dodd, 1976, p.159). 
There has been some empirical support for Dodd's premise. Grimsson (1982) in an 
examination of Icelandic government coalitions reported "strong evidence in support 
of Dodd*s hypothesis concerning the durability of cabinets" (Grimsson, 1982, 
p.181). Norpoth, citing the full terms of those West German coalition governments 
with the slimmest margins, i.e.. Adenauer (1949) and Schmidt (1976), feels "one 
might argue that the more the parliamentary support of a coalition exceeds the 
minimum winning requirement...the shorter the duration of the coalition will be" 
(Norpoth, 1982, p.29).57 
55 One would have expected that, following the findings of Taylor & Laver (1973) of a 
significant number of nninority governments, policy motives might have formed a 
significant part of any hypothesis of coalitional duration. However, Dodd's assertion that 
•parties act to maximise their power within the government; thus they attempt to attain 
and maintain cabinet status'tDodd, 1976, p.16) indicates that policy-preference 
approaches were still considered to be of secondary importance to the motivation of 
ministerial office. 
56 Budge & Herman (1978) supported Dodd's assertion that parties sought the 'best' 
ministries, but construed the best ministries as those "most Influential in the areas of their 
concern (e.g. agrarian parties will want the agriculture ministry)' (Budge & Herman, 
1978. p.476). 
57 Schofieid (1985) also found that minimum winning coalitions lasted longer than other 
types. Against this however, Nyholm argues that In Finland 'the larger the coalition, the 
longer its lifetime", and that coalitional heterogeneity need not be a barrier to coalitional 
durability (Nyholm, 1982, pp.105-108); Budge & Keman (1990, pp.174-175) also found 
that In some systems ideologically mixed governments last longer than homogeneous 
governments, fvlarradi (1982) reported that Dodd's hypothesis was "only partly confirmed 
' in Italy, proposing that Dodd's proposition may be more applicable to minority, rather 
than to oversized, government coalitions (Marradi, 1982, pp.68-69). 
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While Warwick (1979) also finds minimal winning status "a very powerful 
independent influence on durability" (1979. p.490). he offers a different 
perspective on cabinet durability to Dodd. Warwick argues there is a "critical gap" 
between bourgeois and socialist/social democrat panles which has significance for 
both government formation and durability.^^ Where coalition duration is concerned. 
Warwick argues that the "significant aspects of European parly systems...are the 
major political cleavages" and that the less spanning of cleavages there was the 
"more desirable" potential coalitions would be to actors (Warwick. 1979. p.490). 
He found that "coalitions spanning this ideological divide will prove to be less 
durable than other coalitions" (Warwick. 1979, p.479).59 There is support for 
and against Warwick's hypothesis^O However, perhaps more importantly. 
Warwick (1979) argues that his findings concerning the significance of the major 
political cleavages to durability "also means that game theoretical approaches can no 
longer be allowed to dominate theoretical or empirical work on coalition behaviour" 
(Warwick. 1979, p.490). 
Von Beyme (1983) agrees with Warwick's view on game theory approaches, and 
argues "research on coalitions on the basis of game theory has not come to terms with 
the peculiarities of European party systems" (von Beyme. 1983. p.342). However, 
other approaches have also received criticism, and there has been considerable 
argument (examined in section 1.3.4.) between academics on the merits of different 
conceptualisations. 
1.3.3. An Absence of Dynamics 
Whatever the approach taken, predictions of coalition durability have tended to be 
"deterministic" or "regressive"; in other words, the information used to predict 
duration "is known when the government forms" (Laver & Schofield. 1990. p.158). 
For early theorists, coalition formation theories often 'doubled' as explanations of 
durability.^' ' Given this, it is unsurprising that the factors they saw as influencing 
Warwick's categorisation of 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' is an extension of the "pro/anti 
system parties" divide postulated by Taylor & Herman (1971, pp.28-37). 
In addition, he found that 'even ideologically diverse coalitions ... will last longer if 
they cannot afford to lose a member party without losing their majority* (Wanvick. 1979. 
p.490), although as Laver & Schofield point out, Wanwick found no clear relationship 
between ideological "compactness" and stability (Laver ASchofield, 1990. p.155). 
60 Browne reports the contention that "coalitions whose partners span cleavage dimensions 
are less durable than those whose partners do not is supported by data from Finland, 
Iceland and Italy'; however, in Belgium and the Netherlands coalitions spanning such 
cleavages had "slightly increased cabinet durations'.(Browne, 1982, p.487). 
61 For example, Axelrod (1970) and Laver (1974). However, as Strom points out, while 
government formation studies are "typically deterministic", this is not the case with 
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both formation (and as a 'by-product' duration) dominate the first studies of 
coalition durability, which were conducted in the game theory tradition.6 2 
Institutionalists' offered explanations based on such variables as the number of 
parties in the system or "party system fragmentation".63 although game theory 
propositions have also often been incorporated in such "regression models" (see 
Strom, 1988, p.923). 
Of course, there is a strong possibility that factors seen as influencing coalition 
formation (for example, minimum winning status, ideological diversity, the major 
political cleavages) will also affect the durability of administrations. However, 
experienced political observers will not need to be told that the factors leading to the 
break-up of a coalition government will affect the coalitions that subsequently form. 
Parties who have just terminated an arrangement due to, for example, policy 
differences are unlikely to form another coalition immediately.^'* Therefore, 
coalition termination must not just be seen as a consequence of, for example, a 
failure to achieve minimum winning status, but also as a potential cause of a 
particular government forming (see Budge & Keman, 1990, pp.159-162). It may 
even be that a particular termination, leading to a new administration, will also 
affect the durability of that administration in turn. 
This has considerable consequences for theories of coalition formation, fvtost formal 
theories, with their emphasis on wiping the board clean and starting again each time 
a coalition government falls, will consider a previous coalition to be just as likely to 
form again as any other. However, when a coalition breaks up acrimoniously it must 
at the very least be considered less likely to form than other solutions.^5 Any 
similar studies of cabinet durability, where 'there is no deductive theoretical argument 
that cabinet duration is precisely determined by the structure of the coalition formation 
game ... rather , the argument tends to be cast in probabilistic terms' (Strom, 1988, 
p.924). 
^2 In the first hint of a current controversy that is addressed later in this section, Browne 
et al dispute that early studies were in the game theory tradition, although they concede 
such studies utilised variables (such as minimal winning status) 'identified by game and 
coalition theory" (Browne. Frendreis, & Gleiber, 1988, p.934). However, there can be 
little dispute that Dodd (1976) must be seen in this tradition. 
®3 For example, Sanders & Herman (1977) and Lijphart, 1984). Chapters Four and Six 
examines such explanations for their relevance regarding local coalition formation and 
duration.respectively. 
6^ An assumption made by Budge & Keman (1990). See Table 2.4, Implication 6 (ii), p.52, 
although not supported by their research (see 1990, p. 187). 
65 Although Strom (1985. p.753) finds that minority governments do well in subsequent 
elections. 
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successful theory of coalition formation, then, must also Integrate the effects of 
government termination on subsequent coalition actlvlly.66 
However, just as theories of coalition formation have followed different paths, what 
the American Political Science Review calls "a spirited debate"^^ has "arisen over 
the best approach to the analysis of the durability of governing coalitions In 
parliamentary democracies" (Vol. 82, No. 3, September 1988. abstract, p.923). 
Some aspects of that debate will now be examined. 
1.3.4. The "Sp i r i ted Debate-
Criticism of the failure of game theory approaches was also a feature of a series of 
studies by Browne et al into factors influencing coalition duration (1984. 1986. 
1988 and others).^^ Browne, Frendreis & Gleiber (1984) propose a "stochastic 
approach", and argue that "the stability of cabinets is appropriately modelled as a 
problem of individual decision making under uncertainty"; cabinet dissolutions occur 
because of unpredictable "critical events" (1984. p.191). In support, Laver & 
Schofietd find that "even a very 'durable* government [can] have quite a short 
'duration' If a particularly important event happens to bring down the government 
early in its potential life" (Laver & Schofield, 1990. p.162)^9 
As well as criticising game theory approaches. Browne et al were also critical of 
Wanwick's research methods, pointing out that he "eliminated several cabinets from 
his data set whose termination was unconnected with the Idea of Instability" 
(Browne, Frendreis & Gleiber, 1984. p.177). However, their critique was as 
nothing compared to the criticism their work received in turn. While Strom agrees 
that Browne et al make some "valid and reasonable criticisms" against ''coalition-
66 Budge & Keman expected to find that governments ending because of elections or Prime 
Ministerial resignations would be more likely to "encourage continued collaboration' than 
those ending because of "quarrelling" between partners. However, while Budge & Keman 
(1990, p.187}, did find a relationship, it was that 'parties in governments terminating 
with elections are consistently less likely to cooF>erate again* than those where government 
dissention was the cause of termination (my emphasis). 
67 As we shall see, an example of litotes. 
68 for Browne et al, game theoretic approaches to duration 'incorporate unrealistic 
premises' (1984, p.173), are 'deterministic' (1986, p.630) and have failed empirically 
(1986. p.631). 
69 Laver & Schofield argue that the type of "bargaining system' (a combination of party 
weight and policy position) 'conditions the stability of coalition cabinets' (1990. p.158) 
They claim that a synthesis of this model and the "events" approach of Browne et al 'can 
accomodate both the impact of random shocks and the influence of regime and cabinet 
attributes and therefore subsumes much of the work that has been done on the subject of 
cabinet stability" (Laver& Schofield, 1990, p.161; King. Alt. Burns & Laver, American 
Journal of Political Science, forthcoming). See also Chapter Six, Section Two. 
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theoretic explanations of cabinet duration"(Strom. 1988, p.925)70 his main point 
is that: 
"although innovative and methodologically fairly sophisticated, these 
analyses are misconceived, poorly executed, and ultimately unlikely to 
advance our understanding of government coalitions" (Strom, 1988, 
p .923) . 
Not least of Strom's criticisms was their failure to imbue the notion of a "terminal 
event" with "substantive content".^'* He also noted the poor "predictive power" of 
their concept, and he concluded that "the new stochastic models of government 
durability are disappointing and inadequate" and "clearly, a superior alternative [to 
models in the game-theoretic tradition) has not been presented" (Strom, 1988. 
p p . 9 2 8 - 9 2 9 ) . 7 2 
Not surprisingly, Browne et al respond vigourously to such criticism. They describe 
Strom's attack as "mischievous" and "substantially distorted" and they totally reject 
the claim made by Strom, that their work "has sought to discredit and banish game 
theory from the arena of coalition research" (Browne, Frendreis. & Gleiber, 1988, 
pp.931-934). They make a number of pertinent responses, including pointing out 
that an important contribution of the 'critical events' approach Is that it Identifies "a 
major source of uncertainty in the rational decision making calculations of coalition 
actors". This has repercussions for bargaining , because the extent of such 
uncertainty might alter an actor's decision "both with respect to their choice of 
partners and preferences for particular benefits". The central idea of "uncertainty" 
also "encourages us to view coalition processes dynamically" (Browne, Frendreis, & 
Gleiber, 1988, p.937). Most Importantly, the events approach "calls for a 
redirection of scholarly attention from the question of how long cabinets may be 
expected to endure towards the questions of when and why cabinets will fall" 
( p . 9 3 7 ) . 7 3 
70 Notably, coalition theory's often 'simplistic assumptions" and its treatment of 
formations as 'mutually independent events' (Strom, 1988, p.924). 
71 A criticism they accepted; 'aware of this deficiency, we have begun investigating the 
problem'(Browne, Frendreis. & Gleiber, 1988, fn.8. p.938). 
72 For Strom, 'specifically, the stochastic modelers have (1) misrepresented the game-
theoretic tradition and its empirical success. (2) paid insufficient attention to key terms 
and assumptions in their own models, (3) overinterpreted empirical support for these 
models. (4) misplaced the focus of the analysis through substantive unfamiliarity or faulty 
metaphor, and (5) provided a poor alternative to the game-theoretic approach in the 
development of a cumulative and rigourous science of politics' (Strom, 1988, p.923). 
73 Strom (1988, p.926-927) also alleges that Browne et al fail even to specify the basic 
unit of analysis, the definition of a government termination. Their response points out that 
they did offer a definition of termination, in a work (Browne, Gleiber, & f^ashoba, 1988) 
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The dispute between Browne et al and Strom might appear a minor matter, an 
example (particularly severe perhaps) of 'academic infighting', but in addition to 
both sides making pertinent points about the weaknesses of the other's approach, it 
further demonstrates the way in which coalition studies have fragmented, to the 
extent that a wall is being built between the different approaches. Strom's criticisms 
seem not to have been made in a spirit of academic debate, but more in the spirit of a 
vixen protecting her cubs from a predator; the cubs in this case are the offspring of 
various formal studies, while the predator (which is also seen as attacking 
'institutionalist' models) is perceived to be the 'stochastic model'. The argument 
between Strom and Browne et al is an expression of a wider "tragedy", the growing 
apart of complementary traditions of academic research.^^ 
1.3.5. Other In f luences on Durat ion 
We will return to this problem in the final section of this chapter. However, to 
conclude this examination, there are a number of other factors that have been alleged 
to affect coalition duration. As well as arguing that minimum winning coalitions are 
more stable than other coalitions.''^ Dodd maintains that minority governments are 
also associated with instability (Dodd, 1976, pp.133-139). While Strom argues 
that minority governments are not symptoms of political instability. (Strom. 1990, 
p.63). he does find that minority governments are less durable than majority 
coalitions (Strom, 1990, p.23S)7^ 
Perhaps surprisingly, "none of the studies that has been conducted to date provides 
any sustained evidence of a systematic relationship between the ideological diversity 
of a coalition and its life expectancy" (Laver & Schofield. 1990. p.155); Axelrod's 
claim that minimal and ideologically connected coalitions are also longer lasting is 
supported by some studies, and challenged by others77 The effects of policy 
uncited by Strom, and that their decision rule in the articles he did cite was clear (Browne. 
Frendreis, & Gleiber. 1988. pp.g32-933). 
74 See Laver & Schofield (1990, pp.10-11). 
75 A finding supported by Schofield (1985) who used the same criteria of termination as 
Dodd. 
76 3 i 3 Q Strom (1985) where he finds that "minority governments are associated with 
higher rates of governmental turnover", although, given that the minority governments 
fare better in subsequent elections (as previously mentioned; see fn 65), he argues that the 
formation of a minority government is "highly rational' (Strom, 1985, p.753). This implies 
that politicans are aware of the improved electoral performance of former minority 
governments,a not unreasonable assumption given that most politicians are keen students of 
past electoral performance. 
77 See Schofield (1985. p.588). 
35 
considerations on coalitional duration are still largely unconsidered, and Budge & 
Keman (1990) is one of the very few works to examine the effects of policy criteria 
on government termination. While Laver & Schofield argue that "the duration of 
cabinets seems to be unrelated to policy matters" (1990, p.155), Budge & Keman 
received some indication that "governments formed without policy agreements will 
be shorter-lived, less effective, and less stable" (Budge & Keman, 1990. p.188). 
Despite the criticisms that have been made about deterministic approaches, it does 
appear that closeness to minimum winning status is a powerful indicator of 
coalitional durability, and that minority governments, while not necessarily a 
symptom of instability, are less durable than majority coalitions. The evidence for 
the effect on duration of other criteria often associated with coalition formation (for 
example, minimal connected winning status) is more ambiguous. Other research has 
suggested that random and unpredictable events may precipitate government 
collapse, although even within this model of government duration it appears that 
some types of government in some types of system are more durable than others. 
As this section has indicated, game theoretic approaches are often seen as positing an 
unrealistic picture of real life coalit ions. Many of these criticisms fail to 
acknowledge the enormous contribution game theory approaches have made to 
coalition studies, ignore the necessary theoretical assumptions (however flawed) 
that empiricism cannot provide, and often misunderstand the nature of approaches in 
this tradition.^9 That is not to deny the veracity of some of the criticisms; indeed, as 
the following section will show, some formal modellers acknowledge them. Theorists 
have continued to produce highly formal mathematical models based on laboratory 
games, some of which have prompted more empirical research, and the following 
section will examine some of the recent contributions to coalition studies made by the 
game theoretic tradition. 
Sect ion Four: Developments in Game Theory 
To the uninformed, the controversy between stochastic modelling and game theory 
(discussed above) might appear to indicate that coalition studies is an arena where a 
vibrant interchange of ideas is taking place between the supporters of different 
approaches. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to suggest that the reverse is 
the case. The relationship between political scientists in the game theory tradition 
and mainstream political scientists has become tenuous, and the major reason is 
almost certainly because of the increasingly mathematical nature of game theoretical 
78 Strom's (1988) defence of the game theoretical tradition addresses these issues in full. 
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studies.79 Such incomprehensibility may have serious repercussions for empirical 
coalition studies. Pridham (1987) argues that the abstract quality of formal 
coalition theories has discouraged empirical work among country specialists and that 
"academic interest In coalition theory subsided from the early 1970s" (Pridham. 
1987, p.375).8 0 
1.4.1. Some Solut ions to the Bargaining Process 
Despite Pridham's assertions of the deficiencies of formal coalition studies, there 
have been a number of developments within coalition theory during the 1970s and 
1980s. Within the game-theoretical tradition, various solutions have been offered to 
characterise the bargaining process within coalition formation; these have Included 
the 'bargaining-set* proposed by Peleg (1973) from earlier work by Aumann & 
Maschler (1964), the development of the 'core' notion within bargaining-set games 
to the 'kernel' or 'core' solution offered by, amongst others, Schofieid (1976) and 
Owen (1986). and the 'competitive solution' of fvlcKelvey. Ordeshook and Winer 
(1978). The idea of the 'core' is that the payoff, or 'imputation', to actors in the 
coalition game must be rational; the members of each possible coalition must receive 
an imputation at least as great as their value. It would be irrational for actors to take 
less from a coalition than they could get by acting alone or by breaking up the 
coalition. All the "coalitlonally rational Imputations" constitute the core, and a game 
without a core is unstable, because whatever the payoff "some coalition has the 
power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own" (Davis, 
1981, p.184); the theory would therefore predict a coalition outcome in the core.®"* 
The 'competitive solution' rests on an assumption first made by de Swaan (1973) of 
the importance of 'pivotal' actors. The 'competitive solution' hypothesizes that: 
"potential coalitions must bid for their members In a competitive 
environment via the proposals they offer. Given that several coalitions 
are attempting to form simultaneously, each coalition must, if possible, 
bid efficiently by appropriately rewarding Its 'critical' members. Thus, 
if any one player or set of players Is pivotal between two coalitions and if 
each coalition is to have a chance of forming, the pivotal players should be 
79 For example, the nineteen contributions to 'Game Theory & Political Science' (1978) are 
incomprehensible to the non-mathematician. 
Pridham believes coalition studies failed to keep pace with developments in areas such 
as the study of party systems and individual political parties and that only very recently 
has 'this isolation of coalition studies and their deficiencies of approach ... drawn more 
attention* (Pridham. 1987. p.375). 
Strom (1990, p. 171) risks confusion by using the term 'core' (which in game theoretic 
terms is 'the set of undominated solutions") to refer to the position in policy terms of the 
Christian Democrats in Italy. 
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indifferent between the offers of both coalitions lest their preferences 
insure that one of the two cannot form. This can result in certain 
coalitions being unable to compete, and thus, we must identify not only the 
competitive offers of coalitions, but also, the coalitions that can make 
them" (McKelvey. Ordeshook & Winer. 1978. p.605). 
The authors report considerable success for their hypothesis in laboratory games 
(McKelvey, Ordeshook & Winer. 1978, pp.611-612). but such games are not a 
political arena. These, and other game theory solutions, face a considerable problem; 
do they offer an adequate representation of political behaviour? For example, to look 
at the proposals of McKelvey et al, do coalition actors always reap the payoff their 
weight would suggest, as the notion of a 'core' solution proposes? Will the pivotal 
actor be indifferent to competing offers? Are coalitions attempting to form 
simultaneously? Such questions remain largely unconsidered in formal theory. 
1.4.2. Prob lems of Cons t ruc t ing 'Real i ty ' 
The theories have only rarely been utilised by empiricists or informed by empirical 
research, concentrating on formal and elegant solutions to the coalition 'game'; early 
game theory solutions had prompted Taylor (1972. pp.372-373) to argue that 
formal solution theory was irrelevant to the study of legislative coalition processes. 
Political scientists in the game theory tradition, while arguing that game theory had 
made significant developments in some areas, were themselves often critical of its 
shortcomings: 
"In one critical area, game theory has failed to have a substantial impact 
on political science. At the conceptual level, game theory has by now led 
many political scientists to think in terms of strategies, coalitions, and 
payoffs. Game theory has also contributed heavily to the development of 
positive political theory. But game theory has only rarely led to 
rigourous empirical analysis of real world political behaviour. In fact, 
political scientists, including ourselves, have often turned away from the 
messiness of real world analysis to the cozy comfort of laboratory 
experiments" (McKelvey & Rosenthal, 1978. pp.405-406). 
McKelvey & Rosenthal proposed that to develop a real world model would take "three 
critical steps": (1) "the preference or utility functions of the actors must be 
modelled"; (2) "the real world situation must be modelled as a formal game"; (3) 
the analyst must be able "to conduct an appropriate statistical evaluation of the 
correspondence between observed outcomes and predicted outcomes" (McKelvey & 
Rosenthal, 1978, p.406). The difficulties of constructing such a model need hardly 
be stated, but when coalition theory has yet to produce remotely satisfying criteria 
of politicians 'utility functions', for example, their attitudes towards office and 
policy payoffs, the authors' optimism that their paper "applies the above framework 
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for model building and evaluation to a reasonably complex sltuation"^^ seems 
Inappropriate (McKelvey & Rosenthal, 1978, p.406). 
1.4.3. Recent Approaches In the Game Theoretic Tradition 
Recently, some interesting models in the game theoretic tradition have attempted to 
present a more realistic view of political Interaction. Some have Incorporated 
earlier approaches in game theory. 
A New Spatial Theory 
For example, Austen-Smith & Banks' (1988) propose a 'multistage game theoretic 
model' of party competition in a proportional representation (p.r.) system, which 
Incorporates previously Independent "spatial theories" of elections and 
legislatures.®3 The authors argue the merging of the two approaches Is necessary 
because: 
"rational voters...will take into account the subsequent legislative game in 
making their decisions at the electoral stage of the process.^^ In turn, 
rational candidates will take account of such deliberations In selecting 
their electoral strategy and subsequent legislative behaviour conditional 
on electoral success. So to understand more fully both electoral and 
legislative behaviour-in the sense of being able to explain and predict 
policy posit ions, policy outcomes, and coalit ion structures-it Is 
necessary to develop a theory of both political arenas simultaneously" 
(Austen-Smith & Banks. 1988, p.405) 
Again, the difficulty of developing a theory incorporating electoral and legislative 
arenas is apparent.^^ but such an approach demonstrates that game theorists are not 
unaware of the complexities of 'real' political life. Also, their conclusion that the 
model demonstrates that "the popular conception" of p.r. systems as more likely than 
simple plurality systems to lead to legislatures which "reflect the variety of 
interests in the electorate seems mistaken" (Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988. 
62 The framework is applied to electoral coalitions in the French apparantement system. 
63 For a review of spatial theories, see Shepsle. (1986). Another approach is that of 
Schofietd (1982), who offers an incorporation of 'the bargaining set* and policy based 
theories (such as de Swaan. 1973). 
64 As noted, this model is developed to represent competition in a political system with 
proportional representation. However, they also assume there are only three parties 
(Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988, p.408), which in a p.r. system might be taken as further 
evidence of the unrealistic assumptions of game theorists. 
65 tn a very influential paper proposing an integration of office and policy considerations, 
Laver & Budge (1987) had, prior to Austen-Smith & Banks, noted a significant relationship 
between electoral considerations and coaliton formation; they argued electors may well 
'see themselves as voting for potential coalitions" (Budge & Laver, 1987, p.25). Their 
observations are discussed in more depth in Section Five of this chapter. 
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p.417)86 has potential repercussions beyond the study of coalitions. Not only that, 
but such work does not reflect an approach that has nothing to offer mainstream 
political scientists, although the pages of mathematical notations somewhat limit its 
accessibil ity. 
Intraparty Pol i t ics 
A concern with accessibility was clearly important to Laver & Shepsle (1990a), 
who despite an approach very much in the game theoretic tradition, eschewed the use 
of the "axiom-theorem-proof" methods normal in game theory and presented "simple 
paper and pencil examples" in their attempt to produce a model of government 
formation which allows consideration of the role of Intraparty politics to coalition 
formation.(Laver & Shepsle,1990a, p.506). Their approach concentrates on 
government formations rather than coalition building, noting that "most coalition 
theories have not distinguished between coalitions formed to divide a pie or pass a 
motion and those formed to establish a government" (Laver & Shepsle, 1990a, 
p.489). This helps to explain why most theory has failed to address such critical 
matters as intraparty politics. In Laver & Shepsie's model, the cabinet proposals of 
parties becomes the crucial unit by which the credibility of coalition proposals is 
judged. As they express it, the allocation of a portfolio to a party constitutes a 
"credible commitment to implement the ideal policy of that party in the relevant 
policy jurisdiction" (Laver & Shepsle. 1990. p.490a). and a party can "back up its 
promises by indicating the senior politician whose policy preferences provide the 
incentives to implement these promises in office" (1990a. p.506). Laver & Shepsle 
maintain their approach means that it is no longer necessary to make an assumption 
of parties as unitary actors.^^ 
Proto-Coali t ion Formation 
Laver & Shepsie's model, despite its game theoretic approach, was easily 
understandable to a non-mathematician. While it is not strictly 'game theory', one of 
the more accessible formal models that has been presented is Grofman's (1982) 
dynamic model of proto-coalition formation, which also bears a more direct 
relationship with the 'real world' of political coalition formation than the more 
They note that such a conception rests on an assumption of 'non-strategic behaviour' by 
v o t e r s and parties, which 'on both theoretical and empirical grounds is 
unwarranled'.(Austen-Smith & Banks. 1988, p.417). 
While the degree of autonomy their model proposed for cabinet ministers must be 
disputed, as they assume ministers are 'policy dictators' (1990a. fn. p.490) in their 
departments, Laver & Shepsie's approach is certainly capable of allowing the examination 
of party factions in coalition bargaining if we assume that party factions are necessarily 
represented by senior politicians who will be rewarded with cabinet office. 
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abstract solutions offered. The process by which Grofman categorises coalition 
formation can be seen as a development of de Swaan's (1973) hypothesis on the 
processes of coalition formation and as a generalisation of Axelrod's (1970) 
'connected coalitions' from a uni-dimensional policy space to an N-dimensional 
policy space (Grofman. 1982, p.77). An actor forms a 'proto-coalition' with their 
most preferred partner, i.e.. "the actor nearest to him in n-space" (Grofman, 1982. 
p.78). This new coalition then repeats the process until a 'winning' coalition is 
formed. Grofman reports considerable predictive success with this model. 
1.4.4. Problems for Predictive Models 
Once again then, a predictive theory in the game theory tradition appears to suggest a 
plausible hypothesis of coalition formation and claims a considerable predictive 
success. However, there is a serious problem for predictive models, whether they 
are in the game theory or "European politics' traditions. Laver (1989) points out 
perhaps the most significant problem of theorists constructing and testing their 
predictive models using the available empirical data, particularly when it comes to a 
critical evaluation of their properties: 
"This is that the main data set to which they address themselves - the 
universe of national governments in post-war Europe - is by now one of 
the most thoroughly picked over in the entire social sciences. As a 
consequence, the relationship between theory and data has become 
extremely incestuous. It is no longer possible, for example, to construct a 
general theory from a priori assumptions and then run off to 'test' it 
against the data, since the general properties of this data set are by now 
very well known ... a situation that in particular makes it very difficult 
for us to evaluate new inductive theories that have succeeded in snuggling 
still closer to a perfect fit with the universe of post-war European 
coalition governments." (Laver. 1989, pp.16-17). 
This implies that models such as those offered by Grofman (who has made numerous 
changes to his model to improve the fit with a data set he is already familiar with) 
need to be treated with considerable scepticism.^^ 
However, the incestuous relationship between data and theory is not the only 
problem for explanations in the game theory tradition. As previously noted, a major 
problem with the mathematically complex models in a strict game theory tradition is 
^^The original model was criticised by Luebbert (1983) for allowing only majority 
coalitions to form and was further criticised for making a unique prediction, which failed to 
take account of the possibility of coalition arrangements changing without a change in voting 
strength (Rapoporl & Weg, 1986, pp.577-598). Grofman modified his model in 1987 'to 
allow for predicting the circumstances under which a minority coalition might be expected 
to form" (Grofman. 1987, p.1). and reported that his revised model performed well in an 
examination of coalition outcomes in four countries. Denmark. Nonvay. Germany and Italy. 
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their Incomprehensibility to non-mathematlclans. This has undoubtedly limited 
their Influence on political scientists, even those working within the field of 
empirical coalition studies. Perhaps even more Importantly, the scenario of politics 
presented In most mathematical models, despite their general rejection of certain 
unrealistic aspects of early coalition theory such as uni-dimensional policy spaces, 
seems far too simplistic to most observers of political behaviour. While It might be 
relatively easy to apply rational notions of 'winning* as the sole concern of 
pol i t ic ians to the world of, for example, Machlavel l l (and even then 
unsatisfactori ly),69 late 20th century Western coalition politics exists In a world 
where the Influences upon politicians are Infinitely more subtle. The final section of 
this chapter will examine some recent efforts which may meet the requirement that 
coalition studies address the realities of politics. 
Sect ion Five: Towards an Integrated Theory 
A number of areas will be assessed In this section. Within a more general approach, a 
number of studies which relate the theory more directly to the real world have been 
offered,90 and specifically within the area of coalitions of political parties perhaps 
the most important developments have been to establish new criteria of coalition 
'membership' and 'viability', and attempts to achieve a measure of Integration 
between the office-seeking and policy preference approaches (for example, Budge & 
Herman, 1978. and Budge & Laver, 1987). Despite their fundamental importance in 
coalition studies, studies of the distribution of coalition payoffs (and particularly 
policy payoffs) have been limited, although recent work Is redressing the balance.^'' 
In addition, the multi-dimensional framework pioneered by Pridham, which argues 
that more empirical studies of coalition behaviour are necessary, will be assessed. 
This section begins with an examination of the proposal of a new definition of 
government viability, one which offered a plausible explanation for the existence of 
so many minority govenments in European parliamentary systems. 
69 Politics was much closer to a zero-sum game in 15/16th century Florence. 20th 
century politicians have far less freedom of movement that Machiavelli's Prince, who did 
not need to consider, for example, such constraints as future electoral prospects or the 
policy preferences of a mass party. This is not to deny that his Prince also had other 
considerations than 'winning', but when 'losing' means death or banishment, winning 'office* 
becomes very much the primary goal. 
90 It must be pointed out that this was expressed in terms such as 'improving the 
predictive fit'. 
®^ For example, the authors in Browne & Dreijmanis (editors. 1982) did comment on 
payoffs; see also Laver & Schofield (1990, Chapter Seven). 
4 2 
1.5.1. An Explanation for Minority Governments 
The discovery of a large number of minority governments by Taylor & Laver 
(1973) indicated severe problems for the dominant explanations of coalition 
format ion.92 j h e y all made an assumption that 'winning' meant controlling a 
majority of seats. One difficulty of a majority criterion Is evident - it cannot account 
for minority governments. Such administrations were merely seen as short-lived 
and unstable (Dodd. 1976), which while agreeing with both the feelings of many 
observers of political behaviour and earlier theorists (for example, Axelrod, 
1970), gave no indication of why minority administrations formed at all. 
Budge & Herman (1978) offered a possible explanation for minority governments. 
They suggested that parties would pursue policies, and would support governments 
who advanced those policies, whether or not they were in government, thus 
"abandoning the assumption (within coalition theory] that size or even ideology are 
of unvarying Importance or salience" (Budge & Herman, 1978. p.459). They 
introduced a new criterion of government viabllity;93 ability to win "a majority 
on legislative votes of confidence" (Budge & Herman. 1978, p.461). In this case. If 
two parties disagreed with each other more than with the government, the success of 
minority administrations could be explained. It might also be better in some ways for 
the 'support party(ies)' not to enter into a formal coalition agreement by taking 
ministerial office, in that if governments do lose elections rather than oppositions 
winning them, too close an identification with the governing party might be counter-
productive electorally.94 Luebbert (1986) has also suggested that the maintenance 
of party unity for the 'support party' might best be achieved from outside of a 
governing coalition (Luebbert, 1986, p.244) which would certainly be an 
important consideration to any political leader contemplating entering into a formal 
governing coalition. 
1.5.2. The Integration of Office and Policy Motivations 
So, early approaches to coalition formation concentrated on explanations which saw 
winning a legislative majority as the primary goal, and the rewards of office as the 
primary payoff of 'winning'. Policy payoffs were generally used "to constrain the 
92 Riker (1962). Leiserson (1968). Axelrod (1970), de Swaan (1973). 
•^^  It must be noted that a viable government is not necessarily an effective one, for 
'viability is no guarantee that a government can fulfil its constitutional functions [and] 
parliamentary governments ... must be both viable and effective' (Strom, 1990. p.5). 
In order that his .'dynamic model of proto-coalition formation' might encompass minority 
administrations, Grofman (1987) utilised Budge & Herman's criterion to include support 
parties as part of any 'winning* coalition; he called such arrangements 'standing coalitions* 
(Grofman. 1987. p.4). 
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coalitions which office-seeking parties can form, thus improving the fit between 
minimal winning formulations and actual coalition behaviour" (Budge & Laver. 
1987. p.1). At least since Budge & Herman (1978), approaches have stressed the 
importance of policy considerations to a number of governmental factors, pointing 
out the weakness of assumptions that politicians are only interested in office pay-
offs. As Warwick (1979) points out: 
"politicians appear to be under the twin, and by no means compatible, 
motivations of pursuing their beliefs and pursuing power, and causal 
approaches that ignore either one of these motivations are likely to prove 
deficient" (Warwick. 1979, p.490) 
Despite the now general recognition within coalition theory of the importance of 
policy considerations to coalition processes there has been little consideration within 
the literature to policy motivations as a primary motive. As Budge & Laver (1987) 
argue: 
"policy-payoffs ... have generally been used in existing theory to 
constrain the coalitions which office-seeking parties can form, thus 
improving the fit between minimal winning formulations and actual 
coalition behaviour" (Budge & Laver, 1987. p.1). 
However, for Budge & Laver, the relationship between office and policy is far more 
complex and interesting. They characterise the relationship between 'office-seeking' 
and 'policy-pursuit' as variable; their key assumption is "that office-seeking can be 
both an end in itself and a means to achieve office ... similarly, policy-pursuit can be 
both an end in itself and a means to achieve office" (Budge & Laver, 1987, p.2). They 
also offered a new criterion of government viability, replacing the majority 
criterion with a viability criterion; Budge & Herman's (1978) criterion of 
viability was modified to: 
"a proto-coalitlon V will form a government if there is no alternative 
coalition A supported by parties controlling more legislative votes than 
those supporting V and which all supporters of A prefer to form rather 
than V" (Budge & Laver. 1987, p.lO). 
The main tenet of Budge & Laver's argument is that both office payoffs and policy 
payoffs must be included in any comprehensive theory. Such a theory will be lacking 
in empirical support concerning policy payoffs, because despite the general 
consensus within coalition studies of the importance of policy considerations, very 
little substantive research into policy payoffs has occurred. 
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The importance of office considerations Is indisputable. As Laver & Schofield (1990) 
argue, the close relationship "between a party's legislative weight and the number of 
portfolios it receives from Its coalition partners" demonstrates quite conclusively 
that "office is important" (1990, p.193, emphasis in original). However, the 
empirical results of research Into policy payoffs is "hitherto disappointing".^^ gpd 
therefore: 
"the development of a much more comprehensive research programme 
designed to assess the relationship between the policies of a coalition and 
the preferences of Its members remains one of the most important pieces 
of unfinished business in the political science of government coalitions" 
(Laver & Schofield, 1990, p.194). 
Budge & Laver (1987) also propose that the electorate's evaluation of a party's 
policy position will be conditioned by that party's past and anticipated future 
performances, which they argue are "Intimately related to coalitional behaviour" 
(Laver & Budge, 1987, pp.22-23). Significantly, if an electorate evaluates policy 
positions, then It would appear that they may also anticipate likely coalitions; 
electors may well "see themselves as voting for potential coalitions" and parlies 
"may explicitly state In campaigns which coalitions they will, or will not, join". If 
so. then "a large part of the coalition formation process may be over before the 
election is held" (Budge & Laver, 1987. p.25), implying that a successful coalition 
theory must be prepared to admit a significant amount of pre-election bargaining.^® 
Budge & Laver (1987) hoped that stressing the relationship between policy and 
office as variable, rather than assuming the "automatic predominance" of office-
seeking hypotheses, would allow them to face up to a number of problems previously 
ignored In formal coalition theory,9^ especially that of relating the processes of 
35 But see Budge & Keman (1990, Chapter Five) who find that parties do "move policies In 
the direction of their own preferences" (1990. p.l58). 
96 For example, prior to the 1980 West German election, the opinion polls had indicated 
that the choice of Franz-Josef Strauss, the leader of the C S U , as the CDU/CSU nomination 
for Chancellor, was moving some CDU/CSU voters to indicate that they would switch to the 
FDP. Such pre-election manoeuvring made it Impossible (or electorally dangerous In the 
future) for the FDP to support the CDU/CSU after the election, although when Helmut Kohl 
was "offered" as Chancellor by the CDU/CSU In 1982 they abandoned their SPD coalition 
partner (Bogdanor.ig83.pp.44-45); despite a loss In votes In 1984, they were not unduly 
punished for their duplicity. 
3^ It must be noted that "a theory which incorporated all the possible combinations of 
office-seeking and policy-pursuit would be, at least in the present stale of our knowledge, 
essentially untestabie". The authors note that while simplification is therefore necessary, 
"one must be careful to cover the commonly occuring situations* (Budge & Keman , 1990, 
p.30). Otherwise, the same criticism levelled against early theories of over simplistic 
scenarios would be repeated. 
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coalition formation to other aspects of governmental befiaviour (Budge & Laver. 
1987. p.1). Other researchers, although equally disenchanted with the direction 
coalition studies had taken, approached the same problem in a different way. One of 
the most influential approaches of recent years has been the multi-dimensional 
approach of Pridham (1986). The multi-dimensional approach has generated a 
considerable number of empirical studies, although it must be admitted that the 
emphasis appears to have been more on preparing the ground than in significant 
Insights into coalitional behaviour. More questions have been asked than answers 
provided, as some practitioners admit (Mellors & Pljnenburg, 1989, p.306).^^ 
1.5.3. A Multi-Dimensional Approach 
In addition to the differing motivations actors will have towards office and policy 
payoffs suggested by Budge & Laver (1987). Pridham argues that a number of 
contextual factors must be taken Into account in coalition studies "based on linkages 
between coalition politics and party systems as a whole"; parties should be seen as 
operating within both "given party systems" and wider environments (Pridham, 
1986, p.24). A number of dimensions affecting coalition behaviour therefore have to 
be taken into account, and Pridham proposes that any framework for coalition studies 
has to include the following dimensions: 
(1) Historical, emphasising the importance of time, particularly in past 
experiences of relations with other political parties; 
(2) Institutional, recognising that different political systems afford different 
opportunities for coatitional arrangements; 
(3) Motivational, recognising that attitudes to office and policy goals will vary, 
and also that the numerical strengths of parties may affect their willingness to 
enter into coalitions; 
(4) Horizontal/Vertical, examining the effects of local and regional coalitions on 
national party behaviour; 
(5) Internal Party, "focusing on the dynamics of internal party processes", 
which might well lead to questioning of the 'elementary assumption* within formal 
coalition theory of parties as unitary actors; 
(6) Socio-Political, which includes the effects a number of variables such as 
electoral politics, interest groups, cleavage conflict and political culture might 
have on coalitional behaviour; 
93 Although, as Mellors & Pijnenburg's collection of multi-dimensional studies concludes, 
'it is only to be expected that the initial going wilt be tough' (1989, p.307). 
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(7) Environmental/External, examining the role that actors outside the direct 
control of coalition actors (such as the media) might have on coalition politics 
(see Pridham. 1987, pp.376-380).9 9 
Pridham recognised that his list of dimensions was not exhaustive, but did feel that It 
would provide a basis for an alternative theory. Pridham's concerns were not new; 
other research had examined the problems raised by a number of the dimensions 
Pridham Identified.^ 00 Notably, Franklin & Mackle (1983) found that "historical 
events do influence formation outcomes, in that parties who have joined together in 
the past are likely to do so again" (Franklin & Mackie, 1983, p.296). The authors 
argued that the incorporation of a "longitudinal perspective" into existing theory 
more than doubled their ability "to explain formation outcomes" (Franklin & 
Mackie, 1983, pp. 295-298). They maintained that, more importantly, in adopting 
an historical perspective the true importance of size and ideology could be 
appreciated for the first time: 
"Historical events limit the ability of these considerations [size and 
Ideology] to influence particular formation outcomes, but these historical 
events are themselves in large part consequences of the same 
considerations. So where size and ideology fail to affect the present, it is 
often because their effect has already been felt on the past" (Franklin & 
Mackie, 1983. p.298). 
1.5.4. A Challenge to Traditional Coalition Theories 
While acknowledging his debt to these and other studies Pridham argues that the 
multl- dimensional approach "goes beyond them in integrating such work and also 
exploring areas so far untrodden by them" (Pridham, 1987, p.379); it also 
challenges many of the assumptions of coalition theory. Pridham criticises the 
artificial and abstract nature of formal coalition theory, arguing that: 
"Political parties cannot essentially be considered as unitary actors In the 
coalition game. 
- A variety of informal determinants of coalitional behaviour should be 
taken into account. 
- It is imperative to consider the coalitional relationship as a continuing 
process, encompassing both formation and maintenance. 
- Coalitional behaviour has to be assessed within a wider political 
framework than the institutional context. 
99 It might be thought that we are moving from the sublime to the ridiculous in that, while 
game theory leaves a lot out. Pridham includes the kitchen sink. 
100 For example. Groennings. Kelley & Leiserson (1970) had emphasised the importance of 
a comparative approach, while Dodd (1976) had considered the impact of cleavages to 
coalition durability. Hinckley had also pointed out that 'real world games occur in time, 
with past constraints and future expectations" (Hinckley, 1976, p.6). 
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- Political parties are obviously the key or central actors in the 
coalitional game, though not to the exclusion of other possible actors. 
- Qualitative changes in West European party systems since the 1960s 
reinforce the need for a different approach to coalitional behaviour along 
these lines. 
• Coaiitional politics is an inherently complex and often 'messy' affair, 
where expectations of rational behaviour may well be 
unrealistic."(Pridham, 1986. pp.24-29)101. 
As Pijnenburg (1986) has pointed out. this does not imply that traditional coalition 
theories are completely discarded, but that their predictive purpose does not provide 
"an accurate analysis of the mechanisms of coalition politics" (Pijnenburg, 1986, 
p.4). The multi-dimensional approach aims to provide, via empirical research, the 
knowledge of 'real-life* coalitional politics that the dominant formal models have 
scarcely been concerned with. Criticisms of the unrealistic nature of much formal 
theory are not new, although such criticisms, rather than proposing an alternative 
approach to game theoretical models, generally sought to integrate the two strands of 
formal theory and empirical research more closely in the hope that a more accurate 
predictive model could be produced. 
In contrast. Pridham's criticisms confront the very basis of traditional coalition 
theory, its assumption of groups of actors (in this case political parties) as rational 
individuals. The multi- dimensional approach makes no pretensions to predicting 
outcomes: rather, it seeks to explain what actually happens when political parties 
engage in coalitional activities. Laver's (1989) comments on the incestuous 
relationship between theory and data point up (leaving aside its core assumptions) 
formal coalition theory's most serious handicap, the deficiency of the data available 
on which to test hypotheses. Any development in formal theory which expects to be 
taken seriously by mainstream political science must be informed by the empirical 
knowledge gained from the increasing number of studies which have spread their net 
outside of the confines of European national legislatures (for example, Pridham, 
1986. Mellors & Pijnenburg, 1989), However, critics of formal theory must also 
acknowledge the developments that have been made. 
Hainsworth & Loughlin (1989) note that negotiations following French regional 
elections "justified Pridham's view of coalition politics as a messy, complex, uneven, and 
variable process' (1989. p.lSQ). 
102 See Budge & Herman (1978), Hinckley (1981), Browne & Dreijmanis (1982). As an 
example of such criticisms. Browne (1982) perceived the major problem of coalition 
literature as a failure of theoretical developments to incorporate empirical insights and of 
empiricists failing "to carefully connect their propositions with existing theory" (Browne, 
1982. p.356). 
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Some distinguished voices argue the necessity for the gap between the game 
thoeretical approach and the European empirical approach to be bridged. For 1-aver & 
Schofield, an: 
"Intellectual tragedy has been developing...the European politics and 
game-theoretic approaches are by novy so far apan In their styles of 
analysis that they have almost nothing to contribute to one another....This 
growing apart...is a tragedy that has recently become especially apparent 
as game theorists increasingly acknowledge the theoretical importance of 
particular institutional details of the coalition formation process, 
together with all sorts of other empirical matters that have long been the 
concern of the European politics people. It more and more seems to be the 
case that both groups of scholars are talking about almost precisely the 
same thing but that they are simply using different languages to do so" 
(Laver & Schofield, 1990, pp.10-11). 
Conc lus ions 
To a large extent, coalition studies are now attempting to deal more fully with the 
criticisms that have been made concerning their often unrealistic assumptions.of 
political behaviour. Narrow definitions of 'rationality' are now usually avoided, and 
theorists are more aware that the goals of politicians are more complex than a 
simple desire to hold office. 'Winning* is a complex concept, and different actors will 
have different concepts of what winning means. A theory which fails to acknowledge 
this is unlikely to impress. Despite this, holding office is necessary for the 
achievement of many political aims, and the evidence suggests that models assuming a 
priority for holding office are not an inaccurate reflection of most politicians 
strategies. The evidence of the importance of policy is far less clear. The assumption 
of parties as unitary actors has also been challenged, and most observers now argue 
that any comprehensive theory will have to include the idea of intraparty factions. 
Despite the importance of payoff distribution and the reasons for goverment 
termination to future coalition formations, these areas have received little attention 
in the majority of studies. Obviously, they are more difficult to investigate than the 
process of coalition formation. Recent studies (including, to a small extent, this 
thesis) are somewhat redressing the balance, but this weakness still needs to be 
addressed by future studies. 
The attempt by Laver & Schofield to bridge the gap between different traditions of 
coalition research is also essential, and the 'multi-method approach' of this thesis 
attempts to continue their endeavour. Unfortunately, despite some protestations to 
the contrary, the multi-dimensional approach of Pridham and others does not appear 
to believe that formal theory has much to offer empirical studies of coalitions. Many 
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of their criticisms of formal theory are relevant, but their essentially atheoretical 
approach cannot be allowed to dominate coalition studies. The problem with such 
system-specific approaches is that their findings are often of little interest outside 
of the system being examined. Also, despite the adoption of a common 'framework', 
the difficulties of comparison may further 'balkanlse' coalition studies. As the 
introduction to this thesis has stated, this study is an attempt to continue Laver & 
Schofield's process of 'bridge-building', and the insights of the coalition studies 
outlined in this introductory chapter will be used alongside of the findings of 
previous research into hung councils in an attempt to further our understanding of 
'life in the balance'. 
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In t roduct ion 
Chapter Two has two major functions. Firstly, it introduces the English local 
government system, and charts the situation that exists in the majority of local 
councils, where one party has overall control. Secondly, it will also assess the 
independence of local politicians from central political, and local bureaucratic, 
control; the suitability of local politicians as decision making actors in coalition 
scenarios is evaluated. This prepares the way for Chapter Three, which begins the 
process of 'marrying' coalition studies and local government studies. 
We begin with an examination of the structure of English local government since the 
last major reorganisation in 1974. This is followed by a look at the internal 
structure of a local authority, including a resume of the functions of the various 
parts (for example, the committees) of the council. Section two attempts to locate the 
centre of decision making in local councils; the role of council bodies is assessed, and 
the thesis that a 'joint elite' of leading councillors and officers rules is put forward. 
The political and officer elite are examined in turn. With this viewpoint of the 
distribution of power in mind, section three outlines a number of models of the 
oficer-councillor relationship. The nature of officer-councillor relationships is 
examined from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, in an attempt to decide 
which of the models (if any) offers the most realistic picture of decision making in 
English local government. The impact of such a finding on a study of coalition 
formation is determined. Finally, section four looks at the nature of central-local 
relationships, at government and party level, in order to assess the extent of 
possible constraints on the bargaining ability of local parties in a coalition situation. 
Section One:The Institutional Context of Local Government 
Mellors (1989) points out that the "institutional setting" of a local political system 
will be a major influence upon the type of coalition behaviour occuring, and argues 
that there are a number of reasons why this is so. Mellors maintains that: 
"the status of local government will determine the value of the prizes 
(both office and policy) available to the potential coalition actor; the 
constitutional arrangements - both internal (e.g. whether or not there is 
a distinct political executive) and external (e.g. the system and timing of 
elections) - besides also contributing to the value of payoffs at local level 
will help determine the arena for local coalitions and contribute to the 
rules of the coalition game at local level." (Mellors, 1989, p.69). 
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Therefore, an examination of the 'institutional setting' Is a prerequisite of a study of 
local coalitions. This appraisal commences with a review of the local government 
system In which English local coalition actors have to operate. 
2.1.1. The English Local Government System 
Local government in England had its last full-scale reorganisation in 1974, 
following the enactment of the Local Government Act (1972). The recommendation of 
the Redcliffe-Maud Report on Local Government in England (1969) was that a single 
tier of local government would be both more efficient and more democratic, with "no 
doubt where responsibility lies [and] no confusion over which authority does what" 
(Redcllffe-Maud, 1969, Volume One, p.68). Despite this, the Conservative 
government introduced a two-tier structure in England which reflected the views of 
the Wheatley Report (1969, pp.164-165) on Scottish local government.'' The two-
tier structure in England was "strictly adhered to even when there seemed little 
justification for it in particular circumstances" (Hampton. 1987, p.37). For 
example, the Isle of Wight, with a population of less than 100,000 has a total of 
three local authorities (one county and two district councils).^ 
Many of the arguments on the merits of the different systems conceal a struggle for 
ideological supremacy which has Implications for the structures adopted. As Hampton 
notes: 
"the debates between advocates of single-tier and two-tier local 
government are ... conducted within an atmosphere In which the relative 
merits of the two systems for the values of efficiency and democracy are 
infused with the expectations of party or local advantage. The result is 
often a series of complex compromises that obtains the theoretical 
advantages of neither system and forms the basis for further argument." 
(Hampton, 1987, p.55). 
There were numerous criticisms of the reformed local government system, including 
accusations of change for political reasons (see Byrne. 1986, pp.44-46).3 
^The three island authorities In Scotland are unitary authorities. Also, in some places there 
Is an addition of a third tier of parish councils with limited powers. 
2 A recurring complaint was that the nine largest former county boroughs, all with 
populations over 200,000, found 'the restricted powers available to them as a result of 
local government reorganisation . . . completely inadequate to deal with the challenges and 
problems presented In complex urban situations" (Alexander, 1982a, p.64). 
^ Accusations of change for political reasons can hardly go deeper than Chandler's 
argument that "the Redcliffe-Maud Commission was established by Richard Grossman and 
Harold Wilson partly as a device to avoid making decisions on boundary reforms that would 
have had for the Labour Party unpalatable consequences for the safety of some of their 
prized constituencies* (Chandler, 1988, p. 181). More recently, It was suggested that the 
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Accusations of making change for party advantage were also levelled when the 
Conservative government of the 1980s further complicated the structure of local 
government in England (see Horton, 1990. p.178). with a single-tier structure 
being created in the metropolitan areas and in London. The Ijocal Government Act 
(1985) abolished the six metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council (all 
Labour controlled), creating publicly unaccountable 'joint boards' to administer 
those services which were not re-allocated to the London boroughs and metropolitan 
districts. The result is that local government in Britain today has a dual structure, 
with two tiers in England and Wales (counties and districts) and Scotland (regions 
and districts), and a single tier structure in the metropolitan and London boroughs. 
As well as weakening the base of 'local democracy' in some areas of England, this has 
further confused a public who generally have only a limited, and usually inaccurate, 
knowledge of what a local authority does. 
2.1.2. The Duties of Local Authorities 
Just what a local authority does do is tightly controlled by specific statutes from 
central government, and local authorities in Britain cannot act outside of the powers 
expressly given to them by Acts of Parliament.^ The services provided by local 
government can be divided into five main categories, grouped according to shared 
characteristics. These are, (1) protective services such as police and fire, (2) 
environmental services such as highways, transport and planning, (3) personal 
welfare services like social work, education and housing, (4) the provision of 
amenities such as parks and museums, and (5) trading services for which councils 
make charges to the public, such as public transport, local markets and crematoria 
(Hampton, 1987, p. 61). The precise division of responsibilities between the two 
tiers of government (where there are two tiers) is not really of concern to this 
particular study. It is sufficient to note that county councils rather than district 
councils are the "major spending authority" (having responsibility for the two main 
areas of local government spending, education and personal social services) and that 
even before their abolition the metropolitan counties were responsible for far fewer 
services than the metropolitan districts (Layfield, 1976. pp.195-196),^ 
Conservative government's suggestion that strategic planning responsibilities be taken 
from county councils was partly because the rise of the Alliance had meant they were no 
longer 'the bedrock of party support' (Paul Barker, "Goodbye to Lancashire, and welcome 
back. Yorkshire", The Independent. 26/4/89) 
^ The Local Government Act (1972) allows local authorities lo levy a rate of no more than 
2p annually for specific local purposes, but apart from this, local authorities cannot act 
outside of functions given them by statute. (Travers, 1986. p.37). 
S It may be pertinent to note that the Layfield Committee (1976), discussing the possible 
introduction of a local income tax, did not distinguish between counties and districts or 
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Central government has a number of mechanisms available to ensure local 
government does not exceed its powers, and since 1979 it has not hesitated to use the 
full weight of the law, with the result that some writers feel there has been a 
"juridification of central-local relationships" (Loughlin, 1986, p.193). Local 
authorities are not only strictly controlled with regard to their powers; the great 
majority of their duties are obligatory, and councils have little discretion with 
regard to the duties they have. 
In addition to the control exercised by central government over the scope of local 
authority powers, central Intervention has also limited the financial autonomy of 
local government. Most commentators agree that the level of central control has 
increased since 1979. when a Conservative government Ideologically opposed to state 
intervention In the economic and social welfare spheres was elected with a pledge to 
"roll back the frontiers of the state'; local authorities were seen as responsible for a 
great deal of unnecessary spending (see Norton, 1990). During the 1980s. a 
number of Acts have been passed (for example, legislation on 'rate-capping' and the 
introduction of the community charge or 'poll tax', followed by 'charge-capping') 
which have lessened the ability of local authorities to set their own levels of income. 
2.1.3. The Advance of Politics 
It might be thought, then, that a system where local administrations appear to be so 
constrained will fail to generate much interest among the political parties; why 
bother to expend energy fighting for control of institutions with very little 
autonomy? However, despite all the attacks on local government autonomy from 
central government, local government is still a significant part of the overall 
political system in Britain and control of local councils, whether county . district or 
metropolitan, is still a considerable political prize.^ As Mellors notes: 
metropolitan counties and metropolitan districts in its discussions on local government 
finance. Instead, it distinguished between authorities on the basis of 'major spending 
authorities' (county councils and metropolitan districts) and the rest. (Layfield, 1976, 
p.196). 
^ However, it has also been argued that the 'community charge removes the ability of local 
authorities to redistribute income and drastically limits their ability to adjust services 
according to community needs" The authors* gloomy prognosis for supporters of local 
democracy is that this means "in future local government will exist for the narrow purpose 
of delivering services" (Butcher. Law. Leach & Mullard. 1990, p.75). If this does become 
the case, its value as a political prize will be severely lessened. However, while aware of 
the future difficulties for local government, other writers are less pessimistic (see 
Stewart & Stoker, 1989, pp.252-254). 
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"the units of government are large, the range of duties extensive and their 
budgets, although subject to considerable central interference, a major 
component of the nation's economy. In these terms at least, the 
institutional setting of local government provides an attractive arena for 
lively party political activity . . . . the political parties do regard local 
council seats as prizes well worth contesting and winning. Despite all the 
constraints that are imposed on local government, control of a council 
gives a political party a valuable political foothold In the locality and an 
important opportunity to shape the community that It serves." (Mellors, 
1989, pp.73-74) 
There is "scope for real discretion" at local level, and "local councillors take many of 
the important policy decisions that affect most people's everyday lives" (Laver, 
1989. p.21). The growth in the number of seats contested by the major political 
parties, and the subsequent decline of the 'independent' councillor at all but parish 
council level, is some indication of the importance attached to control of a local 
council. As the Widdicombe Report on the Conduct of Local Authority Business noted, 
local authorities have in recent years become increasingly 'politicised* 
(Widdicombe. 1986. p.30)7. 
There are a number of reasons for the increase in the 'politicisation' of local 
authorities. Local government reorganisation in 1974 introduced fewer and larger 
authorities, with greater size increasing the costs of fighting an election and, to some 
extent, negating the advantage of the well known 'local personality* fighting on a non-
partisan ticket. Political parties who wished to be considered as serious national 
parties had to try and maximise support at every opportunity. Competition for 
council seats increased as party labels became more important, and fewer candidates 
were returned unopposed. This has meant that local authorities with a low degree of 
political organisation are now rare, and generally confined to the peripheries, for 
example, Cornwall, where Independent councillors are still a considerable factor. In 
the last election before the 1974 re-organisation, 47% of local authorities in 
England and Wales were controlled by Independent or Non-Party councillors; by 
1985 the figure had fallen to 16% (Widdicombe, 1986, Para. 2.40, p.30). In 
1975. 4,802 councillors did not belong to any of the three major parties, but by 
1985 the figure had fallen to 1.389 (Mellors, 1986. p.6). 
^ However, political parties have been around a long time in local government. Parties have 
been active in local government 'since at least the elections that followed the Municipal 
Reform Act 1835" (Gyford & James. 1983, p.1). and fierce clashes between Radicals, 
Whigs and Conservatives over issues of social reform continued throughout the 19th 
century. The establishment of the Labour Party, with its initial emphasis on collective 
decision-making, ensured that such clashes were to continue, at least in the large urban 
conglomerations, throughout the 20th century, as anti-Labour/Socialist coalitions of 
Conservatives. Liberals and Independents were formed in local authorities where Labour 
was a significant force (Cook. 1975). 
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In addition, during the 1960s the Liberals started to concentrate more of their 
energy in contesting local seats, attempting to build local power bases as a future 
springboard to success In national elections. This activity has had a dominant role in 
continuing "the very existence of the party in the country and, specifically, to 
contribute to its revived electoral fortunes" (Gyford & James, 1983, p.69): it has 
also meant that the other main parties have had to follow suit or risk their local 
power bases diminishing. In addition, Independents increasingly adopted a party 
label, which for the most part meant campaigning on a Conservative ticket (see 
Widdicombe. 1986. Research Volume II. p.37). This increased party political 
activity suggests control of local councils Is seen as a valuable political asset by the 
major parties. 
If, as appears to be the case, political parties do see local authorities as a prize 
worth having. It appears logical that the amount of time they will control the prize 
for will affect the pleasure at winning. Four years of control will presumably be 
preferable to one year of control, so the electoral cycle of an authority may well be a 
considerable influence on the tactics political parties will adopt on assuming office. 
2.1.4. The Electoral Cycle 
The county councils and London borough councils hold elections for the whole council 
every 4 years,the metropolitan districts elect a third of their councillors every year 
with the fourth year free of elections, and the district councils may choose between 
these two contrasting methods.^ Such electoral differences, and the fact that local 
elections in Britain are also for a fixed period, are of more than passing interest to 
students of coalition politics. The fact that elections are for fixed periods means there 
is no possibility of a minority government waiting until the local opinion polls 
indicate it can obtain a majority and then calling a snap election, as Harold Wilson 
did when faced with the same situation in the hung Parliament of 1974. Whatever 
their views of hung politics, the actors in such councils have to live with the 
situation. The fixed election period also means that they "cannot be precipitated by 
the resignation of the local executive"; therefore, "party elites are less able to 
threaten dissidents" (Laver, 1989, p.22), suggesting that the power of party elites 
will be less at local level . 
® There are 333 English and Welsh district councils; 209 have elections every four years, 
and 124 of them elect their council by thirds (Railings & Thrasher. 1989). 
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In addition, the length of time they have to live with hungness will almost certainly 
affect the strategies political parties adopt. There will surely be a greater incentive 
to make a deal in councils with a quadrennial electoral cycle, when there are 4 years 
to go before another election. On the other hand, the possibility of an election in one 
year restoring the status quo may be a powerful disincentive to coalition formation. 
Strom makes just this general point, suggesting that "the anticipation of upcoming 
elections ... may be sufficient to induce parties to abstain from power" (Strom. 
1990, p.81). Politicians raised in a political culture which views coalitions with 
distrust will probably be even more reluctant to make deals with opponents which 
may be electorally damaging, when the possibility exists of a return to 'normality' in 
just 12 months. If this is the case, then coalitions will be more likely to form in 
councils with a quadrennial electoral cycle.^ 
Despite this caveat, the evidence suggests that control of a local council is a 
considerable prize, and the incentives for parties in a hung council to come to some 
arrangements in order that they can share the prize are apparent. As this brief 
outline has indicated, the overall structure of local government, the range of duties it 
possesses, and the nature of local elections and the electoral cycle, will probably 
have some affect on the tactics actors in hung councils pursue. Undoubtedly, the 
nature of a local authority's internal constitution will also affect political strategies. 
However, before examining the various components of a local authority, the main 
influence on the internal structure of 'the new local authorities' will be considered. 
2.1.5. The Impact of the Bains Report 
Following the 1974 reorganisation discussed above, the majority of new local 
authorities have based their management structure according to the recommendations 
of the Bains Report (1972) into the management and structure of the new local 
authorities (Davies. 1986, p.18). Bains believed that a "wider ranging corporate 
outlook" was necessary in local authorities (Bains, 1972, p.6), and recognised that 
if this was to have any chance of occuring "members and officers must recognise that 
neither can regard any area of the authority's work and administration as 
exclusively theirs" (Bains, 1972, p.8). To this end. Bains made a number of 
recommendations which were intended to improve the overall management of 
councils. The most important of these were the creation of a chief executive to head 
the administrative structure, assisted by a management team of chief officers, and at 
the centre of the committee structure, a policy and resources committee to perform a 
9 Such possibilities are examined in Chapter Four, which explores the 'local context* to 
coalition building. 
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coordinating function on the political side of the council. Figure 3.1 offers a 
simplified guide to the main elements of the typical local authority In Britain, 
following the recommendations of the Bains Report (1972). 
Figure 3.1: The Basic Structure of the Council (adapted from Byrne. 1986. 
p.146 & p.162)10 
COUNCIL Chief 
Executive 
CO 
DEPT 
CO 
DEPT 
CO 
DEPT 
CO 
DEPT 
Officers' 
Management 
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While Alexander (1982a, p.76)) argues that the influence of Bains may be less deep 
than the wide-ranging adoption of his main proposals implies, most observers are in 
little doubt that the new corporate management has had a great influence on the 
administration of local government (see for example. Rosenberg, 1989, p.117-
118; Byrne. 1986, p.157). The main recommendations of Bains which were 
adopted, and some aspects of their influence, will now be scrutinised. 
The Demise of Departmentalism? 
Prior to reorganisation in 1974, the traditional pattern of administration was that 
of separate and often antagonistic departmental kingdoms within the authority. Each 
department would report to its committee, and there was little coordination between 
the different departments and committees. The needs of the council as a whole were 
often secondary to the perceived needs of the particular department, and 
'departmentalism' reigned (Elcock. 1986. pp.234-235). The only time committee 
decisions were examined in any sort of 'whole', was when the decisions of the 
10 See Bains (1972, pp.98-121) for detailed descriptions and diagrams of the new 
structures. 
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different committees were presented to the full council for consideration and formal 
approval. As Elcock points out: 
"only then could committee decisions be examined to see whether they 
conflicted with decisions of another committee; whether the overall use of 
resources by committees met the priorities which the council's members 
wished to follow and whether the decisions formed part of a coherent plan 
for the authority's future activity...this traditional decision-making 
process was found wanting on all three counts. Different committees were 
providing competing or even conflicting services, agreed priorities were 
not implemented or had not been clearly stated and there was no coherent 
view of the future" (Elcock, 1986, p.235). 
The difficulties of coordinating activities when the system encouraged fragmentation 
meant that most efforts at coordination were confounded by departmental rivalries 
and pressure of time. It was in order to counteract this lack of coordination that the 
Bains Report recommended the establishment of a chief executive officer in each 
local authority, as the head of the officer structure. The chief executive was to have 
no department to run;^^ his or her main function was to coordinate the 
administration of the council and ensure a more coherent pattern to the plans of the 
authority. To this aim, Bains also recommended the setting up of a management team 
of the senior chief officers, chaired by the chief executive, its main function being to 
decide on proposals to be submitted to the council or the policy and resources 
committee. 
It appears that the establishment of a chief executive and management teams of chief 
officers in most local authorities has meant more coherent overall management. 
Stewart argues that most councillors contend that it was not unusual, before the 
setting up of management teams, for different chief officers to disagree on their 
advice to committees, but that "since the advent of management teams such 
differences are kept within the team" (Stewart, 1983, p.96). Such a united front by 
officers towards councillors raises the question of whether such solidarity will 
contribute to officer ascendancy in a local authority, and Rosenberg notes the fear 
felt in some authorities of management teams becoming a "competing centre of 
decision making" (Rosenberg, 1989, pp.109-110). This fear of management teams 
forming an "alternative power base" has led to some authorities forbidding chief 
^ ^ Despite this, research has found that some chief executives operate with an extensive 
department, usually incorporating sections "responsible for policy analysis and corporate 
planning, research and intelligence, management services, and perhaps the personnel 
function* (Greenwood, Walsh, Minings & Ranson, 1980, p.61). 
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officer meetings while in others elected members Insist on attending (Davles. 1986, 
p . l 8 ) . 12 
The Policy and Resources Commit tee 
However, the rise of management teams has been matched by a rise in party 
organisation and discipline, and a greater emphasis in local parties on research 
learns and long term strategy. Party groups can thus make collective decisions^ ^ 
which a united political front can effectively impose on officers, although Elcock 
reports one chief executive who "tried to persuade members that party group 
decisions were no more than requests to the chief officers group for a report and 
recommendations" (Elcock. 1986, p.263). Such an official attitude, at least in 
public, seems to be unusual. Most actors in local government are well aware that 
officers and councillors must work together, although both Redcliffe-f^aud and 
Bains, inevitably given the importance of notions of 'accountability' to democratic 
theory, argued the need for elected members to be in control of the overall 
development and control of services. 
In order to facilitate this, Bains also recommended the creation of a policy and 
resources committee at the very centre of the committee structure (see Figure 3.2). 
The policy and resources committee would oversee the programme committees and 
would be fed with the necessary resource information by a network of 'resource sub-
committees', monitoring areas such as finance and performance review (Bains. 
1972, p.99). 
^2 Davies (as chief executive of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) argues that chief officers meetings 
are essential for efficient functioning, and that 'if chief officers cannot meet together with 
the approval of the controlling party they will almost certainly have to find a way of 
meeting intormalif (Davies, 1986, p. 18. emphasis in original). 
Section two of this chapter argues those 'collective party decisions* represent the 
policy preferences of a small political elite. 
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Figure 3.2: Outline Committee Structure (from Bains, 1972, p.99) 
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The evidence suggests that the policy and resources committee has become the 
"central control committee" (Rosenberg, 1989. p.132) in many local authorities, 
therefore fulfilling the function envisaged by Bains. Although not all local authorities 
will organise their policy and resources committee to act in this way, it has been 
observed that the most common role for the policy and resources committee is to 
comment on, and coordinate, the policy directives of other committees (Greenwood, 
Walsh, Minings & Ranson. 1980, pp.58-62). Widdicombe reported that 462 of the 
494 authorities responding had such an 'overall policy' committee (Widdicombe. 
1986. Table A.31, p.277). and that it appears to occupy a central role In most local 
authorities (Widdicombe, 1986, p,111). Its importance is further illustrated by 
the knowledge that its chair will usually be occupied by the leader of the council, and 
that "the chief executive officer will be the principal officer servicing the policy and 
resources committee and through him or her the committee will have access to advice 
from all the officers of the local authority". In addition, the tendency will be that 
only senior councillors will be appointed to such an important committee.(Hampton, 
1980. pp.79-80). The resemblance to the central government cabinet is apparent. 
Unlike most European national governments, English local government has no central 
executive or 'cabinet'. With the central function of developing future policy (see 
Green. 1981, p.50-51), the policy and resources committee could be seen as the 
nearest equivalent of a cabinet at local levelJ'^ While it must be remembered that 
1^ It will not always be successful in this function. Green argues that the policy and 
resources committee in Newcastle failed "to give adequate considerations to the issues 
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there are a number of constitutional differences between central and local 
government (see Wendt. 1986, pp.379-380). and even though membership of all 
committees now has to be proportional, control of the policy and resources 
committee still gives the leader of the majority group a "formal coordinating 
position" (Hampton, 1987, p.7g) that was not available prior to reorganisation. 
However, "while it is tempting to use the policy committee as the functional 
equivalent of a cabinet at local level, this would understate the policy-making role of 
the major service committees, which can play a significant part in the allocation of 
resources" (Laver, Railings & Thrasher .1987, p.504). 
Despite the caveat, this does suggest such developments may have moved local 
councils even further away from the formal position of the full council as the 
repository of authority. It is clear that the innovations introduced following the 
recommendations of Bains have become important parts of the structure of most local 
authorities. Even in those authorities where such changes have been resisted, 
similar but informal modes of working may be adopted (Davies, 1986, p.18), 
suggesting that political power is located outside of the formal structure of 
committees and full council. 
However, the formal position is still important. For example, public perceptions of 
Parliament as the centre of decision making in the English political system persist, 
and lip service is still paid to its sovereignty by the central executive. The idea of 
parliamentary sovereignly: 
"provides the dominant language of political discourse. Most citizens feet 
that this is broadly speaking how the policy-process should operate, and 
this in turn provides a powerful incentive for political actors at least to 
go through the motions of following the precepts". (Greenaway, Smith & 
Street, 1992, p,50). 
It is reasonable to suppose that such feelings also exist in the local context. If so, the 
need to conform to this formal conception of the focus of decision making in local 
councils will almost certainly affect the behaviour of local actors, at least In public. 
An examination of the formal picture is therefore essential. 
which were brought before it, or to evolve a satisfactory way of considering questions of 
future policy" (Green, 1981,p.55). Also, Haywood reports the failure of the committee in 
Beverley, a council which was then dominated by Independent members; its usefulness was 
•limited ... with no cohesive party group in control" (Haywood, 1977, p.47), which, if so. 
is an indication the such a committee may be less influential in hung councils. 
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2.1.6. The Management of Local Author i t ies : The Formal Picture 
The organisation of a local authority will vary from one authority to another, and 
Stanyer warns against "the myth of uniformity" (Stanyer, 1976. p.17) which has 
often been a feature of works on British local government.''^ However, all local 
authorities will be organised in a similar way, and although it is necessary to 
remember that each local authority is an individual political unit in its own right, as 
Byrne points out: 
"all follow a broadly similar pattern, and certain forms or procedures 
are universally adopted where they are required by law...all local 
authorities will conduct their activities through a council of all members, 
aided by a number of committees (comprising small groups of members), 
which work in close collaboration with senior officers, who are employed 
by the council and head the various departments of the council" (Byrne. 
1986, p.146) 
Formally, the full council of all members is the governing body of a local authority. 
Councils generally consist of between 40 to 100 elected members, most of whom are 
organised in political parties. Almost without exception, decisions are not made at the 
full council meeting; the practice has been to delegate considerable powers to the 
council committees. Journalists, however, tend to concentrate on the council 
meeting, with its ritualistic and often heated battles contrasting with (and making 
better copy than) the more restrained behaviour in committee meetings. As one 
Labour councillor observed, "if you want to make a splash in a newspaper you leap 
up at a Council meeting ... you don't do it at a committee" (Glasser, 1984, p.67). The 
business of the council meeting, therefore, is largely symbolic and the bulk of the 
council's agenda is dominated by reports from the various committees. The council is 
not usually an Initiator of business; its main function is to ratify decisions already 
made elsewhere, usually in committee (Byrne, 1986. pp.146-147). However, it 
does not follow from this that committees are where power lies in a local authority. 
The Funct ions and Operations of Counci l Commit tees 
A council committee is normally concerned with either a specific service function 
(for example, education) or with a general function applicable to all the departments 
of the local authority (for example, the policy and resources committee). The 
frequency and timing of meetings "are matters which are left largely to the local 
authorities themselves to decide" (Byrne, 1986. p.148). The committee's agenda 
1^ See for example, Marshall (1960) and Warren & Richards (1965). Even today, most 
standard textbooks continue to ignore the widespread existence of hung councils (Byrne, 
1986), although some pay a little attention to the different patterns of organisation hung 
councils exhibit (Stoker. 1991). 
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will usually consist of departmental officers' reports, which will detail the decisions 
required by the committee; officers will normally take part in any discussion. A 
committee normally consists of councillors appointed by the council. Co-opted 
members from outside the council can be added to a committee, but this is, with the 
exception of education committees where it is a common practice, a rare 
occurrence.^ ^ 
When this research took place (Summer, 1988) majority parties were in control of 
allocating committee places. Widdicombe noted they often awarded themselves more 
committee members than their numbers on the council would indicate was fair,^^ 
and single, party committees, which effectively functioned as a de facto executive, 
were also not unknown (fviellors, 1989, p,74). Widdicombe argued that the 
composition of committees should reflect the composition of the council as a whole, 
and that the chief executive should be responsible for enforcing this rule 
(Widdicombe, 1986. Para. 5.54, p.81). The Local Government Act (1989) enacted 
this recommendation, and it is now a requirement that committee composition is 
proportional to the composition of the full council."'^ 
The central point that must be made is that decision making power usually lies 
elsewhere. Party group briefings will inform committee members of the decisions 
required. Given the control of the majority party in the council chamber, committee 
decisions which go to full council have little chance of failing in most local 
authorities."'9 The committee is often seen in standard textbooks as the primary 
source of decision making within a council, but as Stewart points out, although there 
can be issues on which there is real argument and discussion.^o in the most part the 
16 The co-opting of members is Intended to add expertise to a committee, but it can also be 
used to distort the political composition of a committee. The Widdicombe Report (1986) 
detailed widespread disquiet among councillors of all parties at the practice of co-option, 
and argued that the legislation should be amended so that "decision taking committees and 
sub committees may consist only of councillors, and in particular only councillors may vote 
on such committees" (Widdicombe, 1986. Para. 5.107, p.94). 
See Table 7.1, Chapter Seven. 
^ ^ The requirement of proportionality has repercussions for future studies of local 
coalitions, in that committee places can no longer be offered as 'rewards' for participation 
in a coalition. However, when this research took place, this possibility still existed, and 
Section One of Chapter Seven explores this. The fate of one-party committees after a 
council becomes hung is also considered in Chapter Seven. 
1^ Committee decisions will either be or a 'resolution* or a 'recommendation* to the full 
council. A resolution is not normally debated in council; most concern non-controversial 
decisions such as repairs or maintenance. Recommendations, on the other hand, require the 
endorsement of the full council (Stewart, 1983. p.89). 
Such argument is unlikely to affect the view of a majority party, and especially among 
councillors of the majority parly is unlikely to be encouraged. According to Rosenberg, the 
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committee is merely ratifying " decisions made in other settings - in the 
department, in discussion between chairman and chief officer, or in the political 
group" (Stewart. 1983. p.89). So, if the council is merely a ratifying body for 
decisions taken in committees, and if committees are merely ratifying bodies for 
decisions taken elsewhere, many of the standard works on local government are 
perpetuating a myth.2i 
It would also be a mistake to assume that political power is necessarily concentrated 
on the political side of the council. Formally, officers carry out the policy decisions 
of councillors, but it is unrealistic to expect officers who are in day-to-day control 
of the administration of policy not to make an input into the policy process. 
Management in local government "has to be based on acceptance that a local authority 
embodies a political management system in which the political and management 
processes are intertwined (Stewart, 1990, p.26).22 The question of who is in 
control of policy, officers or councillors, has been the subject of much debate within 
local government studies and an examination of the relationship is, therefore, 
essential to our understanding of local policy making. Section Two's examination of 
the location of decision making power in single party majority control councils will 
largely concentrate on the dynamics of this relationship. 
Sect ion Two : Decision Making In Engl ish Local Author i t ies 
Most studies of local government have commented on the close relationship between 
the leaders of the ruling party and chief officers, what Stoker calls the "joint elite" 
(Stoker. 1991 p.92).23 While this relationship is rarely without tensions, and 
Widdicombe noted that the tensions had increased as councillors became "clearer 
about their political goals and priorities and more determined to ensure that these 
are implemented" (Widdicombe, 1986, Research Volume One, p.125), there is an 
committee chairman will ensure that "difficult members' will be "tamed" (Rosenberg, 
1989, p.210). 
2^ For example, according to Wilson "policy making takes place in the full council and in the 
committees and sub-committees' (Wilson. 1988, p.136). To be fair, the majority of 
mainstream studies of local government are well aware that most committees have 
become, like the operation of the full council, instruments of party control (for example, 
see Stoker, 1991, p.84>. 
22 As Stewart notes, "it is a dangerous mistake to believe that political processes and 
management processes are opposed to each other and can be separated" (Stewart, 1990, 
p.25). 
23 Rosenberg (1990. p.210) says that the "inner establishment of senior councillors and 
influential chief officers is of great importance in formal and informal decision making' 
(Rosenberg, 1989, p.210 
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inevitable closeness between chief officers and controlling party leaders in a 
majority controlled council. 
2.2.1. Where Are Decis ions Really Made? 
There is a general agreement among observers of British local government as to who 
the most powerful groups in the majority of local authorities are, and upon the 
significance of the various bodies within the council when a single party group 
controls the decision making process. While formally the officers of a council are the 
servants of all councillors, regardless of party or rank, the contact between officers 
and councillors tends to be confined to meetings of senior officers and senior party 
spokesmen, with the ordinary councillor effectively impotent in the development of 
policy. The 'joint elite' of chief officers and leading members of the governing party 
control the process of decision making and hence the general flow of policy within the 
council.24 
Almost without exception, as Section One has indicated, decisions are not made in the 
Council Chamber where all members sit. The council meeting puts the final, formal 
seal on decisions made elsewhere; normally, considerable powers are delegated to the 
council committees. The Councirs main function in majority controlled councils is to 
ratify decisions already made in committee, and party whipping usually guarantees 
ratification (Widdicombe. 1986, Research Volume One, p.105). The Widdicombe 
Report gave support to this view of decision making, reporting that: 
"it is now almost universal practice for councillors of the same political 
parly on an authority to organise themselves in a political group which 
meets to predetermine the line to be taken on matters coming before the 
council" (Widdicombe. 1986, p.30). 
Widdicombe also found that in most authorities the majority party took all committee 
chairs and vice chairs, and all sub-committee chairs (Widdicombe, 1986, p.30). 
This gives a majority party group a tight control on the activities of committees, and 
also enables group leaders to keep a close eye on rank and file members to ensure 
that party discipline is being maintained. While committee agendas are drawn up by 
officers, enabling officers to structure the business of the council, party discipline 
gives the majority party elite a potentially powerful hold on the major policy 
24 For example. Dearlove (1973). Green (1981). Barker, (1983) and Saunders (1979) all 
report that policy making is effectively controlled by the party leadership; these studies 
are discussed shortly. 
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direction of a council.25 The ruling party also has its committee chairmen to ensure 
party discipline is maintained. 
The Role of Commit tee Chairmen 
In theory, committee chairmen are powerful actors, and "have long been regarded as 
key figures in the process of local government decision making" (Laver Railings & 
Thrasher, 1987. p.504). It is certainly the case that some chairmen can exercise 
considerable influence; the chairman of the policy and resources committee occupies 
a central role, as does the chair of the finance committee.^^ Traditionally, the career 
path of local politicians has seen the eventual possession of one of the important 
committee chairs as a primary aim (Collins, 1978. pp.425-447). However, the 
changes in local government structure and the increasing politicisation of councils 
are seen by some observers as weakening the ability of committee chairmen as 
individual actors. Hampton maintains that "the growth in partisan organisation" 
combined with the new corporate structures has: 
"enhanced the role of the leader but at the same time it has reduced the 
power of councillors occupying committee chairs. At one time these 
positions gave the power to affect policy in a particular area of local 
authority endeavour almost irrespective of the rest of council policy. In a 
politically organised council, however, the minutes of all committees will 
be discussed in the parly groups" (Hampton, 1987, p.79). 
Political decisions will therefore become more consistent, lessening the ability of 
individual chairmen to pursue their own policy preferences. However, because 
'party groups' are discussing policy does not also mean that individual backbench 
councillors of the majority party are any more influential than opposition 
backbenchers.27 The "enhanced role" of the leader noted by Hampton suggests a 
centralisation of decision making within local authorities. 
This is not to deny that committee members will have a degree of influence in 
deciding council policy. Individual committee members have often specialised in the 
work of particular committees for most of their elected life. Newton found that it was 
quite normal for councillors to sit on the same committees for fifteen years (Newton, 
25 That said, there can be "occasions when the ruling group as a whole, not just its leading 
councillors, can be crucial in decision making " (Stoker & Wilson, 1986, pp.285-302). 
26 From his studies. Rosenberg make the common sense observation that some chairmen 
will be "weak" and others will be "powerful" (Rosenberg, 1989. pp.172-202). 
27 Although as Wilson notes, "the literature contains many examples of leaderships being 
force to change policy by determined backbench opposition within the ruling group" (Wilson, 
1988, p.137. emphasis in original). 
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1976, p.152), and as Stewart points out, "specialisation by committee work is 
defined by experience as the norm for the councillor's role" (StewaH. 1983. 
p.139). A committee may merely be pushing through a programme already decided 
by the governing party elite, but the members of a committee will have made their 
views known to their colleagues in the party elite, and long term committee members 
will undoubtedly play a part in deciding their party's policy in those areas where 
they have acquired expertise. 
Despite the widespread contention that elite control of policy has increased,28 
Widdicombe argues for the retention of the current decision making system because 
the level of 'backbench' involvement on committees "gives councillors as a whole ... a 
direct involvement in the process of government which they would not have if 
executive power was concentrated in fewer hands" (Widdicombe, 1986. p.71). In 
this, Widdicombe appears to have minimised the relevance of some of the evidence 
presented to the committee, in particular the contention that the "spread and 
intensification" of politicisation has long since diminished the significance of 
committee or council meetings "as arenas where policies or major decisions are 
actually made, apart from in Independent-dominated or tiung councilsT (Widdicombe, 
1986, Research Volume One. p.105, my emphases). In addition, in response to the 
question "Is there, among the members, an inner circle of particularly influential 
senior members?", exactly three quarters of English chief executives answered 
'yes', supporting the findings of most in-depth studies (Widdicombe, 1986. Table 
A. I2) . The effect of such elite control over policy in most local authorities has been, 
as has been argued above, to reduce the Council and its committees to bodies, where, 
in the main, decisions are ratified and "rubber-stamped" rather than made. 
Of course, it is acknowleged that "senior councillors and officers must be careful not 
to offend the core political values and commitments of backbenchers" (Stoker. 1988. 
pp.92-93). but such acknowledgement does not weaken the case put fonward by 
"defenders of the joint elite model", as Stoker argues.29 The fact that party groups 
28 Stoker challenges the "prevailing wisdom" of total elite dominance, arguing that 'it is 
important to consider the influence on policy processes that can be exercised by ruling 
group back-benchers in private party caucuses" (Stoker. 1988. p.90). 
2^ Stoker seems to feel that assembling "sufficient examples of influences on the policy 
process stemming from outside the joint elite" (Stoker, 1988, p.104) weakens the thesis. 
However, no study of local decision making disputes that all groups in a council are capable 
of at least occasional influence; even backbench fvlembers of Parliament will sometimes 
influence the government, and Davies (1979) notes that Wandsworth backbenchers were 
influential in some policy areas. Also, as Green (1981, p.74) points out. "traditional party 
values' will limit elite influence. 
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can have a key role in scrutinising policy initiatives implies at best a reactive role 
and Stoker admits that "pro-active" influence is rare (Stoker, 1991, p.96). It 
remains the case that in-depth studies of individual councils consistently encounter a 
policy making elite. The findings of some of those studies will now be detailed. 
2.2.2, The Po l i t i ca l El i te 
While there is disagreement as to the precise nature of the relationship between the 
two groups comprising the elite, studies agree that the power of individual 
council lors or 'opposit ion' party groups is l imited.^o In order to map the 
relationship, an examination of the two sides of the elite is necessary, and we begin 
with an examination of the political elite in English local authorities. 
The 1960s saw a growth of interest in local government, reflecting a general 
concern that local government was not providing a consistent level of service across 
the country. There was also more emphasis in the reports of official committees on 
the actors involved, providing scholars for the first time with relatively unbiased 
accounts of the motives, activities and abilities of elected local representatives in 
particular. The Maud Committee (1967) reported that few members saw 
themselves as policy-makers; "only three or four of all the members...even in some 
quite large authorities" (Maud, 1967. Vol.2, p.40), were involved in the formation 
of policy.^ ^ 
Several pre-reorganisation studies supported the existence of small policy making 
elites. Newton's examination of local politics in Birmingham found a "small elite" 
dominating the policy process in both major parties (Newton. 1976, p.233). 
Dearlove's study of the Conservative controlled Royal Borough of Kensington & 
Chelsea found that the Leader of the Council was allowed a great deal of leeway in 
decision-making, even when the leader's views might be against the views of a senior 
committee chairman (Dearlove, 1973, pp.136-140). Neither Jones' (1969) study 
of Wolverhampton nor Bulpitt's (1967) analysis of parties in the North-West of 
England found evidence of party groups playing any significant role in policy 
formulat ion. 
30 See Widdicombe. 1986. Research Volume One, Chapter Six, for an account of a number 
of aspects of the relationship. 
31 How authoritative Maud can be considered is another matter. Stanyer was brutal about 
the committee's shortcomings, arguing that it "must be regarded as one of the most 
disastrous uses of an advisory committee that can be envisaged, if one asks and expects 
that an advisory committee will provide an authoritative analysis of the problems set by 
its terms of reference, and by rigourous reasoning propose defensible solutions which have 
a practical use" (Stanyer, 1970, pp.66-67). 
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The rise of party politics in local government since re-organisation in 1974 has not 
changed this situation. Rather, it appears that party elites retain a tight control on 
the general flow of policy. Barker's study of Bristol Labour party argues that the 
Labour group are "manipulated and controlled by the leadership" (Barker, 1983. 
p.17). In Newcastle. Green (1981) found the ruling Labour group was generally 
subservient to the party leadership. As one backbench councillor told him "the policy 
and resources committee tend to treat themselves as an executive committee of the 
group [displacing the group] in initiating and presenting policy ... the group loses 
out"."^2 Green concludes that the party group "did not play a significant part in 
initiating policy decisions, nor did they provide a setting In which individual 
councillors could put forward new proposals for serious consideration" (Green, 
1981. pp.50-51). Glasser reports the chief executive of St Albans dismissing the 
influence of all but the senior politicians with the words: "the fact of life is that the 
individual councillor is not important in the management role in any way at air 
(Glasser. 1984. p.138, my emphasis). While he notes a rather larger group of 
"influential" councillors than the above writers. Railings (1976). in a study of 
influence in Paisley, finds that policy making is largely the preserve of the 
influential few, with "the majority of councillors [aspiring] no higher than the 
efficient discharge of constituency duties" (Railings, 1976. p.364). In Croydon, 
Saunders reports that the group meetings of the ruling Conservatives were designed 
to "ensure that members formally fell into line behind their leaders" (Saunders. 
1980. p.221). f^ore dramatically, Collins (1984) compares party leaders to Prime 
fVlinisters, with the leader seen as a "custodian of policy" at local level. If major 
changes in policy are planned, this will usually entail a change of leader. Collins 
highlights the tendency for party leaders to become full-time politicians, employing 
a team of policy advisers or research assistants, and suggests that "to this extent 
some have become, in effect. local Prime fvlinisters" (Collins, 1984, p.45). Even in 
'Liberal* groups, "leadership ... is provided by the inner circle of senior group 
members" (Stoker. 1991, p.97).33 
32 Although, as previously noted. Green was critical of the way it performed this function 
(1981, pp.54-55). 
33 As yet. there are no studies of local leadership in the SLD. Traditionally, the Liberals 
have rejected ideas of rigid parly group discipline (Gyford & James, 1983. p.l83), and its 
publications have been careful to emphasise the notion of 'group decisions* (Clay, 1982, 
p.l8). However, 'party group decisions' are largely irrelevant in power terms in 
opposition, and some ruling Liberal groups (for example. Liverpool in the 1970s and early 
1980s) have had an tdemiftable group of leading councillors. At central level, the SLD, as 
its more formalised party convention indicates, may be moving towards the Conservative 
hierarchical structure which Labour has certainly adopted in recent years (as the 
increasingly stage-managed party conventions demonstrate). However, it must be noted 
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The ability of the leaders to decide the composition of the leadership group in the 
council and select chairpersons, puts them in a powerful position, and most 
ambitious local politicians will defer to leaders with such power of patronage.In 
many cities, for example, Liverpool, Hull, and Newcastle, there is a tradition of 
autocratic leadership within both the main parties. While Elcock (both a Labour 
politician and academic) argues that "in Leeds leading figures are carefully watched 
by their colleagues in the Labour Group and quickly cut down to size if they seek too 
much power" (Elcock. 1986, p.81) and while it must be noted that "leadership 
styles" in local government range "from the ultra-democratic to the downright 
authoritarian (Widdicombe, Research Volume One. p.90). most studies of internal 
politics agree on the considerable degree of autonomy allowed to leaders of both the 
main parties.^^ The effect of such elite control on policy in most local authorities 
has been, as has been argued above, to reduce the Council and its committees to bodies 
where, in the main, decisions are ratified and "rubber-stamped" rather than 
made.35 
2.2.3. The Bureaucra t ic Eli te 
On the officer side of the council, the chief executive is the head of the structure. 
Chief officers head the various council departments, and together with the chief 
executive as chairman comprise the management team, whose main function is to 
decide on proposals to be submitted to the council or the policy and resources 
committee.'^^ The adoption of management teams has been almost universal in English 
local government (Alexander, 1981, p.34). As already detailed, the management 
team has contributed to a greater coherence in the views put forward to councillors 
by officers (Stewart, 1983, p.96).3 7 
that the local Liberal ideal of 'community politics' developed through the 1960s and 1970s 
(see Main, 1976, and Pinkney, 1984), runs contrary to tight elite control. 
Pinkney (1984, p.75) also notes an identifiable group of leaders in Liberal groups, 
although Liberal groups were less likely to concentrate power than Labour groups (Pinkney. 
1984, fn.. p.83). 
^5 It is accepted, as Stoker argues, that not all councils will operate in this way; 
however, the consensus view is that the majority of councils now operate with tight elite 
control of policy, a control that the Bains recommendations facilitated (Hampton, 1987, 
pp.78-80). 
36 Stephenson reports that Cheshire's management team "was specifically accountable for 
developing and managing corporate policies, including forward planning, overall 
performance and communications, both internal and external" (Stephenson. 1988, p.1430). 
3^ The Audit Commission offer a note of dissent, arguing that, especially in large 
authorities, "the management team has been perceived to be an inadequate coordinating 
mechanism' (Audit Commission Management Papers No. 2, January 1989. p.3). 
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The management team therefore gives local government officers the opportunity to 
present a coherent strategy to councillors, which raises the question of whether such 
solidarity will contribute to officer ascendancy in a local authority. Officers, after 
all. are experts in their particular fields, and a united front of expertise might 
easily overpower politicians unlikely to possess the specialist knowledge which chief 
officers will have of, for example, town planning or the effects of interest rates on 
council budgeting. As Hampton points out, "councillors need to be very strong-
minded, and in some circumstances foolhardy, if they are to go against strongly 
offered professional opinions"; if it is the norm that "councillors usually rely on 
their officers as the sole source of professional advice" (Hampton. 1987. p.82).the 
capacityjor officer dominance is obvious. 
On the other hand, the rise of management teams has been matched by a rise in party 
organisation and discipline, and a greater emphasis in local parties on research 
teams and long term strategy. Party groups can thus make collective decisions which 
their united front can effectively impose on officers, although Elcock reports one 
chief executive who "tried to persuade members that parly group decisions were no 
more than requests to the chief officers group for a report and recommendations" 
(Elcock, 1986, p.263). Such an official attitude, at least in public, seems to be 
unusual, although one chief officer told Glasser (1984): 
"it pays to give [councillors], something to do. It doesn't matter what it is 
as long as it's not that important. It makes them feel they're doing their 
proper public duty, but the real thing is it keeps them out of our hair, 
and we can get on with our work" (Glasser, 1984, p,98).38 
Despite such responses, most actors in local government are well aware of the need 
for a cooperative working relationship between officers and councillors, although 
few would disagree with the widely held notion that elected members must be the 
final decision takers, accountable to the voters who elected them to office. Whatever 
the formal picture, it is unrealistic to expect officers who are in day to day control 
of the administration of policy not to have an input in decision making. The idea of 
officers being merely servants who implement the decisions of their elected masters 
is "logically untenable" (Collins, Hinings, & Walsh, 1978, p.34). It is also unlikely 
that local politicians, who are often deeply committed to their political views, exist 
merely to legitimate the policy preferences of local government professionals. 
36HOW that chief officer responded to the hungness that was shortly to happen in St Albans 
is unrecorded, but one would guess that his opinions would not have been favourable to the 
more consensual decision making process hungness must bring. 
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There is little doubt that both officers and councillors are involved in the 
development and administration of policy, but their relative power will vary from 
issue to issue and from one local authority to the next (see Alexander, 1981). The 
factors which might affect this power relationship will now be examined. 
Sect ion Three : The Counc i l lo r -Of f i ce r Re la t ionsh ip 
There are a number of conceptions of the relationship between local government 
officers and councillors. The one thing that can be said with any confidence is that 
the formal picture of the relationship is far from the truth. For instance, no 
reference is made to the existence of party political groups either in the legislation 
governing local authorities or in the standing orders of most councils. Formally, 
councillors appoint and oversee a staff of professionals (local government officers), 
who are the servants of the council and responsible to all councillors as a body. Any 
councillor can request information and advice, and each member has the same right 
of access. Formally, officers advise, recommend, and research policies, with 
councillors making the final decisions. As the findings already discussed indicate, 
this is an unrealistic picture. Most studies have shown that the contact between local 
government officers and councillors lends to be confined to meetings of senior 
officers and the ruling elite, with the ordinary councillor effectively politically 
impotent in the development of policy. 
2 .3 .1 . Mode ls of the Counc i l l o r -Of f i ce r Re la t ionsh ip 
The main problem in attempting to evaluate the relationship is the lack of systematic 
studies, particularly into the role of the officer in the policy process.39 As 
Greenwood & Hinings point out, when Newton queried the 'dictatorship of the official' 
he relied "almost exclusively upon interviews with members" (Greenwood & 
Hinings. 1977. p.3), who might be expected to emphasise their role in the policy 
making process. Admitting to excessive officer control would be to damage their 
prestige and also to admit a failure of duty. Deartove justified the omission of the 
local government officer from his research on the grounds of his inability: 
39 Lee's (1963) classic study of Cheshire, Social Leaders and Public Persons , noted the 
importance of chief officers over a range of issues. Also.for councillors "promotion into 
the inner ring depended upon making an impression upon not only one's immediate colleagues 
but also upon the Chief Officers and Chairmen" (Lee. 1963. p.214). Rosenberg laments the 
decline of such 'studies of ministerial politics' which he argues "declined and vanished, 
with few exceptions, after 1974" (Rosenberg, 1989. fn, p.2l7). 
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"to break through the cultural cliche that they were simply servants 
advising the all-powerful policy making councillors whose decisions they 
readily implemented" (Dearlove, 1973. p.229). 
It does appear intuitively unlikely that the role of the professionals in local 
government is confined to carrying out administrative duties, and equally unlikely 
that councillors are under administrative control. The important question to ask 
appears to be: how are both involved in the development and administration of 
policy? Three models have been offered which are designed to address this question, 
the 'Technocratic Model*, the 'Corporate Model', and the 'Representative Model' 
(Collins. Minings, & Walsh. 1978). 
The Technocratic Model sees the officer as dominant, arguing that the "growth in the 
scope of expert knowledge" (Collins, Minings & Walsh, 1978. p.45) has meant most 
of the decisions that have to be taken are so technical that councillors have to rely on 
the professionals for guidance. Politicians are front men. irrelevant to the workings 
of a local authority, but necessary to legitimise the professionals decisions to the 
public. Only those with the requisite knowledge and technical ability are capable of 
making decisions, and politicians are unlikely to possess such knowledge.'**^ It could 
be argued that the establishment of the management teams recommended by Bains 
(1972) in most local authorities, may have led some officers to believe that theirs 
is. or should be, the dominant role in the policy making process. It might certainly 
facilitate such dominance, as management teams enable officers to present a united 
front of expertise to councillors."^ ^ 
The Representative Model, sees councillors as dominant, and while it is accepted that 
policy and administration cannot be fully separated, the officer is expected to be 
reticent about making policy.'*^ in the Representative Model, decisions are taken 
before entering the formal decision-making arenas of the council chamber and the 
council committee. The link between local government officers and party leaders is 
vital, and minor parties are seen as politically impotent. Therefore, in this model 
^^Glasser reports that in St Albans "the feeling that 'the officers keep us at arm's length* 
is common", and officers did not appear to respect the opinions of most councillors 
(Glasser. 1984. p.91). 
At its most extreme, the Technocratic Model would argue that there are no political 
problems, but only scientific and rational solutions to the problems of the social world. 
^2 Two sub-divisions to this model are put fonward by Collins, et al. The 'Individual 
Representative Model' argues that power lies with certain individual councillors, while the 
'Collective Representative Model' sees power lying with the party group (Collins, Minings & 
Walsh, 1978. pp.41-42). 
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there is a clear differentiation between politicians with and without power, a 
distinction that certainly fits with the picture previously presented in this chapter. 
T h e s e models have been criticised for failing to sufficiently recognise that 
"developing and administering policy at the local level is a process which involves 
both officers and councillors, not simply one group or the other" (Wilson. 1988, 
p.137). This criticism cannot be levelled at the third model of the relationship. The 
Corporate Model. This model presents another way of looking at the relationship; as 
we have seen , the Bains Report advocated this type of corporate partnership between 
councillors and officers. In the Corporate IVIodel, functions are inter-related, and the 
political and technical are blended into a political-management system. In this 
model, officers are acknowledged as having a role in the decision-making process, 
but politicians still constitute the final formal policy authority. T h e model 
recognises the existence of a small member-officer elite with a partnership based on 
consensual agreement. 
2 .3 .2 . F a c t o r s I n f l u e n c i n g C o u n c i l l o r - O f f i c e r R e l a t i o n s h i p s 
The three models offered are "ideal types^ and it is admitted that local authorities 
will probably p o s s e s s attributes of all three models, "although they will be more 
like one type than another" (Collins, Minings & Walsh, p.47). The degree to which 
the councillor-officer relationship will approach one of these ideal types is 
obviously dependent on a number of factors. Which party is in control of the council, 
the degree of political control, the degree of technicality of a problem, and the size of 
the authority, will all affect the relationship (Collins et all, pp.44-46).^^ 
Greenwood & Stewart (1973) suggest that Labour authorities will tend to favour a 
more corporate approach, while the Conservatives relationship with their officers 
will be more ' feudar. ' '5 Relat ionships between officers and council lors in 
Stewart points out that the corporate approach can mean the establishment of an 
"ideology of managerial professionalism" (Stewart, 1983. p.217), indicating that 
councillors will be acting more like local government officers than as representatives of 
their electorate, which may lead to charges that public interest is being submerged by 
organisational interests and the need to ensure organisational stability. 
Long & Richer (ig68. pp.152-153) note the extent of such factors will produce 
different structural effects on councils which will hence necessitate different management 
strategies and internal organisation. 
Dearlove notes that in Kensington, the Conservative leader of the council and the 
committee chairmen "were allowed very considerable powers by their colleagues' 
(Dearlove, 1973, p. 124), supporting the argument that *the notion that the party leader is 
the custodian of policy ... operates in local as well as national Conservative politics' 
(Elcock & Wheaton, 1986, p.83). 
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SLD/All iance controlled councils might be expected to be framed along the lines of the 
Corporate Model, given the proclaimed Alliance commitment at local level to more 
open and consultative government.'*^ 
Coll ins et al argue that the "degree to which local authorities are politically 
organised" will be important, with those local authorities being more politically 
organised along party lines tending to be controlled by members (Collins, Minings, & 
Walsh, 1978. p.44). Hill suggests that councils dominated by Independent members 
may well allow officers to play the dominant role In the policy making process, such 
local authorities being dominated by the machinations of "administrative politics", 
but that It Is unlikely to be so in councils where disciplined party groups dominate 
the greater part of council business and where the emphasis is on "ideological 
politics" (Hill, 1972, p.227). Such authorities, whether controlled by a single 
majority party or a coalition of parlies, are now the norm (Widdicombe, 1986, 
p . 3 0 ) . 
The degree of technicality of a problem will also Influence the relationship. In 
certain a reas of local government responsibility, for example, planning and 
transport, the solutions to problems may appear to be more technical and less open 
to political debate than in an emotive area like social services, and it may be that 
officer control in those "technical" areas would be greater. However, as Collins et al 
point out, while it may be that the more complex a problem is the greater the 
likelihood of officer control, "the more complex problems are, the less likely they 
are to be thought amenable to purely technical solutions" (Collins, Hinings, & 
Walsh, 1978, p.46, emphasis in original). The authors suggest that, in such c a s e s , 
it may be that the Corporate Model addresses this problem best. 
C o l l i n s et al also suggest that the size of a local authority will influence the 
relationship between officers and councillors, with the greater the s ize , the greater 
the degree of technocratic control, for two reasons. First, larger authorities will 
have a greater volume of activity and, consequently, more designated decisions, and, 
second, there will be a growth of specialisation because of this greater volume of 
activity (Collins. Hinings, & Walsh, 1978, p.46). The authors conclude that local 
authorities will generally resemble one of these models, depending on the factors of 
political change, growth in the scope of expert knowledge, complexity of problems. 
46 Clay (1982, p.17) tells Liberal councillors that "an important key is getting the crucial 
chief officer relationships right at an early stage ... since chief officers can smooth 
relationships between groups behind the scenes, and are a vital source of information, it is 
worth persevering". 
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and size of the authority, influencing the relationship (Collins, Minings. & Walsh, 
1978. p.47). 
2 .3 .3 . W h i c h M o d e l ? 
The conclusions of Collins. Minings & Walsh, that these models offer a guide to the 
councillor-officer relationship and that local authorities will resemble one or other 
of these models, is unhelpful to this study.'*^ If officers are in control of a local 
authority, a s the Technocratic Model argues, then any bargaining taking place 
between political parties in a hung council is largely irrelevant. Whatever the 
political arrangement agreed between the parties, if the officers are controlling the 
general flow of policy an examination of the ''policy payoffs" will be pointless. 
However, the Technocratic fwlodel does not fit with our, admittedly limited, knowledge 
of councillor-officer relationships. It may well be that, in some local authorities, 
officers will be the focus of decision making, but it is unlikely to be so in the 
majority of local authorities, which are now highly politicised.'*^ 
In addition, while it might appear a reasonable contention that larger authorities 
will tend, of necessity, to adopt a more corporate approach, this does not preclude 
(as the model allows) councillors from making the important policy decisions, which 
provide an ideological framework within which decisions necessitating a high degree 
of technical knowledge can be made. As has been argued, local party elites control the 
majority of the major policy decisions in the council, and most decisions about policy 
are agreed before the committee stage. Committee members are well aware of the 
general direction of policy, and if they have to make a decision in committee are 
generally well aware of the ideological constraints which are 'imposed' upon them. 
The Representative Model argues that decisions are taken before entering the formal 
policy-making a renas of the full Counci l and the committee, recognises the 
impotence of minor parties, and places the local political party at the centre of the 
decision-making process . The clear differentiation between politicians with or 
without power in this model fits with our knowledge from those studies of local 
authorities which have been carried out; party elites make policy, the rest usually 
do what they are told. 
A major problem in assessing the relationship is that the current local government 
model "is not one which lends itself to total clarity in roles and relationships* (Baddeley & 
James, 1987, p.35) 
'^^Recent research (Young & Davies. 1990) has confirmed the continuing trend of 
potiticisation and party control found by Widdicombe (1986). 
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Elcock supports the claim of the Representative Model that decisions are often taken 
before entering the formal policy making arenas of local authorities; he argues 
"party groups and their executive committees make collective decisions which can be 
imposed on committees and officers" (Elcock, 1986, p.105). and even if those 
decisions are not imposed, regular meetings of party groups, at the very least, make 
certain that all members are aware of the senior councillors viewpoint on major 
policy matters. Widdicombe reports that in all the local authorities they surveyed, 
the party groups always met before council meetings, and some groups also met 
before committee meetings (Widdicombe. 1986. Para . 2.42, p.31). 
Newton maintained that the party group in Birmingham w a s a vital factor in 
establishing political will over officers, since "it enabled councillors to say clearly 
what policies they collectively wished to follow" (Newton, 1976. pp.160-161 
While Newton admiued that it was difficult to a s s e s s their relative power with any 
degree of accuracy, the growth in party political organisation by all the major 
parties at local level appears to have placed the politicians in control of policy in 
most local authorities. The practice of appointing political adv isers to local 
government officer posts, and of appointing political sympathisers to important 
posts within the administration, is also a considerable factor in establishing party 
control, and despite the disquiet expressed by Widdicombe about these practices 
(Widdicombe, 1986, pp.151-152), such appointments are likely to continue and 
maintain the political hold on many authorities, whatever legislation is introduced to 
curb the practice. 
There also appears to have been a significant growth in the acceptance of party 
politics at local level, which may have been facilitated by the growing numbers of 
younger people entering local politics as a launchpad for individual national electoral 
s u c c e s s . ^ o The Maud Committee found that approximately two-thirds of councillors 
believed that the work of the council could be carried out more efficiently without 
the existence of political parties (Maud. 1967, VoL2, Table 7.11). Twenty years 
later Widdicombe reported that the existence of party groups, and the disciplined 
approach whereby councillors of the same party vote with each other on almost 
4^ Although Newton also argued that the local pressure group system may have redressed 
the balance somewhat, as most pressure groups contacted officers rather than councillors, 
therefore giving officers valuable informational resources not possessed by councillors 
(Newton. 1976, p.162). 
50 Widdicombe (1986. Research Volume Two. Table 2.4, p.22) found that in all but the 
district councils there had been significant increases in the number of councillors under 45 
in England, compared to the findings of the Robinson Committee (1977); half the councillors 
in London are under 45 years old. 
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every i s s u e , w a s now "widely accepted" in the authorities they surveyed 
{Widdicombe, 1986. Para. 2.43, p.31). In addition. Sharpe & Newton (1984) found 
that "virtually all the county boroughs...were run on fairly well-developed party 
lines for all major, and some minor, policies" (Sharpe & Newton. 1984. p.215). 
The conclusion that party groups are. in the main, firmly in control of policy, and 
that the Representative Model best represents the current situation in councillor-
officer relationships, does not preclude the possibility of party elite control of 
policy, as many studies have indicated Neither does it preclude considerable input by 
officers into the policy-making process.^^ as this chapter has previously argued. 
However, such an input by officers does not mean that this study has to worry unduly 
about the possible effects of such an input upon the bargaining that may take place 
between political parties in hung councils. The same situation exists in studies of 
coalition formation at national level, where the civil service of a country will have 
the same sorts of informational resources as their local equivalents, and thereby a 
similar influence on the policy-output of national governments. The national civil 
service has not been seen as a possible constraint on the bargaining process at 
national level by coalition t h e o r i s t s . W h i l e it may be argued that this is an 
omission in the studies, most politicians are well aware of the restraints they face in 
bargaining, and the knowledge that certain courses of action will be unable to be 
followed b e c a u s e of a strong probability of informed official res is tance will 
necessari ly be taken into account by the actors involved. The conclusion is that 
politicans are in control of policy, and while the input of officers is obviously 
important, politicans will take the final decision. Therefore, politicians can make 
policy deals with other parties in the knowledge that they can honour the decision 
making pledges they make. 
As Baddeley & James argue, the principle of "political neutrality' is "no longer 
appropriate" behaviour for chief officers; as one chief officer told them "officers must be 
sensitive to the political will and aspirations of the democratically elected party" (Baddetey 
& James, 1987, pp.39-4g). Such politically sensitive officers cannot help but be influential 
in the policy process. 
52 Not only that, the problem of possible bureaucratic influences on coalition politics has 
never been seriously addressed, a criticism made by the multi-dimensional approach (see 
Pridham, 1986, pp.24-29). Mellors (1989, pp.96-97) mentions the possible impact of local 
officers on party relationships, but does not examine it. Laver & Schofield also note that 
payoffs to bureaucrats and appointments to administrative posts should be considered by 
coalition studies but are "to the best of our knowledge a largely unresearched area" (1990. 
pp.42-43) . 
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However, if the effect of officer input on the policy process can be dismissed for the 
purposes of this work, there are two constraints on local policy makers which must 
be considered more carefully. First, it is undeniable that central involvement in 
local policy making has increased since 1979 (see Horton, 1990. p.182). Second. It 
may also be that the perceived need for "unity" has meant that national party 
influence has increased to unprecedented levels; certainly, national influences on 
local coalition formation have been felt in some authorities (Leach & Stewart. 1988. 
p,43). Such constraints may affect either the ability or willingness of local groups 
to co-operate with potential allies, and the following section will examine these 
separate yet related areas. 
S e c t i o n F o u r : P o s s i b l e C o n s t r a i n t s Upon L o c a l Pol i t ica l Autononny 
Unlike most national governments, local "governments" are not sovereign. They 
exist, In Britain, at the whim of Parliament (or more realistically at the whim of 
the central government executive) and whole a reas of local government c a n be 
legislated out of existence, as happened to the Greater London Council and the 
Metropolitan Counties. Central government can also take functions out of the hands of 
local authorities, and the increase in central control which first, rate-capping and 
now community charge-capping has brought about, has seriously damaged local 
a u t o n o m y . I n addition, there are certain institutional restraints on local autonomy 
a s a consequence of central control. Local authorities are obliged by statute to 
perform certain functions, and prohibited from pursuing some courses of action, and 
in these areas bargaining would be impossible. However, central governments are 
also not completely autonomous actors, being restrained by international agreements 
and. in Britain, the greater sovereignly of the European Community, so such 
constraints on local coalition behaviour are not necessari ly a barrier to coalition 
studies. 
As well a s the constraints on their behaviour from the central government, the 
individual political parties are also constrained by their national parties. Certain 
policies are decided nationally, and deviation from those policies would create 
problems for local parties. Labour-controlled Liverpool City Council provides a 
Norton notes that "interpretations of the United Kingdom's 'unwritten constitution' used 
to give local authorities a special place within the structure, but local government has no 
special protection in law and it has become clear under the Thatcher government that local 
authorities are unprotected by tradition or consensus. Any sense of independence that the 
cities and boroughs may have enjoyed as creations of the Crown has.virtually disappeared" 
(Norton. 1990. pp.8-9). Long before this, however. Keith-Lucas ('What Price Local 
Democracy?', New Statesman. 12/8/76) was calling local self-government a "romantic 
dream". 
81 
notable example where both the central government and the national Labour Party 
acted as constraints on the activities of a local party. The full weight of both 
organisations were brought to bear on Liverpool's Labour council lors, under 
accusat ions of financial irresponsibility from the government and ideological 
extremism from Walworth Road. However, subsequent events might suggest that the 
power of the central government and of the national party are capable of being 
resisted at local level.^^ 
2.4.1. T h e In f luence of C e n t r a ! G o v e r n m e n t 
We begin this examination of central influences on local politics with a review of 
perhaps the most influential model of the relationship (certainly in recent years) . 
Rhodes* resource-exchange model.^^ Rhodes' model suggests that, despite the trials 
for local government of the Thatcher years, when "the traditional tension between 
central and local government reached an unprecedented pitch of intensity" (Lee. 
1987, p.44), local government may still p o s s e s s considerable resources in the 
'power game'. 
T h e R e s o u r c e - E x c h a n g e r/Iodel of C e n t r a l - L o c a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s 
The power of resistance to central government directives is a feature of Rhodes' 
(1981) model of the relationship between central and local authority. Traditionally, 
local governments have been seen by theorists as 'agents' of the centre or a s 
'partners' with the c e n t r e . T h e growth in central government financial controls, 
the removal of serv ices from the control of local authorities, the increasing 
readiness to use the courts to control 'rebel' councillors, and the abolishing of the 
G L C and the metropolitan counties, have all been used to argue that the concept of 
partnership is redundant, and thai local authorities are fast becoming merely agents 
of the centre (for example, see Jones & Stewart, 1983). Few analys is would 
disagree with the conclusion that there has been an increasing centralisation of 
authority within the last decade; the overwhelming evidence is that there has been an 
5^ A total of 47 Labour councillors were surcharged and disqualified from office for setting 
an illegal deficit budget, and all the councillors had to resign their seats. In addition, 
Labour's disciplinary procedures banished four councillors from the Labour Party, for 
alleged 'membership' of the far-left Militant Tendency (officially. Militant Tendency has no 
members, only supporters). However, two months later, the voters of Liverpool elected 51 
different Labour councillors to the council, re-establishing Labour control, and on some 
estimates, 14 of those councillors were Militant "supporters' ('The Roots of a City's 
Decline', Colin Hughes, The Independent, 12/10/87). 
It must be noted that this is not an uncomplicated task; as Chandler observes, "it is 
impossible to describe precisely Rhodes' power-dependence model since it has been subject 
to continuous amendment by its author" (Chandler, 1988, p.6). 
^® See Thrasher (1981) for an account of the development of these two schools of thought. 
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Increase in central controls, especially in the crucial area of local government 
finance.57 However, as Sharpe and Newton point out; 
"this conclusion does not in any way validate the local-government-as-
agents school which seems to have exaggerated a quantalive change into a 
qualitative transformation" (Sharpe & Newton, 1984, p.37). 
Rhodes proposes a different perspective on the relationship between central and local 
government, a resource-exchange model concentrating on a power dependency 
relationship. The relationship is an organisational struggle with both s ides fighting 
for the control of constitutional, financial, political, hierarchical and informational 
resources (Rhodes, 1981. pp.30-31).5^ Despite the confrontational nature of the 
central-local relationship since at least 1979, Rhodes argues that because the 
relationship is necessari ly one of exchange and dependence, that is . central 
government needs local authorities to provide services and local authorities need 
central f inance to provide those and other specifically local s e r v i c e s , the 
relationship cannot continue indefinitely in a confrontational manner. Rhodes' model 
recognises that either central or local government may be more dominant at any 
particular time, recognises variations in the degrees of discretion and power, and 
acknowledges that the relationship has the potential to vary from outright conflict, 
cooperation or domination by one side.^^ However, it is not, therefore, merely a 
variation on the "partnership" model. Rhodes' model, when applied to the analysis of 
central-local relation, means that; 
"local authorities are neither the agents of the centre nor partners of the 
centre, but are rather loci of power which is mobilised in relation to the 
power exerted by the central authority" (Rhodes, 1981, p.24). 
Revisions of the model (Rhodes, .1986) have placed far greater emphasis on the 
powers of central government to force local governments to carry out central 
5^ Travers (1986, xii) cites central government's incompetence over many years to 
provide effective reform. The "ambiguities' found by the Layfield Report (1976) in the 
financial relations between the centre and localities are an indication of central 
government's long term inability to reform a complicated system. 
58 As Saunders puts it, the model is "an attempt by each side to defend and extend the 
degree of its autonomy and control in relation to each other (Saunders, 1984. p.25). It 
must also be pointed out that other writers, for example Boaden (1971) and Stanyer 
(1976) had previously pointed to the deficiencies of the traditional ways of looking at the 
relationship, pointing to the considerable discretion local government frequently exercised. 
See Goldsmith (1985) for an elegant essay on theories of urban politics. 
It has been noted that "channels of communication may ... be deliberately obscured when 
local authorities choose to follow a different interpretation of their powers from that held 
by the government" (Chandler, 1988. p. 130). 
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directives. This is unsurprising , for "the Thatcher years have been characterised by 
much greater central direction and the influence of the community of local 
government has been greatly diminished" (Chandler. 1988, p.7). 
However, the degree of central control need not affect a study of coalitional 
behaviour. Even if one were to agree with the argument that Britain today "stands 
within sight of a form of government which is more highly centralised than anything 
this side of East Germany" (Newton & Karran. 1985, p.129), it would be irrelevant 
to this study. Although local government is under pressure from the centre, it still 
h a s scope for autonomous action. A s Laver points out (after citing a number of 
English c a s e s ) , "the scope for real discretion over important substantive policy 
outputs can be.. .as great at local as at national level" (Laver. 1989. p.21). Be that a s 
it may, whatever the degree of power of British local authorities in relation to 
central government, this study is concerned with them only a s 'authoritative 
allocators of values*. Whether the decisions they make are major or minor in respect 
to the local environment, the concern of this work is with the process of deciding 
which parties in a hung council make those decisions, and not with the possible 
content of the decisions that the local authority is "allowed" to make.^^ It is the 
dynamics of decision making, rather than the consequences, which is of interest to 
this study. 
Of course, the degree of interest in this study would be far less if local authorities 
were merely concerned with, for example, street lighting, rather than major 
budgetary decisions affecting the lives of the local population, but for the purposes of 
a study of local coalition behaviour the decisions being made are, effectively, of no 
concern. This is not to deny that the constraints placed on local government in the 
form of requiring local authorities to carry out certain tasks might affect the 
process of coalition formation. However, it is the deals that are made between 
political parties which are our primary concern, and provided central government 
does not forbid inter-party deals we can study local government coalitions. While it 
may be rather easier to form coalitions about street lighting than about crucial 
social welfare decisions, all local actors are operating under the same constraints 
with regard to central control. 
60 For example, despite their conclusion that "the community charge will be qualitatively 
different from local rates because it will deny the potential for local authorities to fund and 
develop policy differences; (it) will be denied the potential of income redistribution through 
the local rates" local government can still be seen to be "enjoying a bounded autonomy" 
(Butcher, Law. Leach & Mullard, 1990, p. 186). 
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The same qualification does not apply to the central control which may be mobilised 
by the major political parties. E a c h of them will be operating under a different set of 
rules or a different set of national attitudes, and it may be that some local parties 
will be in a better position than others to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by hungness. That proposition will now be examined. 
2 .4 .2 . T h e In f luence of Nat ional Par t i es 
There is little doubt that the fortunes of local parties are inextricably linked with 
those of their national party. While there may be disagreement over the extent of the 
influence, the importance of national politics to local voting behaviour is 
indisputable (Rail ings & Thrasher , 1989). However, a s Hampton points out. 
"although people vote in local elections with national issues in mind this does not 
mean ... that the national political parties necessarily have a strong influence on 
local politics" (Hampton, 1987, p , l58 ) . The extent of such influence, whether 
minor or not, is difficult to gauge. This section will look at some general points 
before assess ing the central-local relationship of each of the three major party 
groups in turn. 
To a large extent, local politicians operate in an environment created by their 
national colleagues. The important ideological battles are fought out nationally, and 
the major determinant on local election results appears to be the standing of the 
parties nationally, as the c lose correlation between local election results and 
national opinion poll ratings indicates (see Railings & Thrasher, 1988, p.72). From 
time to time, national parties will actively intervene in the affairs of local parties if 
they believe their national image is being affected.^^ 
This is not to say that local parlies no longer p o s s e s s considerable autonomy, but 
merely to note that the increasing importance of a consensual image being presented 
to a mass electorate has probably affected the extent of that local autonomy, and 
increased the 'politicisation' of local authorities, with local parties more likely to 
divide along national lines (see Mellors, 1989, p.95). The media compound this, 
often looking at local political events (especially local elections) totally from the 
81 As already mentioned, Walworth Road's intervention in the internal politics of Liverpool 
Labour Parly offers a good example of this, the national party moving to expel Liverpool 
'militants' from Labour Party membership despite the strong local support for those 
eventually expelled. It was not just Liverpool where Labour brought pressure to bear. In the 
run-up to the 1983 general election, Labour leader Michael Foot made it publicly clear, 
'that he expects the eight local Labour parties which have chosen Militant parliamentary 
candidates to drop them unless they renounce their Trotskyite allegiance" {The Times, 
1 3 / 9 / 8 2 ) 
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viewpoint of their effect on national politics, a 'crime' academic psephologists are 
also often guilty of committing.62 
It must be noted that, while national parties can often wield considerable influence 
over the activities of local party organisations, they will find it difficult to interfere 
with the activities of the party groups on local councils. Gyford & J a m e s point out 
that, "constitutionally, none of the parties p o s s e s s any mechanisms whereby local 
politicians may be forced to comply with the wishes of the party at the centre" 
(Gyford & J a m e s , 1983. p.195). Of course, for the most part, local parties will be 
anxious to support their national parties. A s Hampton points out "there is no doubt 
some res is tance among local politicians about embarrassing their national 
leadership, but national politicians need to earn any respect that is available" 
(Hampton, 1987. p.159). Many local leaders are often dominating figures 
themselves, and well capable of resisting national dictats.^^ 
While it would be surprising if the possibility of power, after years of opposition, 
did not affect the strategy of even the most deferential local party, it is "inevitable ... 
that national norms and values will affect what happens at local level" (Mellors. 
1989. p. 81). However, it is likely that each of the national parties will react 
differently to their local organisations. Those differences will now be a s s e s s e d , 
beginning with the parly that has traditionally been viewed as the most centralised of 
the three major parlies. 
L a b o u r a n d Cent ra l Contro l 
The Labour party is "far more likely...to take an active interest in internal party 
controversies" than the Conservative party (Hampton, 1987. p.148). and given 
Labour's historical roots in collectivism this is unsurprising (Gyford & J a m e s , 
1983, p.1). The extent lo which Labour's opponents at national level use the 
activities of local Labour parties to attack the national parly's "extremism" (see 
Laver. 1989, p.26) is another good reason why Labour will be especially concerned 
about the behaviour of local groups. The model standing orders for local parties were 
originally drafted by the national party in 1930. C lause Six of those orders comes 
62 Such a 'nationalisation* of local politics is not confined to Great Britain. For example. 
Thomas has noted the same trend in Denmark (Thomas, 1989, p.125), and Pridham has 
commented on both the increasing 'nationalisation' of local politics (1984, p.223) and the 
way the media in Italy 'have habitually commented on regional and local election results in 
national terms" (Pridham, 1989. p.208). 
®3 (I may even be that, given the lack of experience al national level, future pariiamenlary 
coalitions will be influenced by local coalition behaviour, as Pridham believes they are in 
Italy (Pridham. 1984. p.229) 
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close to forbidding local Labour groups from forming "local pacts" with other party 
groups (Mellors, 1989, p.93), and some groups have acquiesced to central party 
pressure (see Carter, 1986, p.13).6'* However, Gyford & J a m e s (1983, p.147) 
report instances of Labour groups defying the central party, and as Hampton notes, 
the majority of local Labour groups can in no sense be considered a s "passive tools" 
of Walworth Road. Those struggles intensified during the 1970s. culminating with 
the creation of the Social Democratic Party, and continued through the 1980s, with a 
succession of Ideological battles fought between (usually) the new 'moderate' centre 
and the remains of the 'hard left'.^^ This indicates that local Labour groups will not 
allow central preferences to dominate automatically.66 
T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s : P r a g m a t i s m R u l e s 
Like the Labour party, the Conservative party at Central Office has only a small 
number of staff in its local government department, which reflects its very 
limited."role in [local] policy formation" (Gyford & J a m e s , 1983. p.40). S o m e 
writers argue that the "weakness of the central organisation" is the "most salient 
point" of the relationship between Central Office and local party groups (Wilson & 
Pinto-Duchinsky. p.244). Local Conservative groups, therefore, have a good deal of 
autonomy, although the more ideological party of the Thatcher years often caused 
friction between the centre and local organisations, a s demonstrated by the 
opposition of local Conservative groups to the introduction of both rate-capping and 
the community c h a r g e . I n addition, Mellors reports the national party "hardly 
welcomed" local party deals by Conservat ives with other party groups (1986, 
p.23). Like Labour, the national party feels it has little to gain by proving the 
efficacy of coalitions, even at the local level. However, if there is one word that 
might best describe Conservative politics in England (with the notable exception of 
64 Mellors notes a "gradual change in Labour attitudes towards hung councils ... a more 
pragmatic approach has come to prevail" {Mellors. 1989. p.93). 
65 King notes the problems of the 'urban left* agenda for "redefining socialism" with both 
central government and the national Labour party: "undoubtedly, the unfavourable national 
arena influenced this development significantly as did the debates within the Labour party 
about their objectives" (King, 1989, p.202). 
66 Labour local groups are also hardly likely to respect a central party which appears to 
regard local government of such little importance that its spokesman for local government 
will admit to the conference of the Association of Metropolitan Councils that 'he had tried 
to find out what the policy was [but] no one was able to tell him" Jeff Rooker went on to 
say that "putting it at its baldest, we haven't got a policy, that's the actual truth" ("Rooker 
admits to naked truth on local government", Sandra Barwick, The Independent, 24/9/87). 
67 Some of the tensions (and congruences) between Thatcherism and the local government 
system are examined by Mather (1989. pp.212-234). 
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the years from 1979-1990). it is 'pragmatism' (see Gilmour. 1 9 7 7 ) . I f this is 
the c a s e , local Conservative groups will share power with almost any political group. 
There are some similarities in the approach of the two biggest parties. At national 
level, both Labour and Conservative will no longer hesitate to intervene if a local 
party selects an 'unsuitable' Parliamentary candidate. This is especially apparent at 
by-elections, when the full force of national media attention is focussed on the main 
candidates. Labour has had a number of central-local c l a s h e s over prospective 
parliamentary candidates, and is now able to force a candidate on a local party. Local 
Conservatives have also alleged that "Central Office directly influences the choice of 
candidates", a s , following a disastrous sequence of by-elections for the Conservatives 
in 1990-91, rumours abounded that a major reason for failure was that candidates 
were "foisted on the local association", a claim denied by the party vice-chairman 
(see Stephen Goodwin, The Independent, 2 July, 1991, p.8). 
T h e L i b e r a l E x p e r i e n c e 
As yet, there are no reports of local Liberal Democrats being 'leant on' by their 
national party to select a more suitable candidate. During the post-war years , the 
attitude of the Liberal party towards local parties has been clear. Perhaps because of 
their lack of political power, both nationally and (generally) at local level, local 
groups have exercised a good deal of autonomy. As has been noted, the role of local 
politics in recent years has been vital to the continued existence of the party as a 
national force (Gyford & J a m e s , 1983, pp..68-69). Mellors notes: 
"being a decentralised party, the national leadership has little ability to 
enforce strategies upon local groups and the actual tactics adopted by 
Liberal council groups owe more to circumstances on the ground than to 
any nationally-determined p lan . T h e role of the centra l party 
organisation ... is to give guidance when asked and to facilitate the sharing 
of experiences." (Mellors. 1989. p.94). 
Liberal publications stress the autonomy of local groups on a range of i s s u e s , 
particularly in the institutional arrangements they can make (for example, see Clay, 
1982. p.3). There is little reason to feel that the attitudes of the centre party 
Even the Thatcher years can be seen as pragmatic, if one believes that "Thatcherism 
represents an emphasis on the rhetoric rather than the reality of power" (Butcher, Law, 
Leach & Mullard. 1990, p.37). a position taken by Heseltine (1987). Butcher et al are 
dismissive of the pragmatic argument, and maintain that "the true nature of the 
Conservative Party" is centred upon "the protection of property rights' (1990, p.37). 
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towards local elected groups has changed significantly since the merger with all but 
the Owenites of the S D P . ^ ^ 
It seems that S L D groups at local level have a great deal of freedom from central 
party interference. Despite the inevitable differences of approach, it appears that 
the local associations of the other two major parties are also capable of resisting 
central directives. Labour, Conservative, and S L D groups can enjoy a considerable 
degree of autonomy in the strategies they pursue at local level. While the greater 
degree of 'freedom* enjoyed by the Liberals/ S L D / Alliance might indicate they will 
be more active in local coalitions (a proposition examined in Chapter Five) , the 
indications are that they can all be considered as sufficiently independent from their 
national associations to be treated as effective 'actors' in the coalition game. 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
This chapter has outlined the basic structure of the English local government system 
and attempted to demonstrate its suitability as an arena in which to study coalition 
politics. It is evident that, despite the considerable cutbacks in the scope of local 
government powers in recent years, local councils still have considerable budgets 
and political power and control of a local authority is still seen as a welcome prize by 
the political parties. The number of uncontested seats has declined dramatically and 
organised party groups now control most local authorities in England. 
Increasing politicisation, together with the changes introduced following the Bains 
recommendations, appears to have produced more coherent overall management. The 
changes introduced, especially the creation in most councils of a chief executive 
officer in charge of a management team of chief officers, have.combined with the 
effects of increased party discipline to produce (or consolidate) a policy making elite 
which is in control of the general direction of council policy. Despite the increased 
coherence on the officer side of the council , however, the c o n s e n s u s Is that 
increasing politicisation, with party whipping and increased electoral competition, 
has ensured that the politicians remain in charge. While it is undisputed that officers 
can be influential figures, most councils appear to be under firm political control. 
Party groups are not generally seen as particularly powerful; senior councillors are 
seen to be in charge of their groups. The relationship between chief officers and 
leading councillors remains problematic, largely because of the lack of studies. The 
69 However, such local independence might be challenged if leader Paddy Ashdown's plans 
for 'a new economic philosophy for the party" (largely unspecified) are successfully 
formulated {The Guardian. 29/7/91, p.20). 
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formal picture of officers as servants of the whole council, however, is clearly a 
fal lacy. 
Despite the increasing restrictions over local autonomy, central government is still 
unable to claim total control over local politics. While a number of studies have 
expressed concern that the poll tax will finally remove the 'politics' from local 
politics, that position has not yet arrived. Political parties in local authorities can 
still be viewed a s independent actors in the s e n s e that there is still an element of 
redistribution which can be negotiated. Similarly, local parties still appear to have 
quite a a good deal of autonomy from their national parties. Therefore, despite the 
distaste often exhibited by the two major parties at national level towards coalition 
politics, the evidence suggests at least some local parties will make deals in hung 
councils. 
Chapter One has detailed the development of coalition studies, and this chapter has 
suggested that local councils in England seem to offer an acceptable arena for the 
study of coalition politics. Chapter Three will now address some of the potential 
difficulties of marrying two such widely different areas of study as coalition studies 
and English local government, and prepare the way for the empirical examination 
that forms the main part of this thesis. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
A number of assumptions and observations about the behaviour of actors In local 
government coalitions have been made by both political scientists and actors in hung 
councils. Much of this work has been concerned with local coalitional arrangements 
in Western Europe where, given the regular formation in many countries of both 
national and local coalitions, a significant amount of data have been collected. Britain, 
with its general tradition of single party majority rule at both local and national 
government level, has largely been ignored in coalition theory's search for data with 
which to test theoretical suppositions. However, a number of recent studies have 
concentrated on hung local authorities In Britain. While the detailed studies have 
mainly been concerned with a comparatively small number of authorities (for 
example, Blowers (1987) on Bedfordshire and Carter (1986) on three South 
Western counties), a few have examined a larger universe of hung councils (see 
Leach & Stewart. 1988. Leach & Game, 1989, and Mellors. 1989). From this body 
of work, a number of general propositions have been generated for hung councils. 
As the opening chapters have indicated, the insights of coalition studies will be 
utilised whatever their source. However, the assumptions generated by studies of 
local coalitions will constitute the background for the testing of various hypotheses 
concerning the responses of actors in hung councils. In order to avoid constant 
repetition, the majority of those works will be introduced in the relevant chapters; 
for example, the observation by Carter (1986) that 'traditional rulers' will be 
excluded from administrations when a council becomes hung will be outlined and 
examined in the relevant section of Chapter Five, which examines party strategies, 
while the reasons for Mellors* (1983) argument that coalitions between parties will 
be more likely in councils with a quadrennial electoral cycle are detailed and tested 
in Chapter Four, which examines the effect of certain English local government 
Institutional factors in coalition strategy. Chapter Three will concentrate on 
preparing the ground for that examination by assessing some of the potential 
problem areas the opening two chapters have indicated for the study of coalition 
behaviour In English councils. 
Inevitably, Chapter Two has already addressed some of those problems. For example, 
there is no doubt that political parties see local authorities as prizes worth winning; 
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the rise in politicisation is just one indication of thisJ The argument that central 
control, by both central government or the Individual political parlies, means that 
local parties and local administrations cannot be viewed as sufficiently independent 
to warrant studying as potential coalition actors has also been disposed of in Chapter 
Two. However, a number of potential difficulties remain for coalition research at the 
local level. 
In section one, we assess some of the analytical problems raised by formal theory's 
assumptions, including an evaluation of the goals of local actors and whether the 
'unitary actor* assumption is acceptable for local parties. Following this, section two 
wilt examine a number of problems related to the study of local administrative 
duration, including a defence of the criteria which will be used to determine the 
ending of an administration. Section three will then examine the multi-dimensional 
approach, as well as briefly outlining the nature of the five empirical chapters 
which follow this chapter. Finally, section four provides the details of response rates 
to this survey's questionnaires. 
Sect ion One: Some Analyt ical Problems 
Chapter One has indicated that the study of political coalitions has centred on 'cabinet' 
coalitions, but there is no official cabinet in English local government. Therefore, we 
need to address the question of whether an assumption of 'office-seeking' politicians 
is correct for local coalitional actors. We also need to define the criteria by which we 
will decide whether a particular 'administration' is in place. Following this, we 
assess some of the problems raised by the theoretical assumption of political parties 
as unitary actors; the assumption is problematic for national parties, but it may be 
even more difficult to operationalise in the study of the undoubtedly less ideological 
world of English local authorities. However, we begin with the fundamental question 
of just what local actors are seeking from the coalitions they make when a council is 
hung. 
3.1.1. What is the Goal of Local Pol i t ic ians? 
The concentration, historically, of coalition theory on the central desire of 
politicians as winning cabinet office is understandable. In most European national 
legislatures, the distribution of cabinet portfolios as rewards for participation in a 
'winning' coalition are clear to see (Browne & Dreijmanis. 1982). However, while 
^ Although the "tidal force" of polilicisallon could have received a "possibly terminal 
setback" if the Widdicombe proposals had been enacted more fully (see Leach 1989 
p.121). 
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the emphasis by analysts on formal cabinet coalitions in Western democracies is 
understandable, it does offer a problem for studies of local coalitions. 
As Chapter Two has detailed, there is no requirement for an 'executive body* or 
'cabinet' in British local authorities, which appears to weaken the explanatory 
power of office-seeking' theories. The formal decision making body is the full council 
of all councillors, and while many local authorities do have 'unofficial cabinets' 
(Stewart, 1986, p.137) the existence of such bodies is dependent upon "disciplined 
voting majorities in full councils and council committees capable of delivering 
policies in accordance with the wishes of the majority party"; when a council 
becomes hung, the "constitutional situation reverts to its more formal nature" 
(Mellors, 1989, p.74). Therefore, whatever the true (if informal) picture when 
one party has a majority of seats, when a council becomes hung there is no official 
central decision making body which can comprise a prize for a successful coalition to 
divide among its members. Our first question must be: without a cabinet and the 
distribution of ministerial portfolios, what is the goal of local politicians in a hung 
council? 
It might be thought that the offer of committee chairmanships could fulfil the 
requirements of 'office-seeking' explanations of coalition behaviour. After all. 
committee chairmen are commonly seen as powerful people in local government 
circles, and the possession of an important chair has been characterised as the aim of 
most polit icians.2 Despite Hampton's argument (see 2.2.1) of the demise in 
importance of committee chairmen following the "growth in partisan organisation" 
(Hampton, 1987, p.79) most observers of local government confirm that committee 
chairmanships are still much sought after by local politicians, and that committee 
chairs and vice-chairs represent the political elite of a council (see Stoker, 1991. 
p .92) . 
Unfortunately for this hypothesis, research indicates that office payoffs in the form 
of committee chairs do not appear to be the goal of most local politicians in hung 
councils (Laver, Railings. & Thrasher, 1987). This is understandable if Mellors is 
correct in his assertion that: 
"committee chairmen in hung authorities have no executive power and are 
often able to do little more than control the proceedings of committee 
meetings. Without a voting majority on the committee, the value of their 
committee chairmanships is greatly reduced and, indeed, may be 
2 See Laver. Railings & Thrasher (1987, p,504) and Collins (1978, pp.425-447). 
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considered so small as to be of no real political value" (Mellors, 1989. 
p .75) . 
If It is the case that committee chairs have little value In hung councils,^ and the 
findings of Laver. Railings, & Thrasher (1987) offer strong evidence for the 
proposal, then one of the major assumptions of much formal theory, that politicians 
seek office as the reward for participation In a coalition, may not be applicable to 
British local coalitions. Coalition activity in hung councils will have to be looked for 
In policy payoffs* and the focus will shift from executive to legislative coalitions. The 
distinction between executive and legislative coalitions is important. Legislative 
coalitions mean that parties outside of the 'administration* may be able to exert 
considerable Influence over policy outputs and that minority governments can be 
perfectly viable (and stable) solutions to the problems of hungness. There Is also 
less pressure on conserving benefits, which means that surplus majority coalitions 
may not only be more prevalent, they may have more legitimacy and authority (see 
Laver & Schofield, 1990. pp.68-69). 
For Mellors, the absence of an executive body means that the focus of local coalition 
activity must shift away from the idea of an act of formation to regarding coalitional 
activity as an on-going process {Mellors, 1989, pp.74-75). Laver notes that one 
consequence of a tendency for legislative coalitions is that "civilised life" can 
continue during long periods of coalition negotiations, with less pressure for a 
'government' to form (Laver. 1989. p.23). There may be more cases where there Is 
'no administration' in place. Indeed, it may even be that the notion of an 
'administration' is unnecessary, with temporary and shifting alliances becoming the 
norm.'* 
3.1.2. What is an 'Admin is t ra t i on '? 
Therefore, It appears that we must examine the very notion of an 'administration' 
Itself. If cooperating parties are not sharing committee chairmanships, we need to 
outline the criterion by which we define an administration, or to be more accurate, 
how we define the existence of Inter-party support. The definition of 'administration' 
this survey adopted is simple; it relied upon the judgements of chief executives. If 
^ The hypothesis that chairs are not valued by coalition actors is tested in Chapter Four, 
section two. 
^ It must be pointed out that this is not what previous research into hung councils suggests; 
relatively stable voting alliances appear to be the norm, although in some councils more 
"opportunistic" strategies are adopted (see Leach & Game. 1989, p.36). British experience 
of hung legislatures is limited, and it is likely that considerable sophistication is required 
for such temporary and shifting alliances to function without considerable problems. 
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they replied that the administration was, for example, Conservative/SLD, then that 
is what was recorded. While relying on one person's judgement is obviously 
problematic, the nearest thing to an objective and knowledgeable actor In local 
councils must be (in the majority of cases) the chief executive of that authority. The 
chief executive's assessment of the political arrangements should be more honest 
than a political leader, who may be either trying to hide (or minimise) their party's 
Involvement or attempting to present the cooperation of other parties as being more 
than it actually Is, for political reasons. This is not to deny that chief executives 
could have a particular axe to grind, but they will have to be very careful in their 
assessment of the political arrangements in their council. Their replies should 
therefore be balanced and generally accurate. 
The difficulties of deciding the make-up of administrations without a 'cabinet' as 
guidance, even for informed chief executives, are apparent. Different surveys have 
adopted different definitions of 'governmenV; as Leach & Game point out: 
"the two New Statesman surveys ... include all situations in which one 
party is 'allowed' to form a minority administration, however active or 
passive the support expressed. Our survey uses more rigourous criteria. 
To qualify as an expression of inter-party support, one party must have 
made a positive choice in relation to the party holding the chairs, for 
example either by voting for that party, or supporting Its budget. This 
definition would therefore exclude the use of abstention as a tactic" (Leach 
& Game, 1989, p.25). 
Leach & Game's definition of "inter-party support", as they acknowledge. Is quite 
rigourous. Leach & Stewart (1988) are also rigourous in their definition; for 
example, in their classification a 'minority administration' Includes those where the 
minority party has the "explicit or Implict 'support' of another party" (Leach & 
Stewart, 1988), which the great majority of coalition theorists have long treated as 
a coalition (see de Swaan, 1973, p.143). Other writers have been both less strict 
and less clear in their definition. Warwick (1979) follows de Swaan's precedent 
(1973, p.143): 
"by Including in the governing coalition any parties who were committed, 
tacitly or openly, to maintaining the coalition In power, even If they did 
not assume government portfolios" Wanwick (1979, p.467).5 
5 Wanwick's definition is unclear about the precise meaning of 'tacitly', which could cover a 
range of tactics, from abstention to secret policy deals. 
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This survey has followed Warwick in including any example of cooperation. For 
example, if the chief executive responded to the question, "which parties comprise 
the current administration?"^ by answering 'Conservative with tacit SLD support' 
(which one chief executive in fact did) this survey treated that as a 
Conservative/SLD administration. However, an informal agreement to support a 
party's nominations for committee chairs is obviously not the same degree of support 
as a formal agreement between two or more parties to share committee chairs or an 
agreement on substantial budgetary concessions. 
It is acknowledged that a considerable weakness of our approach is that in some cases 
we do not know the criteria behind a chief executive's classification of the 
administrations in his or her local authority. In most cases the chief executive 
merely answered, for example, 'Conservative/SLD'. without going into more detail, 
although in the great majority of current administrations we are aware of whether 
this was a formal or informal arrangement. However, given that we were seeking 
judgements not just on (initially) 111 current administrations but also on a/ / the 
previous administrations since those councils had become hung, it is difficult to 
know a better way of deciding than the judgement of the chief executive in a large 
scale questionnaire based exercise such as this. The fact that a chief executive has 
decided that some expression of support should be detailed in a question asking 'what 
parties comprise the administratior) in your authority?' implies that such support 
is meaningful. 
Therefore, the judgement of chief executives is our criterion on the 'administration' 
in place, and where we have the information we classify any example of cooperation 
as an 'administration', although the differences in the type of cooperation will of 
course be detailed whenever necessary. The nature of such cooperation (that is, 
whether in the form of office or policy pay-offs) is examined throughout this thesis, 
notably in Chapters Four, Seven, and Nine. However, while the nature of the local 
coalitions which must form is obviously a major problem of analysis, we do know 
that some form of agreement is essential. Whether such agreement can be classified 
as "inter-party agreement" is more problematic, as the cohesion displayed by 
national parties may not necessarily be a feature of local government. The very lack 
of a cabinet may be a major contributory factor to this, and this potentially 
problematic area will now be addressed. 
6 See the Appendix for full details of the four questionnaires sent to local actors. 
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3.1.3. Are Local Groups 'Uni tary Ac to rs '? 
The previous sub-sections have noted the problems of deciding both the nature and 
existence of coalitional behaviour by local party groups. As Chapter One has already 
noted, the definition of 'coalition' offered by Kelley (1968) appears an adequate 
starting point in the discussion of local coalitions, covering a wide variety of 
cooperative behaviour. The assumptions of rationality which underpin formal 
coalition theory, however, appear to offer even more problems for the study of local 
politicians behaviour than the admittedly considerable problems they present to a 
study of the behaviour of national politicians. Potentially, the assumption of parties 
as rational 'unitary actors' may not be acceptable for the parties in English local 
government. 
Laver (1989) argues that national parties can be thought of as unitary actors 
because the central role of the cabinet at national level gives national political 
parties a strong hold on the backbencher. The cabinet is the central decision making 
body and cabinet portfolios are the aim of ambitious politicians; therefore, "party 
elites have a very strong hold over the aims and aspirations of the rank-and-file 
legislator, thereby enforcing party discipl ine" (Laver, 1989. p.22). Laver 
maintains that "matters are quite different at local level" and that the "paltry nature 
of local offices" means party elites have fewer rewards to offer, making discipline 
difficult to maintain (Laver, 1989, p.22). 
However, throughout Chapter Two, the increased politicisalion of local government 
and the control of policy by senior councillors has been seen as a feature of English 
local government. Despite differences between urban and rural councils, with urban 
councils consistently more partisan, Widdicombe (1986) reported high levels of 
party cohesion in council votes. A quite staggering 99 percent of Labour groups and 
92 percent of Conservative groups always or usually voted together when in power 
in full council meetings (Widdicombe, 1986, Research Volume One. Table 2.3). If 
the lack of a cabinet means we are looking for legislative coalitions, such figures 
demonstrate that the two major parties can deliver disciplined voting blocs; not only 
that, "group solidarity is the norm for all parties" in local government (Stoker, 
1991. p.39, my emphasis). 
There is little doubt that Widdicombe's assessment that it is an almost "universal 
practice" for party groups to meet regularly and "pre-determine" the party line is 
indeed the case (Widdicombe. 1986, p.30). Party politics dominates at local level. 
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with the majority of councillors regarding the Implementation of their party 
manifesto as their "first concern", although It must be noted that a majority of 
Liberal councillors disagreed with this proposal (WIddicombe. 1986. Research 
Volume Two, Table 7.17). Labour and Conservative groups set particular store by 
Ideas of party loyalty,^ and although 'Liberals' have traditionally been viewed as 
composed of more independent minded people, there is some evidence that the new 
'Liberal Democrats' are adopting a more disciplined approach, sometimes to the 
extent of being accused of an "authoritarian style" (see Stoker, 1991, p.49). In 
contrast to the argument that party discipline has become lighter. Stoker argues that 
"the polilicisation of local government has been accompanied by evidence of a greater 
degree of division and conflict both between and within parties" (Stoker, 1991, 
p.40, my emphasis). However, the general consensus, as Widdicombe has 
undoubtedly demonstrated, is that disciplined party politics is the norm in English 
local government, a finding confirmed by recent research (Young & Davies. 1990). 
Despite the general levels of discipline, it is still the case that English local politics 
is less dominated by party whipping than Westminster, where Members of 
Parliament have long since surrendered any pretensions to Independent thinking. 
However, it would be a mistake to suppose from this that ruling local parlies must 
constantly be struggling to put together a majority in council. Despite the lack of 
cabinet places on offer, the picture presented in Chapter Two of senior elites making 
policy Indicates a universal truth of modern party politics, whether at local or 
national ievei. Whatever the formal picture, local elites will almost certainly have 
some form of unofficial forum where policy matters are discussed, and 'invitations* 
to such a forum will almost certainly not be offered to mavericks. Politicians who 
wish to attain the positions of power, whether such positions are represented by 
cabinet chairs or not, must demonstrate during their ^apprenticeship' that they can 
be trusted, and politicians who consistently vote against the party line will find 
themselves either deselected or becoming permanent backbenchers. The widespread 
control of local authorities by party groups Is clear, and the Idea that without a 
cabinet elites necessarily lack control over the actions of their minions, is not 
demonstrated by the disciplined voting behaviour of local groups. 
However. If for the purposes of coalition bargaining we can assume that the three 
major parties are unitary actors, at least one significant 'group' at local level can 
Although the 'new right" of the Consen/ative party are openly hostile to the tactics of 
•traditional- local Tories (see Ridley. 1988, p.29). and Ken Livingstone (1984. p.271) notes 
the difficulties of the 'urban left' in achieving a rapport with traditional working class 
Labourism. 
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not automatically be assumed to be a unitary actor. Independent groups have a long 
and distinguished history in local politics, and despite their decline with the 
encroachment of politicisation, they are still a not Inconsiderable factor. 
Independents : Ind iv idual or Group Ac to rs? 
The question of the cohesion of Independent groups must be posed; Is It right to 
consider these groups as unitary actors, responding to central direction In a similar 
way to the major parties? One of the 8 Independent group leaders responding to this 
survey replied that most of the questions: 
"are not really applicable to a diverse group of Independents. I have tried 
to answer them but there could well be six different answers from my 
colleagues." 
At first glance, this appears to indicate that it would be foolish to consider local 
Independents as unitary actors and that, especially, any utilisation of formal 
coalition theory will have to regard these groups as lacking the necessary cohesion. 
However, there is another way of considering the problem. Chief executives passed 
the questionnaire to the people they considered to be the 'leaders' of the Independent 
group on the council, and the Independent 'leaders' presumably considered 
themselves competent to answer on behalf of their colleagues. The great majority of 
Independent groups did not fill in a questionnaire, so perhaps it is justifiable to 
consider those 8 leaders who did reply on behalf of their colleagues as leading a group 
which is sufficiently cohesive for our purposes, despite the honest answer of the 
Independent 'leader' quoted above. Certainly, that is the approach that this research 
proposes to take. This does not imply that all Independents could be considered as 
unitary actors, any more than noting a tendency for Independents to co-operate with 
Conservatives implies that all Independents are closet Tories or that all Conservative 
groups will naturally gravitate towards Independents. 
It must be acknowledged that local parlies, for reasons which include the lower 
profile of local politics, the less rigourous approach to candidate selection, and the 
surviving conception of local politics as 'non-politicar, are less cohesive than the 
equivalent national parties. This may have repercussions for coalition deals, and 
such agreements may therefore be prone to instability. Despite this, the level of 
voting discipline is such that considering local groups as unitary actors seems 
acceptable. 
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Sect ion Two : The Study of Admin is t ra t ive Durat ion 
It is of the upmost importance that any study of administrative duration define 
clearly its definition of administrative termination.^ Therefore, this section begins 
with an examination of the definitions adopted by previous research, and defends this 
study's criterion of termination. Following this, the difficulty of measuring the 
duration of extant administrations is addressed. 
3 .2 .1 . Compet ing Def in i t ions of 'Government Dura t ion ' 
The study of coalitions (whether theoretical or empirical) has largely concentrated 
on coalition formation: the areas of payoffs and duration have received much less 
attention, although (as noted in Chapter One) recent studies have somewhat redressed 
the balance. The same emphasis has prevailed in local coalition studies: the seminal 
works, although not totally ignoring the problems of coalition maintenance, have 
largely concentrated on the factors influencing administrative formation, with only 
brief examinations of the problems of maintenance and (especially) payoffs.^ Those 
studies which have given a prominent role to coalitional durability have, however, 
often differed in their judgement of the criteria to utilise when measuring duration; 
there is no commonly agreed measurement of government duration. Consequently, 
comparison between studies is constrained by the knowledge that different criteria 
will inevitably produce different conclusions regarding the stability of various 
administrative forms. 
Therefore, any examination of administrative durability is immediately faced with a 
problem of definition. The difficulty of measuring the longevity of an administration 
is complicated by lack of agreement as to what should be measured. Therefore, a 
defence of the criteria adopted by this study is necessary before testing the 
propositions offered to explain coalition durability. 
Laver & Schofield list four criteria from which different authors have 'permed* 
various combinations to define the end of a government: 
" 1 . A change in the party membership of the cabinet; 
2. A formal government resignation. 
3. A change in the Prime Minister. 
4. An election." (Laver & Schofield, 1990. p.145) 
8 As Chapter One has shown, one of the many criticisms made by Strom (1988) of the 
stochastic approach of Browne et al is their failure to define their terms, including 
•termination" (a criticism they reject). 
9 For example, see Leach & Game (1989) and Mellors (1989) 
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Budge & Keman call these criteria the "standard definition" (1990. p.15), and point 
out that writers whose definitions of how to determine government duration deviate 
from these criteria, such as Dodd (1976) who omits elections and resignations, 
mean that some dominant electoral groups (for example the Menzies 1949 
Australian government which lasted 17 years) skew the findings (Budge & Keman. 
1990, p.15). However, the definition, as Laver & Schofield note, is far from 
standard. For example. Warwick eliminated cabinets from his data set "whose 
termination was unconnected with the idea of instability" (Warwick. 1979, p.468). 
effectively excluding cases (for example, cabinets ended by elections) other studies 
had considered. Some studies counted a change of Prime Minister as signalling the end 
of a government (for example, Browne et al. 1984). while others (for example, 
Dodd. 1976) did not consider this to signify the end of a government. 
Therefore, any criterion of 'government duration' adopted by this study will 
encounter opposition from some quarters. This study proposes to utilise the 
criterion adopted by Lijphart, with a change in the party membership of the cabinet 
being the sole definition of the end of a government (Lijphart. 1984b, p.278). There 
are a number of reasons for not adopting the remaining criteria when examining 
English local government coalitions. 
In some legislatures there is a formal (or in some instances informal) requirement 
that governments resign after defeat on a particular issue. For example, if a British 
government is defeated in a 'vote of confidence', constitutional convention requires 
resignation and a dissolution of Parliament. No such requirement exists in English 
local government where elections are for fixed terms and the ruling administration 
has no power to dissolve the council and hold fresh elections. Consequently, there is 
little to be gained for opposition parties by defeating a government without having a 
viable alternative government.'"^ If a government did resign, and after a period of 'no 
administration', the same party or parties re-assumed control, then this would be 
treated as a new administration; however, according to the information supplied by 
chief executives, there are no cases in this study where this occurred."* Also, there 
are no cases we are aware of in our sample where a government resigned and then 
10 Despite this, it does happen, as the case study of Devon in Chapter Ten demonstrates. 
^ ^  There was one local authority where a government resigned, and a period of 'no 
administration', rather than an alternative government, followed. In this case, a different 
administration eventually assumed control. Of the other 11 Instances of 'no administration' 
we have information for, 2 were short term initial responses where an administration 
eventually formed. Of the 9 current examples. 6 councils had never had an administration 
since becoming hung and 3 councils had previously had a party or parties in power, often 
for considerable periods of time. 
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Immediately re-assumed control (although this could have happened), so the decision 
of this study not to include a government resignation as signalling the end of a 
government could be seen as academic. However, whatever the circumstances, it 
appears foolish to consider a change of government has occurred if the same 
combination and weight of parties and the same personalities continue In office. A 
change of personalities is potentially a different matter. 
As Chapter Two noted, Collins (1984), compares local party leaders to Prime 
Ministers, with the leader seen as "the custodian of policy" at local level. He 
maintains a change of leader will usually entail a change of policy (Collins, 1984, 
p.45). However, Collins* study was of leaders in single party majority control 
councils, and leaders in hung councils may not have the same hold over policy;^ 2 
identifying exactly who Is the 'leader' of a local party can also be problematic. In 
addition, even in majority control governments a change of leader does not 
necessarily mean the end of a government, and nor does a change of policy 
d i r e c t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , this study (along with Laver & Schofield. 1990, see p.146) 
does not take a change of leader(s) as necessarily signalling the end of a government. 
Elections pose a more difficult decision, because even if the same party or parties 
continue in office the relative weight of parties both in and out of the coalition will 
probably have been altered. Inevitably, if closeness to minimum winning status (for 
example) is an important factor on coalitional durability, then a change in the 
arithmetical balance will be important. However, there is one very good reason for 
not considering an election as signalling the end of a government in English local 
authorities. In councils holding elections by thirds the maximum time an 
administration could last would be only 24 months, and in most cases only 12 
m o n t h s . R e g a r d i n g an election as signalling the end of a government would be 
inappropriate in such cases, and the average length of such governments would not 
reflect reality. 
^2 Section three of Chapter Eight examines the possibility of changed power relationships 
in hung councils. 
"13 For example, the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major as Prime Minister, 
despite the policy and Cabinet personnel changes that followed, was (like Callaghan 
replacing Wilson in 1976) not generally seen as creating a 'new government*. However, 
neither was the Lib/Lab pact in 1977, which this study would regard as a change of 
government. This demonstrates that any definition will create problems and encounter 
disagreement. 
'^ ^ See Chapter Two, section 2.1.4., for an explanation of the different electoral cycles, 
and Chapter Four, section one, for an examination of their effect on administrative 
formation. 
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This study proposes to regard an election (and by-election) as an important event, 
and will plot the changes in the balance between the parties over the period of 
hungness in order to check any relationship between numerical strength (however 
measured) and durability, but will not regard the election as necessarily signalling 
the end of the government. Importantly, we are not comparing the duration of 
administrations in hung councils with the duration of administrations in majority 
control councils. If we were, the argument for considering an election as terminating, 
a government would be overwhelming. Some local authorities have only ever known 
one party in power, which would make comparison of administrations In such 
councils with the inevitably more 'up-and-down' hung councils pointless unless an 
election was used as signalling the end or beginning of an administration. 
Given that we are comparing like with like, and that 73 months Is the longest period 
any administration has lasted in our sample of hung councils, the reservations of 
Budge & Keman (see above) are perhaps less relevant to this study. As Strom notes: 
"political or academic conventions specifying when a government begins 
or ends are arbitrary, and operational definitions must be justified by the 
research problem at hand" (Strom, 1988. p.927). 
To give Lijphart the final word on the subject of measuring government duration: 
"it does not often happen in the social sciences ... that the easiest solution 
Is also the best one, but we do find such a happy combination here. The 
other measures are all refinements of [any change in the party 
membership of the cabinet]: they all use party composition as their first 
criterion and then add one or more further criteria. Since these 
refinements do not strengthen the basic measure, they are not worth the 
extra effort. The measurement of cabinet durability in terms of the one 
criterion of parly competition clearly offers the optimal combination of 
validity and simplicity." (Lijphart. 1984b, p.278) 
Accordingly, especially given the justifications of Strom (1988) and Lijphart 
(1984b), only a change of party membership will invariably be treated as a change 
of government by this study. 
3.2.2. Extant Adm in i s t r a t i ons 
However, there is another significant problem which must be addressed. A majority 
of the administrations in our universe of 121 administrations are extant (62 extant, 
59 completed), and including extant governments in the analysis obviously raises 
problems for any study of administrative duration. Some of those administrations 
have not had time to develop, while others which have been In existence, for 
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example, for 37 months, may well go on to last much longer. However, to exclude 
current administrations''^ from the study would not only mean a large number of 
local authorities which have had the same administration for the duration of 
hungness would be excluded from any analysis; it would also mean excluding the great 
majority of coalition administrations in the sample, as there are few coalitions in 
the sample of completed administrations."'^ However, despite the obvious problems 
of including extant administrations, this is not seen as a major drawback to this 
analysis, for the following reasons. 
The primary aim of this study is not to assess the adequacy of various predictive 
theories, whether of formation or duration, but to examine empirically the 
circumstances which may be affecting the formation and durabil i ty of 
administrations in hung English councils. To exclude a large number of interesting 
cases for the secondary consideration of assessing or building general theories of 
coalitional behaviour therefore makes little sense. The data base of English local 
coalition studies (despite the pioneering work of, especially, (vtellors, Leach, and 
Stewart) is obviously extremely limited. Any additions to the important findings of 
previous observers is useful, and throughout the analysis of local administrative 
durability in Chapter Six, the findings will be qualified when necessary. For 
example, assessments of durability by type of administration will note any 
differences between completed and extant administrations, and where their inclusion 
will affect the composition of the relative samples, administrations which have been 
in existence for a short period of time will be excluded from the analysis. While it is 
accepted that a large sample of completed administrations would give more conclusive 
findings, an examination of the findings of this chapter will reveal a number of 
interesting suppositions which are worthy of further analysis when a larger 
universe of completed administrations is available. 
There is one unavoidable problem with the examination of administrative durability; 
if experience of hungness is essential for effective coalition bargaining, then 
coalitions should be more likely to form in long term hung councils. A longitudinal 
study covering a much greater time span than this study would be necessary to test 
this hypothesis. This is because most English hung councils have not been hung for 
long enough to test this hypothesis. Short-term hung councils (which Chapter Four 
^5 The use of the term 'current' is to indicate those arrangements pertaining at the time of 
the primary data collection, Summer, 1988. 
Chapter Nine's testing of coalition theory's suppositions regarding duration must set 
more rigourous requirements of definition, and this precludes the use of extant 
administrations. 
1 05 
designates as lasting less than 37 months) have not had enough time to 'last'; they 
will be less durable on average than administrations in long term councils simply 
because of this factor. Therefore, an examination of such factors must wail until a 
future study has enough councils with long term experience of hungness. The thesis 
that long term experience of hungness facilitates the formation of coalitions may then 
be able to be tested adequately. However, despite these reservations concerning this 
study, a large number of possible influences on administrative durability can still be 
examined. 
The first two sections of this chapter have dealt mainly with problems of definition. 
We now move to a general examination of the factors which may be affecting coalition 
formation in English local government, and detail our approach to the empirical 
chapters which follow. 
Sect ion Three: The Examinat ion of Local Coal i t ions 
This section begins with an assessment of the relevance of the multi-dimensional 
approach to the study of hung local councils; the difficulty of studying local coalitions 
using such an all-embracing approach is admitted, and this study does not adopt its 
approach. It is proposed that this study will use the insights of all traditions in 
coalition research in an attempt to build up as much knowledge of life in hung 
councils as possible. The specific empirical approach that this study will take is 
briefly outlined. 
3.3.1. The Mu l t i -D imens iona l App roach to the Examina t ion of Hung 
C o u n c i l s 
A number of factors may influence the formation of coalitions at local level. Mellors 
(1989). following the multi-dimensional model first proposed by Groennings 
(1970) and later formulated in detail by Pridham (1986), has detailed a number of 
possible influences on local coalition behaviour. These follow the seven 'dimensions' 
identified by Pridham (1986, pp.24-29), and indicate the enormous variety of 
factors that any truly realistic formal model would have to accommodate. While many 
of the variables are not capable of being adequately examined by a large scale survey 
such as this study they are worth listing in full, if only to demonstrate the 
difficulties formal theorists face in constructing an adequate representation of 
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coalition behaviour, Mellors identified the major "multi-dimensional Influences" on 
local coalition behaviour as: 
"Institutional: regulations (e.g. location of executive responsibility, 
requirement to form an execut ive, possibi l i ty of minor i ty 
administrations, election periods); legal constraints and competences; 
political status (e.g. scale, policy-making powers, financial autonomy); 
arithmetical factors. 
Historical: local political traditions; past experiences of conflict and 
cooperation (between both parties and leaders); evolution of parties In 
the local authority; shifts in party support; previous patterns of party 
control. 
Motivational: office v. policy-seeking motives (and the relationship 
between them); the nature of 'power* In local government 
(of f Ice/pat r onage /po l l c y -mak ing ) ; Ideo log ica l and pe rsona l 
compatibilities; short-, medium- and long-term strategies. 
Vertical/Horizontal: degree of devolution; compatibility or conflict In 
roles and bargaining styles of respective party actors; ideological space 
between parties; extent to which local party politics are 'nationalised*. 
Party-Internal: extent of national control over local party groups; 
levels of activism; extent to which national parties have developed 
strategies for local coalitions and/or see local coalitions as 'laboratories* 
for national alliances; communication between party levels; extent to 
which elected parties have dual interests In local and national political 
arenas. 
Socio-Political: degree of party politicisation; nature of local economy; 
urban v. rural areas; proximity to national elections; electoral volatility; 
electoral movements (e.g. rise of 'new' parties); extent to which political 
options are understood by the electorate; turnout; personalities and local 
leaders. 
External: influence of local bureaucrats; perceptions of local media; 
'events' (e.g occurrence of a local crisis or change in local economy)." 
(Mellors. 1989, p.7) 
Faced with such a large list of potential influences. It Is unsurprising that critics of 
formal theory are sceptical of its ability to model accurately the 'real world' of 
coalition politics. The multi-dimensional (or atheoretic?) approach does not attempt 
the predictive aims of formal coalition theories: rather. Its aims are to provide the 
detailed knowledge of the real world of coalition politics that formal theories appear 
to have minimised or ignored, as some formal modellers agree^^, and to act as an 
analytical framework for future observers. While the multi-dimensional approach 
as outlined by Mellors might be criticised for Its apparent concentration on political 
17 As Chapter One has already noted. McKelvey & Rosentahl (1978) make this point (see 
1.4.2.) 
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factors at the expense of bureaucratic inputs, with the local bureaucracy in Mellors' 
model being seen as an 'external' influence rather than as part of the political 
dynamic, It does point one way forward for future empirical examinations. 
While the multi-dimensional perspective has considerable benefits in the empirical 
study of coalitions, because it provides an exhaustive 'checklist' of influences and 
recognises the links between, for example, institutional constraints and coalition 
outcomes often ignored by theorists, it has not been formally utilised in this study. 
The difficulties of plotting the relationships between the 'dimensions* is apparent 
and. as f^eliors has pointed out: 
"if it is to provide a workable framework for the systematic collation of 
so far uncollected data about sub-national coalitions, then it needs 
considerable elaboration if it is not to present an impossible task to those 
who research in the field of local politics" (Mellors. 1989. p.8) 
Although Denters (1985) has attempted to isolate certain conditional factors within 
political systems in order to highlight the importance of context to coalition 
formation, the difficulties of operationalisation preclude (at the moment) a thorough 
utilisation of the framework in a large scale questionnaire based exercise such as 
this. Perhaps the biggest difficulty of the approach is the lack of a base from which a 
realistic empirical examination can proceed. If everything is important, how does a 
student of coalition politics decide where to concentrate attention? Thanks to formal 
theory, we know that office and policy are important. It is easier, and perhaps more 
productive, to treat these goals as paramount and then look for the constraints that 
will temper those goals. 
3.3.2. The Test ing of Assumpt ions About Life In Hung Counc i ls 
There are. of course, many variables which any examination of the factors 
influencing coalition strategies in hung councils must acknowledge. For example, a 
personal closeness between the leaders of two otherwise ideologically distant parties 
might well lead to cooperation. While 'cross-party* friendship between competing 
political elites might well be more common in the constrained world of local politics 
than in the high profile national arena, such assessments are outside the general 
scope of this research.18 Institutional factors may also present too many problems 
in assessing their influence on local coalition behaviour. For example, it is apparent 
^® As the case study of Devon demonstrates, this factor (and others identified by Mellors) 
plays a big role in the strategies of local parties there; see Chapter Ten. 
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that the importance of national issues to local voting may mean the link between a 
party's performance and its electoral fortunes is weakened. 
Many studies maintain that local elections in Britain are largely determined by the 
standing of the national parties (for example, Dunleavy. 1980, p.136). If this Is the 
case, then parties can pursue any kind of coalitional behaviour (including 
' irresponsible' tactics) without being punished electorally for it. This has 
repercussions for local coalition studies (see Laver, 1989, pp.27-28); for 
example, it may mean that local coalitions are less stable, but attempting to isolate 
cause and effect in such cases is obviously difficult, if not impossible. However, 
while accepting that isolating cause and effect will be inevitably be problematic in 
any study of political behaviour (particularly when examining elite behaviour), 
there are many factors which are capable of being examined. 
While a number of the multi-dimensional approach's observations influenced the 
content of the questionnaires sent to actors in hung and non-hung councils, it must be 
admitted that the range of variables it cites are so numerous that coherent research 
utilising the framework is a huge enterprise. The main reason for listing the 
"multi-dimensional variables" is to demonstrate the difficulty of the task facing any 
student of coalition politics. Undoubtedly, without the more specific propositions of 
game theory, the study of coalitions may never have advanced as far as it has. This 
study has already detailed numerous insights into coalition politics from a number of 
academic traditions. The intention is to examine the possible veracity of those 
insights whether they arise from a game theoretical examination in the laboratory or 
from the observations of a chief executive working in a hung council. 
The findings of this research are based upon the replies of chief executives and 
political leaders to questionnaires sent to them in June, 1988. The questionnaires 
(see Appendix A) were designed in order to generate information with which a 
number of general assumptions about life in hung councils, and the differences 
between hung and non-hung councils, could be empirically tested."*® The information 
gathered could also be used to test a number of the hypotheses which coalition 
theorists have argued influence both the formation and durability of political 
coalitions. The nature of that examination will now be briefly outlined. 
As the introduction to this thesis has already detailed, it is proposed to examine the 
activities of hung councils under-live substantive headings,-organised into chapters: 
19 The following section gives details of the nature and fielding of these questionnaires. 
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Chapter Four The Local Context: Chapter Five Party Strategies and Coalition 
Formation; Chapter Six The Stability of Administrations in Hung Councils, Chapter 
Seven, The Effects of Hungness on Council Practices, and Chapter Eight. The Effects of 
Hungness on Political and Administrative Actors. Following this. Chapter Nine will 
be devoted to testing a range of formal theories of coalition formation and 
maintenance against the data collected in this survey; the attitudes of parties towards 
office and policy pay-offs will be examined in this chapter. Finally. Chapter Ten wiN 
take a different approach, with a case study of Devon County Council which is 
supported by Interviews with all the leading actors. While these divisions inevitably 
have a touch of artificiality about them, in that factors impinging on coalition 
activities will be complex and variable, they do allow a measure of coherence to be 
brought to the study of the 'messy' business of coalition politics.^o 
As stated above, the bulk of this thesis is informed by the information which was 
collected by a large-scale questionnaire-based survey, and the method by which the 
data were collected will now be detailed. 
Sect ion Four: The Col lect ion of Data 
The final section of Chapter Three details the fielding of the questionnaires which 
yield the information which this study is based upon. The distribution of the 
questionnaires is outlined, and the response rates by political and bureaucratic 
actor, type of authority and political party are detailed. However, the paucity of data 
provided some initial problems. 
3 .4 .1 . I n fo rma t i on Prob lems 
The data in this survey derive from the questionnaires which were sent, initially, to 
111 local authorities which had been identified as hung, and a representative sample 
of 27 non-hung local authorities. The information on council composition was taken 
from the 1987 Municipal Yearbook and checked against other sources, primarily 
data from the Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre at Polytechnic South 
West. Plymouth, and from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA). However, completely reliable data on council compositions is difficult to 
obtain. Local authorities have no statutory duty to provide detailed election results. 
20 Occasionally, common-sense will dictate that a particular area is investigated "out of 
turn*. For example, the proposal that minimum winning coalitions will be more durable than 
other types of administration is examined in Chapter Six's overall look at the factors 
connected with durability and not in the examination of coalition theories in Chapter Nine. 
Given that section two of Chapter Six. is concerned with examining a variety of numerical 
factors which have been alleged to affect administrative durability, it appears essential to 
consider the impact of minimum winning status on durability there. 
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The results supplied often fail to identify political parties, and by-elections occur 
more frequently than at national level. Changes of party allegiance by councillors are 
not uncommon; one chief executive, responding to this survey, frankly admitted that 
he had no idea how to identify the "fragments" of the Alliance in his authority. In 
addition, councils with groups outside of the main parties may appear hung but be 
effectively controlled by, for example, a Conservative-Independent alliance which 
has no significant ideological differences. 
Allerdale District Council is a good example of such an authority. As their chief 
executive pointed out, in response to our initial letter and questionnaires, the basic 
statistics of 12 Conservative, 19 Independent, and 24 Labour members "gives a lie 
to the practical situation at Allerdale". Since 1973. following Labour gains, the 
Conservatives and Independents had formed what the chief executive termed an 
"Alliance Group" and since then "there has never been any separate Conservative or 
Independent groups". 
In total, 16 councils responded to the initial enquiry to say that they were not hung, 
some because of a long standing Conservative-Independent relationship, and others 
because the council composition had changed in 1987 or been incorrectly listed in 
the f^unicipal Yearbook. Therefore, these councils were omitted from the survey, and 
a revised lolai of 95 hung councils were surveyed. It may well be that some of the 18 
councils in this revised figure which did not respond to the questionnaire might also 
not consider themselves hung; 11 of the 18. according to our information on council 
composition, could have been controlled by a Conservative-Independent alliance. 
3.4.2. D is t r i bu t ion of Quest ionna i res 
Four different questionnaires were designed for the survey. Questionnaire 1 was 
designed for the chief executives of hung authorities, Questionnaire 2 for the party 
leaders or group spokesmen in hung authorities. Questionnaire 3 for chief executives 
in the control group of non-hung authorities, and Questionnaire 4 for their party 
leaders or group spokesmen (the appendix contains copies of the questionnaires). A 
total of 515 questionnaires were distributed; 95 of Questionnaire 1. 315 of 
Questionnaire 2, 27 of Questionnaire 3 and 78 of Questionnaire 4. 
All questionnaires were sent to the chief executive of the authority concerned for 
completion or distribution as appropriate. This had one significant disadvantage, in 
that some chief executives shared the views of one of their colleagues who felt that 
the questions "strayed into sensitive areas on which I do not believe either I or the 
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party leaders should be stating opinions", and declined to answer or pass on the 
questionnaires to his councillors. However, sending all questionnaires to the chief 
executives meant that, in most cases, the coordination of the task of completing them 
was carried out by the person in the best position to do so. In addition, the chief 
executive's greater knowledge of the political situation within his or her local 
authority meant that questionnaires were more likely to reach the correct person, 
with a better chance of all relevant factions being contacted, and were probably more 
likely to be completed. 
The questionnaires were sent to chief executives under the aegis of the Local 
Government Chronicle (LGC), with a personal letter from the LGC's Chairman, Mr. 
Geoffrey Smith. It was thought that this approach would produce a higher response 
rate, as Mr. Smith was personally known to almost all chief executives. Also, it was 
felt that the imprimatur of a publication which is well known and respected among 
local government officers would produce a more favourable response rate than a 
request for often sensitive information from an academic institution, albeit one with 
a noted reputation in the local government community. 
The questionnaires, with the accompanying letter, were sent out on June 6th, 1988, 
to 95 hung and 27 non-hung authorities. This date was chosen because (a) memories 
of the budget making process (usually finalised by the beginning of May) would still 
be vivid in the respondents memories, and (b) so that the local elections of May 
would be over and provide no distraction to the task of completing the questionnaire. 
Possible changes of control after the May 1988 local elections, either creating newly 
hung councils or returning those hung councils selected to majority control, were 
considered irrelevant for our purposes, as it was the experience of those councils 
which had been hung for a year or more which was the focus of this research. A 
return to majority control (for example, as in St Albans D.C) or a change to hung 
status by authorities in the control group (which did not in fact occur) did not 
invalidate the experience of the preceding years. A follow-up letter, again under the 
aegis of LGC. was sent to chief executives in those local authorities which had not sent 
completed returns. In addition, a number of councillors who had written with 
various queries about the research were sent personal letters clarifying its 
objectives or assuring them of confidentiality-^! 
In nearly every local authority, requests for confidentiality were made by at least one 
respondent; in many, a specfic assurance of confidentiality was requested. Accordingly, no 
local authority is specifically identified in the empirical chapters which follow. 
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3.4.3. Response Rates 
These procedures resulted in a final return of 242 completed questionnaires from a 
total of 515 sent out, an overall response rate of 47 percent. Tables 3 .1 . 3.2, and 
3.3 show the detailed response rates to the survey. 
It can be seen from Table 3.1 that the response rate of chief executives was 
considerably higher than that of party leaders in both hung and non-hung councils. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this. In cases where chief executives 
refused to complete the form or did not respond to either of our requests for 
information, it was unlikely that the questionnaires designed for party leaders were 
distributed. The questionnaires for party leaders required, in general, more 
subjective assessments than those designed for chief executives and were also longer, 
which may have led to a greater reluctance on the part of party leaders to complete 
the questionnaire. In addition, while councillors are ostensibly 'part-timers', party 
leaders in particular are effectively full-time politicians, with little or no time to 
fill in 'yet another* questionnaire: the much lower response rate from parly leaders 
in hung, as opposed to non-hung, authorities might also say something about the 
pressures of time on councillors in hung authorities. 
The attitude of the national party organisations may also have affected the response 
from local politicians. The official policy of both the Conservative Party and. 
especially, the Labour Party towards local coalitions is hardly encouraging (see 
Mellors. 1986, pp.22-23), and this may have inhibited local party leaders from 
responding to the survey.22 This could account for the lower response rates from 
Conservative and Labour leaders when compared to SLD/Alliance politicians. Given 
the positive attitude of the Alliance parties to power sharing, it is unsurprising that 
Alliance group leaders had a much higher response rate than the two main parties. In 
addition. Local Government Chronicle is a publication aimed primarily at local 
government officers, and a request for information from LGC would probably not 
have the same impact upon politicians as upon chief executives. 
n o 
Central-local party relations are examined In Chapter Two. section three. The possible 
effects of this national party hostility to local coalitions is examined in Chapter Five 
Section One. 
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Table 3.1: Overal l Response Rates to Survey 
Hung Councils Non-Hung Councils 
Surveyed Responded Percent Surveyed Responded Percent 
oh. execs 95 62 65.3 27 20 74.1 
party Idrs 315 117 37.1 78 43 53.1 
totals 410 179 43.7 105 63 60.0 
Table 3.2: Response Rates By Type of Author i ty 
Hung Councils Non-Hung Councils 
chief execs surveyed responded percent surveyed responded percent 
district 67 39 58.2 18 14 77.8 
county 21 18 85.7 4 3 75.0 
met.d.c. 6 5 83.3 3 2 66.7 
london b.c. 1 0 - 2 1 50.0 
party Idrs 
district 226 69 30.5 49 27 55.1 
county 67 40 59.7 12 6 50.0 
met.d.c 1 9 8 42.1 10 6 60.0 
london.b.c. 3 0 - 7 4 57.1 
Table 3.3: Response Rates By Poli t ica Party in Hung Counc i ls 
Conservative Labour SLD/Allce Independent Others 
district 22 1 5 24 7 1 
county 12 1 4 12 1 1 
mdc/lbc 3 1 4 - _ 
Total 
response 37 30 40 8 2 
Total 
surveyed 95 95 83 28 14 
Response 
Rate 38.9% 31.6% 48.2% 28.6% 14.3% 
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The much higher response rate from non-hung councils can probably be best 
explained by the number of surveys carried out recently into hung councils.23 i i 
may well be that a certain resistance to filling in questionnaires or answering 
questions has developed among both the members and officers of hung councils: it is 
also probable that they are a lot busier as a group. Whatever, at least one response 
was received from 67 of the 95 hung councils surveyed (70.5 percent), and 21 of 
the 27 non-hung councils (77.8 percent), and these returns, as well as comparing 
favourably to other elite surveys 24 offer a good basis for an analysis of the situation 
in hung councils and the differences in operation (if any) between hung and non-
hung councils. 
Conc lus ions 
This chapter has attempted to address some of the problems for the study of local 
coalition building raised by the developments in coalition studies and the nature of 
the English local government system, and prepare the way for the empirical 
examination which follows. A number of general points can be made. 
It is apparent that the primary goal of local councillors in hung councils is probably 
not 'office', given the absence of a core elite policy making body. It appears probable 
that deals between local parties will concentrate on policy concessions of some form, 
and the focus will therefore shift from executive coalitions to legislative coalitions. 
The definition of an 'administration' will also have to be broader when legislative 
coalitions are being considered, and this survey proposes to treat any example of 
commitment to maintain a particular arrangement in power as an expression of 
'inter-party support', and classifies the parties involved In such support as the 
administration. Deciding which parties are cooperating is more difficult when clear 
office pay-offs do not exist, but chief executives will be aware of the arrangements 
current in their authorities, and this is why the judgement of the chief executive 
concerning both present and previous administrative arrangements will be accepted. 
Another potential problem area is the assumption coalition theory makes that 
political parties will act as rational unitary actors. It is acknowledged that the group 
discipline of SLD groups and Independent groups may be considerably less than that 
23 For example, the national studies of Mellors. Laver Railings & Thrasher, Leach & 
Stewart, and Leach & Game. 
24 For example, Norton's (1990) postal survey of English chief executives achieved a 
response rate of 51.2 percent (Norton, 1990, p.138); the overall response rate of our 
survey was 47.0 percent, and the overall response rate of chief executives to our survey 
was 67.2 percent. 
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of the two major parties, but there is evidence that all local groups, particularly 
when in power, demonstrate considerable cohesion. While it is undeniable that local 
parties are generally less cohesive and politicised than national parties, it is 
concluded that they still act (most of the time) as unitary actors. 
Section two demonstrates the need to offer a clear definition of government 
termination in any study of coalition duration. It is apparent that there is no such 
thing as a standard definition, and different research has often used radically 
different criteria. After a detailed study of different approaches, the conclusion is 
that the best definition for the study of local administrative duration is the simplest 
one. Only a change in the parly membership of a administration will invariably be 
taken as signalling the end of a particular arrangement. This decision is contentious, 
as is the decision to include extant administrations in assessments of government 
duration. However, the majority of administrations are extant, and to exclude these 
administrations from the empirical analysis of duration because there is no way of 
knowing hovv long they will last would be counter-productive. The distinction 
between extant and completed administrations will be drawn where the findings of 
any analysis will be affected. The inability to conduct a meaningful longitudinal study 
of duration was also briefly addressed; most hung councils have not been hung long 
enough for such a study to be useful. 
As Chapter One illustrates, there are different ways to approach any study of 
coalitions. The multi-dimensional approach, if nothing else, demonstrates the 
enormous range of potential influences on local coalitional behaviour. It is 
unsurprising that criticism of the formal approach cites such lists as evidence of 
formal theory's deficiencies, but formal theory has been the dominant contributor to 
analyses of coalition behaviour; whatever its weaknesses, its propositions have 
spurred many writers to examine its claims. This survey proposes to use the 
insights of all writers on coalition behaviour, whatever their perspective. 
The following empirical chapters take a variety of approaches to the study of 
behaviour in hung councils. The responses of the actors in English local government 
to the questionnaires sent to them in the summer of 1988 have provided a large data 
bank from which the following chapters will draw. The analysis commences with an 
examination of the possible effects of certain institutional factors of local 
government on administrative formation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COALITION FORMATION: THE LOCAL CONTEXT 
Introduction 
Section One: The Impact of the Electoral Cycle on Coalition Formation 
4.1.1. The Effects of the Electoral Cycle on Administrative Formality 
4.1.2. Single Party Minority Government and Formal Status 
4.1.3. The Electoral Cycle and Political Arrangements 
Section Two: The Administrative Arrangements in Hung English Local Authorities 
4.2.1. Current Administrative Types 
4.2.2. The Allocation of Pay-Offs in Hung Councils 
4.2.3. The Effects of Hungness on the Distribution of Committee Chairs 
4.2.4. The Passage of Time and Administrative Arrangements 
Section Three: The Effects of Arithmetic on Administrative Arrangements 
4.3.1. The Balance of Power and Administrative Formation 
4.3.2. The Relationship Between Party System Fractionalization and Administrative 
Formation 
4.3.3. Minority Governments and Oversized Coalitions 
Conclusions 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Wherever its empirical cases studies are derived, formal coalition theory, in 
general, searches for a 'universal' theory potentially capable of explaining coalition 
building in a variety of settings, from Supreme Court decision making (Rohde. 
1972) to Italian government formation (Axelrod. 1970). However, as we have seen, 
critics of formal coalition theory have frequently pointed out the fallacy of 
attempting to produce general theories which take no account of country specific 
institutional and political factors (for example, see Mellors & Pijnenburg, 1989, 
p.302). In particular, the tendency of formal iheory to concentrate on the outcomes 
rather than the processes of coalition formation has meant that important factors 
impinging on coalition formation are minimised or ignored. 
For example, as the previous two chapters have addressed there is no requirement 
for an 'executive body' (i.e., in British terms, a 'cabinet') in British local 
authorities. The lack of a 'cabinet' appears to influence the strategies local parties 
adopt; research indicates that office payoffs in the form of committee chairs are not 
the goal of most local politicians (for example, see Laver. Railings & Thrasher, 
1987). If this is so. one of the major assumptions of much formal theory, that 
politicians seek office as the reward for participation in a coalition, may not be 
applicable to British local coalitions. Some of the implications of this point are 
examined later, both in this chapter and Chapter Nine (which tests some formal 
theories). The basis of this chapter is an examination of factors which will largely 
structure the strategies parties can adopt; specifically 'political' factors, such as the 
strategies and attitudes of the various political parties, will be analysed in the 
following chapter. 
Chapter Four is divided into three main sections, which examine not only potential 
structural, institutional and local influences on coalition building but also the effects 
of hungness on some of those institutional factors, such as the distribution of 
committee chairs. It has been argued that one of the most important structural 
factors impinging on coalition formation is the differing electoral cycle in local 
authorities (see for example, Leach & Stewart, 1988) and the opening section deals 
with the possible effect of this variable on the formality/informality of local 
administrations. Section one also assesses the impact of electoral cycles on the type 
of political arrangements made, specifically examining the idea that coalitions are 
more likely to emerge when hungness will be longlasting. Section two details the 
current administrative arrangements in hung councils and also addresses some of the 
difficulties arising from the first section. In particular, the problem of assessing 
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exactly what type of administration is in place when there is no 'cabinet' to guide the 
observer in his/her search for office pay-offs between ostensible coalition partners 
is examined in detail. The effects of hungness on the distribution of committee chairs 
is assessed and the difference in the allocation of chairs between single party 
administrations and coalition administrations is compared; some deviations from the 
hypotheses of previous observers are noted. Completing this section, we examine 
whether the passage of time leads to greater coalition building or to a propensity for 
minority administrations to form. The final section looks at some of the effects of 
'arithmetic' on the administrative arrangements emerging from hung counties. 
Among early coalition theorists such as Gamson and Riker the number of legislative 
seats each group possessed was regarded as the dominant factor in determining which 
coalitions would form. The theoretical implications of this are considered in Chapter 
Nine but a different approach is taken here. Stable inter-party accomodations have 
been predicted on the basis of the distribution (rather than the number) of seats 
(see Leach & Stewart, 1988). Section three looks at the effect a specific 
distributions of seats (for example, when all the major parties have a substantial 
number of seats or when one party is close to a majority) might have on the 
propensity for coalition or single party administrations to form. This section will 
also examine, from a number of perspectives, the possibility of a relationship 
between the number of parties and the type of administration forming, a thesis 
advanced by a number of authors (for example, Schofield, 1985). 
This examination of the factors influencing the types of administration forming 
begins with a look at the impact of the differing electoral cycles on administrative 
formation. 
Section One: The Impact of the Electoral Cycle on Coalition Formation 
There is a growing body of research into hung local councils, and this section will 
assess a number of hypotheses connected to the different electoral cycles, derived 
from that literature. We examine whether formal administrations are more likely to 
occur in councils with quadrennial electoral cycles, and whether within that 
category, county councils will (because of their higher profile) have more formal 
arrangements than district councils. Related to this, the thesis that coalitions will be 
likelier in councils holding quadrennial elections Is examined. 
4.1.1. The Effects of the Electoral Cycle on Administrative Formality 
The English county councils and London boroughs hold elections for the whole council 
every 4 years, while the metropolitan districts elect a third of the council every 
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year with the fourth year free of elections. Some district councils have the same 
arrangements as the counties; others follow the metropolitan pattern. While this 
might appear eccentric, it could be said to fit in well with a system of local 
government in which some areas of England are governed by two tiers of local 
government (the counties and shire districts) while in other areas (the metropolitan 
districts and London) one tier is deemed sufficient. IVIellors argues that there is 
c lear ly: 
" a greater temptation to fashion a durable solution in a hung council 
where there are 4 years before the next election than in one where there 
are just 12 months to wait in anticipation of a more decisive result" 
(Mellors, 1983. p.233). 
It appears at least intuitively likely that Mellors is correct. Support for this view 
comes from Leach & Stewart, who further argue that stability is also more likely in 
authorities holding elections every four years, a point examined in Chapter Six 
(Leach & Stewart. 1988, p.52). If Mellors is correct, formal administrative 
arrangements should be more likely to exist in county councils and in those districts 
where four-yearly elections are held. In authorities where elections are held by 
thirds, formal arrangements may be less likely to exist. In such authorities, 
hungness could be perceived as a temporary affair by the previous rulers. The main 
point of contention (the budget) will already have been established for the coming 
year; the annual budget is formally approved before the normal election dates in 
May. In such situations, former rulers in particular may be reluctant to enter into 
an agreement which could have electoral consequences in only a year's time. 
The generally higher profile among the electorate of issues at shire level (for 
example, education and social services) may also lead to a propensity for formal 
arrangements. It appears plausible that political elites will believe there is a 
greater need for administrations to present an image of competence to the electorate 
when the issues are perceived as more important (which may also, of course, mean 
that politicians at district level feel there is more freedom to manoeuvre and less 
pressure to come to such agreements). If this is the case, we would expect to find 
more formal arrangements in counties than in districts with a four year electoral 
cycle. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that: 
1.1: FORfyiAL ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEIVIENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO 
OCCUR IN AUTHORITIES WHERE THE COUNCIL IS ELECTED FOUR-YEARLY 
THAN IN AUTHORITIES WHERE THE COUNCIL IS ELECTED BY THIRDS. 
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1.2: FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO 
OCCUR IN COUNTY COUNCILS THAN IN DISTRICT COUNCILS WHICH HOLD 
FOUR-YEARLY ELECTIONS. 
As Table 4.1 (below) demonstrates, the expectations of Hypothesis 1.1 appear to be 
confounded by the evidence. There were more formal an-angements agreed in councils 
with yearly elections than in councils with quadrennial elections. The responses of 
political leaders to the same question supports the evidence of chief executives; 
contrary to Mellors expectations, formal arrangements are more likely in 
authorities which elect by thirds than those which adhere to a four yearly election 
cycle. Over half of political leaders in the former (58.7 percent) reported the 
existence of forma! administrative arrangements, compared to only 41.3 percent in 
councils holding full elections every four years. 
Table 4 . 1 : Admin is t ra t i ve Formal i ty By Electora l Cycle 
(response of chief executives, n=62; table excludes 'no response") 
Electoral Cycle Formal Administration Informal Administration 
Quadrennial (n=36) 51.9% 48 .1% 
Annual (n=26) 60.9% 39.1% 
Table 4.2 (below) details the responses of chief executives in all four categories (by 
electoral cycle) of council. Contrary to Hypothesis 1.2, there does not appear to be a 
greater level of formality in county councils than in districts with the same electoral 
cycle. If anything, the reverse appears to be the case. However, in both cases 7 of 18 
respondents replied that there was a formal arrangement; differences in the number 
who made no response to this question account for the apparently greater number of 
formal arrangements in district councils. However, the responses of group leaders 
lend support to the idea of greater formal administrative arrangements in county 
councils as opposed to district councils holding quadrennial elections. Table 4.3 
(below) shows the responses of group leaders in hung councils. According to the 
politicians, nearly half (48.6 percent) of group leaders in county councils reported 
the existence of formal arrangements compared to (ess than a third (31.8 percent) 
of political respondents in districts with the same electoral cycle. 
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Table 4.2: Administrative Formality By Type of Local Authority 
(response of chief executives, n=62; table excludes 'no response') 
Electoral 
Cycle 
Quadrennial 
(n=36) 
Annual 
(n=26) 
Type of 
Authority 
County (n=18) 
District (n=18) 
Mel. D.C. (n=5) 
District (n=21) 
Formal 
Administration 
46.7% 
58.3% 
60.0% 
61.1% 
Informal 
Administration 
53 .3% 
41 .7% 
40 .0% 
38 .9% 
When the results in Table 4.3 (below) are aggregated by electoral cycle they show 
that, according to party leaders, only 42.1 percent of councils with a four-yearly 
cycle have formal administrative arrangements compared to 58.7 percent of councils 
holding yearly elections. This supports the replies of chief executives: contrary to 
expectations, formal arrangements are more likely to exist in councils holding 
yearly elections, although it must be noted that the status of many 'formal' 
agreements is open to question. One S L D leader in a district council suspected the one 
year agreement between the coalition partners in his authority would only last "until 
a month before the next election". 
Table 4 .3: Administrative Formality By Type of Local Authority 
(response of group leaders. n=117; table excludes 'no response') 
Electoral 
Cycle 
Quadrennial 
Annual 
Type of 
Authority 
County (n=40) 
District (n=26) 
Mel. D.C. (n=8) 
District (n=43) 
Formal 
Administration 
48.6% 
31.8% 
42.9% 
61.5% 
Informal 
Administration 
51.4% 
68.2% 
57 .1% 
38 .5% 
Quite why there appears to be a relationship between electoral cycle and 
administrative formality is more difficult to say, and some possible explanations 
will now be assessed. 
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P o s s i b l e Exp lana t ions for the Apparent Re la t ionsh ip Between 
Formality and Electoral Cycle 
However the data are examined, it appears indisputable that there are more formal 
administrations in councils holding yearly elections than in councils holding 
quadrennial elections. The reasons for this are more difficult to discern. Certainly, 
one year seems to be a recurring figure when formal arrangements are examined. 
Group leaders report that in two-thirds of cases where there is a time limit on 
formal arrangements (30 of 45 cases) the time limit Is one year, a finding 
supported by the responses of chief executives. A one year time limit on 
administrative arrangements appears to be the norm, perhaps because this reflects 
the budgetary cycle of local authorities. Although this does not explain the differences 
in formal arrangements according to electoral cycle, it does suggest an explanation; 
it may be easier to come to a formal arrangement when there is only a year to go 
before a possible change of political control. 
Political actors in councils with a four-yearly cycle, faced with four years of 
hungness to come, may be reluctant to endow any administration with a degree of 
formality (even for one year) which might imply a 'right to rule'. However, when 
this research was carried out (June-August, 1988) there was just under a year left 
before the next county council elections. The counties were half of the sample of 
authorities holding elections every four years (in the other half of the sample, there 
were another 3 years to go before new elections). Therefore, one might have expected 
to find no significant difference between county councils and councils holding yearly 
elections, as in both cases there is less than a year to go before possible change. 
That expectation does not take account of the bigger stakes involved in councils with a 
four-yearly cycle. It may be that in such situations (i.e. less than a year to go before 
an election which will decide a councirs political fate for the next four years) 
politicians are not going to risk endowing their opponents with authority by granting 
them formal governmental status. On the other hand, group leaders may be mindful of 
the oft-quoted adage *oppositions don*t win elections, governments lose them' and be 
actively disassociating themselves from any connection with government. For 
example, it was 15 months before the quadrennial elections that the electoral pact in 
Devon County Council between the Liberals and the Social Democrats fell apart, with 
much bitterness, and that particular arrangement should have been the easiest pact 
to maintain. As Strom notes, "as elections draw close, the value of short-term office 
holding declines, and electoral considerations become paramount" (Strom, 1988. 
p.929). The price of failure is four years without power, a much higher price than 
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that paid by unsuccessful parties in councils electing by thirds. In such 
circumstances, it would not be surprising if politicians were wary of entering into 
any sort of political arrangement, either alone or with other parties. 
4.1.2. Single Party Minority Government and Formal Status 
An alternative explanation for the greater number of formal arrangements in 
councils which elect by thirds arises from an examination of Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 
below. It may be that another variable is more important than the electoral cycle; 
the form of administrative arrangement existing in the local authority appears to be 
a very important factor. 
Table 4.1 (above) shows the relationship between administrative arrangements and 
electoral cycle. From Mellors (1983. 1989) we expected to find more formal 
arrangements in councils holding quadrennial elections; this was not the case. It may 
be that the greater number of formal arrangements in councils electing by thirds can 
be explained by the far greater number of single party administrations in such 
authorities. Single party minority administrations are far more likely to have 
formal administrative arrangements than other forms of administration, as Table 
4.4 (below) demonstrates. In addition, Table 4.5 (see below) shows there are far 
more single-party administrations in councils which hold elections every year; this 
alone would account for the greater number of formal arrangements in councils 
holding elections every year. 
Table 4.4: Percentage of Formal Arrangements for Coalition and 
fWinorily Governments By Electoral Cycle 
(response of chief executives, n=62: table excludes 'no response') 
Electoral Cycle Minority Governments With Coalition Governments With 
Formal Admins Formal Admins 
Quadrennial 75.0% 42 .1% 
Annual 85.7% 22 .2% 
Why single party minority governments should be more likely to have formal status 
is difficult to say. Perhaps there is a reluctance to rule alone in such an exposed and 
precarious position without some degree of stability being afforded. The price of 
taking on government in such a difficult situation may be a formal recognition of the 
'right to rule'. Opposition parties may then need to be careful not to be accused of 
1 2 4 
irresponsibility if they attempt to subvert the minority government without being 
prepared to rule under the same circumstances. Also, given there is often a feeling of 
hostility (especially initially) to coalition building, there can be a feeling that the 
largest single party should be allowed to rule alone. In the great majority of cases, 
the party ruling alone is close to an absolute majority. As l^ellors points out 
"morally, if not electorally, such groups may regard themselves as having the right 
to form the administration in the council" (Mellors. 1989, p.85). Such feelings 
appear to be widespread in local government, particularly among the two main 
parties (see Carter, 1986), and this may facilitate the granting of formal status. 
Such factors are analysed in the following sub-section. 
4.1.3. The Electoral Cycle and Political Arrangements 
It must be noted that formal administrative arrangements do not necessarily imply a 
majority coalition government. It may be that single party or minority coalition 
governments will be formally constituted. However, fvlellors' reference to the desire 
to fashion a "durable situation" over a four year period can certainly be seen as 
implying a formal situation where stable voting patterns can be expected. A formal 
majority coalition is normally seen as the optimum expression of stability in a hung 
situation. Further to his earlier comments on forming a durable solution, Mellors 
repeats his view that "there is rather more incentive for political parties to come to 
some kind of understanding with each other in a hung council when the stalemate is 
likely to last a number of years" (Mellors, 1989, p.69). This receives support 
from Clay, who in a remarkably pragmatic and trenchant Liberal party guide to 
action in hung or, as the Liberals insist on calling them, 'balanced* councils, 
instructs the party's councillors that their influence may well be less in councils 
which hold yearly elections, because "the other parties will be prepared to live with 
uncertainty for a year if they think that after that everything will revert to 
'normal'" (Clay, 1982, pp.4-5). While this might appear to contradict the findings 
of this research (that formal arrangements are more likely in councils electing by 
thirds) there is no necessary relationship between a formal agreement to allow one 
party to rule alone and *a lack of uncertainty', especially when there is no agreement 
with other parties over policy packages."* 
Mellors argues that formal pacts are unusual, with alliances tending to be "loose, 
temporary and issue specific" (Mellors, 1989, p.103; see also Leach & Game, 
^ Research has suggested thai governments which form without agreements over policy 
appear to be shorter lived and less stable than formal coalitions (see Budge & Keman 
1990, p.188) 
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1988. p.39), an argument strongly supported by the figures in Table 4.4 above, 
which show that minority administrations are far more likely to have formal 
arrangements than coalition administrations; the majority of coalitions are 
'informal' according to our respondents. It would intuitively appear to be harder to 
sustain such informal arrangements over four years, and this is also given support 
in Table 4.4. which shows that 42.1 percent of coalitions in councils holding 
quadrennial elections are formally constituted compared to only 22.2 percent of 
coalitions in councils electing by thirds. 
While the pressure to come to an agreement in councils with a four-yearly electoral 
cycle does not preclude an understanding to allow a minority governmenl to form, it 
might appear logical to assume that parties will be more likely to enter negotiations 
in such a situation. Leach & Game argue that "the knowledge that the hung situation is 
probably unchangeable for four years is a major force for cooperation" (1989, 
p.63). If this is so, coalitions (whether formal or informal) should be more likely 
in councils with a four-yearly electoral cycle; one might also expect to find fewer 
minority governments in councils with a four year electoral cycle. Accordingly, it is 
proposed that: 
1.3: COALITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES A R E MORE L IKELY IN COUNCILS 
WITH A QUADRENNIAL ELECTORAL C Y C L E 
1.4: MINORITY ADMINISTRATIONS A R E MORE L I K E L Y TO FORM IN 
AUTHORITIES WHERE THE COUNCIL IS E L E C T E D BY THIRDS THAN IN 
AUTHORITIES HOLDING QUADRENNIAL ELECTIONS. 
The above hypotheses propose that coalitions are more likely in councils with a four 
yearly electoral cycle and minority administrations are more likely in councils 
electing by thirds. Table 4.5 details the findings of this research, and strongly 
supports the hypotheses. The majority of governmental arrangements in authorities 
with a four-yearly cycle are majority coalitions. In councils which elect by thirds, 
the reverse is the case; the majority of arrangements are for one party to rule alone 
in a minority government. As mentioned above, this appears to account for the 
unexpectedly greater number of formal arrangements in such councils, as single-
party minority administrations are more likely to be formally constituted. 
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Table 4.5: Type of Government By Electoral Cycle 
Single Party Majority Minority No Admin 
Admins Coalitions Coalitions 
Elect'l Type of no. % no. % no. % no. % 
Cycle Auth'y 
Quad- district 6 25.0 7 47.2 2 8.3 3 19.4 
(n=18) 
rennial county 3 1 0 1 4 
(0=18) 
Annual Met.d.c. 4 57.7 1 34.6 • 7.7 
(n=5) 
district 1 1 8 - 2 
(n=21) 
Total (n=62) 24 38.7 26 41.9 3 4.8 9 14.5 
It appears that politicians in councils with a quadrennial electoral cycle are far more 
likely to engage in coalition agreements (whether majority or minority coalitions) 
than their counterparts in councils electing their members by thirds. The reasons 
for this must be open to contention, but Mellors' assertion that 'durability' will be of 
greater importance when there is four years to wait for the next election must be a 
plausible explanation. However, this does not answer the question of why there are 
more four-yearly cycle authorities with no administration in place (19.4 percent) 
than is the case with councils holding yearly elections (7.7 percent). If there are 
forces pressing for durable agreements in councils with a four-yearly electoral 
cycle, one would expect the reverse to be true. It may be (and this is conjecture) 
that such pressure for agreement pushes together groups who are not ready for the 
compromise essential to coalition politics over a wide range of issues, and that such 
groups are incapable of sustaining agreements over such time periods; Devon 
provides a graphic example of the gradual failing out of two previously close parties, 
with the SLD and SDP accusing each other of wrecking the administration (see 
Western Evening Herald. 20/2/88. p.7) 2 On the other hand, the earlier 
explanation of an unwillingness to form an administration prior to the four-yearly 
elections seems a highly plausible one. 
2 Chapter Ten, section three, examines the break-up of the Alliance in detail. 
127 
There is, of course, no necessary requirement for parties In hung councils to enter 
into formal arrangements. Indeed, the history of British politics suggests that the 
major political parties, including the Liberals, might regard all forms of 
cooperation between parties with suspicion. As Bogdanor points out "party attitudes 
and preconceptions ... have [predisposed] parties against coalitions" (Bogdanor. 
1983, p.7). Asquith and Lloyd George's Liberal / Conservative coalitions, Labour's 
memory of Ramsay MacDonald, and the Lib/Lab pact of Callaghan's faltering 
administration have undoubtedly coloured the perceptions of even present-day 
politicians towards coalition politics. In addition, British political culture, heavily 
influenced by the vested interests of the two major parties, has continually 
emphasised the 'importance* of one party control to 'effective* policy making. In such 
a climate, those coalitions which did form might tend to be informal, and the 
emphasis might well be upon single party minority administrations. 
There are also good reasons for viewing minority administrations, not as an 
'irrational* act by ill-informed politicians hostile to coalitions, but as the result of 
rational political behaviour. Strom argues that minority governments can be seen as 
the outcome of "rational party behaviour'* (Strom, 1990. p.90-91). and this could 
offer a feasible explanation for the large number of minority administrations in 
English local authorities. It is certainly rational for local politicians to hesitate at 
forming coalitions with electoral rivals when hungness may be a temporary 
phenomenon (see Mellors. 1989. p.86 for support for this view). Even in councils 
holding quadrennial elections hungness could be seen as temporary, as by-elections 
are not uncommon at local level. Blowers notes that in a number of hung county 
councils "death, illness, or the resignation of members shifted the balance of power 
from one party to another" (Blowers. 1987. p.43), which may also inhibit rational 
actors from making deals which could rebound on them.3 
It could be that actors will also hesitate to form a minority administration if they are 
unable to get some indication of at least tacit support from another party or parties. 
However, opponents might hesitate to 'bring down' an unsupported minority 
administration without offering a viable alternative as "the electorate is unlikely to 
look kindly upon those who perpetuate stalemate and chaos inside the council" 
(Mellors. 1989, p.86). Budge & Laver's "viability criterion" partly explains the 
success of minority governments by the failure of opposition parties to present a 
^Interestingly, Blowers suggests by-elections will be even more common in hung councils 
as "the burden on councillors ... is intensified under the conditions of minority rule" leading 
to a higher rate of resignations than in non-hung councils (Blowers. 1987, p.43). 
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viable alternative (1986, p.488). Rational actors who recognise the unwillingness 
of some actors to enter coalitions can form a minority government and get at least 
some of their policy preferences adopted. Even if a party is reluctant to take power 
without a majority it "may perceive that as the best available alternative" (Laver, 
Railings & Thrasher. 1986. p.13). If opposition parties are reluctant to take office 
when they cannot be sure of getting their policies enacted, they will probably be 
unlikely to want to bring down the ruling minority administration and run the risk 
of such 'irresponsibility' rebounding on them electorally. If this is the case, 
minority administrations may be more stable than some observers argue, a point 
addressed in Chapter Six, which examines administrative stability in hung councils. 
Most research into hung councils supports the predominance of minority 
administrations (for example, fvlellors 1983, Leach 1985, Carter 1986. Laver 
Railings & Thrasher 1987, Leach & Stewart 1988). indeed, in a few authorities, the 
provision that the party with the most seats forms the administration (regardless of 
whether it has a majority) is part of the council's standing orders (see Leach & 
Stewart. 1988. p. 43). Therefore, given the findings of previous researchers, it 
would be expected that single party minority administrations would be the most 
common type of administrative arrangement in hung councils. However, the findings 
of this research (as Table 4.5 has already indicated) are that such governments are 
no longer the most common form of administration in English local authorities. 
Section two will now examine the possible reasons for this change, and assess the 
research of previous writers in the light of this finding, 
SECTION TWO: The Administrative Arrangements in Hung English Local 
Author i t i es 
This section begins by listing the type of administrations forming in hung councils, 
and discusses the differing ways administrations in hung councils have been defined 
by observers and the consequent difficulty of comparison with previous studies. The 
relationship between 'formality' and type of administration is also investigated, with 
some unexpected findings. Finally, the area of 'office pay-offs* is examined, with the 
relationship between the allocation of committee chairs and 'coalition governments' 
receiving close scrutiny. 
4.2.1. Current Administrative Types 
According to the responses of chief executives, the arrangements which exist in the 
hung English local governments can be classified as follows: 
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(i) a single minority party rules alone (38.7 percent) 
(ii) a majority coalition rules (41.9 percent) 
(lit) a minority coalition rules (4.8 percent) 
(iv) there is no administration and voting alliances are ad hoc (14.5 
percent) 
This largely supports the classification of hung authorities by Leach & Stewart 
(1988), although they further identified councils which were classified as 'knife-
edge', in that one party has exactly half the council seats. In such situations, Mellors 
argues: 
"it is unlikely that the opposition parties will attempt to form the 
administration of the authority, but rather will use their voting strength 
to win occasional policy concessions from the largest party" (f^ellors. 
1989. p.85). 
There were four 'knife-edge' authorities in this survey. Three of these are classified 
in Table 4.5 (above) as single party minority administrations; in all three cases the 
party holding half the seats rules alone, lending support to Mellors' argument. The 
remaining 'knife-edge' authority is classified in Table 4.5 as a minority coalition. In 
that council, Labour had exactly half of the council seats (33). and the Conservatives 
(with 12 seats), Liberals (20 seats) and a solitary Independent had formed a 
coalition against the previous rulers of the council. This might appear to support the 
idea that Independents can be more closely identified with Consen/atives than other 
parties, as a Labour/ Independent coalition could have held a majority. However, in 
two of the three single party minority administrations a Conservative/ Independent 
coalition could have ruled but did not; in the other a solitary SLD councillor could 
have helped minority rulers Labour to an overall majority. While there may have 
been policy payoffs to the single councillor in these three cases, the responses from 
group leaders all agreed with the assessments of the Chief Executives regarding the 
administrative arrangements, indicating that there was no such arrangement; 
political opponents would not be slow to point out such deviancy from the official 
administrative position. There may be considerable resentment by the two big 
parties at just one councillor holding the balance of power, a possible explanation for 
the lack of involvement of what in all three cases appears to be a plausible partner 
for the party ruling alone. 
In their 1988 survey, Leach & Stewart also identified a minority coalition in 
Grampian. However, that minority coalition of SLD/lndependent/SDP had the "tacit 
support" of the Labour party (Leach & Stewart. 1988, pp.38-40). If, following De 
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Swaan (1973) and Warwick (1979). we extend the coalition to include "parties who 
were committed, tacitly or openly, to maintaining the coalition in power" whether or 
not they took government office (Warwick, 1979. p.467). Grampian (which was not 
included in this survey) could be seen as a majority coalition. Also, l^ach & Stewart 
argue that "the minority administration is the most common form of hung authority" 
(1988, p.39). This goes against the findings of this research, which indicates that 
majority coalitions are the most common form of administration in English hung 
local authorities. 
Leach & Game (1989) presented a slightly modified version of Leach & Stewart's 
classification, identifying four major types of administration: (i) the formal 
coalition, (ii) a shared power administration with no commitment to shared policy 
objectives, (iii) the minority administration, and (iv) no administration (Leach & 
Game, 1989, pp.13-15). Again, they argued that minority administrations were the 
most common, although their research was confined to the county councils. As with 
Leach & Stewart, they included the idea of a minority administration with support 
from one or more parties. Leach & Game argue that "the extent of such support can 
range from something resembling an informal coalition ... to an initial agreement 
enabling one party to form an administration" (Leach & Game, 1989, p.14). The 
former case must surely be examined as a coalition and not as a minority 
administration, weakening their assertion that minority administrations are the 
most common form of administration. 
However, Leach & Game's assessments of the administrative arrangements in county 
councils were made in September 1987, nine months before this survey asked chief 
executives to detail the current administrative arrangement. It may be that, even 
allowing for the differences of definition, minority governments were more common 
then. Indeed, when the 59 previous administrations in our sample are examined, 
minority administrations dominate; 35 (59.3 percent) of previous administrations 
are single party minority administrations, 19 (32.2 percent) are majority 
coalitions, 2 (3.4 percent) are minority coalitions, and in 3 cases (5.1 percent) 
there was no administration. This suggests that a 'learning process* appears to be 
taking place, and indicates that experience of hung government is necessary for 
successful coalition strategies. 
The findings of this research suggest coalition arrangements, although not in the 
majority, are now the most usual form of administration. However, it must be 
reiterated that our definition of an administration is tied to the judgements of chief 
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executives. Their answer when they were asked which party or parties comprised 
the current administration was accepted as the 'administration*. This may tend to 
produce more 'coalition' administrations than the earlier studies cited, because an 
answer such as "Conservative, with Independent support", was treated as a 'coalition' 
administration. In other words, the findings of this research might be artefacts of the 
definition of an 'administration' we adopted. Chapter Three (see 3.1.2.) details the 
arguments for using the opinions of chief executives as the criterion for deciding the 
administration in place. It must be pointed out that the lack of commonly agreed 
definitions concerning administrative arrangements is a considerable barrier to 
comparison with previous studies. A common definition of terms such as "formal", 
"coalition", and "administration" is needed if future studies are not to face the same 
Impediments to comparison, a problem the conclusion to this thesis examines. 
Despite the caveat above, chief executives might be expected to think very carefully 
before categorising the administrative arrangements In their authority. While it 
must be remembered that "one politician's tacit support is another's formal 
coalition" (Railings & Thrasher. 1986, p.12), and therefore one might expect much 
disagreement concerning the nature of administrative arrangements, group leaders 
generally supported their chief executives assessments. In 60 percent of local 
authorities, the politicians responding agreed completely with their chief executive. 
In a further 22 percent of local authorities, there were minor differences between 
political and bureaucratic actors, mostly involving one group leader disagreeing over 
the inclusion (or olhenwise) of a minor actor. In only 18 percent of cases were there 
significant disagreements between politicians and chief executive over the nature of 
the administration. That said, some of those disagreements were striking. In two 
authorities, three different coalitions were claimed by the actors involved, 
indicating the difficulty of comparing this research with that of previous observers. 
Some examples of cooperation will be in the form of fairly loose agreements, while 
other arrangements will be highly formalised. The degree of formality of the 
administrative types found by this survey will now be examined. 
Administrations and Formality 
Table 4.6 details the formality or otherwise of the various administrative 
arrangements, and as Table 4.4 has already indicated, shows that most coalitions are 
informal. All 3 minority coalitions are formally constituted, which might lend 
support to the idea offered earlier to explain the large proportion of single party 
minority administrations given formal recognition. That is, there may be a 
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reluctance to rule in such a precarious position without a degree of stability 
(however illusory) being afforded, in this case formal governmental status. This 
formality does not extend to the sharing of committee chairs in the 3 minority 
coalitions, where in only one case were chairs shared. 
Table 4.6: Formality By Type of Administrative Arrangement 
(table excludes those 9 local authorities where there is *no administration*) 
Formal (n=28) Informal (n=22) No Info, re Formality 
Majority Coalition 7 (28.0%) 18 (72.0%) 1 
(n=26) 
Minority Coalition 3 (100%) 
(n=3) 
Single Party 18 (81.8%) 4 (18.2%) 2 
Minority (n=24) 
Indeed, the use of 'formal' and 'informal' coalitions to describe the administrative 
arrangements appears to bear little relationship to an agreement or othenvise to 
share committee chairs and deputy chairs. In those authorities for which the 
information on chair distribution was available, 5 of 6 formal majority coalitions 
and 9 of 14 informal majority coalitions shared committee chairmanships. Given the 
small numbers involved, the slightly greater number of formal coalitions which 
shared chairs does not appear especially significant. Interestingly, in the 9 'no 
administration' councils there were 6 in which the chairs were known, and in all 
these the committee chairs were shared. This might demonstrate the difficulty of 
classifying administrative arrangements in hung councils; the difference between an 
'informal coalition' and 'no administration' might not be apparent to even an 
informed observer."^ What the above findings do appear to show is that the thesis that 
committee chairs are not sought by local coalition actors (see Laver, Railings & 
Thrasher, 1987) needs to be re-examined, and this point will now be closely 
addressed. 
^ Taking the subjective assessment of chief executives is not without problems, as this 
demonstrates. The difference between 'no administration*, an 'informal coalition*, and an 
*all-party administration' will be in the eye of the beholder (see Chapter Five, section 
5.2.8). 
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4.2.2. The Allocation of Pay-Offs in Hung Counci ls 
It has been noted how difficult it can be to classify the administrative arrangements 
in hung councils. Differences of opinion between the actors involved are not 
uncommon, although there is usually general agreement. One of the major problems 
of categorising the administrations in hung councils is the difficulty of observing 
•pay-offs' to coalition actors. Formally, there is no central policy making body in 
British local authorities, unlike at national level, where the Cabinet performs that 
function. The problem is not confined to British local government; as Thomas has 
pointed out in a study of sub-national coalitions in Denmark, the existence of a 
formal executive body at local level makes Denmark "unusual by West European 
standards" (Thomas, 1989, p.130). Of course, as Meliors points out: 
"the formal position has not ... precluded the development of de facto 
executives in those authorities with well-established patterns of single-
party majorities, but such practices have no legal standing and rely 
entirely on the existence of well-disciplined voting majorities in full 
council and council committees capable of delivering policies in 
accordance with the wishes of the majority party. In a hung council this is 
not the case and the constitutional situation reverts to its more formal 
nature" (Mellors. 1989. p-74).5 
Prior to the Local Government Act (1989) introducing proportionality for 
committee membership, the policy and resources committee fulfilled the function of 
a 'cabinet' in many single party majority control councils. Widdicombe reported that 
94 percent of all authorities had such an 'overall policy' committee, although the 
majority were not single-party (Widdicombe, 1986, Table A.31. p.277). However, 
as the case study of Devon in Chapter Ten demonstrates, 'secret' committees of 
chairman and chief officers meeting regularly are not unknown. Despite Mellors' 
observation, it would be naive to believe the ruling party/parties will not continue 
to have some informal group which will effectively function as a local 'cabinet'. For 
example, one chief executive of a hung council 'confidentially' reported the existence 
of 'mini-groups' of chairs meeting to discuss strategy before committee meetings. 
Mellors makes a significant observation for students of coalition behaviour, pointing 
out that the existence of a 'cabinet' in most European democracies has encouraged 
both actors and observers to consider the formation of a coalition and the distribution 
of portfolios as the definition of coalition activity. After the "distribution of the 
spoils of office" there is a period of "coalition inactivity" until either the collapse of 
the coalition or a new election restarts the process. As Mellors observes, "inevitably 
5 Stewart (1986, p. 137) makes the same point. 
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... we have come to regard coalitions as acts or outcomes rather than processes" 
(Mellors, 1989, pp.74-75, emphases in original).® Mellors argues that, with the 
absence of an executive body, "coalitional activity tends to be a more complex and 
protracted process" (1989, p.75). Coalition theory's concentration on coalition 
formation rather than coalition maintenance might therefore render much formal 
theory inappropriate for a study of English local coalitions.^ 
The lack of a formal 'cabinet' in British local government poses serious problems for 
coalition theories which concentrate on an 'office-seeking' perspective to coalition 
formation. The majority of studies (see Mellors, 1989, pp. 97-103 for an account 
of these) have looked for payoffs to actors in the form of committee chairs, and, as is 
discussed in the following section, have generally failed to find much evidence of 
this.^ The importance of readily observable rewards for coalition participants is 
not just that it enables theorists to test their hypotheses more easily; it also has 
important effects on the deals that will be struck by actors. As Laver & Shepsle 
argue, in the case of cabinet rather than legislative coalitions: 
"portfolio allocation becomes the mechanism by which prospective 
coalitions make credible promises and so inform the expectations of 
rational agents in the coalition formation process" (Laver & Shepsle, 
1990, p.873). 
4.2.3. The Effects of Hungness on the Distribution of Committee Chairs 
Without the possibility of 'portfolio allocation' in a cabinet setting, it might be 
thought that local coalition actors would seek office payoffs in the form of committee 
chairs and deputy chairs. As Mellors points out, such positions are probably "the 
closest approximation in local government to ministerial portfolios" (Mellors, 
^ Laver & Shepsle (1990) agree that a weakness of formal coalition theory has been that 
not enough attention is paid to what happens after the formation of a government, and argue 
that "rational expectations' of what will happen after the formation process is completed 
will actually influence 'the formation process itself (Laver & Shepsle, 1190, p.873). 
^It must be pointed out that a number of recent studies have attempted to redress the 
concentration on formation, notably Budge & Keman's (1990) study of coalition formation 
in twenty states, which also examined the functioning of government and the causes of 
government terminations. 
®Given that committee membership is quite commonly awarded on a proportional basis in 
non-hung councils (see Mellors. 1989. p,103) the award of committee places is not 
commonly cited as evidence of payoffs although it can be "an important objective for 
Liberals' (Metiers, 1989. p. 103). Anyway, the introduction of new regulations enforcing 
proportionality in committees (in the Local Government Act, 1989) means that parties 
must now be given committee places in accordance with their council membership, and 
makes it impossible in future to consider committee membership as a possible reward for 
participation in a local coalition, although this legislation was not in place when this 
research took place during the Summer of 1988. 
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1989. p.80). In majority control councils such chairmanships carry considerable 
power and prestige. It is argued that this changes when a council becomes hung, with 
the status of chairmanships becoming significantly reduced. Indeed, one chief 
executive responding to this survey claimed one of the advantages of becoming hung 
was that it acted as "a useful break on the well known syndrome of chairmen thinking 
they are ministers". If this is so, actors are unlikely to seek rewards in the form of 
committee chairs. Mellors goes so far as to maintain that the relatively low prestige 
and power of committee chairs and deputy chairs "suggests that office-seeking should 
not be a prime motivation for party groups in hung councils" (1989. p.98). 
Mellors' assertion is supported by many observers of hung councils. Only a quarter 
(12 of 48) of the hung councils examined by Laver, Railings & Thrasher (1987) 
had shared administrations, in the sense that chairs were allocated to more than one 
party. In the other three-quarters of councils one party, usually (but not always) 
the largest party, took all the chairs and deputy chairs (1987. p.10). Leach & 
Stewart reported even fewer shared administrations; in their sample only 8 of 103 
hung councils had administrations which shared committee chairs. However, it must 
be pointed out that over a quarter (27 percent) of their sample were classified as 
'low partisanship' councils, and that in those councils sharing of committee chairs 
did take place (Leach & Stewart, 1988, p.40). 
Whatever, it appears from the authoritative study of Laver, Railings and Thrasher 
(1987) that committee chairs do not constitute a bargaining point for the great 
majority of actors. The large majority of councils have one party taking all the 
chairs and vice-chairs. One would expect to find that the absence of a formal cabinet 
would imply that, whatever the type of hung administration which is formed, one 
party will tend to take all the chairs and deputy chairs. Accordingly it is proposed 
that: 
1.5: HUNG COUNCILS WILL TEND TO G E N E R A T E ADMINISTRATIONS IN 
WHICH A SINGLE PARTY T A K E S ALL COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND DEPUTY 
CHAIRS. 
Chief executives in hung and non-hung councils were asked to detail (where 
applicable) the party which held the chair and deputy chair on the following 
committees: policy and resources, education, social services, housing, planning, 
highways, transport, and finance. In the single party majority control councils 
comprising the control group for this survey there was no deviation from the 
principle that the majority party took all the chairs and vice-chairs. However, the 
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replies from chief executives in hung councils shown in Table 4.7 (below) are at 
odds with those of earlier studies. 
While there are still a majority of authorities in which one party takes all the 
chairs (53.7 percent), there are a substantial minority of authorities (40.7 
percent) in which chairs are shared. The difference between these findings and 
earlier research can probably be best explained by the passage of time. Experience of 
hungness is essential to making the hung situation work. It would be more surprising 
if this research had shown a decrease in authorities sharing chairs compared to the 
Laver, Railings and Thrasher survey (carried out in 1986); many of the same 
councils were included in this survey. 
Table 4.7: Chair Arrangements By Type of Administration 
Type of Administration 
Chair Coalition {n=29) Single Party No Admin (n=9) Total (n=62) 
Arrangements (n=24) 
Shared Chairs 65 .2% 4.2% 66 .7% 40.7% 
No Sharing' 34.8 95.8% - 53.7% 
No Chairs - 33 .3% 5.65 
*ln all cases, one party (not necessarily the largest) took all the chairs, 
(n.b tables excludes 'no response') 
However, whether this reveals that committee chairs should therefore be considered 
as rewards for office-seeking actors is another matter. It may merely be a 
recognition that it saves a great deal of committee time to have permanent chairs and 
deputy chairs and that parties cooperating in a legislative sense should be prepared 
to cooperate administratively. If this were the case, the allocation of chairs would not 
be seen as a 'reward' for participation in the coalition, but more as a 'duty' for the 
ruling group. 
The Allocation of Chairs in Minority Control Administrations 
What might be distressing to those who advocate the more cooperative nature of hung 
councils is that only one of the parties ruling alone has chosen to share chairs. A 
closer examination reveals that this apparent case of cooperation may be misleading. 
While the chief executive for this district council replied that an SLD administration 
ruled, the only response from a group leader (Conservative) identified the 
administration as a Conservative/SLD administration. As the chairs were shared 
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between these two parties (with the Liberals, with more seats, taking the majority 
of chairs) the chief executive appears to have been mistaken in his assessment of the 
administrative arrangements. 
In the remaining 21 cases of minority administrations where one party takes all the 
chairs, that party is also the largest single party on the council. This supports the 
observations of previous observers such as Leach & Stewart (1988) and Laver. 
Railings & Thrasher (1987), although both also found a small number of cases 
where the group taking all the chairs was not the largest group in the council. 
The Allocation of Chairs In Coalition Administrations 
Within coalition administrations, while in 15 (65.2 percent) of such cases chairs 
were shared, in one of these cases chairs were also shared with a party from outside 
the coalition. Why this should be so is unclear. It may signify a belief that, as 
Mellors argues (1989, p.80), these positions carry low prestige and are not worth 
bargaining over. The 'real bargaining' may be occurring over policy issues, and 
which party is allowed to take the chair may be considered unimportant. However, in 
this instance an alternative explanation might be advanced. The coalition 
administration in place was unusual, in that 3 of the 4 partners were 'independent' 
groupings; the groups involved were Conservative/ Independent/ Independent 
Labour/ Ratepayers. It appears plausible that Ratepayers groups and Independents 
(and perhaps Independent Labourites) will see themselves as less partisan than the 
major political groupings, which could weaken the pressure for conserving benefits 
to the coalition partners. 
Perhaps more significantly, in a third of the 15 cases of coalition government where 
chairs were shared, one of the major coalition partners did not take any of the 
committee chairs or vice-chairs. (While these coalition partners may have held 
other committee chairs whose composition this survey did not elicit, the committees 
whose composition was requested are generally seen as the most important.) A 
possible explanation for this lack of participation is that some parties will be 
reluctant to extend legislative cooperation into 'taking office'. As previously argued, 
many parties are reluctant to become too closely identified with either another party 
or with certain administrative arrangements. However, in 3 of these 5 cases the 
party not taking chairs was the SLD (Labour and Conservatives declined chairs in one 
case each), which is surprising, given their generally more positive approach to 
coalition participation (for example, see Leach & Game, 1989. p.29). Of course, 
such non-participation may be for one of the reasons advanced to explain the taking 
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of chairs by non-coalition members: if the groups concerned do not see chairs as 
worth holding, it does not matter who holds these positions. The rewards of coalition 
membership may be seen as influencing policy, rather than holding relatively 
unimportant offices (but see below). 
In the coalition administrations identified, in 9 cases one party took all the chairs. 
Unlike single party minority control administrations, it is not always the largest 
member of the coalition which takes all the chairs. In 4 cases this is so. but in the 
remaining 5 cases a 'junior partner' in the coalition took all the chairs. It is difficult 
to give convincing reasons for this rejection of office by the larger party, although 
the reason given previously could be advanced. That is, these positions are relatively 
unimportant in hung councils and it does not matter who takes the chairs. 
Some evidence for the relative unimportance of office is offered by Table 4.8 below, 
which details the response of group leaders to the question of whether office or policy 
was the main motivating force in the negotiating process. Quite clearly, policy 
payoffs are seen as far more important by political actors in hung councils. Only 
17.2 percent see office as the major goal, compared to nearly half who cite policy 
payoffs as the dominant factor in the negotiating process. Nearly a quarter (23.2 
percent) of group leaders replied that they would not negotiate with other groups; 
unless this was for public consumption, this effectively disbarred them from office, 
as even a single party minority administration must come to some agreement with 
other groups to remain in office.^ 
Table 4.8: Relative Importance of Policy and Office 
response of group leaders. n=117 (n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
Policy Most Policy Equal Office Office Most Not Willing 
Important Greater Importance Greater Important To Negotiate 
Importance Importance 
39.4% 10.1% 10.1% 9.1% 8.1% 23.2% 
Despite the finding that policy payoffs are rated considerably higher by politicians 
than office, when the responses of those group leaders who are actually participating 
in government are considered (a total of 56 responses), a slightly different picture 
®The majority of these respondents were 'former rulers', and the motivations of 
traditional rulers are considered in more detail during the following chapter. 
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emerges. When asked where the benefits of participating In government had 
occurred, 37.5 percent said from policy payoffs and 14.3 percent from holding 
office, while 10.7 percent said they had received no benefits from participation. 
However, a further 37.5 percent replied that the benefits of participation had been 
reaped equally from office and policy, an Indication that, despite the apparently low 
expectations of the importance of office, at least half of those participating In 
government saw real value in holding committee chairs. An Independent group leader 
argued that holding the chair was important "in that it enables minority parties to 
gain experience of holding office". 
It certainly appears that office-seeking and policy-pursuit approaches need to be 
considered as what Budge & Keman have called "complementary bases" for explaining 
the behaviour of political parties in government, and the greater Importance of 
policy (yet with a recognition of the importance of office) tends to support their 
conclusion that, in general, office is sought as a a basis for attaining policy goals 
rather than policy being subordinated to office (Budge & Keman, 1990, pp.26-31). 
The experience of holding office appears to show some participants the importance of 
holding office in achieving policy objectives. The importance of experience in 
coalition politics cannot be over-emphasised; it appears logical to assume that actors 
need time to learn the correct strategies to pursue. If so. it also appears likely that 
the passage of time will affect the forms of administrations which occur at local 
level. In the great majority of cases local politicians have been thrown into a 
situation totally outside their political knowledge, and will probably take some time 
to adjust to the new situation; the ramifications of this will now be considered. 
4.2.4. The Passage of Time and Administrative Arrangements 
While 'time' is not strictly speaking a 'structural* or 'institutional' influence, and 
might perhaps be seen more correctly as a contextual variable, its passage is 
certainly beyond the control of even the most devious politician. The importance of 
time, in the sense of supplying politicians with knowledge of the conditions under 
which they are operating, has been recognised by many observers of coalition 
activity (for example. Hinkley. 1976. Pridham, 1984). Whilst It might seem 
plausible that the longer an authority is hung the more likely formal majority 
coalitions will occur, some observers have argued that the opposite might be true, as 
minority government can appear to become an accepted and established feature to 
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actors (for example, see Blowers, IseyjJO However, a number of observers have 
argued that while the largest party may be initially reluctant to bargain, they will 
modify their strategies if faced with a continuous exclusion from office (for 
example, see Leach & Game, 1989, f^ellors, 1983). If this is the case, it might 
appear that more formal arrangements will be likely to emerge in long term hung 
councils. 
Railings & Thrasher (1986) reported that from their examination of hung councils, 
including a large number which had only recently become hung, it was clear that: 
"most local politicians have been schooled in the art of two-party politics 
and are both inexperienced and. perhaps, antagonistic, towards the Idea of 
having to make pacts with those traditionally regarded as the opposition" 
(Railings & Thrasher, 1986, p.12). 
Leach & Game note the frustration felt by parties at sustaining this "oppositional 
role" (1989, p.35) and, in support of IVlellors (1983) argue that over time there is 
a "tendency for ... political parties ...[to].:, accept the necessity for a degree of inter 
party collaboration" (1989, p.57). There Is a tendency for minority 
administrations of whatever party, according to Leach & Game, to be "gradually, over 
time ... replaced by administrations in which no one party plays a leading role" 
(1989, p.24). The decline in the number of minority administrations ruling in our 
sample, reported in Section Two. might also hint at a propensity for more coalition 
to emerge over time, although it must be noted that many of those previous minority 
administrations were in 'short-term' hung councils; therefore, the increase in 
coalitions is not necessarily related to the passage of a considerable period of time. 
However, given the general belief among observers of hung English councils on the 
relationship between the passage of time and more extensive co-operation, and 
supported by the generally accepted idea in coalition studies that knowledge of 
coalition situations is necessary for formal arrangements to last, it is proposed that: 
1.6: FORIVIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEtUIENTS A R E MORE L I K E L Y TO 
OCCUR IN LONG-TERM HUNG COUNCILS. 
1.7: COALITIONS ARE MORE L IKELY TO FORM IN LONG-TERM HUNG 
COUNCILS. 
10|t may, of course, be the case that the longer the council stays hung the more the actors 
involved grow to dislike each other, effectively precluding coalitions from forming. 
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Although, as shown in Table 4.9 (below), there are more formal arrangements in 
long-term hung councils than in short-term hung councils,^ ^ the difference is 
slight. As previously discussed, in many of these councils four yearly elections were 
looming, and it might be that there is an unwillingness to grant any administration a 
degree of formality prior to such important elections (see Strom, 1988, p.929). 
This appears to offer a reasonable explanation for the relative failure of hypothesis 
1.6. 
Table 4.9: Formality By Length of Time Hung 
Time Hung Formal Administration Informal Administration 
Short Term (n=36) 53.3% 46 .7% 
Long Term (n=26) 60.0% 40.0% 
response of chief executives (n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
Table 4.10: Type of Administration By Time Hung 
Time Hung Single Parly Coalition No Administration 
Administration Administration 
Short term (n=36) 36 .1% 50.0% 13.9% 
Long term (n=26) 42 .3% 42 .3% 15.4% 
response of chief executives (n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
As Table 4.10 indicates, the expectation of Hypothesis 1.7 appears to have been 
confounded. Contrary to the findings of, for example, Leach & Game, there are fewer 
coalition arrangements in long-term hung councils than in short-term hung 
councils. This also fails to support the explanation, given in section two, for the 
greater number of coalition administrations now than previously in our sample of 
hung authorities. If a 'learning process' was taking place then long-term hung 
councils should have more coalition administrations than short-term 
administrations. Convincing reasons for this unexpected state of affairs are difficult 
to put forward. It might be that elections are disrupting the 'learning process'. On the 
other hand, knowledge of the processes Involved in guiding policy through a hung 
council (which must surely increase with time) may outweigh the need for open 
11 'Short term is defined as less than 3 years, while 'long term* is defined as more than 3 
years. The reason for adopting this time period is because all councils hung for 3 years or 
more had completed at least one electoral cycle. It was also the only measure that gave a 
reasonably sized group of long term hung councils. 
142 
agreements with other parties. Provided the policy preferences of the party or 
parties required are kept in mind when the single party administration is 
formulating policy, there may be no need for formal coalition arrangements to be 
made. The growth in single parly administrations the longer a council is hung and 
the finding already reported of a link between formality and single party 
administrations (see Table 4.4) appears to explain the greater number of formal 
arrangements in long term hung councils. 
It appears that the passage of time is not a significant factor in the type of 
administrations which form. However, many observers have posited a crucial role 
for another variable. Mellors, amongst others, has pointed out that the "arithmetic of 
the power balance ... is likely to influence the perceptions and, therefore, the 
behaviour of parties" (Mellors. 1989. p.85). The final section of this chapter will 
therefore examine some numerical aspects which previous researchers have 
suggested might affect the types of administrations forming in hung political 
systems. 
S E C T I O N T H R E E : The Ef fects of Ari thmetic on Administrat ive 
Arrangements 
The precise distribution of council seats between the parties on the council is vital to 
coalition formation for a number of reasons. Although the concept of the 'minimum 
winning coalition' has undergone numerous revisions since Piker's first formulation 
(1962). it is still an important factor in coalition theory. However, the specific 
predictions of coalition formation posited by coalition theorists will be examined in 
Chapter Nine; this section of Chapter Four will examine both less specific theoretical 
ideas about the type of administration which will form, and the propositions put 
forward by previous observers of hung British councils. Firstly, the possible, effects 
of the balance of seats on the administrative arrangements prevailing in hung 
councils will be examined. For example, it seems plausible that when one party is 
close to a majority it will feel it has a right to rule, which may mean more single 
party minority administrations will form in such councils. Secondly, the number of 
'effective' parties in the system might also be an influence on the type of 
administrations which form. This section assesses the impact of this variable, using 
a measure of 'parly system fractionalization*. We begin with an examination of the 
effect the 'balance of power' might have on the type of administration forming. 
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4.3.1. The Balance of Power and Administrative Formation 
The distribution of seats between various groups will largely determine the 
coalitions capable of forming. In addition, political actors will adopt differing 
strategies according to the way in which seats are distributed. Although it must be 
remembered that "the numerical aspect should not be considered In isolation" and, 
whatever the difficulties of assessment, the interaction "between the numerical and 
the political" must be considered (Pridham. 1989. p.217), it appears reasonable to 
assume that when one party is close to an overall majority (which is treated here as 
45 percent or more of the council seats) it may regard itself as having a moral right 
to form an administration (for support for this view see Mellors. 1989, p.85). 
However. Pridham's caveat must be borne in mind when considering possible 
administrative outcomes. If, for example, the largest party previously ruled alone as 
a majority ruler, opponents could plausibly maintain the electorate had rejected 
them and that defeated former rulers should not be allowed to carry on ruling in a 
single party minority administration.''2 
The situation is further complicated when two of the party groups are both close to 
an overall majority, a situation which occurs in 5 of the authorities in this survey. 
As Mellors points out. "in coalition terms, the minor parties here are 'pivotal 
parties' holding the key to a majority", and argues that the main parties will be 
reluctant to enter into deals with a party who could be seen as "spoilers" (Mellors. 
1989, pp. 85-86). Mellors assumes that the main parties in such a situation are 
Consen/ative and Labour, which is the case in 4 of our 5 instances; in the other case 
both Conservatives and SLD are close to a majority. It does appear plausible, given 
the general distrust of coalitions often displayed by both Conservatives and Labour at 
national and local level, that in such cases one of the big parties will allow the other 
to rule alone rather than allowing a small third party to exercise influence. 
However, this was not the case in these 5 authorities; although in 2 cases one of the 
big parties did rule alone, in the other 3 cases a coalition administration ruled. 
Perhaps this is not surprising. When two parties are both close to an overall 
majority it will be difficult for either of them to argue they have a 'moral right' to 
rule. However, despite the caveats, it is much easier in councils with a dominant 
group for that party to claim that it has either a mandate from the electorate or the 
best chance of providing stable government. Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
^2 Carter, 1986. noted this perception in his study of three South West county councils, 
and the proposition is tested in the following chapter. This feeling was universal amongst 
former opposition parties in Devon, as Chapter Nine's case study details. 
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1.8: S I N G L E PARTY ADfi/IINISTRATIONS WILL B E MORE COMMON IN 
COUNCILS WHERE ONE PARTY IS C L O S E TO AN OVERALL MAJORITY. 
Additionally, given the proposition that in councils where one party is close to an 
overall majority it will attempt to form a single party minority administration, it 
can also be hypothesised that: 
1.9: COALITION ARRANGEMENTS WILL B E MORE L I K E L Y IN L O C A L 
AUTHORITIES WHERE NONE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IS C L O S E TO AN 
OVERALL MAJORITY. 
Table 4.11 (below) details three arithmetical situations; as well as the two already 
mentioned, it also looks al the administrative arrangements prevailing in authorities 
where there are three substantial political groups, in terms of all having at least a 
fifth of council seats (a criteria used by Leach & Stewart. 1988. p.52). The five 
councils where two parties are both close to a majority, discussed above, are not 
included in the councils classified as having one party close to a majority. Table 4.11 
demonstrates that both hypothesis 1.8 and hypothesis 1.9 appear to be supported by 
the evidence. Single party administrations are more common in councils where one 
or more parties is close to an overall majority. In councils where no party is close to 
a majority coalition arrangements account for nearly 60 percent of all 
administrations, indicating that parties may feel a greater necessity to bargain in 
such circumstances. 
Table 4.11-.Type of Administration By Distribution of Counci l Seats 
Type of One Party Close To A No Party Close To A Three Parties With 
Administration Majority (n=33) Majority (n=24) More Than 20% of 
Seats (n=17) 
Single Party Admin 45.5% 29.2% 29 .4% 
Coalition Admin 36.4% 58 .3% 41 .2% 
No Administration 18.2% 12.5% 29 .4% 
Interestingly, when those councils in which three parties all have over 20 percent of 
the seats (which includes councils from both of the other categories) are examined, 
there is a greater likelihood of no administration being in place; the remaining 
administrations are also far more likely to be formally constituted than 
administrations in the other two categories. Leach & Game argue that where three 
parties all have a significant percentage, the balance of power is less likely to be 
145 
seen as "unfair" or "illegitimate" (1989, p.l2). This may account for the greater 
number of formal arrangements in such situations, two-thirds of administrations in 
this category being formally constituted compared to just over half in the other two 
categories. 
The nature of the distribution of seats between parties is not the only numerical 
factor which has been seen to affect the type of administrative arrangements which 
occur in hung legislatures. Closely related to the distribution of seats is the 
•fractionalization' of the party system and the number of parties in the political 
system, and these factors will now be examined. 
4.3.2. The Relationship Between Party System Fractionalization and 
Administrat ive Formation 
The relationship which theorists have generally posited between the number of 
parties and the type of administrations forming is not a simple one. While, 
traditionally, it is assumed that multi-party systems make it more difficult to form 
coalitions (see Laver & Schofield, 1990. p.147), the relationship is generally 
expressed in terms of the 'effective' or 'significant' number of parties in the system, 
and some measure of 'fragmentation* or 'fractionalization' oi the party system is 
usually adopted (see Strom, 1990. p.13). As Rae's (1967) seminal work on the 
Impact of electoral laws on a country's politics points out, the question of the extent 
to which competitive strength is distributed among parties cannot be answered 
without a measure of fractionalization, a concept which cannot be equated with the 
number of parties In a system. As Rae notes: 
"the idea of fractlonalizatlon resolves itself Into two lesser concepts: 
(1) the number of party shares, and (2) the relative equality of these 
shares. A non-fractionalised system has only one share, and that share 
contains the whole pool of competitive power; this Is the 'one-party 
system', which entails no competitive relationships. Its concrete analog is 
a whole apple. A highly fractionalized system has a great many shares of 
about equal magnitude so that no one of them contains a very targe share of 
the total pool of strength (i.e. votes). This corresponds to an extreme case 
of 'multi-partism', with, say. ten parties each polling about one tenth of 
the total vote. Its concrete analog is an apple which has been sliced into 
ten equal pieces, no one of which is anything like the size of the original 
apple. Fractionalization varies by degrees, between the whole apple and 
ready ingredients of an apple pie. Fractionalization means division into 
many parts, and all the actual party systems are fractionalized to some 
degree." (Rae. 1967, pp.53-54. emphasis in original) 
Rae's description concerns the fractlonallzatlon of vote shares, but we are not 
concerned here with the relationship between vole share and the number of parties. 
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It Is the relationship between legislative seat share and number of parties which 
concerns this study, and Rae provides a measure which is "exactly parallel - both 
conceptually and computationally - to the fraclionalization of elective party 
systems" (Rae, 1967, p.62). Rae's measure of fractionalization in parliamentary 
systems (Fp), is expressed mathematically as: 
Fp = 1 - (2 Si ) 
where Si equals the percentage of seats in the legislature. The more parties, and the 
more evenly the distribution of legislative seats between them, the more 
fractionalised the legislature is; the closer the index is to 1, the more fractionalised 
the party system. In a hung system, the smallest index of system fractionalization is 
0.5. where two parties both have 50 percent of the legislative seats. Rae's 'index of 
fractionalization' will be used in this assessment of the effects of fractionalization on 
administrative arrangements. This is not to deny the importance of other approaches, 
which will now be examined. 
Fractionalisation is seen as an Important contributory factor to uncertainty, and 
hence a contributory factor to both minority administrations and over-sized 
coalitions forming (see, for example, Dodd, 1976; Sartori. 1976; Schofield, 
1985). However, it is not the only measure of the "significant number of parties", 
and the use of related, but different, criteria by researchers means there can be 
difficulty in comparing the results of different researchers. 
For example. Budge & Keman (1990) use the term "fragmentation", and argue that: 
"as fragmentation increases, in the sense that the number of significant 
parties goes up, surplus coalitions alternate in increasing numbers with 
minority governments. This alternation can be interpreted as a reaction 
to the confusion and uncertainty inherent in dealing with too many 
independent actors, and consequent difficulties in calculating how many 
are needed for the coalition" (Budge & Keman. 1990. p.15. my 
emphasis). 
Unfortunately, Budge & Keman offer no definition of what constitutes a "significant 
number of parties". Laver & Schofield (1990) use a slightly different measure of 
party system bipolarity. based on Laasko & Taagepura's measure of the "effective 
number of parties in a system" (Laasko & Taagepura, 1979. p.5). classifying their 
systems as 'unipolar', 'bipolar' or 'multipolar' "according to the pattern of one-
147 
dimensional coalition bargaining that they appear to exhibit" (Laver & Schofield. 
1990. p.113)."'3 
Rae's 'index of fractionalization* is a simple yet relatively sophisticated measure, 
widely utilised by students of coalitional behaviour (see Dodd, 1976; Sartori. 1976; 
Strom. 1990). Unlike the other measures discussed it needs no subjective 
assessments of the party system in question. Given the diversity of systems in 
English local government, and the 62 local authorities in this sample where 
judgements would have to be made.this is a very good reason for adopting this 
measure. However, the differences of definition between studies needs to be kept in 
mind. 
4.3.3. Minority Governments and Over-Sized Coalit ions 
While this research has failed to find any convincing evidence of the alternation 
between minority governments and surplus coalitions identified by Budge & Keman 
(whether using the number of parties or the level of fractionalization in the 
system), there is (as already noted) support for the idea of a connection between 
party system fractionalisation and certain types of administration. Strom (1984) 
argues that minority governments are associated with a high degree of 
fractionalisation (1984, p.220), and Laver & Schofield note that in 'multipolar' 
systems (which have a large number of 'significant* parties) "conventional norms of 
political behaviour will be less likely to emerge" (1990, p.137) especially when 
there is more than one salient policy dimension. Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
1.10: THE G R E A T E R THE FRACTIONALIZATION OF A L E G I S L A T U R E , THE 
MORE L IKELY THAT MINORITY GOVERNMENTS WILL FORM. 
Another connection between fractionalization and administrative formation can also 
be proposed. Laver & Schofield's observation (above) might mean that surplus 
majority coalitions are more likely to form in highly fractionalized party systems. 
As Chapter One describes, over-sized coalitions have often been seen as an irrational 
response to hungness (see Sartori, 1976. p.178) and early coalition theories (with 
their emphasis on minimising office pay-offs) were unable to account either for 
them or minority governments. Uncertainty could be much greater in highly 
fraclionalized systems with "too many independent actors'* (Budge & Keman. 1990. 
^^The term 'polarisation' is, as Strom (1990) notes, often subject to misunderstanding. He 
uses the term to refer to the "overall ideological distance" between relevant parties, and 
white he admits that it is "far from obvious to operationalize this concept, it is clearly 
distinct from a second prevalent conception of polarisation as the extent of party system 
bipolarity" (Strom, 1990, fn. p.13). 
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p.15) and politicians may build larger than needed coalitions in order to be sure of a 
legislative majority. Dodd (1976) makes just this point, arguing that "high 
fractionalization contributes to information uncertainty" which will lead to both 
minority and over-sized governments (Dodd, 1976, p.64). This tendency may be 
more pronounced in English local government which, despite increasing 
pollticisation, still has a greater number of "independent actors" than most national 
legislatures in Western Europe (Bogdanor, 1983). Therefore, it is proposed that: 
1.11: THE G R E A T E R THE FRACTIONALIZATION OF A L E G I S L A T U R E , THE 
MORE COALITIONS WILL B E OVER-SIZED. 
The findings of this research support the suggestion of a relationship between the 
level of fractionalisation and the type of administration which forms in hung 
councils. However,ihe relationship posited by hypothesis 1.10 does not hold. Table 
4.12 shows that the systems in which minority governments form are the least 
fractionalized of the four categories listed, although in the two biggest categories the 
differences are so small that the level of fractionalization seems to make no effective 
difference to whether minority administrations or majority coalitions form. 
Table 4.12: Type of Administration By Level of Party System 
F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
(number of councils=62; number of administrations=121) 
Type of Administration Mean Fractionalization 
Single Party Minority (n=59) 0.63 
Majority Coalition (n=37) 0.64 
No Administration (n=12) 0.67 
Under and Over Sized Coalition (n=13) 0.67 
(Fractionalisation: high=0.79, low=0.52. Mean fractionaiization of whole 
sample=0.64) 
Low levels of party system fractionalization are associated (generally) with at least 
one party holding the majority of seats, regardless of the number of parties in the 
system. The more one party controls the system, whether the system is hung or not, 
the lower the level of system fractionalization (see Rae, 1967, pp. 47-64, for a full 
discussion). Table 4.11 (above) has already shown that where one or more parties is 
close to a majority, single party minority administrations are more common. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the results shown in Table 4.12 support this. 
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and the reasons are probably the same as those advanced above; a party close to an 
overall majority will feel it has a 'right to rule'. 
Hypothesis 1.11 suggests that over-sized coalitions are associated with a high degree 
of system fractionalization. Table 4.12 lists both under and over sized coalitions and 
indicates that system fractionlization is associated with these departures from 
minimal winning status. However, when that variable is broken down, it appears 
that minority coalitions are not associated with high system fractionalization. The 4 
minority coalitions in this sample occured in councils with a mean fractionalization 
index of just 0.62. although the small size of this sub-group makes a positive 
conclusion difficult. Accordingly, there is a high level of party system 
fractionalization when just over-sized coalition administrations are examined. In 
those 9 cases, the mean system fractionalization is 0.69. by far the highest level for 
any type of administration; two of the surplus majority coalitions occured in the 
council with the highest level of party system fractionalization (0.79). Therefore, it 
seems that hypothesis 1.11 is strongly supported, with highly fractionalized 
systems tending to generate more surplus majority coalitions. 
Finally, supporting Rae's point that fractionalization and party system size are by no 
means the same thing, the number of parties in the system appeared to make little 
difference to the type of administration that formed, beyond the obvious fact that 
multi-party systems produced more oversized coalitions than four-party systems. 
Conclus ions 
A number of possible influences on administrative formation have been examined, 
and some inferences about their effect on local government coalition building can be 
drawn, although the difficulty of isolating cause and effect must be acknowledged. 
While the findings of previous observers are generally supported, albeit often with 
an allowance for the effects of the passage of time, there are results which indicate 
that previous research findings might need to be modified or that events have 
changed. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding was that majority coalitions are now the most 
common form of administration in hung councils.^'* When minority coalitions are 
included, nearly half of current hung councils (46.7 percent) are ruled by a 
coalition, which is against the findings of previous observers, who found a 
Again, the caveat that this may be partly a reflection of the definitions adopted must be 
made. 
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propensity for single party minority administrations to form in hung councils. The 
most plausible explanation for this difference might appear to be that experience of 
hungness has increased the willingness of parties to bargain, as well as increasing 
their skill in the complicated process of coalition negotiations. There is evidence both 
for and against this proposition. The majority of previous administrations since 
becoming hung were indeed minority adminsitrations, which does suggest a 
successful learning process towards cooperation. Despite the plausibility of this 
explanation, this research has discovered long term hung councils are less likely to 
be run by coalitions, which suggests the reason initially preferred is inadequate. 
That said, administrative arrangements in long term hung councils are more likely 
to be formalised, which does suggest a growing awareness that some degree of 
administrative stability is desirable. It helps any organisation to know that policy 
makers are not likely to be summarily removed from office. Of course, it might 
appear easier to come to some agreement when there is only a year to go before a 
possible change of political control, which could certainly explain the greater 
formality of administrations in councils electing by thirds. Even when a local 
authority has been hung for a number of years, if the political situation is capable of 
changing within a year because of elections, parties will probably be reluctant to 
enter coalitions. However long a council has been hung, politicians are politicians, 
and the scent of possible victory at forthcoming polls will certainly influence their 
strategy. 
Such pragmatism may also offer the best explanation for the frequency of one year 
agreements concerning administrative arrangements. That is, local politicians will 
agree arrangements which, while mirroring the needs of the council (in that the 
budgetary cycle is yearly), go on for no longer than absolutely necessary. A clear 
indication Is given, both to Internal council factors and the voting public, that this 
arrangement Is strictly for one year and carries no hint of any long term 
arrangement which might too closely link different party groups. 
Whether coalitions form or not appears to be related more to the electoral cycle than 
to the need for time to pass and enable actors to gain the necessary knowledge. As 
previous observers have Implied, coalitions are more likely to form in local 
authorities with a quadrennial electoral cycle. The need to construct more stable 
arrangements when a council Is going to be hung for a fixed number of years offers a 
reasonable explanation for the greater number of coalition administrations in such 
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councils. The electoral cycle is not the only factor which appears to influence the 
type of administrations forming. 
There appears to be a connection between the political balance in the council and 
administrative arrangements. It certainly appears as if parties are more prepared to 
deal with rivals when no 'near-winner' emerges, and less likely to attempt to rule 
alone in such situations; nearly three-fifths of administrations in councils where no 
party was close to an overall majority were coalitions, and where three parties all 
had a significant number of seats coalitions were also more likely than other forms 
of administration. When one party was close to an overall majority, it was more 
likely to attempt to rule alone (perhaps waiting for a by-election to enable it to 
regain sole control?). 
The level of party system fractionalization also seems to influence the type of 
administration forming, although the more simple measure of the number of parties 
in the system appears to make very little difference. While it appears clear that 
over-sized coalitions, as expected, were more likely to form in councils with a high 
index of system fractionalization, other expectations were confounded. Although 
coalitions were more likely to form in systems with 'high' fractionaliszation. the 
differences were not striking. More strikingly, contrary to most expectations, both 
single party and coalition minority governments tended to form in systems with low 
levels of fractionaiization. Despite being the largest single group, single party 
minority governments had a mean system fractionalization value below the average, 
which appears a fairly conclusive indication that other explanations for minority 
governments forming must be sought. 
Finally, a point of real significance to formal coalition theory can also be made. 
Contrary to the findings of previous observers, committee chairs do appear to be 
valued by local politicians, and this research shows most actors in a coalition will 
accept them; two-thirds of all coalition administrations shared chairs. While policy 
payoffs were initially seen as of paramount importance and office appeared to be of 
minor significance, those participating in government, while still seeing policy 
benefits as greater, were far more likely to see benefits in holding committee chairs. 
At the very least, possession of the chair gives an astute operator the ability to 
structure and guide debate, and the title of 'Chairman' still carries great weight in 
local government circles. For coalition theorists, the greater importance of policy, 
while recognising the significance of holding office, supports the idea that policy-
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pursuit and office-seeking approaches need to be integrated but that, in general, 
office is sought by politicians In order to attain policy goals. 
An examination of possible influences on the types of administration forming has 
produced a number of insights. However, it must always be remembered that 
politicians are, as previously observed, "more than just institution-bound actors" 
(Pridham, 1987. p.380), and there will be numerous influences unaffected by 
Institutional, structural, or local factors. The strategies political parties adopt will, 
almost always, be paramount in deciding the political arrangements existing, and the 
following chapter will closely examine party political strategies, and the factors 
which affect their tactics, in hung councils in England. 
153 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PARTY STRATEGIES AND COALITION FORMATION 
Introduction 
Section One: The Central-Local Parly Dimension 
5.1.1. Ideological Differences 
5.1.2. National Party Attitudes to Local Deals 
Section Two: The Behaviour of Local Political Parties 
5.2.1. The SLD: A Greater Willingness to Compromise? 
5.2.2. The Conservatives and Local Coalitions: The Independent Factor 
5.2.3. The Conservatives: Clinging On To Power? 
5.2.4. Labour: The Politics of Necessity? 
5.2.5. Labour and the SLD 
5.2.6. The "Unholy Alliance": Conservative-Labour Cooperation 
5.2.7. Labour and Conservative Minority Administrations and Small SLD Groups 
5.2.8. The Possible Effects of SLD Seat Share on 'No Administration' Forming 
Section Three: The Role of Traditional Rulers in Hung Councils 
5.3.1. Former Rulers and Local Administrations 
5.3.2. Former Rulers and Coalition Administrations 
5.3.3. SLD Involvement With Former Rulers 
Conclusions 
154 
In t roduct ion 
The preceding chapter examined a number of areas which could be influencing 
political strategies. It appears that certain institutional considerations do influence 
the nature of the administrations forming; for example, coalitions are more likely to 
form in councils which hold elections every four years. However, while such 
constraints will undoubtedly influence politicians in their willingness to negotiate, 
they may be less likely to influence the composition of the coalitions which actually 
form. To utilise Pridham's and Mellors' dimensions, it appears intuitively likely 
that historical, motivational, vertical / horizontal, party-internal, socio-political, 
and certain external factors (such as a 'local crisis') will have a far greater effect on 
the deals made between political parties, or even whether deals are made at all, than, 
for example, the local electoral cycle. This is not to minimise the effects of 
structural and institutional constraints, but merely to re-emphasise the importance 
of 'polities' over the structures in which it operates. 
This chapter will look at a number of potential party political influences on local 
coalition building, beginning with an examination of the influence national parties 
might have on the deals made at local level. If the thesis that there is an increasing 
'nationalisation' of local politics is credible, then the views of national parties 
towards local 'power-sharing' will exercise an influence on the deals that can be 
made at local level. The different attitudes of the major parties towards coalition 
politics will be examined and the possible effects of such views on the local 
administrations formed will be assessed. Following this, section two (the main body 
of this chapter) will look in detail at the attitude of local party groups, and (in 
particular) their approach to their selection of partners will be examined in the 
light of previous research. Certain hypotheses offered by previous observers will be 
tested against the data collected.'^ Finally, a number of proposals have been made by 
previous writers concerning the behaviour of 'traditional rulers', those parties 
which have previously controlled a local authority, often for a considerable period of 
time, section three will examine the strategy adopted by (and towards) former 
rulers and assess the significance of the observations made. 
^ It has been found to be impractical, given the considerable degree of overlap occurring, to 
sub-divide this section strictly by party groups. This division is too artificial, and ignores 
the complexity of the arrangements discovered. That said, each of the particular areas 
examined (for example, the relationship between Conservatives and Independents) is 
clearly differentiated, and each of the sub-sections is related to the sub-sections preceding 
and following it. 
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It must be noted here that the Liberal Democrats, the Liberals, the Social Democrats 
(SOP) and other groups connected to the broad 'middle-of-the-road' alliance of the 
years examined In this survey will be treated throughout as a single party bloc, 
except where It is necessary to distinguish between them. There were only 6 
councils (9.7 percent) in the sample with an SDP group; the SDP had less than 250 
councillors nationwide at the time this survey was carried out (Railings & Thrasher, 
1989). In the great majority of cases there was only one group on the council, 
generally calling themselves 'Liberal Democrats'. If there were different 'factions* 
there appeared to be a large degree of unanimity between the groups, with the group 
classified under one title and one councillor clearly seeing him or herself as the 
'leader' of the group. A few chief executives remarked on their inability to 
distinguish the differences between "the various Liberal/Alliance groups on the 
Council". Therefore, treating the 'Alliance* as one group appears to make sense, and 
will considerably simplify the following analysis. That said, where chief executives 
and party leaders have distinguished between the SDP and Uberal Democrats, that 
distinction will be respected; a Conservative/SLD/SDP coalition wilt be treated as 
three-party. 
A related problem also arises; what name to give to this 'single party bloc'? The field 
work for this research was carried out during June-August of 1988. Liberal and 
SDP working groups had agreed the title Social and Liberal Democrats for the 
proposed merged party in January 1988 (Coxall & Robins, 1989, p.254) and, if 
only for the sake of simplicity, it is proposed to use the title Social and Liberal 
Democrats (SLD), again except where it is necessary to distinguish between, for 
example, the separate SLD and SDP groups in Mendip and Devon, or when quoting 
previous research which may have used a different appellation. 
Section One: The Central-Local Party Dimension 
Section Four of Chapter Two (see 2.4.2.) has already gone into some detail about the 
relationship between central and local parlies. Despite the increasing pressure that 
the nature of modern party politics brings for 'uniformity' it was established that 
local parties retain considerable autonomy. Local parties will also span the full 
range of ideologies within their broad political allegiance. However, despite the 
attempts by the major national parties to present a monolithic image, local parties 
often differ considerably from the currently dominant ideology displayed by the 
leadership of their central party (see Gyford & James. 1983). 
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5.1.1. Ideological Differences: 
An example of such local Ideological differences is provided by the SLD. All political 
leaders were asked to locate their ideological position in relation to their national 
parly, in order to aid the placing of local parties on an unidimensional ideological 
scale to test formal coalition theories (see Questionnaire 2. Appendix). A number of 
SLD leaders replied that such questions were applicable only to the other 'old style' 
parties. However, 37.5 percent (15 of 40 respondents) of SLD leaders did not see 
themselves as sharing the same political position as the national party, indicating 
that the SLD also demonstrates differences of opinion at local level; 12 of these 15 
saw their local party as 'to the left' of the party's position nationally.^ The often 
bewildering variety of party labels under which 'Social and Liberal Democrat' 
candidates campaigned during the 1989 county council elections might be taken as 
further evidence of a lack of homogeneity (see Railings & Thrasher. 1989). 
Therefore, it can be reasonably stated that, whatever the advice of the central parties 
towards local power sharing, not all local groups will follow it. 
While, as Mellors points out, it is "inevitable ... that national norms and values will 
affect what happens at local level" (1989. p. 81), it would be surprising if the 
possibility of power after years of opposition did not affect the strategy of even the 
most deferential local party. However, those national norms and values may mean 
some parties will be more or less likely to engage in local coalitions. 
5.1.2. National Party Attitudes to Local Deals 
Although it has already been demonstrated (see Chapter Two, section 2.4.2.) that 
local parties can have considerable autonomy, the evidence suggests central views 
will, at the very least, be taken into account by local parties in hung councils. For 
example, official Labour Party policy comes close to prohibiting "local pacts". 
Carter reported that, in the case of the three shire counties he investigated, 
"Walworth Road instructed Labour Groups not to form pacts under any 
circumstances", advice which was accepted, "albeit reluctantly" (Carter. 1986. 
p.13). While IVlellors argued that Conservative Central Office's more "federalist" 
conception of local government was probably more amenable to power sharing 
(1983. p.237), as he later pointed out. it "hardly welcomed" local party deals by 
Conservatives with other party groups (1986. p.23; see also Mellors. 1989. p.81). 
In contrast, the SLD and SDP both adopt a more positive strategy at national level 
towards local coalitions; their lack of power at national level is "likely to strengthen 
2 See Chapter Nine, section four (Table 9.6) for more details. 
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their inclination to lake advantage of whatever opportunities occur (or power 
sharing at local level" (Mellors. 1989. p. 81). SLD central publications offer 
frequent advice to their members in hung councils on the best strategies to adopt in 
influencing policy making, and positively encourage local deals (for example, see 
Clay. 1982). 
Continental observers have often noted the influence pressure from party 
headquarters can have on local coalition formation (for example, see Loeb-Mayer, 
1986, p.13). Carter's observations on the responses of local Labour groups to 
central directives offers some support that the same pressures might be brought to 
bear in Britain. Whilst accepting that other variables might be influencing their 
participation in coalitions,^ given the above, it is proposed that: 
2.1: THE SLD WILL B E MORE WILLING TO ENTER INTO COALITION 
DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER POLIT ICAL P A R T I E S THAN EITHER THE 
CONSERVATIVE OR LABOUR PARTIES AND, T H E R E F O R E , WILL B E MORE 
L IKELY TO BE PARTICIPATING IN LOCAL AUTHORITY ADMINISTRATIONS. 
Table 5.1: Current Administrations In Hung Counci ls 
(responses of chief executives, n=62) 
Administration Number 
Conservative 4 
Labour 12 
SLD/Alliance 8 
Conservative/SLD 5 
Conservative/Independent 6 
Labour/SLD 7 
Conservative/SLD/Independent 2 
Conservative/Independent Labour/Independent/Ratepayers 1 
SLD/SDP/lndependent 1 
Conservative/Labour/SLD/Ind (all-party administrations) 3 
Labour/SLD/Green/lndependent 1 
Labour/SLD/Ratepayers 1 
Labour/SLD/lndependent 1 
Conservative/SLD/Labour 1 
No Administration 9 
Total 62 
3 For example, the SLD's 'pivotal' position ideologically may mean they have a greater 
involvement in local administrations, a point which is addressed below. 
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Table 5.1 shows in detail the current administrations, while Table 5.2 (below) lists 
the total number of administrations the major parly groups were participating in at 
the time the questionnaire was answered. As hypothesized, the SLD were involved In 
more administrations than either Labour or Conservative; more than half of the 
current administrations involved the SLD. However, there are a number of possible 
qualifications to this greater involvement. The following section will examine these 
qualifications, and look in detail at the behaviour of parties as regards coalition 
formation. 
Table 5.2: Participation of Major Parties in Local Administrations 
Party Minority Two- Multi-Parly Total Number 
Admins Party 
Coalitions 
Coalitions* of Admins 
Conservative 4 1 1 7 22 (41.5%) 
Labour 12 7 7 26 (49.1%) 
SLD 8 1 2 1 0 30 (56.6%) 
Independent 0 6 - 9 15 (28.3%) 
*AII parties in this column include 3 all-party administrations comprising all 4 parties in 
Table 5.2. 
-All of these are Conservative/Independent coalitions 
Section Two: The Behaviour of Local Political Parties 
This examination of the behaviour of local party groups begins with an examination 
of the SLD's involvement in local coalitions. A number of factors might contribute to 
the apparently greater involvement of SLD groups in local administrations, and this 
section will attempt to assess whether the SLD has a more positive attitude to 
coalition dealing. Following this, we examine the attitude of Conservative groups and 
the 'special relationship' between Conservatives and Independent groups; whether we 
can treat Independent councillors as 'groups' in the same way as the main parties is 
also examined. The factors which might make it difficult for Labour groups to share 
power in hung councils are then analysed, in particular the idea that Labour is 
constrained in its choice of 'partner' by its ideological position. Some writers have 
noted Conservative/ Labour coalitions at local level, and the factors which might 
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influence the creation of such an unexpected phenomenon are appraised. Finally, the 
factors which might contribute to 'no administration' forming are examined. 
5.2.1. The S L D : A Greater Willingness to Compromise? 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (above, in section one) appear to offer support to the hypothesis 
that the SLD will be more involved in local coalitions than the other two main 
parties. However, the reasons for this apparently greater involvement may not 
simply be the more positive attitude of local parties, fostered by the greater 
willingness of national leaders to encourage negotiations. The SLD are also ideally 
situated in ideological terms, and as coalition theorists have argued, a pivotal 
position ideologically will probably lead to greater involvement in coalitions (see, 
for example, de Swaan, 1973). 
However, while the SLD's pivotal position ideologically might tend to make them 
more active in local coalitions than the other parties, it is argued that it is their 
willingness to enter into negotiations which will be the major factor in their 
participation in local coalitions. If they are more willing to discuss arrangements 
with other parties, they will be more likely to be involved in coalitions. The great 
majority of studies into local coalitions have commented on the more open attitude of 
the SLD and SDP in a hung situation (for example, see Leach & Game, 1989, p.29). 
Therefore, it is proposed that: 
2.2: THE SLD WILL B E IVIORE P R E P A R E D TO NEGOTIATE WITH OTHER 
PARTIES THAN THE CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR PARTIES, 
As expected, this was indeed the case. Only 4 SLD leaders out of the 36 (11.1 
percent) answering the question on the relative importance of policy or office in 
their negotiations with other political parties replied they were 'not prepared to 
negotiate'. This contrasts with 12 of 29 (41.4 percent) of Conservative leaders and 
7 of 26 (26.9 percent) of Labour leaders answering this question who gave the same 
response. Interestingly, in all 12 cases where the Conservatives answered they were 
not prepared to negotiate, they had controlled the council prior to it becoming hung; 
the behaviour of former rulers (both Labour and Conservative) is examined later in 
this chapter. It also appears inconceivable that an SLD leader could reply, as one 
Labour leader did, that: 
"we will not take control until we have a majority on the Council 
sufficient to implement our policies, and we will not enter formal or 
informal coalitions with other parties" 
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This effectively debarred his party from exercising any influence at all. At first 
glance, these responses appear to indicate that while it would be foolish to ignore the 
importance of the SLD's central position ideologically, their greater willingness to 
enter into discussions could be the most important factor in their apparently greater 
involvement in local coalitions. 
However, while it is undoubtedly the case that the SLD were involved in more 
coalitions at the time the questionnaire was answered, when participation in all 
administrations formed since the councils in this survey became hung is examined 
the picture is markedly different. Table 5.3 shows it is the Conservatives who have 
been most active in local administrations over the life span of the hung councils in 
this survey, with over half of all administrations (52.3 percent) involving 
Conservative groups. However, alone of the four major party groupings, their 
participation appears to decline with time. 
Table 5.3: Total Number of Administrations Party Groups have 
Participated In Since Becoming Hung 
Party Previous Coali- Single Present Coali- Single Grand Total 
Admins tions Party Admins tions Party 
Conservative 35 1 5 20 22 18 4 57 (52.3%) 
Labour 1 6 8 8 26 14 12 42 (38.5%) 
SUD 21 1 4 7 30 22 8 51 (46.8%) 
Independent 7 7 0 1 5 1 5 0 22 (20.2%) 
Others 4 4 0 4 4 0 8 (7.3%) 
number of councils =62; total number of administrations =121 (including 12 instances of 
'no administration' in charge, which are excluded from the percentages above) 
It may be that the wider political environment can explain the declining involvement 
of Conservative groups in hung councils. The early to mid-1980s were a period of 
decline for the party locally, although they regained some support in the latter half 
of the decade. For example, the Conservatives performed very poorly in the 1981 
county council elections and, although their share of the overall vote still remained 
higher than Labour and the Alliance, they did even worse in 1985. due to a 
combination of some significant local factors and poor national opinion poll ratings 
(see Leach & Game, 1989, pp.85-89). A number of "safe Conservative" counties 
(see Railings & Thrasher, 1985) became hung for the first time in 1985. and it 
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may be that they were in a less powerful bargaining position in these authorities. 
Two-thirds of the 18 county councils in this sample had previously been 
Conservative controlled for many years, and one had been previously controlled by a 
long-term Conservative/ Independent administration which effectively functioned as 
a single party (according to its chief executive). If the opposition parties perceive 
this as perhaps their only chance of achieving policy aims (as the opposition actors 
in Devon did) before the return to 'normality', then the pressures to exclude the 
Conservatives will be great, and this may partly explain their decline. Their 
declining local vote could have affected their strength in all councils (not just the 
counties), and it may be that fewer Conservative groups were in the right position to 
exercise influence. However, there are other possible reasons for the Consen/atives' 
previous high involvement and subsequent decline, and some of these will now be 
assessed.'* 
5.2.2. The Conservatives and Local Coalitions: The Independent Factor 
There are a number of possible reasons for the apparently greater involvement of 
Conservatives in local administrations detailed in Table 5.3. As noted above, Mellors 
has stated that the more "federalist" structure of the Conservatives might make 
Central Office more amenable to coalition discussions than Walworth Road. Stewart, 
noting the hostility of certain Labour groups towards hung situations, has argued that 
this would make them less likely to enter into formal discussions; he posits that such 
a viewpoint is "less influential in Conservative groups" (Stewart. 1985.p.5). Leach 
also notes that there appears to be a "much greater readiness" on the part of local 
Conservatives to negotiate deals with the Liberals (Leach, 1985,p.9). 
A New Statesman survey (30 August, 1985. p.4) showed that of the 52 councils then 
identified as hung the most common arrangement was some form of Conservative/ 
Alliance cooperation, a finding which is disputed later in this chapter. Nevertheless, 
this appears to fit with the findings shown in Table 5.3 that in the early stages of 
hungness Conservatives are more likely to be involved in administrations than other 
parties, and the SLD are more likely to be involved than Labour. The far greater 
early involvement of Conservatives in single party administrations might have been 
predicted, the result perhaps of former rulers desperately clinging on to power. 
However, Conservatives were also involved in more coalitions than other parties, 
which suggests, at the very least, that they were more ready to negotiate than the 
^ The increased willingness of Labour to do deals with the SLD, addressed later in this 
chapter (section 5.2.4.). could also explain the Conservative decline in involvement. 
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findings to Hypothesis 2.2 (above) appear to indicate.^ The SLD are at least as 
likely to engage in negotiations as Conservatives; far fewer were 'not prepared to 
negotiate', as discussed above, so a greater readiness to enter discussions is probably 
not a significant factor in greater Conservative involvement in local coalitions. A 
simpler explanation may be the large numbers of Independent 'groups' at local level. 
Ideological closeness to Independent groups appears to be an important contributory 
factor in the greater number of administrations Conservatives have been involved 
with. In English local government Independents have often been seen as Conservatives 
in all but name, and Widdicombe reported that 26 percent of Independent councillors 
were also members of the Conservative party. Although they discovered Independents 
who were also members of the Labour (2 percent). Liberal (5 percent) or 
Nationalist (3 percent) parties, in the great majority of cases Independents 
admitting to membership of a political party were Conservatives (Widdicombe, 
1986, Research Volume Two, Table 4.4, pp.37-38). 
This helps to explain the high level of Conservative involvement; in many cases. 
Independents may be close enough ideologically for negotiations to be relatively 
painless. Of the 11 two-party coalitions Conservatives were currently participating 
in, 6 were with Independents, while 6 of the 7 multi-party current coalitions 
involved Independents. The 6 Conservative/ Independent coalitions were also, as 
Table 5.1 demonstrates, the only two-party coalitions Independents were currently 
participating in, although on one previous occasion Independents had formed an 
administration with Labour. Independents were involved in 15 current 
administrations: 12 of 15 (80 percent) involved the Conservatives while 8 of 15 
(53.3 percent) included the SLD and just 5 of the 15 current coalitions (33.3 
percent) involved a Labour group. 
Although a very different pattern of Conservative and Independent involvement 
emerges when previous administrations are examined (see Table 5.4 below), there 
is still a propensity for Independents to participate in coalitions with Conservative 
groups rather than other political parties. 
Indeed. Leach & Game (1989) argue that where Consen/atives and Independents have 
more than 50 percent of seats there is a "high probability" they will dominate the 
county council (1989, pp. 6-8). However, this is not supported by this research's 
5of course, this greater involvement might not be so in terms of time, and the durability of 
these coalitions will be examined in detail in the following chapter on coalition stability. 
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findings. In the 17 councils where these two parties have more than 50 percent of 
the council seats. Conservative/ Independent coalitions are ruling in only 1 of the 3 
counties in that sample and in only 6 of the 17 in all. While a Conservative/ 
Independent coalition had lasted for 4 years in one district before being replaced by a 
Conservative/SLD administration, and in one council which was classified as having 
'no administration' Conservatives and Independents shared chairs, in the majority of 
cases Conservatives and Independents were not openly co-operating.® 
Table 5.4 (below) details the composition of the 59 administrations that had ruled 
prior to those current administrations shown in Table 5.1 (above), and shows only 2 
examples of Conservative/Independent administrations but 20 occasions where 
Conservatives formed a minority administration. While Independents may have been 
giving tacit support to Conservative minority administrations, this appears unlikely 
when one realises that only 4 cases of Conservative minority control currently exist. 
With Independent support (whether overt or covert) it might have been expected 
that these Conservative minority administrations could have been more duriable. 
especially in the 17 councils where Independent support would have given 
Conservatives an overall majority. 
As Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate, the major difference in the pattern of involvement of 
Conservatives and Independents is that Conservatives have attempted to rule alone 
more in the early stages of hungness while Independent involvement is much greater 
in current coalitions than in previous arrangements. There is support for this from 
Leach & Game (1989) who described this initial attempt to rule alone as a 
"characteristic mistake of Conservative groups in the hung situation" (1989, p.34). 
They noted that numerous defeats, leading to Conservative groups having to carry the 
burden of responsibility for policies of which they disapproved, forced a change of 
strategy by Consen/ative groups in a number of counties; Independents appear to 
have been the main beneficiaries of this. The failure of Conservatives to maintain 
these minority administrations also offers an explanation for their decline in 
® It may be that the Independent groups in our survey are not the 'unitary actors' which our 
analysis of unitary status in Chapter Three decided to treat them as. A lack of cohesion 
offers a very convincing reason for the failure of Leach & Game's hypothesis that with 
more than a half of the seats between them Consen^atives and Independents will usually 
control the council. A coalition agreement, however informal, requires that the partners 
are able to offer disciplined voting majorities. If such 'Independent groups' are really no 
more than a disparate bunch whose major similarity is a dislike of belonging to a political 
party, it is not surprising if a seemingly rational 'minimum winning coalition* fails to form. 
Truly independent members may well balk at offering support to a Conservative group that 
in the majority of cases considered here has just been removed from power by the 
electorate. 
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participation shown in Table 5.3. While their involvement in coalitions has been 
relatively constant, they now rule alone in only 4 councils compared to 20 previous 
occasions. 
Table 5.4: Previous Administrations in Hung Counci ls 
(responses of chief executives) 
Party/Parties Comprising the Administration Total 
Conservative 20 
Labour 8 
SLD 7 
Conservative/Labour 2 
Conservative/SLD 7 
Conservative/Independent 2 
Labour/SLD 5 
Labour/Independent 
Conservalive/lndependent/Rate 
Consen/alive/lndependent/lndependent Labour 
Conservative/SLD/lndependent 
Conservative/lndependent/lndependenl Labour/Ratepayers/SLD 
No Administration 3 
Total 59 
Of the 7 previous coalitions Independents were involved in (compared to their 
involvement in 15 current coalitions) Independents and Conservatives were 
collaborating on 6 of those occasions. This compares to just 2 collaborations by 
Independents with the SLD (in multi-party coalitions which also included 
Conservatives) and only 1 collaboration with Labour (albeit in a two party 
coalition). The low involvement by Independents in initial administrations is 
difficult to understand. Perhaps other party groups are less willing to work with a 
group they perceive as Conservative, while the tendency of Conservatives to prefer 
to rule alone initially (while noting that they still participate in more initial 
coalitions than other groups) might mean less opportunities for Independent 
participation, at least formally. Of the 8 Independent leaders who responded to the 
survey, none answered that they were not prepared to negotiate with other groups, so 
it does not appear to be the attitude of Independent groups which is responsible for 
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their low level of participation initially. The following examination of Consen/ative 
tactics may provide an answer to this problem. 
5.2.3. The Conservatives: Clinging On To Power? 
Stewart (1985) has argued that local Conservative groups, especially where they 
had formerly been in control, might be more likely to consider discussions with the 
Alliance parties, "in the expectation that (Conservatives] should continue in power" 
(1985, p. 5). As mentioned above. Leach supported this assertion. Despite the 
findings of a New Statesman survey (6 June. 1986. p.5) that the Alliance parties 
were then more likely to form coalition arrangements with Labour, a finding 
supported by Leach & Stewart (1988, p.41). Alliance groups (rather than the 
ideologically opposed Labour groups) will almost certainly come under initial 
pressure from Conservative groups attempting to hold on to political control, 
especially if there is no sizeable Independent group. If Stewart (1985) is correct, it 
appears that: 
2.3: CONSERVATIVE/SLD COALITIONS WILL B E MORE L I K E L Y TO FORM 
INITIALLY THAN COALITIONS COMPRISING OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES, 
PARTICULARLY IN AUTHORITIES WHERE THE CONSERVATIVES W E R E THE 
FORMER RULING PARTY. 
Table 5.5 (below) details the initial administrations forming in hung authorities and 
demonstrates conclusively that proposition 2.3 is not proven. Only 4 initial 
coalitions (less than 10 percent) were Conservative/SLD partnerships, with a 
further 4 multi-parly coalitions involving both parties (and 2 of these were all-
party administrations). Furthermore, contrary to expectations, where the 
Conservatives had formerly ruled there were no examples of co-operation between 
the two parties without the involvement of other party groups. Although 7 of the 8 
SLD/Alliance minority administrations were in authorities formerly ruled by 
Conservatives, given that 42 of the 62 hung councils in the sample had previously 
been controlled by Conservatives this is not especially significant. 
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Table 5.5 Initial administrations In Newly Hung Local Authorities By 
Former Ruling Party 
(response of chief executives; n=62) 
Former Ruling Party 
Labour Indeo- Con/Ind Initial Administration Cons 
Conservative 16 
Labour 1 4 
SID 7 1 
Conservative/Independent 4 
Conservative/SLD - 4 
Conservative/Labour 
Labour/SLD 
SLD/SDP/lndependeni 
Cons/Lab/SLD/lndependen 
t 
Cons/lnd/Ratepayers 
Cons/SLD/Ind 
Cons/SLD/Labour 
Labour/Independent 
No Administration 2 1 
No Information 1 
Total 4 2 11 
p
endent 
Always 
Hung 
Total 
16 
5 
8 
5 
4 
1 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
62 
Table 5.6 Involvement of Party Groups in Initial 
Admin is t ra t ions 
(from Table 5,5. above) 
Party Percentage of 
Administrations 
Conservatives 50.8 
Labour 27.9 
SLD/Alliance 39.3 
Independent 16.4 
Number of 
Administrations 
31 
1 7 
24 
10 
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While arguing that Conservatives would be more likely to co-operate with the 
Alliance in authorities where they had formerly ruled. Stewart also cautioned that 
"given the tradition of governing alone" former Conservative rulers may actually be 
reluctant to discuss power sharing with former opposition parties (1985, p.5). 
With over two-fifths of Conservative leaders 'not prepared to negotiate' with other 
parties and with 16 cases where the Conservatives initially attempted to rule alone, 
it appears that Stewart may well be correct in his assessment of Conservative 
reluctance to share power. However, this is not supported by their involvement in 
initial coalitions which, like their overall involvement in initial administrations, is 
greater than any other party group. Furthermore, although Conservatives only 
remain in sole control of 4 councils, their involvement in current coalitions is only 
beaten by the SLD (see Table 5.3). This does not suggest a party reluctant to discuss 
power sharing. What such apparently contradictory findings could demonstrate is 
that local Conservative responses will vary considerably, and that the pragmatism 
many Conservatives pride themselves on is alive and well. These figure also hint at a 
possible reason for the small involvement initially of Independent groups. 
An Explanat ion for the Initial E x c l u s i o n of Independents from 
Governing Coalitions 
The large number of hung councils where the Conservative former rulers have 
initially attempted to rule alone (16 of 41, or 39 percent) offers a possible 
explanation lor the low level of Independent involvement in initial administrations 
discussed previously. Table 5.5 indicates that Conservatives demonstrate a tendency 
to attempt to rule alone in councils where they had formerly ruled. Indeed, all 12 
Conservative leaders who replied that they were not prepared to negotiate in the 
formation of a coalition administration were heading parties which had ruled prior to 
hungness. Table 5.1 (detailing current administrations) indicates that they have not 
been able to sustain such minority administrations, with only 4 current examples of 
single party rule by Conservatives. In order to remain in power, or to regain a share 
off power after their initial exclusion from administrations, it seems likely that they 
will do a deal with the group ideologically closest to them, which will probably be 
Independents. Although this remains conjecture, it does offer a convincing 
explanation for the greater involvement by Independents subsequent to initial 
administrations. 
Table 5.6 (above) demonstrates that it is not only Independents who have a low level 
of involvement in the initial stages of hungness. Barely a quarter (27.9 percent) of 
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initial administrations involve Labour party groups, compared to nearly half (49.1 
percent, see Table 5.2) of current administrations, and some possible reasons for 
this increase in Labour's participation will now be examined. 
5.2.4. Labour: The Politics of Necessi ty? 
As previously mentioned, Stewart has noted the hostility shown by many Labour 
groups to coalition discussions (see Stewart, 1985, p.5). However, it can also be 
proposed that this 'strategy' will give way to greater involvement by the Labour 
party the longer a council is hung. Despite their initial reluctance to enter 
discussions, as Mellors (1986) reports, "the growing incidence of hung councils has 
led the Labour party to re-examine its strategy at local level", however much they 
remain "reluctant to discuss this re-assessment publicly" (1986. p.22). Leach & 
Game have noted that in the hung county councils, "once the initial posturing was 
over" Labour became aware that the effect of their "oppositional" stance was that a 
Conservative minority administration was able to remain in power. Following the 
initial stages Labour was prepared either to take an "opportunistic" approach and 
"exploit opportunities on an ad hoc basis" or adopt a "co-operative" approach with 
Alliance groups (Leach & Game, 1989, pp. 31-37). This willingness of Labour to 
start seeking deals with the SLD also offers a convincing explanation for the decline 
in Conservative participation after the initial stages of hungness. Given this, it is 
proposed that: 
2.4: THE LONGER AN AUTHORITY REMAINS HUNG. THE IWORE L IKELY IT 
IS THAT T H E L A B O U R P A R T Y WILL B E I N V O L V E D IN ITS 
ADMINISTRATION. 
At first glance, Table 5.3 (above) appears to support that contention, with Labour 
involved in 26 current administrations as opposed to 16 previous administrations. 
As previously mentioned, Table 5.6 (above) also appears to lend support to the 
hypothesis, with Labour involved in only 27.9 percent of initial administrations, as 
against their involvement in almost half of current administrations. 
Table 5.7 (below) offers a different perspective of Labour's participation, indicating 
no significant difference in their involvement in local administrations with the 
passage of time. Perhaps surprisingly, Table 5.7 also shows the SLD are less likely 
to be involved in the administrations of long-term hung councils, although the 
difference is small. There appears to be no significant difference in the involvement 
of any of the major party groups over time, nor does there appear to be any 
difference over time in the ability of parties to come to some agreement. There was 
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*no administration' in 5 of the 36 short term hung councils, compared to 3 of the 24 
long term hung councils, 13.9 percent compared to 12.5 percent. 
Table 5.7: Party Involvement in Administrations Over 
T i m e 
Party Short Term Hung Long Term Hung 
(n=36) (n=24) 
Conservative 33 .3% 37 .5% 
Labour 44.4% 41.6% 
SLD 52.8% 45.8% 
Independent 22.2 25 .0% 
To return to Labour's involvement over time, although Table 5.7 deals with current 
administrations only and does not offer a picture of the development of 
administrative involvement, it lends no support to Hypothesis 2.4. If the hypothesis 
was correct, one would expect to find a greater involvement by Labour in those 
authorities which have been hung the longest, and this is clearly not the case. In 
support of Leach & Game's findings that after the 'initial posturing' was over Labour 
was prepared to negotiate, it appears more correct to note that while Labour are less 
likely to be involved in initial administrations than either the Conservatives or the 
SLD, this initial reluctance does not appear to last very long. 
5.2.5. Labour and the SLD 
Labour politicians soon recognise the realities of the hung situation, and Leach & 
Game (1989) have noticed a predilection for a basis of "mutual co-operation 
between Labour and Alliance groups" (Leach & Game. 1989. p.36). Even in those 
county councils where Labour and the Alliance adopted an "opportunistic" rather 
than co-operative approach, they noted a tendency for "a significantly greater 
amount of informal discussion between Democrat and Labour groups than there is 
among other pairings" (Leach & Game. 1989. p.37). Mellors (1989) also noted that 
the two groups were closer in budgetary matters than any other pairing from the 
three major parties, and that "Labour-Alliance patterns of support" had become 
more common as Conservative-Alliance patterns of support had decreased (Mellors. 
1989, p.107). Leach & Stewart also found that where arrangements entailed 
"positive support" two-thirds involved "Alliance support for Labour or Labour 
support for Alliance (equally distributed)" (Leach & Stewart, 1988, p.41). They 
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attributed this to the fact that the majority of hung councils had previously been 
Conservative controlled, and former opposition parties would naturally tend to co-
operate, a point examined in detail in section three of this chapter. Whatever the 
reasons, it appears from previous observers that Labour and the SLD will be more 
inclined to come to an arrangement than other party groupings, both by nature of 
their closeness over budgetary matters and by their mutual status in many hung 
county councils as long term opposition parties (the SLD as 'Liberals'). Accordingly, 
it is proposed that: 
2.5: LABOUR/SLD COALITIONS WILL B E MORE L I K E L Y TO FORM THAN 
OTHER PARTY GROUPINGS. PARTICULARLY IN THE COUNTY COUNCILS. 
Table 5.1 (above) lists current administrations and Table 5.4 (above) lists 
previous administrations in hung councils, and neither lend support to the 
hypothesis that Labour/SLD coalitions are more likely than other party pairings. 
Currently, there are 7 Labour/SLD coalitions and 11 other two-party pairings (6 
Conservative/Independent, 5 Conservative/SLD). Previous administrations indicate 
5 Labour/SLD coalitions and 12 other two-party pairings (7 Conservative/SLD, 2 
Conservative/Independent, 2 Conservative/Labour, 1 Labour/Independent). Overall, 
there are as many examples of Conservative/SLD co-operation as there are of 
Labour/SLD co-operation, and with 5 current examples of the former this cannot be 
dismissed as examples of Conservatives doing a deal with whoever will maintain them 
in power in the early stages of hungness: the average time the 5 councils currently 
with Conservative/SLD administrations had been hung was 40.8 months. 
Labour/SLD coalitions are more common than other pairings, but only for Labour 
groups. They are far more likely to engage in coalitions with the SLD than with any 
other party, while the SLD is just as likely to co-operate with Conservatives as with 
Labour. Labour groups had been involved in 15 two-party coalitions during the 
period these councils had been hung, and 12 of these (80 percent) were with the 
SLD, 2 with Conservatives and 1 with Independents. In addition, all 14 of the current 
two-party or 'multi-party' coalitions (7 of each) Labour groups are engaged in 
involve the SLD. There were no previous examples of Labour involvement in multi-
party administrations, lending more support to the idea that Labour will become 
increasingly involved in hung councils after its initial hostile reaction has worn off. 
However, when Labour groups do decide to become involved, they may find their 
choices are more restricted than the other three main party groupings. 
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A Lack of Choice for Labour 
It appears Labour groups are constrained (for whatever reasons) in their choice of 
partner, which rules out a number of alternatives at local level. While, given the 
unimportance of 'Independents' at national level, this constraint may apply equally in 
national parly politics to Consen/atives, at local level Conservatives appear to have 
considerably more freedom of choice in selecting coalition partners. Neither party is 
as free (or as ideally situated ideologically?) as the S L D 7 which is just as likely to 
do deals with the Conservatives as with Labour. The difficulty of Labour engaging in 
coalitions with both the Conservatives (for obvious reasons of tdeological 
incompatibility) and with Independents (who, as Widdicombe demonstrates, are 
generally closer to Conservatives than other party groups) may explain why. despite 
their high involvement in current administrations (mainly as single-party 
minority rulers), they are less likely than the Conservatives, the SLD or 
Independents to be involved in coalitions. If policy proximity is the deciding factor, 
they might have only one choice of partner (the SLD) in most authorities. 
This probably accounts for their low level of involvement in coalitions. Table 5.2 
(above) shows Conservatives in 18 current coalitions, the SLD in 22, Independents 
(despite the far fewer authorities with Independent groups) in 15 and Labour in only 
14 current coalitions. Mellors attributed this low level of Labour involvement in 
"inter-party deals" to a "generally negative approach" (Mellors, 1989, p.94), but 
this may be unfair to Labour groups. Conservative leaders were far more likely to be 
hostile to negotiations than Labour leaders, which suggests it is Labour's ideological 
position, to the left of the other three major groups at local level, which is the major 
influence in their lower level of co-operation with other parties. 
^ The advantages the S L D ' s ideological position gives it are examined in Chapter Nine, after 
the construction of a unidlmensional local policy sca le enables it to be placed ideologically. 
Until that is done, it cannot be assumed that the party is the centre party. 
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Table 5.8: Admin is t ra t i ve Ar rangements in 
County Counci ls (n = 18) 
Part ies in Current Prev ious 
Administrat ion Admins Admins 
(n=18) (n=18) 
C o n s e r v a t i v e 1 4 
Labour 4 4 
SLD 1 -
L a b o u r / S L D 6 3 
C o n s e r v a t i v e / S L D 1 4 
Conservat ive/ Independent 1 
C o n s e r v a t i v e / l n d / S L D 1 
L a b o u r / C o n s e r v a t i v e - 1 
No Administration 3 2 
However, hypothesis 2.5 also posited Labour/SLD agreements were especially likely 
in the county councils, and this is certainly the case. There were 18 counties in the 
sample of hung authorities, and the administrative arrangements lend support to 
Leach & Game (1989) and Mellors (1989), as one would expect given the similarity 
of their universe and time-span. Table 5.8 (above) details the arrangements in 
county councils, and by far the commonest 'pairing' in county councils is 
Labour/SLD, with a third of county councils currently controlled by this pairing. 
The increase in this arrangement and decline in Consen/ative/SLD coalitions lends 
support to Mellors observation that Labour/SLD coalitions have increased as 
Conservative/SLD coalitions have declined (1989, p. 107, see above). Given the 
much lower level of Conservative/SLD co-operation in the counties, it may be that 
the hypothesis that former 'opposition' parties will combine to remove former 
rulers from power explains this best; 12 counties were formerly ruled by 
Conservatives, one by a long running Conservative / Independent "alliance", and 5 by 
Labour. This hypothesis is examined in detail in section three of this chapter. 
Despite the difficulties in coming to terms with groups other than the ideologically 
adjacent SLD. Labour has formed two-party coalitions with both Independents (once) 
and Conservatives (twice). Their agreement with an Independent group is 
unsurprising; not all Independents are Tories. However, their agreement with a 
party at the other end of the policy scale is more difficult to understand. 
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5.2.6. The 'Unholy A l l iance ' : Conservative and Labour Co-operation 
A number of respondents to this survey used the phrase 'unholy alliance' to refer to 
the perhaps unexpected spectacle of Conservative/ Labour cooperation. Given the 
distance generally acknowledged to exist between the two major parties 
(particularly at national level), under what circumstances might such a coalition 
emerge? A 1985 New Statesman survey found that over a fifth of all arrangements in 
the 52 councils then hung involved such a coalition {New Statesman, 30 August, 
1985, p.4). This appears to be a surprisingly high total, especially as this research 
has indicated no current examples of such a coalition and only 4 cases where Labour 
and Conservatives are co-operating in a multi-party coalition; also, in 3 of these 
cases their co-operation is in an all-party administration, while In the remaining 
case the only members excluded from the governing coalition are two Independent 
councillors (see Table 5.1 
Of course, the co-operation between the two major parties will almost certainly be 
less obvious than a formal governing coalition with both sharing chairs. Leach & 
Stewart say it is apparent that in some authorities "Labour and Conservative groups 
are working behind the scenes to minimise the ability of the Alliance to wield 
effective influence" (1988. p.41). They add that this appears to be particularly the 
case where the Alliance group is "relatively small"; in such cases there is still 
"widespread mistrust" of the Alliance "coupled with a sense of injustice if any small 
party group appears to wield influence not commensurate with its size" (Leach & 
Stewart. 1988. p.4l) . II might also be supposed that where the Alliance is both a 
small and 'pivotal* group on the council^ both the major parties will: 
"particularly in the early days of a newly-hung authority, often find 
themselves the target of negative attitudes on the part of the other two 
more long-established party groups, both on account of their successful 
disruption of the familiar two-party system and the fact , that a relatively 
small number of Alliance councillors are seen as having a degree of 
influence out of line with their numerical strength". (Leach & Game, 
1989. p.20, their emphasis) 
^In two c a s e s where a Conservat ive/ Labour coalition w a s alleged by party leaders, no 
response was received from the relevant Chief Executive. As it is the judgement of Chief 
Execut ives which has been used to delineate the administrative arrangements in these hung 
councils, those c a s e s do not appear in the relevant tables. Also, these c a s e s cannot be 
cons idered with other c a s e s , a s the n e c e s s a r y details concern ing party/committee 
composition (given by Chief Executives) are unavailable. 
9 'Pivotal' is used in the s e n s e of being capable of constructing a majority with either 
Labour or Conservative. 
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As one SLD respondent put it "we were prepared to negotiate, but no one else would", 
a view echoed by other SLD leaders. Mellors corroborates this, noticing that "some 
resentment of the Alliance was evident in most councils" (1986, p.15). Perhaps the 
easiest way for the two big parties to negate the Alliance would be for one to form a 
minority administration and 'behind the scenes' make private deals with the other, 
although one wonders how long such an unsatisfactory relationship could exist 
without 'backbench' councillors creating havoc. In addition, the ideological divide 
would surely soon create indivisible problems. 
Browne has pointed out that the attitude of many European political parties can be 
that "only some parties should be entrusted with the responsibil i ty of 
wielding...power" (1982, p.347), and it appears that such attitudes can be observed 
in British local authorities where the Alliance has the potential for Influence beyond 
its size. Both Labour and Conservative have a vested interest in denying the Alliance 
opportunities to show it is capable of ruling either alone or with another party, as an 
unwanted precedent may be set. 
Therefore, it is proposed that: 
2.6: CONSERVATIVE/LABOUR COALITIONS WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO 
OCCUR IN THOSE AUTHORITIES WHERE THE ALLIANCE PARTIES ARE A 
SMALL (I.E. LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE COUNCIL) AND PIVOTAL 
GROUP. 
2.7: IN THOSE AUTHORITIES WHERE THE ALLIANCE COMPRISES LESS 
THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE COUNCIL. CONSERVATIVE OR LABOUR 
MINORITY ADMINISTRATIONS ARE MORE LIKELY. 
The use of a figure of less than 20 percent to denote a 'small' third party is of course 
debatable. Although Leach & Game use the criteria of "less than 15% of the seats" to 
denote a 'small* third party (1989. p. 12). Leach & Stewart utilise a figure of 20 
percent or more of the seats to denote a "significant proportion of seats" (1988, 
p.52). In most cases less than 20 percent is a small number of councillors (i.e.. 
single figures), and the largest Alliance group under 20 percent only comprises 14 
councillors. Therefore, it is proposed to utilise that figure in this analysis, giving a 
total of 28 authorities where the Alliance is a 'small' party group. 
It may be that the large numbers of Labour/Conservative administrations reported 
in earlier studies were cases of one supporting the other in the formation of what 
was really a single party minority administration (see Leach & Stewart, 1988, 
p.39, for an outline of the different degrees of 'support' which could be involved in 
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such an arrangement). Certainly, this research failed to uncover such a number, and 
with only 2 cases of Conservative/Labour collaboration reported by Chief Executives 
hypothesis 2.6 must remain unproven, although those 2 cases do provide some 
interesting information. 
In both instances the SLD was a *small group* (4 percent and 14 percent), in 
neither instance were they pivotal, and in both cases the pact lasted less than a yeaL 
Where the SLD held 4 percent (2 seats) they could have formed a 'knife-edge* 
coalition with either Labour or Conservative, and an Independent group was in the 
same situation. The only two party majority coalition possible was the 'unholy 
alliance*, a truly "grand coalition* comprising 96 percent of the council seats. This 
council had only been hung for a year, and this 'grand coalition* was quickly replaced 
by the former Conservative rulers establishing a single party minority 
administration and taking all the chairs. In the authority where the SLD held 14 
percent of the seats the 'unholy alliance', which followed successive and short lived 
Labour and Conservative minority administrations, was also short-l ived. The 
Conservatives could have formed a winning coalition with the independents; instead a 
Labour/SLD minority administration was allowed to form. Given this, it does not 
appear from this admittedly small sample that the SLD are being frozen out of 
government when they are a small group. 
5.2.7. Labour and Conserva t i ve f^/linorlty A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s and Smal l 
SLD Groups 
However, as mentioned previously, Labour and Conservative co-operation will 
probably be less overt, and when the contention of hypothesis 2.7 is examined (i.e., 
that small SLD groups will encourage the two major parties to form minority 
administrations) it might at first appear that there is some evidence to support the 
contention that covert action is being taken to exclude the SLD in some authorities 
where it is a small group. 
As Table 5.9 shows, where the SLD has less than 20 percent of the seats 29 of 67 
(43.3 percent) of all administrat ions which had formed were minority 
administrations of one of the main parties, while in those councils where the SLD had 
over 20 percent of the seats only 17 of 53 (32.1 percent) administrations were 
Conservative or Labour minority administrations. This apparent difference is 
misleading, and the higher number of Labour and Conservative single party 
administrations where the Alliance is a small party is almost certainly not 
significant. 
1 76 
Table 5.9: Relat ionship Between SLD Seat Share and the 
Format ion of fVlinorily Adm in i s t r a t i ons 
S L D S e a l Share 
SLD 
(Minus 20%) 
SLD 
(Plus 20%) 
Con or Lab Minority 
Administrat ions 
4 3 . 3 % 
(29 of 67) 
3 2 . 1 % 
(17 of 53) 
All Minority 
Administrat ions 
4 7 . 8 % 
(32 of 67) 
5 4 . 7 % 
(29 of 53) 
The difference can be quite simply explained by the fact that when the SLD is also a 
significant party grouping it will limit the number of occasions when the two 
traditional rulers can form minority administrations. Where it was a small group 
the SLD had, unsurprisingly, formed only 3 short-lived (all less than a year) 
minority administrations and all 3 were in the same metropolitan district council. 
That council had had 9 administrations in 9 years of hungness, all of them single 
party minority administrations. In contrast, 12 of the 53 administrations which had 
formed (22.6 percent) in authorities where the SLD was a significant grouping were 
SLD minority administrations, including the 8 cases detailed in Table 5.1 listing 
current administrations. As Table 5.9 indicates, where the SLD was a small group, 
nearly half (47.8 percent) of all administrations were single party administrations; 
where the SLD was a large group just over half (54.7 percent) of all 
administrations were single party administrations. This difference would be 
expected, and there is no evidence that the two main parties are acting to exclude the 
SLD from office when it is a small group. 
What does emerge from an examination of SLD participation is that they have 
increased their participation in administrations over time, as the data presented in 
previous tables have indicated. They are involved in 48.4 percent of all current 
administrations compared to only 35.6 percent of previous administrations, and if 
those administrations where *no administration' was in place are excluded they were 
involved in 56.6 percent of all current administrations. As Table 5.2 has indicated 
this is by far the greatest total of any party group. This increase in involvement over 
time might indicate that the two main parties initially attempted to freeze them out. 
However, this can also be accounted for by less 'sinister' explanations; the initial 
attempts by the two main parties (especially the Conservatives) to rule alone can be 
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explained at least as convincingly by the historical attitudes of the main parties to 
'coalitions' as by a concerted attempt to keep this upstart third party out of 
government. 
This is not to deny that the size of the SLD group might have a bearing on the process 
of coalition building in a local authority. However, this is a difficult point to prove, 
as the following assessment will demonstrate. The difficulty of 'isolating' the impact 
of the various party groups concerning the variables discussed must not be 
underestimated. 
5.2.8. The Possib le Effects of SLD Seat Share on 'No Admin is t ra t ion* 
F o r m i n g 
There are 28 councils where the SLD holds less than 20 percent of the seats and 33 
councils where they hold 20 percent or more. The former had seen a total of 67 
administrations, and the latter 53 administrations in all, an indication that there 
may be a connection between the percentage of seats held by the SLD and 
administrative stability; this point is examined in the following chapter. 
One area in which there appears to be a connection between SLD seat share and 
administrative formation is when no administration forms. Where chief executives 
responded 'none* to the question concerning administrative arrangements, then 'no 
administration' was recorded as the administrative arrangement. There were a total 
of 12 'no administrations' in the history of our sample of hung councils, and 10 of 
these were in councils where the SLD seat share was over 20 percent An 
overwhelming majority of current cases of 'no administration' (8 of 9) were in 
authorities where the SLD was a significant force, varying from 21 percent to 48 
percent of the council. There is also a difference between the SLD 'variable' and 'all-
party' administrations; all 3 'all-party' administrations were in councils where the 
SLD had less than 20 percent of the seats. 
The high incidence of 'no administrations' where the SLD is a significant force, may 
indicate a difficulty for the other two parties in accepting the SLD as a coalition ally 
when it is the senior partner in terms of members and will therefore almost 
certainly insist on a majority of committee chairs and seats. That said, this is not 
supported by Leach & Stewart's assertion that Labour and the SLD supported each 
other in roughly equal measure (1988, p.41). It may be that large SLD groups are 
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less likely to want to rule alone in a minority government and more concerned with 
establishing the principle of power-shar ing.^ 
An important point needs to made here; the difference between an 'all-party* 
administration and 'no administration' might be in the eye of the beholder. When the 
distribution of committee chairs and deputy chairs of the 9 current authorities with 
•no administration* is examined 6 of them appear to have some sort of an-angement in 
place, at least when it came to sharing out committee chairs, and in four of these 
cases there was a multi-party chair system."* 1 
Perhaps the only sure thing these findings indicate is a point made previously. It is 
difficult to decide with any certainly the administrative arrangements existing when 
there is no formal distribution of 'cabinet' seats. The situation is even more difficult 
in English local government, with no cabinet and with no necessary relationship 
between the administrative arrangements and the allocation of committee chairs. 
Given that a sizeable minority of coalitions at local level, even when 'formal', do not 
share chairs (see section three, previous chapter) it is unsurprising if chief 
executives or party leaders are unsure about how to designate the administrative 
arrangements. Despite this, it does appear that there is a relationship between (a) 
no administration forming, and (b) an all-party administration forming, and a 
sizeable SLD group on the council. 
However, Mellors' "multi-dimensional influences" provide a reminder that what 
appear to be significant differences may be due to a number of local factors, and that 
making assumptions from quantitative data could be misleading. It may be that 
influences such as "local political traditions" and "the personalities of local political 
leaders" (see Mellors, 1989. p.7) account for some findings, rather than an overall 
pattern from which general assumptions about party behaviour can be made. That 
said, many of the differences which occur between the four major party groupings 
participation in administrations, detailed in this chapter, have been plausibly 
explained in general terms. The temptation to use 'local factors' to explain all 
variations which defy easy explanation needs to be avoided. 
^^Apart from the greater number of authorities without an administration in p lace when 
they were a large group, there appears to be little difference between the types of 
administration which form and S L D seat share. Whether the S L D w a s a large or a small 
group did not significantly affect the propensity of coalitions to form, or the number of 
single party minority administrations which formed. 
^ No information is avai lable (or the distribution of cha i rs in administrations prior to 
current arrangements 
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That said, general inferences may be more easily drawn from some variables. One 
variable which Mellors has mentioned in his list of 'multi-dimensional influences* 
might well have a more discernible effect than others on the local coalitions which 
form. A number of observers have argued that the "previous patterns of party 
control" (f^ellors. 1989. p.7) wilt influence the coalitions that can form, and this 
will now be looked at in some detail. 
Sect ion Three: The Role of Tradi t ional Rulers In Hung Counc i ls 
This section will scrutinise a number of proposals put forward to explain attitudes 
to, and the behaviour of, those political groups which previously controlled the local 
authority. The contentions that former opposition parties will act to exclude 
'traditional rulers' from power, and that where traditional rulers do retain power it 
will tend to be as a minority administration, will be assessed. 
5.3 .1. Former Rulers and Local Admin is t ra t i ons 
The supposed reluctance of Conservative former rulers to share power has already 
been briefly discussed, and it does appear that Conservative former rulers will 
attempt to retain power by forming a minority administration, as Table 5.5 (section 
5.2.3. above) detailing initial administrations indicates. However, it may be the case 
that former opposition parties are reluctant to talk to the Conservatives, effectively 
excluding Conservative former rulers from participation in ruling coalitions in the 
newly hung council, and some evidence was put fonA/ard to support this view (see 
Table 5.8, section 5.2.5. above). Further support for this comes from Carter 
(1986), who argues that coalitions at the shire level will tend to exclude the 
Conservative "traditional rulers". During their long period of domination in the 
shire counties Conservatives behaved as if they had "a God given right to rule" 
(Carter, 1986, p.6). In the authorities examined by Carter, he argues that 
"crucially, the Conservatives accepted that the electorate had rejected their 
policies". Furthermore, the previous Conservative administrations: 
"certain of their unassailable position, were seen to rule in an elitist, 
often arrogant manner....consequently, there was little basis upon which a 
working relationship could be built" (Carter, 1986, p.10). 
Carter's thesis can also be applied to those authorities traditionally controlled by 
Labour. Stewart argues that in such authorities, "the Conservative Party will 
probably be ready to enter into ... discussions, in order to gain power" (1985, p.5). 
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Mellors provides support for the view that opposition parties will be inclined to co-
operate to remove traditional rulers from power. Mellors maintains that "above all. 
coalitions essentially operate against the previous winning party" (1983, p.283). 
and argues: 
"a taste of power after long exclusion is an enticing goal. There is great 
temptation for Labour groups to wrest power from Conservatives in their 
county strongholds and [for] Conservatives to sample the delights of control 
in the urban based districts long held by the Labour party." (Mellors. 1983. 
p .238) 
Mellors also noted a tendency for the Liberals to "engage in coalitions with 
whichever party had not been in power" (1983. p.241). He found the Liberals were 
more likely to support Labour in the shires and the Conservatives in the cities 
(1983. p.241), indicating a desire by the Liberals to form alliances against former 
rulers. Given the above, in part contradiction to hypothesis 2.3 (above), it would be 
expected that: 
2.8: FORMER RULERS WILL TEND TO BE BE EXCLUDED FROM LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS. 
2.9: THE SLD WILL ENGAGE IN COALITIONS WITH WHICHEVER PARTY 
WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY IN POWER. 
Despite this proposition being tentatively offered to explain the low level of 
Conservative involvement in county councils (which it has earlier been suggested 
may be partly because of their poor electoral performance in 1985). the evidence 
strongly suggests that hypothesis 2.8 is incorrect. Former rulers had taken part, 
either alone or with other parties, in administrations at some time during the period 
of hungness in 41 of the 57 local authorities (71.9 percent) examined. This does not 
indicate a process from which ex-rulers are excluded to any great degree.** 2 
Table 5.10 details the degree of former ruler involvement in initial and current 
administrations. As Table 5.10 shows, in over half of the cases examined (32 out of 
57. or 57.1 percent) former rulers were involved in the initial administrations; in 
35.1 percent of cases (16 Conservative and 4 Labour) they initially attempted to 
rule alone (see Table 5.5, section 5.2.3.). 
^2 Of the 62 authorities in this sample, in 4 c a s e s the authority had always been hung and 
in 1 c a s e there was insufficient information to test this hypothesis 
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Table 5.10: Former Rulers Involvement In Hung Counci ls 
Former Ruling Party Initial Admins Current Admins 
Conservat ive (n=41) 25 (61.0%) 16 (39.0%) 
Labour (n=11) 5 (45.5%) 7 (63.6%) 
Independent (n=4) 2 (50.0%) 2 (50%) 
All Ex Rulers (n=56) 32 (57.1%) 25 (43.9%) 
%= percentage of former rulers involved in administrations 
The involvement of ex-rulers is not confined to initial administrations; this is not 
just a demonstration of politicians attempting to remain in office in the aftermath of 
defeat. Although there is an appreciable decline in the participation of Conservative 
former rulers, when current administrations are examined, former rulers are 
involved in 25 cases (43.9 percent), a not insignificant total. In 10 (17.5 percent) 
of those cases, they are ruling alone; all 4 of the current Conservative and 6 of the 
12 current Labour minority administrations comprise former rulers. In 6 of these 
16 cases other administrative arrangements had lapsed and the former rulers had 
resumed sole minority control. 
Even more convincingly rebutting hypothesis 2.8, in 15 (26.3 percent) out of the 
57 local authorities for which the relevant information is available former rulers 
have remained in power for the whole time the council has been hung, in 4 cases 
alone and in 11 cases with other parlies. The average time these 15 councils had been 
hung was 3.3 years, so the 15 cases are not just newly hung councils where former 
rulers are desperately clinging on to power. The evidence of this research does not 
support the hypothesis that former opposition parties act to 'freeze out' former 
rulers, and if they do attempt to act in this way, they appear to have been 
unsuccessful. 
However. Carter's observation that beaten former rulers appear to accept that their 
policies had been rejected (Carter. 1986, p.10) was based on an examination of 
three county councils, and the phenomenon of former rulers being excluded from 
administrative involvement does appear more prevalent in the counties. When the 18 
county councils in this sample are examined, the figures for former rulers 
involvement are far less. Former rulers were involved in only 7 of the initial 18 
administrations (38.9 percent) and only 5 of the 18 current administrations (27.8 
percent), which as Table 5.10 indicates is much below the overall involvement of 
former rulers. Therefore, the hypothesis appears to be more relevant for county 
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councils, which have usually had a long tradition of Conservative domination. There 
was a definite policy among the former opposition parties in Devon County Council to 
exclude the Conservatives from any agreement reached (see Chapter Ten). 
5.3.2. Former Rulers and Coa l i t ion Admin i s t r a t i ons 
Hypothesis 2.9 proposes that the SLD will form alliances with whichever party had 
previously been in opposition. This proposition is examined below, but It also 
suggests that former rulers might be especially excluded from taking part in 
coalition administrations. Their involvement could tend to be confined to single party 
minority administrations where they attempt to rule In their traditional manner, 
without regard to the changed circumstances. Again, this is not supported by the 
evidence. 
Excluding examples of *no administration', there are a total of 109 administrations 
in the lifetime of the hung councils in our sample, 2 of which occurred in authorities 
which had previously always been hung. Therefore, a total of 107 administrations 
can be checked against former rulers participation; 49 of these were coalition 
administrations and 58 single-party minority administrations, indicating the 
propensity of single party minority administrations to initially form (as the 
previous chapter reported, a plurality of administrations are now coalitions). 
Former rulers had taken part in 27 (55.1 percent) of the 49 coalit ion 
administrations which had formed and in 32 (55.2 percent) of the 58 single party 
administrations. Although Table 5.10 indicates that Conservatives are now less 
likely to be involved in their former kingdoms than Labour are in theirs, this is due 
to Conservative inability to maintain their minority administrations. Labour are 
more likely to maintain the minority administrations they form in the authorities 
they formerly controlled. Indeed, as mentioned above, half of the current Labour 
minority administrations (6 of 12) are cases of former rulers in power, including 
4 examples where they have taken over when other arrangements have broken down. 
This may be because Labour, even when it is a 'traditional ruler*, will find it easier 
to find allies (which even a minority administration must have) at local level than 
Conservatives when a Conservative central government is seen as 'hostile' to local 
government and responsible for considerable cuts in local authority finance. That 
said. Conservative involvement in the authorities they formerly controlled, whether 
in minority administrations or in coalitions, is not insignificant. 
Quite clearly, former rulers are not specifically excluded from the coalitions which 
form, nor have they been prevented from forming minority administrations. It 
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seems traditional rulers, whatever their initial hostility towards sharing power, 
quickly learn to play by the new rules coalition politics dictates. Although their 
involvement in administrations does decline slightly over time this can be attributed 
to the failure of the minority administrations they initially attempt to form, 
especially in the case of Conservatives. 
5.3.3. SLD Invo lvement Wi th Former Rulers 
Allied to the thesis that former opposition parties will combine to prevent former 
rulers taking power, which does not appear to be the case, hypothesis 2.9 proposes 
that the SLD will engage in coalitions with whichever of the major parties was their 
partner in opposition. At first sight there might appear to be some support for this 
hypothesis, but a closer examination suggests that the reality is more complex. 
The SLD has taken part in a total of 36 coalitions in the lifetime of the hung councils 
in this survey, and 24 of them have been two-party coalitions. Half of these 24 have 
been with Labour and half with Conservatives. The majority of Labour/SLD 
coalitions (10 of 12) have been in authorities formerly ruled by Conservatives; this 
includes one counci l where a 'nominal coal i t ion ' of a permanent 
Conservative/Independent group had previously ruled and was still in place (if not in 
power) after 3 years of hungness. This finding appears to support the hypothesis, 
but the majority of Conservative/SLD coalitions (7 of 12) have also been in 
authorities formerly ruled by Conservatives. 
However, these findings are hardly surprising, as most of the hung authorities had 
previously been controlled by Conservatives (43 of 62 including the council with 
Conservative/Independent former rulers). Therefore, one would expect to find that 
the majority of SLD coalitions were in councils formerly ruled by Conservatives. 
69,4 percent of councils were formerly ruled by Conservatives, and 70.8 percent of 
SLD two-party coalitions (7 with Conservatives and 10 with Labour) were in those 
authorities. Ex-Labour councils account for 17.7 percent of the sample and 29.2 
percent of SLD two-party coalitions (5 with Conservatives and 2 with Labour) were 
in ex-Labour councils. There are more cases of SLD cooperation with Labour in ex-
Consen/ative councils and more cases of SLD co-operation with Conservatives in ex-
Labour councils, so some support for the hypothesis is evident, but it hardly appears 
conclusive. The hypothesis that the SLD will engage in coalitions with whichever 
parly had not previously been in power must remain unproven. 
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Conc lus i ons 
Throughout this chapter, the difficulties of isolating cause and effect have been 
apparent. The complexities of political life in English local government make 
drawing firm conclusions from quantitative data difficult. However, certain patterns 
have been observed in the behaviour of political parties in hung councils, which 
appear to indicate some general truths. 
When current administrations are examined, the SLD are more likely than Labour or 
Conservative to be involved. Although more administrations overall have involved the 
Conservatives, this is explained by their initial attempts to rule alone in the 
councils they formerly ruled. When this strategy has broken down, the 
Conservatives appear to have been remarkably pragmatic; their involvement in 
current coalitions is only exceeded by the SLD. Labour has appeared to be more 
intransigent, with half of all current minority administrations involving them and 
with Independents (despite the far fewer councils with an Independent group) 
exceeding Labour in their involvement in coalition administrations. However, there 
may be forces which act to place Labour in the most difficult position of all the local 
parties, and the apparent pragmatism of Conservatives may also be misleading. 
It is likely that the encouraging approach of the national party organisation, the open 
attitude of local SLD groups towards negotiations with other parties, and their 
ideological position all contribute to a greater SLD involvement in current 
administrations. Which of these variables is most important is impossible to say; all 
these factors support one another. Their relatively low level of involvement in 
initial coalitions is also probably best explained by a combination of factors, 
including Conservative former rulers attempts to rule alone, the attitude of the two 
main parties towards 'coalition' government, and a dislike by Labour and 
Conservative groups of a third party wielding influence beyond its size. SLD groups 
seem just as likely to do deals with either of the two main parties, and the previous 
status of other party groups seems to make little difference to their willingness to 
negotiate; SLD groups do not generally hold to the thesis that former rulers have 
been defeated and therefore should not be negotiated with. The close relationship 
between them and Labour, posited by a number of observers, was not readily 
apparent when observing their choice of partners. However, from the point of view 
of labour groups, a relationship with their SLD colleagues on the council appears to 
have been almost unavoidable if they wanted a share of power. 
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Labour were initially involved in barely a quarter of administrations, and despite 
their involvement in half of all current administrations they are less likely than any 
of the four main groups to be involved in coalition agreements. At first sight this 
suggests, as f^ellors believes (1989. p.94), a negative attitude towards inter-party 
deals by t-abour groups. However. Labour's choice of partner is constrained; a large 
majority of their two-party coalitions are with, or have been with, SLD groups, and 
all their multi-party coalitions include the SLD. By contrast. Consen/atives are 
involved in current two-party coalitions, in roughly equal measure, with both the 
SLD and Independents. All of the current Independent two-party coalitions were with 
Conservatives, and ideological proximity to Independents seems to be an important 
contributory factor both in the high involvement of Conservatives in coalitions and 
the ability of Conservative former rulers to remain in power. It appears Labour, in 
order to gain a share of power, has to come to an arrangement with the SLD. The 
Conservatives have another alternative. 
The high levels of Conservative/ Labour co-operation reported by some previous 
observers were not evident, although the large numbers of initial Conservative 
minority administrations, and current Labour minority administrations, may 
conceal cases where one of the two has abstained or voted to put the other in 
possession of committee chairs. There were cases where, for example. Labour 
leaders admitted doing this for the SLD. but none where either of the two main 
parties admitted to this strategy, so this remains conjecture. 
Finally, the belief that former rulers will be excluded from power is not supported 
by this research's findings. Former rulers do show a propensity to attempt to rule 
alone, particularly in the initial stages of hungness, but they appear to come to 
terms with the new situation quickly. Their involvement in current administrations, 
while not as great as their initial involvement, is not inconsiderable. 
A number of these findings suggest that certain administrative arrangements, for 
example, where former rulers initially attempt to rule alone or where Labour are 
initially excluded from the administration, may be less stable than others. It has also 
been suggested in this chapter that there may be a relationship between SLD seat 
share and administrative stability; in addition, a number of observers have accused 
the Alliance parties of opportunism, switching their support at crucial moments 
(for example. Leach. 1985, Stewart, 1985). The following chapter will examine 
these and other possible influences on the stability of the administrative 
arrangements this chapter has detailed. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Chapter Three (see 3.2.1) gives the definition of duration/termination that this 
chapter will utilise. The problems of measuring extant administrations was also 
dealt with there. To briefly summarise, only a change in the party membership of an 
administration will be invariably treated a s signifying the end of a 'government'. In 
addit ion, extant administrat ions will be c o n s i d e r e d here a s completed 
administrations except where this will significantly distort any findings. 
One of the enduring myths (especially in Britain) about hung legislatures is that 
they are characterised by instability. The example of Italian government coalitions, 
rather than the post-war West German experience, is used to 'prove' the thesis, 
which Is often allied to a defence of the 'first-past-the-posl' electoral system as 
providing stable and 'effective' government (for example, s e e The Independent, 
'Giving Coalitions A Bad Name', second leader, 16/11/87). Hung local government in 
England has not escaped this criticism (see Blowers, 1987). Even a sympathetic 
study of hungness talks of the "inherent Instability of administrative forms in hung 
authorities" (Leach & Game, 1989. p.21). It Is undeniable that hung governments 
are more likely to experience changes of administration than non-hung governments, 
but this is not inevitable. 
Unsurprisingly, in the control group of authorities where one party has a clear 
overall majority, in all c a s e s the same party remained in control for the duration of 
the period examined. When one party can control the direction of policy without 
regard to other parties there are few pressures affecting the stability of that 
administration; it is in place for the duration of that electoral period, and one 
hundred percent 'stability' is the norm. 
In contrast, a number of factors may affect the stability or otherwise of 
administrations in hung councils. The political history of an authority, electoral 
factors which could determine the amount of time an authority Is hung, the type of 
administration formed, and the proportions of seats held by the actors, have all been 
Identified a s being of major importance (for example, s e e Leach & Stewart. 1988. 
p.52; s e e also Laver & Schofleld, 1990. pp.147-148) . T h e s e factors will be 
examined In an attempt to determine their impact on the stability of coalitlonal 
arrangements. 
The type of administration formed Is s e e n a s an important Influence on 
administrative durability, with minority administrations traditionally being seen as 
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the most unstable (see Taylor & Herman. 1971). Section one will examine the 
relationship between the type of administration which forms and the length of time It 
lasts, look at the stability of initial administrations and examine the effects of 
former rulers attempting to cling on to power In the new environment. The effect of 
the political composition of an administration on durability will also be a s s e s s e d . 
Section two forms the main body of this chapter, and will examine a variety of 
numerical factors which have been alleged to affect administrative durability, 
beginning with an a s s e s s m e n t of the effects of small and pivotal groups on 
government duration. The relationship between durability and various distributions 
of sea ts will also be looked at; for example, there could be a difference In 
administrative duration when one party is close to a majority and when there are 
three 'significant' party groups on the council. The hypothesis that a greater number 
of parties means a greater turnover of administrations rece ives a critical 
examination, as does the related thesis that greater party system 'fractionalization' 
or 'fragmentation' means more unstable governments. The number of parties In a 
coalition might also affect duration, with multi-party coalitions being seen as more 
difficult to manage than two party coalitions, and this is examined. Finally in this 
section, many observers have argued that c loseness to 'minimum winning status' is 
an important determinant for duration, and this and related hypotheses are examined. 
Finally, section three examines some of the possible effects of the passage of time. 
Chapter Four has already posited a relationship between the electoral cycle of an 
authority and administrative formation; section three looks for a relationship 
between the electoral cycle and administrative duration, and also investigates the 
thesis that previous experience of hungness will be a factor in greater 
administrative duration. 
One very important hypothesis concerning coalitional duration will not be examined 
in this chapter; the ideological diversity of a coalition has been frequently cited as an 
Influence on administrative durability (from Axelrod, 1970). However, such a 
proposition involves a detailed discussion of ideological ordering which is better 
suited to Chapter Nine, where we look at local administrations in the light of formal 
coalition theory. Accordingly, the possible impact of ideology on duration is analysed 
there. 
S e c t i o n O n e : T h e Durabi l i ty of ft/linorlty A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
The most unstable form of government has usually been seen as one which is unable 
to command a legislative majority. Although, as many observers have pointed out. for 
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a number of reasons "a government can survive quite comfortably for a considerable 
period with less than 50 per cent of legislative seats'* (Budge & Keman. 1990. 
p.34). it appears at least intuitively likely that the maintenance of minority 
administrations will be more difficult than for a majority administration. Indeed. 
Strom describes minority governments as a "counter intuitive phenomenon" (1984, 
p.200). and our examination of governmental stability, therefore, begins with a look 
at the problems faced by minority administrations. 
6.1.1. T h e C o n v e n t i o n a l V iewpoint 
Coalit ion theorists have traditionally s e e n minority administrations both a s 
inherently unstable, and as an expression of a troubled political system. For example, 
for Von Beyme they represent a "crisis symptom" (1970, p.570), Taylor & Herman 
s e e their position as "precarious" (1971. p .3 l ) , and to Dodd they are "vulnerable" 
(1976, p.51). Their inability to command a legislative majority means that 
government policy runs the constant risk of being rejected by the legislature. While 
rejection of an administration's policy does not automatically entail resignation in 
most legislatures, this does not appear to be a good recipe for administrative 
stabil i ty. 
There is convincing evidence that outside the world of English local government, 
minority governments are less stable than majority governments. In a study of 12 
European democracies, Laver & Schofield found that (with the exception of Sweden) 
majority coalitions lasted considerably longer than minority governments (see 
Laver & Schofield, 1990, Table 6.2, p.152). Budge & K e m a n ' s study of 20 
countries, while noting some exceptions, also concluded that in the majority of 
political systems "minority governments are generally the shortest lived" (Budge & 
K e m a n , 1990, p.170) . Despite his general ly posit ive v iew of minority 
governments, Strom also finds that "minority governments are less durable than 
majority coalitions" (Strom. 1990. p.238). While, in a n examination of the 
allocation of policy portfolios, Austen-Smith & Banks (1990) argue that "stable 
allocations ... can exist with minority governments" (1990. p.891), the majority of 
writers agree that minority administrations are more unstable than majority 
coalitions. 
f^any students of hung British councils also agree that minority administrations are 
more unstable than other forms of government. For example, L e a c h argues that 
minority administrations in British local counci ls find government "extremely 
frustrating", and their inability to carry items put through the committee chairs 
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normally results in chairmen of the minority administration stepping down from 
office ( L e a c h . 1985. p . l7 ) . Leach argues this leads to a period of political 
instability, a view with which Blowers (1987, p.32) and Meliors (1983, p.239) 
concur. 
However, another viewpoint is that opponents might hesitate to 'bring down* an 
unsupported minority administration without offering a viable alternative. Budge & 
Laver's "viability criterion" partly explains the s u c c e s s of minority governments by 
the failure of opposition parties to present a viable alternative (1986, p.488). If 
opposition parties are reluctant to take office when they cannot be sure of getting 
their policies enacted, they will probably be unlikely to want to bring down the 
ruling minority administration and run the risk of s u c h ' irresponsibility' 
rebounding on them electorally. Some observers of hung English councils concur, 
pointing out that "the electorate is unlikely to look kindly upon those who perpetuate 
stalemate and chaos inside the council" (Meliors, 1989. p.86). If this is the c a s e , 
minority administrations may be more stable than some observers argue. In 
addition, minority administrations in hung councils are far more more likely to have 
formal status than coalition administrations (see Chapter Four, Table 4.4), which 
might also imply a greater degree of administrative stability. It certainly s e e m s 
likely that 'formal status' will be a factor in prolonging the duration of an 
administration. 
Despite these caveats, the recent research of Laver & Schofield (1990), Budge & 
Keman (1990), and Strom (1990) strongly suggest minority administrations are 
shorter-lived than majority coalitions, and the observat ions of L e a c h (1985). 
Meliors (1983) and Blowers (1987) imply the s a m e might be true of 
administrations in English local authorities. The consensus of observers of coalition 
politics, whether in European parliaments or English local councils, is that single 
party minority administrations formed without a commitment from other parties for 
further support are less stable than other forms of administration; such a 
'governmental strategy* often necessitates a change of administration before too long 
(see Leach & G a m e , 1989. pp.32-34). Even when minority party leaders reach 
agreement with political rivals, deals worked out on an ad hoc basis between party 
leaders in order to construct a legislative majority c a n be frustrated by an 
unresponsive legislature. This may be more common at local level, a s local 
politicians in England are traditionally more independent of the party line than their 
national counterparts. In majority control councils councillors usually follow an 
agreed party line (see Widdicombe. 1986. Report, p.30), but many observers argue 
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discipline is less easy to enforce in hung councils, a s "the importance of Individual 
councillors is enhanced" (Blowers, 1987, p.42). In such c i rcumstances , party 
leaders trying to maintain a minority administration may find the experience 
frustrating and unrewarding. Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
3 . 1 : M I N O R I T Y A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S A R E U N S T A B L E , A N D W I L L 
T H E R E F O R E B E S H O R T - L I V E D W H E N C O M P A R E D T O M A J O R I T Y 
C O A L I T I O N A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S . 
T a b l e 6.1: Tinne In Months of Minority a n d Majority A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
Minority Admins Majority Admins 
All Administrations 21.8 (0=64) 20.2 (n=45) 
Previous Administrations 19.7 (n=37) 19.1 (n=19) 
Current Administrations 24.5 (n=27) 20.2 (n=26) 
All Initial Administrations 27.0 (n=30) 23.9 (n=24) 
Initial Admins (completed) 23.3 (n=21) 20.8 (n=11) 
Initial Admins (extant) 34.3 (n= 9) 31.0 (n=13) 
Total=109 administrations: 64 minority, 45 majority 
The evidence indicates that hypothesis 3.1 Is incorrect. The average length of all 
administrations in hung councils is 21.1 months. As Table 6.1 shows, all minority 
administrations (including 5 minority coalitions) last 21.8 months on average, 
compared to the 20.2 months average of majority coalition administrations. 
Whatever quali f ications are made (for example , compar ing only those 
administrat ions which had been completed) T a b l e 6.1 s h o w s minority 
administrations are more durable than coalition administrations. The average time 
councils with minority administrations and councils with coalition administrations 
had been hung was almost identical, so the length of time councils had been hung was 
not a factor."* 
S o m e E x p l a n a t i o n s F o r the G r e a t e r S t a b i l i t y of M i n o r i t y 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
The finding that minority administrations last longer on average than majority 
coalition administrations is not necessarily surprising, a s English local authorities 
are steeped in a political culture which emphasises single party rule a s the 'norm' 
1 Councils which included minority administrations had been hung an average of 4.2 years, 
compared to an average of 4.1 years for councils which included majority coalition 
administrations. There was obviously some overiapping, because some councils had 
experienced both minority and coalition administrations. 
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and s e e s coalition politics as leading to, amongst other things, shady deals and a loss 
of principles. Given this view of coalition politics, a lack of trust between partners 
might lead to more frequent break-ups. Coalition politics will be intrinsically more 
difficult for participants in Engl ish local government, and while minority 
administrations may have to make more ad hoc deals to ensure a legislative majority, 
this may (paradoxically) lead to greater stability. The minority government will be 
under no illusions about their 'partner(s)' in the deal, and a consequent about face by 
an erstwhile partner will not be seen as the act of 'treachery* it might be to the 
partners in a 'coalition' administration. Budge & Keman's attempt to construct an 
integrated theory of democratic party government includes the assumption that 
governments will attempt to survive in order to carry out their policy preferences 
(Budge & Keman. 1990, Table 2.1 Assumption 2. p.34). One implication of this 
assumption is that "the less governments agree over policy, the more likely they are 
to terminate for involuntary internal reasons"; this leads to the further implication 
that "single-party governments are less likely to terminate for involuntary internal 
reasons than coalitions" (Budge & Keman, 1990, Table 2.4, Implications 5 (i) and 5 
(ii), p.51), although a s mentioned above, their research found that minority 
governments are "generally the shortest-listed" (p.170). However, this does offer a 
feasible explanation for the greater longevity of some minority administrations, and 
the idea of policy c loseness contributing to longevity is examined in detail in Chapter 
Nine (section 9.4.5.). 
Local coalitions are often legislative, with one-third involving no sharing of 
committee chairs (see Chapter Four, Table 4.7), and in such c a s e s there may be less 
pressure to keep the coalition together when disagreement ar ises. If so, this could 
help to explain the lesser average duration of coalition administrations. Connected to 
this, minority administrations are far more likely to be 'formal' (Table 4.4) , 
implying a degree of acceptance by opposing parties. This may also be helping to 
prolong most minority administrations, although as details of formal and informal 
administrative arrangements are only available for current administrations, it is 
impossible to say if formal status has an impact on administrative duration. That 
said, it appears intuitively likely to affect the length of time an administration can 
last; one Labour formal minority administration has remained in control of its 
district council for over 6 years. 
Other explanations can also seem persuasive. For example, (as section two of Chapter 
Two details) despite the official position that officers are both responsible to and 
available for information to all councillors regardless of party, the working 
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practices of English local authorities are adapted to a political and bureaucratic elite 
who effectively control the flow of policy.^ Given this, single party minority 
administrations will fit the working practices of most councils more easily than 
coalitions of parl ies, despite the difficulties minority administrations present to 
decision making. When hungness is seen as a hopefully temporary phenomenon, 
forming a minority administration might seem to make more s e n s e ; why make deals 
with long term rivals if elections will restore the status quo in 12 months time?3 K 
elections do not bring a majority for one party, minority administrations may then 
become the new status quo. This may partly explain the longevity of minority 
administrations. 
6 . 1 . 2 . T h e S t a b i l i t y of In i t i a l f^ inor i ty A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s In the 
C o u n t i e s 
Single party minority administrations may even have their attractions when 
hungness will last, barring a ser ies of by-elections, for 4 years . At a time of 
apparent chaos , single party minority administrations may seem a reassuring link 
with previous practices. This may explain the otherwise puzzling phenomenon 
observed by Leach & Stewart of a general readiness by parties in the hung counties 
(with the exception of a few Labour groups) to assume minority control at the onset 
of hungness without even a majority in committee (Leach & Stewart. 1985, p.6). 
This immediate response might also indicate a naivety concerning the realities of 
governing in a hung situation, and therefore it might be expected that the initial 
minority administrations formed in the counties would last for a much shorter time 
than the norm. As well as this, Leach argues that on the collapse of the initial 
minority administration, the second largest party may fill the "vacuum" ( L e a c h , 
1985. p.17). 
Neither of these proposals is supported by the evidence. In the 18 hung counties in 
this survey, there were 7 examples of initial minority administrations forming and 
the average duration was 32.9 months, compared to the 25.6 months average 
duration of the initial coalition administrations formed. Two initial minority 
administrations (one Conservative and one S L D ) were still ruling after more than 3 
years of hungness. This does not indicate a predilection for instability among initial 
minority administrations. Likewise, while in 2 of these 7 c a s e s the second largest 
2 Temple (1991, pp.27-31) sums up the general findings concerning power in majority 
control councils. 
^ Supporting this point, Table 4.5 (Chapter Four) shows single party minority 
administrations are far more common in councils holding yearly electrons. 
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party took minority control on the breakdown of the initial minority administration, 
this is hardly surprising, and other outcomes (for example, a coalition of two non-
administration parties) were just as likely. 
6 .1 .3 . T h e Minority A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of F o r m e r R u l e r s a n d Stab i l i ty 
One situation where such an 'anti-administration* coalition might be more readily 
formed is when former rulers attempt to maintain control of the council . The 
findings d i s c u s s e d in section three of Chapter Five showed that, contrary to 
expectations, former rulers were neither excluded from coalitions in their former 
'kingdoms' nor prevented from forming minority administrations. However, their 
involvement in administrations does decline slightly over time and this w a s 
attributed to the failure of the minority administrations they initially formed. There 
are now far fewer single party minority administrations run by former rulers than 
was initially the case (see Table 5.5, Chapter Five). There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. As Leach points out: 
"parties which have become accustomed to control with a clear majority 
may expect to continue In power on a minority basis (particularly if they 
are the largest single party) without recognising that different political 
style and skills are required in the new situation. Indeed, inexperience of 
hungness can lead to errors of judgement or tactics on the part of the 
party in this position which weaken their credibility and their ability to 
sustain a minority administration over time" (Leach . 1985, p.16). 
Carter's observations on the "bitterness" between former rulers and other parties, 
perhaps inevitable after years of often "elitist and arrogant rule" (Carter, 1986, 
p.11), support the idea that former rulers will encounter fierce opposition in any 
attempt to maintain sole control. In such c a s e s , electoral rivals night be more 
prepared to bury differences, particularly a s Instability and frustration (two 
qualities often associated with hung authoritiesi) are likely to be more prevalent 
when 'traditional rulers' attempt to carry on governing with a minority after they 
have been 'rejected' by the electorate. If former opposition parties are willing to co-
operate to remove long term rulers from power (as also argued by. for example. 
Stewart, 1985, p.5; Mellors, 1989, p.241) it certainly appears likely that former 
rulers will find it difficult to maintain their hold on power for any length of time. If 
this is so, and given Leach's observations above, it Is proposed that: 
3 .2: W H E R E T R A D I T I O N A L R U L E R S FORfUl A MINORITY A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 
IN N E W L Y HUNG C O U N C I L S . T H A T A D M I N I S T R A T I O N W I L L B E S H O R T -
L I V E D . 
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Despite the wealth of prima facie support for the proposition, hypothesis 3.2 Is not 
backed by the evidence of this survey. Traditional rulers formed an initial minority 
administration in 20 of the 62 local authorities in our sample, and the average time 
those administrations lasted was 27.4 months, considerably above the norm for all 
administrat ions (21.1 months) and also above the norm for all Initial 
administrations (25.9 months). In four c a s e s the former rulers were still In power, 
including one c a s e where a Labour minority administration had ruled for over 6 
years . These results indicate that, far from being unstable, administrations formed 
by traditional rulers are more stable on average than other forms of administration. 
Of course, there were a number of instances where minority administrations formed 
by traditional rulers were short-lived, but there were more examples where they 
lasted a considerable time. However, there w a s a difference in longevity of 
administration between the two main parties. 
6 .1 .4 . T h e P a r t y P o l i t i c a l C o m p o s i t i o n of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L o n g e v i t y 
In the 16 c a s e s where Conservative former rulers had formed an initial minority 
administration, the average time of those administrations was 25.7 months; In the 4 
Labour c a s e s the average administration time was 33.5 months. The greater length of 
Labour minority administrations in administrations they had formerly ruled may 
Indicate that the S L D finds it harder to come to an agreement with Conservatives to 
remove Labour than vice versa."* However, a s the results shown in Chapter Five 
Indicate, in contrast to the observations of many observers (for example. Carter, 
1986. Mellors, 1989) the S L D Is just as likely to come to an arrangement with 
Conservatives as Labour, although the evidence indicates the S L D find it harder to 
maintain agreements with Conservatives than they do with Labour. 
Table 6.2 lists the average time of administrations by political composition.^ Quite 
cleariy. Conservat ive /SLD coalitions are short lived compared to Labour/ S L D 
^ Budge & Keman find that administrations with a "socialist" Input last longer than those 
with a "bourgeois" input, perhaps because "divisions between Social Democrats and Left 
Socialists will be of degree rather than direction" (Budge & Keman, 1990, pp.173-174). 
Although they lack precise enough information to come to clear conclusions, this does offer 
another possible reason for the greater longevity of administrations with a Labour input 
compared to those with a Conservative imput (with the exception of Conservative/ 
Independent coalitions, as Table 6.2 shows). 
5|n order to prevent misrepresentation arrangements with only one or two examples are 
excluded. For example, the average time of 37 months for 'all-party* administrations 
(Conservative/ Labour/ SLD/ Independent), which implies a degree of stability in such 
arrangements, appears less significant when one realises the two cases we have 
information on time for lasted the two extremes of 13 and 61 months. 
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coalitions, which appears to support Mellors (1989. p.107) in his assessment of a 
greater c l o s e n e s s between Labour and S L D . Indeed. C o n s e r v a t i v e / S L D 
administrations are even shorter lived than periods of 'no administration' (which 
average 15.6 months), which certainly indicates a high degree of volatility. 
However, the greater longevity of Labour/SLD administrations may merely indicate 
further support for the proposal in Chapter Five that Labour has little choice but to 
'like the S L D or lump them'; if this is the c a s e , then the longevity of Labour /SLD 
coalitions compared to Consen/at ive /SLD coalitions can be easily explained. The 
relative longevity of S L D minority administrations can also be explained by this, a s 
Labour will again have little choice ideologically other than support the S L D or lose 
influence.^ 
T a b l e 6.2: A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Stabi l i ty By Po l i t i ca l C o m p o s i t i o n 
Political Composition Number of Admins Average Duration 
(months) 
Conservative 22 21.0 
Labour 19 22.5 
SLD 14 26.6 
Conservative/Independent 7 28.1 
Conservative/SLD 1 1 15.3 
Labour/SLD 12 19.9 
No Administration 9 15.6 
Table 6.2 also indicates that administrations formed by Labour or Conservative 
former rulers are far longer lasting than administrations formed by these parties in 
councils which they did not formerly rule. The average time of former rulers 
administrations of 27.4 months is far above the average for all Labour (22.5 
months) or Conservat ive (21.0 months) minority administrations, indicating 
former rulers find it easier to rule. The most likely explanation for this could be 
that their knowledge of running a council is greater and their relationship with 
officers will necessarily be much closer.^ Former opposition parties attempting to 
rule alone may well find the experience especially dispiriting. Not only do they lack 
political experience, they have to acquire the knowledge of how to run the council at 
6 Secliont two (below) explores this proposition further. 
^ However, former rulers tended still to be the largest single group, and it may be that the 
electoral result has been interpreted in their favour; if so, their greater longevity would be 
expected. However, despite the Conservatives being the biggest group in Devon, the other 
groups were determined they should not continue in power. 
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the very time it Is most difficult to run. Perhaps it is not surprising that such 
minority administrations are relatively short-lived. What is also unsurprising is 
the relative longevity of Conservative/ Independent administrations (28.1 months). 
A s previous chapters have argued these two groups will generally be ideologically 
close, and agreement between them will be much easier than for other groups. 
Sect ion One has demonstrated that, contrary to most expectat ions, minority 
administrations are more durable than majority administrations in hung councils 
and that former rulers can also continue ruling alone for long periods despite their 
lack of a majority. Previous chapters have indicated that whether single party 
minority administrations or coalitions of parties assume control appears to be 
influenced by certain arithmetical factors. Section two will now examine whether 
such variables are also affecting the durability of the administrations which form in 
hung councils. 
S e c t i o n T w o : T h e Importance of Numbers 
A number of arithmetical variables have been cited a s possible contributions to 
administrative durability. The first, and most far-reaching for formal theorists, is 
the connection that has been made between minimal winning status and durability, 
most famously by Dodd (1976). A correlation has also been posited between 
durability, and both the number of parties in a political system (e.g.. Blondel, 
1968) and the number of parties in a particular administration (e.g., Sanders & 
Herman, 1977). Chapter Four has Indicated that the level of •fractionalization* of the 
party system may influence the type of administration forming, and studies have 
suggested a relationship between fractionalization and administrative durability (for 
example , Laasko & Taagepura , 1979) . T h e s e factors have rece ived little 
consideration in the largely empirical studies of hung councils in Britain. Before 
assess ing their influence on administrative stability, it is proposed to examine those 
arithmetical factors which have been especial ly noted to affect administrative 
durability by observers of British hung councils; these are all connected with the 
distribution of seats between the parties. 
6 .2 .1 . T h e Impact of E l e c t o r a l Ar i thmet ic o n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Stabi l i ty 
Some of the effects of electoral arithmetic on coalition formation have been shown in 
the previous two chapters. Chapter Four demonstrates a relationship between 
electoral arithmetic and the administrative arrangements which form in hung 
councils; coalitions are more likely to occur when no 'near-winner* emerges, and 
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when one party is close to a majority it is more likely to try and rule alone. In 
addition to this. Chapter Five notes a relationship between S L D seat share and either 
'no administration' or an 'all-party' administration forming. T h e s e chapters also 
offered hints of a relationship between the number of seats held by party groups and 
the stability of administrations; for example, more administrations had formed in 
councils where the S L D was a small group than in those where it held a significant 
number of seats, indicating a possible relationship between small S L D groups and 
administrative instability. The relationship between electoral arithmetic and 
stability will now be examined, beginning with a look at the S L D , which, for reasons 
of both ideological position and general smallness of group, has found itself most 
likely to be accused of undermining administrative stability. 
T h e •Oppor tun is t i c ' S L D : A n Unfair C r i t i c i s m ? 
Severa l observers maintain the S L D is more likely to switch support in hung 
councils than other party groups. For example. Blowers argues that small Alliance 
groups tend to behave in an opportunist way, "favouring whichever side appears to 
offer greatest electoral advantage" (Blowers, 1987. p.42), and L e a c h notes a 
tendency for the Liberals to switch support at crucial junctures in order to increase 
their influence and demonstrate independence (Leach. 1985. p.16). Certainly, S L D 
advice to its councillors in hung authorities has tended in the past to lay as much 
emphasis, if not more, on obtaining the maximum benefit from policy concessions a s 
it has to ensuring stability. As Clay puts it, in a handbook for Liberal councillors in 
hung councils: 
"while Liberals will try to be responsible politicians and to ensure that 
the government of the area continues as coherently a s possible this has to 
be set against the overall political objective [control of the council]. For 
much of the time these aims will not conflict but there will be 'crunch' 
moments, particularly when the other parties try to put pressure on you. 
Often they will demand that you are 'responsible' when they are not being 
so themselves - don't be taken in by this" (Clay, 1982, p.4). 
S u c h claims of 'irresponsibility', and the widespread feeling found by some 
observers that "the Alliance cannot be taken too seriously" (Leach & G a m e . 1989. 
p.34) may contribute to views of the S L D as 'opportunistic*. However, it may be that 
S L D groups are being unfairly maligned by comments on their opportunistic nature, 
and that any instability observed could be caused by the arithmetic of the situation 
rather than by the tactics of the S L D . In other words, any small party group wielding 
influence 'beyond its size' may cause instability. However, while Mellors notes that 
"constantly regrouping voting coalitions" could benefit any smaller parties in hung 
authorities, he maintains the Liberals have been "especially adroit" at ensuring 
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maximum policy payoffs from their voting strength (Meliors. 1983. pp.241-242). 
It is therefore proposed that: 
3 .3 : IN H U N G A U T H O R I T I E S W H E R E S M A L L S L D G R O U P S ( I . E . L E S S 
THAN 20 P E R C E N T O F T H E C O U N C I L ) H O L D T H E B A L A N C E O F P O W E R . 
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S W I L L T E N D T O B E U N S T A B L E . 
The evidence strongly supports this proposition. There are 12 local authorities 
where S L D groups are both small and pivotal, and 32 administrations have ruled 
since the 12 became hung (they had been hung an average of 49 months, close to the 
overall average of 50.4 months). The average time of those 32 administrations is 
18.4 months, less than the norm of 21.1 months. To further illustrate the point, in 
those authorities where the S L D seat share was over 20 percent the average time of 
all administrations was 25.7 months (see Table 6.3 below for details). 
It was noted above that small S L D groups might be being 'unfairly maligned' by the 
comments about their opportunism, and that any small and pivotal group will 
generate administrative uncertainty. However, in the 6 local authorities where 
another party group is both small and pivotal.^ the initial administration was still 
in place. The average time of both hungness and administrations was therefore the 
same. 35.0 months; although these authorities had been hung for a comparatively 
short time, the administrative duration was far above the norm. This appears to 
support the proposition that S L D groups are far more likely to behave 
opportunistically than other small groups. However, the longevity of administrations 
where Labour is small and pivotal is almost certainly the result of Labour's 
ideological position rather than a more 'responsible attitude' to government; Labour 
has less choice of partner. 
Aga in - L a b o u r H a s Little C h o i c e of Partner 
As would be expected from the arguments put fonward in Chapter Five to explain 
Labour's favourite choice of coalition partner and the arguments advanced in Section 
One of this chapter to explain the greater longevity of L a b o u r / S L D coalitions 
compared to Conserva t ive /SLD coalitions, the S L D is the beneficiary of the 
ideological constraints imposed on Labour. In ail 5 c a s e s where Labour is small and 
pivotal there is an S L D minority administration in place. In e a c h c a s e the S L D 
minority administration had been in power for the duration of hungness (ranging 
from 13 months to 49 months), and was presumably able to remain in power for so 
long because of tacit Labour support (in none of these c a s e s were Labour rewarded 
® In 5 cases Labour is pivotal and in one case a Conservative group is pivotal. 
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with committee chairs) . That said, there is little evidence for tacit Labour /SLD 
arrangements; in only one case was there evidence of policy deals, minor concessions 
In transport policy being agreed between the two parties. However, party leaders 
were more likely to claim that concess ions had been obtained than to admit to 
granting them, making such tacit deals hard to discover.^ In the single authority 
where the Conservat ives are small and pivotal there is no Labour group, and a 
Conservative / large Independent group coalition had remained in power for the 
duration of hungness at the expense of a large S L D group. The 'natural coalition' of 
Conservat ives and Independents accounts for this stability; as Table 6.2 shows. 
Conservat ive / Independent coalitions are longer lasting than other two-party 
coalitions. 
From these results, a feasible relationship could be proposed between small and 
pivotal Labour groups and administrative stability, at least when there are large S L D 
and Conservative groups in the hung council; "where there is a small and pivotal 
Labour group, a stable S L D minority administration will form" appears, from the 
admittedly small number of c a s e s considered here, to be a highly plausible maxim. 
The results of this research tend to support the general thesis that the existence of 
small S L D groups will tend to generate administrative instability. Observers of hung 
councils have noted that It is not only small groups which will affect administrative 
stability. A number of other factors related to party size have been alleged to affect 
stability in English local government, and these will now be examined. 
6.2.2. T h e E f f e c t s of S e a t Dist r ibut ion on Admin is t ra t i ve Stabi l i ty 
It has been suggested that the proportion of seats held by the parties Is a significant 
Influence on the durability of administrations in hung councils. L e a c h & Stewart 
argue that if each of the three major parties has a significant proportion of seats and 
neither Is likely to obtain a majority in the foreseeable future, more stable "inter-
party accommodations" will be likely to exist (Leach & Stewart. 1988. p.52). Leach 
also proposed that where all three groups had roughly the same number of seats , 
stability was more likely than where the third party was small and held the balance 
of power (Leach . 1985. p.16). Inter-party accommodations do not necessar i ly 
entail a coalition; it may be that the agreement is to enable one party to rule alone 
for a specified time. However, such 'stable inter-party accommodations' also suggest 
that any coalition arrangements which are reached might be more durable. 
Therefore, It would be expected that: 
^ Chapter Nine deals with policy payoffs in more detail. 
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3.4: S T A B L E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E A R R A N G E M E N T S A R E M O R E L I K E L Y IN 
T H O S E A U T H O R I T I E S W H E R E A L L T H R E E M A J O R P A R T I E S H A V E A 
S I G N I F I C A N T P R O P O R T I O N ( I .E . O V E R 20%) O F C O U N C I L S E A T S . 
3 .5: C O A L I T I O N S IN A U T H O R I T I E S W H E R E A L L T H R E E M A J O R P A R T I E S 
H A V E A S I G N I F I C A N T P R O P O R T I O N O F C O U N C I L S E A T S W I L L B E L O N G E R 
L A S T I N G THAN C O A L I T I O N S IN O T H E R A U T H O R I T I E S . 
Table 6.3 (below) details the results of testing hypothesis 3.4; the table also 
examines administrative stability when (a) no party is c lose to a majority, (b) 
when one party is close to a majority, (c) the S L D is small and pivotal, (d) one 
party (Including the S L D ) is small and pivotal, and (e) where the S L D has over 20 
percent of the council seats. Obviously, there is some overlapping of these categories. 
T a b l e 6.3: Admin is t ra t i ve Durat ion By C o u n c i l S e a t D is t r ibut ion 
Distribution of Seats Time In Months 
(n= number of councils) Average Time Average Time 
Hung Admins 
Three Parties Over 20% (n=17) 52.4 19.9 
No Party Close To Majority (n=24) 63.6 26.5 
One Party Close To Majority (n=38)' 45.7 18.7 
One Party Small & Pivotal 44.3 21.0 
SLD Small & Pivotal (n=12) 49.0 18.4 
SLD Over 20% (n=33) 48.7 25.7 
Overall Averages (n=62) 50.4 21.1 
In 5 of these 38 councils, two parties are both close to a majority with each 
having over 45% of the council seats. 
At first sight (as Table 6.3 indicates) neither of the above hypotheses is supported 
by the findings of this research. The average time of administrations in councils 
where all parties have a substantial number of seats is 19.9 months, and there is no 
difference in time between coalition administrations and single party minority 
administrations. It could be proposed that in these authorities each of the three 
parties might feel It has a 'right to rule', and under such conditions instability might 
therefore be expected. However. Leach & Stewart offered the qualification that the 
stability of 'inter-party accommodations' would be enhanced if no party was likely to 
gain a majority in the near future-(1988, p.52). In 6 of the 17 c a s e s where three 
parties had a significant number of seats one party was close to a majority, and 
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would therefore be looking towards forming a majority administration after the next 
election; such a hope would be less likely to be held by parties In councils where no 
party was close to a majority. 
If we examine the 11 councils where all three parties held over 20 percent of the 
sea ts but none was close to a majority, there is support for Leach & Stewart's 
hypothesis. The average time of administrations is 22.3 months, above the average, 
and the average time of coalitions in these authorities is 27.8 months, although the 
sample is small Gust 5 of the 16 administrations we have information on time for 
are coalitions). Whatever, Leach & Stewart's observations are confirmed by this 
evidence; other expectations were generally confounded. 
Contrary to expectations, where one party is small and pivotal administrations last 
21 months on average, very close to the overall average of 21.1 months, and longer 
than where all three parties had a significant number of sea ts . T h e s e results 
somewhat contradict the findings of Laver & Schofield (1990) on the impact of the 
bargaining environment on stability. They found that administrations in bipolar 
s y s t e m s ^ o were much longer lasting than those in multipolar sys tems, which 
councils with three significant party groups would be (Laver & Schofield. 1990. 
Table 6.5. p.159). However, the longevity of administrations in councils with a 
small and pivotal third party is (as discussed above) largely due to the longevity of 
the 6 administrations in the authorities where Labour or Conservative are small and 
pivotal. Also, Laver & Schofield's sample of 'bipolar systems' includes systems 
where the third small party is not pivotal, making comparison problematic. 
Administrations also last a shorter time than the norm when one party is close to a 
majority. It is difficult to find a convincing reason for this, especially when it is 
considered that single party administrations (which a s section one details last longer 
than coalition administrations) are more common in these authorities; therefore, 
one would expect to find administrations lasted longer when one party was close to a 
legislative majority. Perhaps the best explanation for the relative instability of 
administrations in such councils is that actors may feel the council is more likely to 
return to single party minority control sooner than other categories, either a s the 
result of the next election or one or two by-elections. Such a situation may mean 
politicians are reluctant to enter into agreements. 
^ ^ Bipolar systems were defined as "effectively 'two-and-a-half party systems with two 
large parties and a much smaller one which may nevertheless hold the balance of power' 
(Laver & Schofield. 1990. p.1l4). 
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Table 6.3 does detail one category in which the average administration is much 
longer lasting than the norm. Administrations in authorities where no party is close 
to a majority last an average of 26.5 months. It may be the greater time these 
councils have been hung (63.6 months compared to the overall average of 50.4 
months) has enabled more stable administrative arrangements to emerge. However, 
this durability may well be due to the fact that no party is close to a majority. The 
actors involved will have to view the hung situation as a more permanent feature, a s 
by-elections are unlikely to lead to a return to the 'normality' of one party majority 
ru le . 
The distribution of legislative seats has has been shown to have some influence on the 
durability of administrations, although attaching convincing reasons for some of the 
unexpected findings is difficult. Arithmetical features unconnected with electoral 
arithmetic have also been cited as an influence on stability, and such factors 
constitute our next area of concern, commencing with a look at the effect of the 
number of parties in the political system on stability. 
6 .2.3. Mult iparty S y s t e m s A n d Stab i l i ty 
Traditionally, multi-party s y s t e m s have been a s s u m e d to make coalition 
maintenance more difficult (see Laver & Schof ie ld. 1990, p.147). Coalition 
stability is assumed to be more difficult in multi-party systems because of the 
variety of alternatives actors are presented with; if a party is not happy with the 
reward from its participation in government there is a s s u m e d to be a higher 
probability it can form a new coalition with another party or parties. If "the 
stability of cabinets is appropriately modelled as a problem of individual decision-
making under uncertainty" (Browne, Frendreis & Gleiber. 1984. p.191) then 
factors increasing uncertainty will affect stability, and the greater the possibility of 
alternative coalitions forming, the greater the uncertainty. A lso , multi-party 
systems could mean that multi-parly coalitions are formed more often, and the more 
partners there are the more difficult it becomes to find policies acceptable to all 
coalition actors (the stability of multi-party coalitions is examined later in this 
chapter ) . 
Laasko & Taagepura (1979) show some disagreement with the general thesis that 
governmental instability is related to the size of the party system. Although they note 
that instability "may or may not be correlated" with fluctuation in the "effective 
number of parties" (relating to both the number of parties and their comparative 
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weights), they argue that "it certainly is not merely correlated with the mere 
effective number of parlies in our sample" (Laasko & Taagepura, 1979. 
However, despite some caveats. Laver & Schofield found "very clear evidence ... that 
countries with bigger party systems have less stable cabinets" (Laver & Schofield, 
1990. p.149). Therefore, It is proposed that: 
3.6: T H E G R E A T E R T H E N U M B E R O F P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S , T H E G R E A T E R 
T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E I N S T A B I L I T Y . 
In direct contrast to the findings of Laver & Schofield (1990).12 this research 
strongly suggests that the more parties there are in an authority the more likely it 
Is that administrations will be long lasting (see Table 6.4 below). Although the 
numbers of administrations in councils with 5 or 6 parties is small, and therefore 
the correlation may be suspect when applied to these councils, the relationship 
appears to be quite clearly demonstrated in the differences between councils with 3 
or 4 parties. However, there was a clear discrepancy in the average time these 
groups had been hung, which has almost certainly influenced the figures. The far 
shorter average time which councils with 3 parties had been hung (34 months) 
compared to councils with 4 parties, which had been hung an average of 20 months 
longer (54 months), will mean that current administrative arrangements will have 
had less time to develop. This appears to throw doubt on the correlation observed. 
T a b l e 6.4: Admin is t ra t ive Durat ion B y S i z e of Party S y s t e m 
Average Time in Months 
No of No. of No. of Time All Completed Coalition 
Parties Councils Admins Hung Admins Admins Admins 
Three 1 6 31 34.0 17.6 11.2(n=15) 17.3 (n=9) 
Four 34 70 54.0 22.3 21.3(n=36) 18.5(n=29) 
Five 9 13 77.3 44.8 26.0 (n=.1) 31.5 (n=5) 
Six 3 7 45.0 19.3 30.0 (n=4) 19.3 (n=7) 
11 Laver & Schofield found that "cabinet duration was more likely to rise than to fall when 
the size of the party system increased ... [suggesting) ... the operation of other factors that 
change from country to country and are related both to cabinet stability and to the size of 
the party system" (1990, p.149). 
12 It must be admitted that Laver & Schofield's examination-covered a number of systems 
with an effective number of parties ranging from an average of 2.2 to 5.8 parties, a far 
greater range and scope than this analysis, where the great majority of 'local systems* 
were of either 3 or 4 parties. 
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However, if we delete all those current administrations from the sample which have 
been hung 2 years or l e s s , we still find a significant difference in the average 
administrative duration. The average administration in councils with 3 parties is 
then 21.0 months, compared to an average of 25.8 months in councils with 4 parties. 
Therefore, It appears plausible to suggest that, at the very least, administrations 
last longer In authorities with 4 parties than in authorities with 3 parties. Not only 
that, but coalitions are also likely to last longer in authorities with 4 parties than 
with 3 parties, 18.5 months compared to 17.3 months. 
Quite why administrations last longer in multi-party s y s t e m s Is difficult to 
understand, as this appears counter-intuitive. Also, percentage-wise, there are 
more single party administrations in three-party s y s t e m s than multi-party 
sys tems which alone should have increased the average duration; minority 
administrations usually last longer than majority administrations (see Table 6.1). 
However, minority administrations are relatively unstable in three-party sys tems, 
lasting only 18.7 months on average compared to the 25.6 months average of single 
party minority administrations in four-party systems. It may be that when there 
are only three parlies in a system, d iscussions are much easier to effect, and 
contrary to received wisdom, alternatives may be easier to arrange than in a multi-
party system. E a c h party only needs to reach agreement with one other party to 
bring down an administration or improve its share of the 'reward' of participation in 
a winning coalition. 
However, the dominant reason may well be the relationship between time hung and 
c l o s e n e s s to a majority. Compared to four and more party councils, three party 
councils had experienced hungness for only a short period. 34 months on average, 
and memories of single party control are more recent. Perhaps more importantly, 
one party was close to a majority in 15 of the 16 three-party systems, and Table 
6.3 has already detailed the relative instability of administrations where one party 
is close to overall control. The number of parties is also a crude measure of 'party 
system size ' , and a more sophisticated measure may well illustrate the expected 
relationship between party system size and instability. Therefore, Rae 's index of 
party system fractionalization will now be utilised to examine this possibility. 
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6.2.4. L e v e l s of F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S tab i l i ty 
While the number of parties in the council has not produced the expected effect on 
administrative durability, it may be that a more subtle measure of party system size 
is needed. A 'six-party system' may. in reality, contain only one significant party, 
the remaining five holding only a handful of seats , while In a 'three-party system* 
all the parties may be significant actors. As d i s c u s s e d in Chapter Four when 
assess ing the impact of party system fractionalization on administrative formation, 
Laver & Schofield's assessment of the effects of party system size on stability was 
conducted In terms of "the effective number of parties'* (see Laver & Schofield, 
1990. pp.116-117) from a measure put forward by Laasko & Taagepura (1979). 
Laver & Schofield found a strong correlation between instability and 'multipolar* 
systems. They also suggested that the 'events* approach of Browne, Frendreis & 
Gleiber (1984), which makes the general assumption that government downfall is 
caused by random and unpredictable "critical events" (Browne et al, 1984. p.628), 
compliments the "bargaining system stability" approach: 
"The combined approach suggests that coalition cabinets exist in a 
bargaining environment that is continually changing in unpredictable 
ways. These changes may be produced by the random events that are liable 
to occur in any social environment. Some bargaining systems (those we 
have called multipolar systems) are more likely to be disturbed by such 
changes than others; they are thus inherently more unstable** (Laver & 
Schofieid, 1990, p.160). 
Such systems are more unstable because the members of coalitions in multipolar 
systems are more likely to find themselves "in a situation in which they suddenly 
develop incentives to unscramble the deal that forms the fundamental basis of the 
coalition" (Laver & Schofield, 1990, p.160). A model that synthesises the 'events' 
and 'attributes' approaches has been produced, reporting that the higher the degree of 
fragmentation and polarisation, the less durable the government (King. Alt. Burns & 
Laver, forthcoming, see Laver & Schofield, 1990, p.161). 
Despite the reported s u c c e s s of the above models,^^ it is proposed to examine the 
relationship between the 'effective' size off party systems using R a e ' s 'index of 
fractionalization' (1967). Rae 's index has already been used, with some interesting 
findings, in an examination of administrative formation (see Chapter Four), and this 
measure will again be used a s a less subjective index than (for example) the 
^3 Although as noted in the opening chapter, Strom, 1988, is highly critical of the approach 
of Browne, et at (see section 1.3.3). 
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unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar categories adopted by Laver & Schofield in their 
"bargaining system stability approach" (1990, p.160). 
If the findings of previous observers are supported, it would be expected that the 
greater the degree of fractionalization, the more difficult it would be to maintain the 
administration, especially when a coalition administration is in place (see R a e , 
1967, pp. 62-63). Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
3.7: T H E G R E A T E R T H E INDEX O F P A R T Y S Y S T E M F R A C T I O N A L I Z A T I O N . 
T H E L E S S D U R A B L E T H E ADMINISTRATION W I L L B E . 
3.8: T H E G R E A T E R T H E INDEX O F P A R T Y S Y S T E M F R A C T I O N A L I Z A T I O N , 
T H E L E S S D U R A B L E C O A L I T I O N ADMIN ISTRATIONS W I L L B E . 
Table 6.5 details administrative duration by the degree of party sys tem 
fractionalization, and it appears that Hypothesis 3.7 is not supported by the 
evidence. ' '^ If anything, the reverse appears to be the c a s e , although the differences 
in duration are not great. Perhaps party system fractionalization is not an influence 
on English local government administrations, although, as shown earlier in this 
section, other 'numerical' factors, such as the c loseness of one party to an overall 
majority, do appear to have an effect on administrative duration. 
T a b l e 6.5: Admin is t ra t i ve Durat ion B y Party S y s t e m 
F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
Party System Average Duration in Months 
Fractionalizalion All Administrations Coalition Admins 
Low (n=37) 20.4 14.0 (n=11) 
Medium (n=44) 19.3 18.7 (n=12) 
High (n=40) 22.9 28.3 (n=11) 
As noted above. Laver & Schofield (1990) suggest that coalition administrations in 
'multipolar' systems will be less durable because the 'bargaining environment' is 
frequently changing in unpredictable ways. Therefore, given the similarity of the 
indices of 'high fractionalization' and 'multi-polarity', we would expect to find a 
relationship between coalition durability and party system fractionalization, a s 
hypothesis 3.8 predicts. However, as Table 6.5 shows, the more fractionalized the 
party system is, the longer the average length of coalition administrations. While 
^^The same criteria as those detailed in Chapter Four (see section ) were used to 
categorise party systems as 'low*, 'medium*, and 'high' fractionalization. 
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systems with high fraclionalization had generally been hung for longer than systems 
with low fractionalization, this can only partially explain the difference. Also, 
coalitions (and under and over sized coalitions have been excluded from this test of 
hypothesis 3.8) were very evenly distributed between the three categories of system 
fractionalization. so it is less likely to be the c a s e that a few unusual c a s e s are 
skewing the result. Such an unexpected (and again, counter-intuitive) result is not 
easy to explain. 
Party sys tem fractionalization does not s e e m to offer an explanation for 
administrative durability in English local government, as it certainly goes against 
all previous observers to argue that the more fractionalized the system Is, the more 
durable an administration will be. As shown above, studies of European party 
systems have consistently found a link between 'fragmentation* and durability. Again, 
it must be pointed out that English local councils have a different history in regard to 
coalition politics and different institutional and organisational structures to 
European national legislatures which will probably be greater influences on local 
political behaviour than the number and weight of the parties themselves. In other 
words, explanations culled from sys tems with a history of coal i t ions, and 
organisational structures adapted to coalition politics, may be lacking when applied 
to hung councils. More specific local factors may be accounting for the variance 
shown in Table 6.5. 
Other numerical factors may have more relevance to coalition bargaining and 
maintenance whatever the system, and one that intuitively appears likely to affect 
the durability of a coalition will now be examined. 
6.2.5. T h e In f luence of the ' B a r g a i n i n g Propos i t ion* 
A numerical factor which might affect stability is the number of parties involved in 
the coalition. Leiserson's (1968) 'bargaining proposition' suggests that the fewer 
parties there are in a proposed coalition, the easier it is to reach agreement; 
Leiserson therefore proposes that two-party coalitions are likelier to form than 
three-party coalitions, and so on (Leiserson, 1968, pp.70-87)."'5 |f bargaining is 
easier the fewer parties there are . it appears intuitively likely that coalition 
maintenance will be easier the fewer parties there are, a s the compromises 
necessary for coalition maintenance should be easier to make when there are fewer 
^^See Chapter One. 1.2.2. for an assessment of bargaining theory. Its proposition 
regarding formation is briefly considered in Chapter Nine when testing theories of coalition 
formation. 
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partners to consult, an argument put forward by Rae (1967, p.63). There Is 
support for this from observers of hung governments. Sanders & Herman (1977) 
argue that the fewer parties there are in a coalition, the longer it will last (Sanders 
& Herman, 1977. p.358). For Warwick also, the number of parties is a "significant 
influence" on coalitional duration, with the fewer the parties the longer the coalition 
(Warwick, 1979, pp.469-474) . Lijphart (1984b) lends further support to this 
argument. Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
3.9: T H E F E W E R P A R T I E S T H E R E A R E IN A C O A L I T I O N . T H E L O N G E R IT 
W I L L L A S T . 
There is some support for the hypothesis, as Table 6.6 (below) indicates, although 
the small numbers of local coalitions which have more than two partners means any 
conclusion can be considered as no more than tentative. The average time of all two-
party administrations (21.1 months) is exactly the same a s the average for all 
administrations in hung councils. The average time d e c r e a s e s sharply for three-
party administrations, such coalitions lasting for only 13.1 months on average. The 
higher average duration of multi-party coalitions (21.8 months), which appears to 
contradict the proposition, is mainly because of the long duration of one of the 2 
extant 'all-party' administrations in the small sample of 4 administrations, which 
has so far lasted 61 months. 
T a b l e 6.6: Admin is t ra t i ve Durat ion By Number of P a r t i e s 
in C o a l i t i o n 
Time in Months 
Parties in Coalition 
(n=number of coalitions) 
Two (n=33) 
Three (n=:9) 
Four/Five (n=4) 
Administrations 
21.1 
13.1 
21.8 
Completed 
Administrations 
20.3 (n=16) 
16.0 (n=3) 
12.0 (n=1) 
Of the 46 coalitions for which we have information on duration. 33 (71.7 percent) 
are two-party coalitions while only 9 (19.6 percent) are three-party coalitions, 
making comparison problematic; there are too few three-party coalitions to come to 
clear conclusions (offering some preliminary support for Le iserson 's 'bargaining 
proposition'). It does appear that coalitions last longer the fewer partners there are. 
although another factor may be contributing to the relative instability of multi-
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party coal i t ions. They are obviously more likely to be 'surplus majority 
governments', and the general view of theorists is that surplus majority coalitions 
are relatively short-lived, as the possibility of alternative winning (and more 
minimal) coalitions among the members of the surplus majority coalition adds an 
extra element of instability (see Laver & Schofield, 1990. p.151). Coalitions which 
are 'minimal winning' have normally been seen as the most stable form of coalition 
administration. That proposition will now be examined. 
6.2.6. 'Minimal* a n d 'IVtinimum' W i n n i n g S t a t u s a n d Dura t ion 
As d iscussed in more detail in Chapter One, minimal winning coalitions are coalitions 
which will be rendered 'losing' if they lose one of their members. The minimal 
winning criterion (from the work of Von Neumann & Morgenstern. 1945) is the 
most exhaustively tested proposition in coalition theory, and its predictive failures, 
particularly the inability to account for the large number of minority and over-
sized governments which form in the 'real world' of coalition politics, are often cited 
as evidence of the inadequacy of formal theory (see Browne, 1982. pp.336-344, 
and Pridham, passim). However, as Laver & Schofield note, its performance is often 
misrepresented. While it is more often wrong than right, being successfu l in only 
about 40 percent of c a s e s , it does better than "picking coalitions out of a hat ... (and] 
... does add significantly to our understanding of what is going on." (Laver & 
Schofield, 1990, p.97) 
However, while the large number of predictions made by the minimal winning 
criterion helps it to perform better than both Leiserson's bargaining theory and the 
minimum winning criterion,^ ^ its lack off specificity reduces the statistical 
significance of its predictions, as well as limiting its usefulness to those wishing to 
predict which of a number of possible coalitions will form. Also, as the high 
proportion of two-party coalitions indicates, most of the coalitions which form in 
local government are minimal winning. Therefore, while the minimal winning 
criterion cannot explain the formation of minority governments, it will probably 
out-perform more specific accounts of which coalition will form in English local 
government.^ ^ 
Riker*s minimum winning criterion (1962) was the first more specific criterion to 
be offered by coalition theorists. Minimum winning coalitions are a *subset' of 
minimal winning coalitions, and can be considered a s 'bare majority coalitions' 
16 See Franklin & Mackie (1984) for an assessment of these theories. 
Chapter Nine tests this and other proposals. 
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which comprise the smallest total weight of members in the legislature. Given the 
emphasis on minimum winning coalitions by coalition theorists from Riker onwards, 
and the connections that have been made between such status and durability (for 
example, Dodd, 1976) it night be expected that oversized coalitions will be less 
durable than minimal winning coalitions (which two-party majority coalitions in a 
hung situation must be) which should in turn be less durable than minimum winning 
coalitions. Those possibilities will now be looked at. 
It must be noted that the concept of minimum winning status was first suggested a s an 
explanation of coalition formation, and that "theories that are useful for explaining 
which coalitions form often are of little use for explaining which coalitions are most 
durable" (Wright & Goldberg, 1985. p.704). However, there is considerable 
support for a connection between minimum winning status and longer coalition 
duration. As Chapter One has noted, Dodd (1976) was the first observer to posit a 
systematic relationship between cabinet coalitional status and cabinet durability 
(see section 1.3.2.). His research indicated "minimum winning cabinets are durable; 
a s cabinets depart from minimum winning status, cabinet durability decreases" 
(Dodd. 1976. p.159). It was not just oversized cabinets which were unstable; Dodd 
also argued "undersized coalitions [i.e.. those not commanding a majority in the 
legislature] will face a tendency for larger coalitions to arise and replace them" 
(Dodd. 1976, p.140). Warwick agreed, finding that: 
"minimal winning status is a very powerful independent influence on 
durability: even ideologically diverse coalitions ... will last longer if they 
cannot afford to lose a member party without losing their majority" 
(Warwick, 1979. p.490). 
Other empirical support has been offered for Dodd from, for example. Norpoth 
(1982) in a study of West German coalitions and Grimsson (1982) who, in his 
study of both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary coalitions in Iceland, found 
"strong evidence in support of Dodd's hypothesis" (Grimsson, 1982. p.181). On a 
wider scale , Laver & Schofield also offer support for Dodd, finding that minimal 
winning cabinets tend to last longer than both surplus majority and minority 
cabinets (1990, pp.150-155). However, the results of this study indicate minority 
administrations last longer on average than majority coalitions in English councils 
(see Table 6.1). While this suggests Dodd's proposition that a departure from 
minimum winning status increases instability may also be invalid for English local 
government coalitions, it might be that the presence of surplus majority coalitions 
in our sample of coalition administrations contributed to this result. Dodd found that 
•oversized cabinets" are generally much shorter-lived than "under-sized cabinets" 
2 1 2 
(Dodd. 1976, pp.196-197) . Again, there is dispute on this: against their 
expectations. Budge & Keman found that surplus majority coalitions lasted longer 
than minimal winning coalitions in 6 of 9 democracies (Budge & K e m a n , 1990, 
pp.170-171). A possible explanation for this durability is forwarded by Schofield. 
Grofman & Feld (1988) who argue that, perhaps contrary to the findings of n-
person laboratory games: 
"in the party political context, bare-minimum majorities [i.e. minimum 
winning coalitions] are unsafe , because they are too vulnerable to 
blackmail through threats of defection" (Schofield, Grofman & Fe ld , 
1988, p.207) . 
If this was the c a s e , minimum winning coalitions would be more unstable than 
surplus majority coalitions.''^ Certainly, there is no necessary relationship between 
surplus coalitions and instability. Laver & Shepsle (1990) point out that a good 
reason for surplus majority coalitions forming is that the inclusion of a particular 
party may be "vital to the credibility of a proposal for a government even if it is 
'surplus' to its legislative majority" (Laver & Sheps le , 1990, p.885). If this is so , 
that party will continue to be essential to the credibility of the government 
throughout the government's lifetime, and such a 'surplus majority coalition* would 
therefore have strong political factors influencing its stability in a positive manner. 
Another potential problem is that what little research has been carried out on 
coalitional durability has concentrated on cabinet durability. If in English local 
government there is "little evidence" of bargaining for office and "coalitional 
behaviour shifts to the legislative arena" as Mellors (1989. p.108) maintains (see 
also Laver, Railings & Thrasher, 1987, p.508). the absence of a cabinet in English 
local government may mean there is not the same incentive to restrict coalition size. 
Unlike office payoffs (in the form of ministerial portfolios) to actors in cabinet 
coalitions, policy payoffs are not 'zero-sum', and consequently there may be less 
need to restrict the size of the coalition forming. If this is the c a s e . Dodd's hypothesis 
regarding coalition size and durability would be l ess applicable to coalitions in 
English local government. Despite these reservations, it is proposed that: 
3.10: T H E C L O S E R C O A L I T I O N S A R E T O MINIMUM WINNING S T A T U S , T H E 
M O R E D U R A B L E T H E Y WILL B E . 
Bare-minimum majorities are also vulnerable to defeat because of by-elections. 
2 1 3 
T a b l e 6.7: A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Durat ion B y A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S t a t u s 
(n.b. See also Table 9.6) 
Type Average Duration in Months 
Status of Current Completed Aggregate 
Administration Administrations Administrations 
Single Party 27.6 19.6 23.0 
Minority (n=24) (n=35) (n=59) 
Minority 1.0 21.0 9.0 
Coalition (n=3) • (n=2) (n=5) 
Minimum Winning 23.2 24.9 23.8 
Coalition (n = 12) (n=7) (n = 19) 
Minimal Winning 22.8 17.4 19.5 
Coalition (n = 5) (n=8) (n = 13) 
Surplus Majority 16.4 12.0 15.0 
Coalition (n=9) (n=4) (n = 13) 
'All 3 current minority coalitions had been in place for just one month. 
Table 6.7 offers support for Hypothesis 3.10, with minimum winning coalitions 
lasting longer than any other status of administration. Also, if we ignore the three 
current minority coalitions in Table 6.7 (which s e e m s sensible) then despite the 
general findings of Budge & Keman discussed above (1990, pp.170-171), surplus 
majority coalitions conformed to most observers expectations as the most unstable of 
all arrangements. However, as previous hypotheses in this chapter have already 
indicated, current minority administrations are the most durable of all 
arrangements (see Table 6.1). Even when current and former administrative 
arrangements are aggregated, single party minority administrations rival minimum 
winning coalitions in durability, lasting 23.0 months compared to the 23.8 months 
average of minimum winning coalitions. This goes against the findings of most 
previous research, which predicts minority governments will be the shortest lived 
of all possible arrangements (see Laver & Schofield, 1990, Table 6.2, p.152; Budge 
& Keman. 1990. Table 6.4, p.171). 
The longevity of minority administrations can only be understood by supposing that 
other parties are not prepared to take power and therefore not prepared to bring 
down a minority administration. There may be factors in the organisation of English 
hung councils which counter the forces which have been s e e n a s contributing to 
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greater instability in minority governments. The knowledge that concessions must be 
granted in order for the annual budget to pass can justify a strategy of allowing a 
minority administration to form, and the loss of 'office' this strategy entails may not 
be seen as a great loss. Without a cabinet, the lure of office consists of committee 
chairs and vice-chairs; such 'rewards' may appear unappetising when the full 
council can overturn any decision reached there, even iff committee places are fixed 
to ensure a majority for the minority rulers (see Leach & Game. 1989. p.33)J® 
As the first section of this chapter has already suggested, the longevity of minority 
administrations (as well as their formation) may best be explained by Budge & 
Laver's (1986) "viability criterion"; parties may hesitate to bring down a minority 
government without a viable alternative as they could sufffer the electoral 
consequences of such 'irresponsibility' (see Mellors, 1989, p.86). This could 
account for the long duration of the minority governments in this sample off hung 
councils. 
The greater longevity of minimal and minimum winning coalitions when compared to 
surplus majority coalitions can be understood in a number of ways. For example, the 
conventional explanation that bare majority coalitions cannot afford to lose a 
member party so there will be greater emphasis on working together amicably 
(Warwick, 1979), appears a reasonable assumption. Also, the parties concerned 
will both receive a good return in terms of 'office'; as previous findings have 
indicated, two-thirds of local coalitions share committee chair. Finally, policy 
concessions are easier to reach without an extra partner's position to consider. 
Despite the contention that policy payoffs "evaporate" the logic of minimal winning 
coalitions because there is "no cost to a coalition in carrying passengers" (Laver & 
Schofield, 1990, p.69), it must be the case that when policy compromise is 
necessary it will be easier without an extra position to take into account. Laver & 
Schofield's assertion is only totally valid when there is unanimity of policy goals, 
which observers might feel is relatively rare in the adversarial conflict of British 
party politics. 
A number of propositions concerning the influence of numerical factors have been 
examined in this section, and the results have suggested that what often appear to be 
powerfful predictors of durability for cabinet coalitions in Parliamentary 
democracies may be less relevant when applied to the largely legislative coalitions 
which dominate hung English local government. However, one of the major reasons 
19 This possibility is examined in the following chapter. 
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for the failure of some hypotheses may merely be the novelty of coalition bargaining 
in England; politicians are not used to the compromises that must be made when one 
party fails to achieve a legislative majority. Perhaps the p a s s a g e of time will 
familiarise actors with the strategies required both to form and maintain coalitions; 
the increase of coalitions, and the consequent decline in the frequency of single party 
minority administrations (see Chapter Four, section two) suggest this may s o . 
Previous chapters have shown 'time' certainly appears to be an influence on the 
types of administrations which form and on the strategies of both the Labour party 
and the Conservatives. Section three will now look at the influence of time, with 
particular reference to the impact differing electoral c y c l e s may have on 
administrative stability. 
S e c t i o n T h r e e : T h e 'T ime' F a c t o r 
The previous two chapters have investigated a number of hypotheses connected with 
the passage of time; some expectations have been confounded. For example, if 
experience of hungness is necessary for successful negotiations, coalitions should be 
more likely to form in long term hung councils, but this does not appear to be the 
c a s e (see Chapter Four). It might also be that the longer the council is hung the more 
likely it will be that the administrations which form are long-lasting, because , for 
example, greater knowledge of the processes of forming a durable coalition has been 
acquired. Unfortunately, as d iscussed in the introduction to this chapter, such an 
hypothesis would be difficult to test without a longitudinal study covering a far 
greater time-span than this study. If administrations are more durable in the 'long-
term' hung councils in this sun/ey it may simply be because administrations have 
had 'more time' to last longer. Administrations formed in 'short-term* hung councils 
would be. on average, less durable than those in long-term hung councils because 
there could be no administrations which had lasted longer than 3 years; therefore, 
such a proposal cannot be examined in this study. However, other hypotheses 
connected with 'time' are certainly capable of closer examination. 
6.3.1. T h e E l e c t o r a l C y c l e a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Stab i l i ty 
In English local coalition studies, perhaps the main connection that has been made 
between coalition duration and the passage of time concerns the electoral cycle of an 
authority. Chapter Four (section one) noted a relationship between coalition 
formation and electoral cycle, with (as expected) coalitions being more likely to 
form in councils holding quadrennial elections. Some observers of local government 
argue the electoral cycle also influences coalitional stability, and this appears a 
promising hypothesis which deserves further analys is . It might also be that 
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government duration depends on the time the government is formed during the 
•parliamentary term', with those formed earlier demonstrating greater stability, 
and such a possibility will be examined. Also connected with 'time' Is the argument 
that rural authorities will exhibit greater stability than urban authorities because 
they are more likely to have had past experience of hungness (Leach & Stewart. 
1988). These possibilities will now be explored, beginning with an examination of 
the possible relationship between the length of an administration and the electoral 
cycle . 
As noted in previous chapters, there are differing electoral cycles in English local 
councils, with county councils and some district councils holding elections every 
four years and the metropolitan districts and some district councils holding elections 
by thirds. A number of studies have posited a relationship between administrative 
stability and the electoral cycle. Leach & Stewart argue time is a significant factor, 
and that: 
"if the hung situation is seen as long-lasting - which is more likely in 
authorities holding elections every four years (unless hungness could 
disappear as a result of one or two by-elections) - then stability is more 
likely" Leach & Stewart (1988, p.52). 
Leach & Game offer support for this, noting that non-cooperation appeared to be 
more prevalent outside the shire counties. They maintain: 
"the system of elections means that, by-elections excepted, whatever 
result an election produces is likely to hold for four years ... a long time 
to sustain oppositional or opportunistic / disruptional tact ics. The 
knowledge that the hung situation is probably unchangeable for four years 
is a major force for co-operation" (Leach & G a m e , 1989. p.63). 
It certainly seems intuitively probable that arrangements will become more stable 
with time, and the experience of such long term hung authorities a s Cheshire might 
appear to support this. However, Mellors points out that while Cheshire might be 
cited as proof of the hypothesis that deals are more likely to stand when there are 
four-year intervals between elections, other hung county councils which have long 
experience of hungness have less stable arrangements. Bedfordshire demonstrates 
that "such a generalisation does not always stand the test of real life" (Mellors, 
1989, p.86). Despite this reservation, most observers support the idea that 
stability is more likely in councils with a four-year electoral cycle. Therefore, it is 
proposed that: 
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3.11: A U T H O R I T I E S WITH A Q U A D R E N N I A L E L E C T O R A L C Y C L E W I L L 
T E N D T O G E N E R A T E M O R E S T A B L E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E A R R A N G E M E N T S 
T H A N A U T H O R I T I E S W H E R E T H E C O U N C I L tS E L E C T E D B Y T H I R D S . 
Table 6.8 demonstrates that despite the longer time counci ls with quadrennial 
elections have been hung, they do not last significantly longer than administrations 
in councils which elect by thirds. There appears to be no connection between 
administrative durability and the differing electoral c y c l e s in Engl ish local 
government. 
T a b l e 6.8: Admin is t ra t i ve Durat ion B y E l e c t o r a l C y c l e 
Average Time in Months 
Electoral Cycle Time Hung Administrative Duration 
Quadrennial (n=36) 55.0 22.4 
Annually (n=26) 49.4 21.6 
Even though elections can change the political balance more frequently in councils 
electing by thirds, which does not appear a good recipe for stability, the differences 
in administrative duration are slight. A possible explanation for this is that minority 
administrations are more common in councils electing by thirds (see Chapter Four, 
Table 4.5), and the greater duration of minority administrations (see Table 6.1) 
may be influencing the figures. While this may offer a partial explanation, given the 
support for Hypothesis 3.11 from observers of hung English councils it is difficult 
to find general reasons for the failure of the hypothesis, apart from re-iterating 
Mellors' warning about making generalisations when examining hung councils. These 
are separate political systems with different histories and political cultures, and the 
factors affecting both administrative formation and duration may be beyond the 
bounds of general explanations. That said, some general explanations concerning 
administrative durability should hold true whatever the political system. 
6 .3 .2 . Durabi l i ty a n d ' C y c l i c a l Va r i a t ion ' 
For example. Strom notes that "durability may vary cyclically, with governments 
formed very late in a parliamentary term less durable than those formed just after 
elections" (Strom, 1988, p.926), irrespective of electoral considerations (see also 
Taylor & Herman. 1977), This possibility is not easy to examine, a s deciding 
whether a government broke up because of 'electoral considerations' is obviously 
difficult. Also, administrations formed in councils electing by thirds will have to be 
excluded from any examination, as the notion of a 'parliamentary term' makes little 
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sense in councils electing by thirds. However, an examination of the 36 councils with 
a quadrennial electoral cycle found no evidence to support Strom's contention that 
administrations which formed late in the four year term were less durable; when an 
administration formed appeared to make no difference to its duration. 
We now move to an examination of a factor, 'rural stability', that appears to sit a 
little uneasily in a section devoted to 'time'. However, the impact of the rural factor 
on administrative duration is connected with past experience of hungness. and hence 
the ability to learn from that past, a point made by a number of theorists 
emphasising the importance of 'time' to successfu l coalitional activity (Hinckley. 
1976; Browne, 1982). 
6 .3 .3 . R u r a l S t a b i l i t y 
According to Leach & Stewart, "rural or semi-rural counties or districts" are more 
likely to exhibit stability than urban authorities because they are more likely to 
have had recent experience of hungness (1988, p.52). Presumably, the reason for 
this is that patterns of political control have been more likely to be regarded as an 
"alien presence" (Widdicombe, 1986, para. 4.16) in rural councils, while "formal 
party politics" has long been the norm in "big-city aulhorities"(see Stoker, 1988, 
p.40). Therefore, a greater number of Independents in rural a reas will mean they 
have more experience of. at least, 'nominal hungness'. It is certainly the c a s e that 
political parties, with their emphasis on voting discipline, are a more recent 
addition to the the rural scene (see Bains, 1972; Widdicombe, 1986) and inter-
party cooperation might therefore be easier; of course, the reverse might be as true. 
That said, the tradition of "closed bargaining groups" (Mellors. 1983. p.238) will 
probably be less well established in rural a reas . While there are considerable 
difficulties of classifying authorities as 'rural' or 'urban' (and worth pointing out 
that 'stability' is not synonymous with administrative duration) it d o e s s e e m 
plausible that more 'stable* authorities will produce more stable administrative 
arrangements. Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
3.12: S T A B L E ADIVI INISTRATIVE A R R A N G E I V I E N T S A R E M O R E L I K E L Y T O 
O C C U R IN HUNG R U R A L AND S E M I - R U R A L C O U N T I E S A N D D I S T R I C T S 
THAN IN HUNG U R B A N A U T H O R I T I E S . 
Finding an acceptable definition of the categories *urban' and 'rural' is not easy; 
there is no consensus on the precise meaning of these terms. For example. Uzzell & 
Provencher (1976) note that 'experts* define urbanism without precision or 
consistency. While they acknowledge that "size and density are used most often to 
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define urban places probably because of their simplicity rather than any more 
cogent reason" they note a number of other variables (such as occupation) which 
may also have some bearing on any definition (Uzzell & Provencher, 1976. pp.4-
5). Different countries also have different conceptions, and therefore, different 
definitions, of these concepts. The problem is intensified by the highly urbanised 
nature of much of England (which many definitions would classify as exclusively 
•urban) and the 'artificial' nature of some local government units. For example, 
using a population density figure of less than 2 people per acre to signify Vural' 
local authorities means that areas most people would regard as 'rural' (for example. 
Dorset) will be classified as 'urban', while Humberside is therefore classified as 
'rural'. Therefore, a combination of population density figures (noting Uzzeli & 
Provencher's coments, above) and subjective analysis (with the help of Polytechnic 
South West's Geography Deparimeni) was adopted, producing 24 'rural' and 38 
'urban* authorities. The result of this analysis was that there appears to be very 
little difference in administrative stability demonstrated when utilising the 
urban/rural divide. On average, administrations in rural authorities lasted 21.0 
months compared to the almost identical average duration in urban councils of 21.1 
months. Hypothesis 3,12 is, therefore, not proven by the available evidence. 
Conclus ions 
A number of variables which may affect the duration of administrations in hung 
councils have been examined, including the type of administration, arithmetical 
factors, and the impact of time. There are undoubtedly other factors which will affect 
administrative duration. For example, long-term experience of hungness and the 
attitudes of the participants themselves are almost certainly important (see. for 
example, Leach & Stewart, 1988, p.52), and although beyond the bounds of this 
study are deserving of any future investigation. Once again, it must be admitted that 
this study encounters unavoidable problems when examining the factors which may 
be affecting administrative duration. Some initial administrations are still extant, 
and some councils in this sample have been hung for loo short a time to enable a 
potentially crucial variable (the passage of time) to be adequately assessed. That 
said, this research has covered a large number of possible influences on 
administrative duration. A number of hypotheses have been supported, while some 
expectations have been confounded. 
This investigation of administrative duration began with an examination of the 
longevity of minority and coalition administrations. The traditional view of minority 
administrations as unstable is not borne out when they are compared with coalition 
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administrations. Despite their legislative majority, coalitions in hung councils last a 
shorter time than minority administrations, and a number of possible explanations 
were advanced for this. The culture of English local government, and the difficulty 
actors not familiar with 'coalition politics* will undoubtedly face in constructing 
durable solutions with long term political opponents, are crucial factors in this 
finding. Initial minority administrations, often seen as examples of political naivety, 
were also long lasting, even when former rulers appeared to be 'clinging on to 
power*. 
The role of traditional rulers in hung councils was not what was generally expected. 
The idea, common among observers of hung councils, that traditional rulers will tend 
to be excluded from the ruling process when a council becomes hung was not 
supported by the findings in Chapter Four; the related hypothesis that the 
administrations former rulers construct will be short-lived was also not generally 
supported. While there are undoubtedly local authorities where the attitude of the 
former rulers or the feelings of former opposition parties initially precludes co-
operation, a large number of former rulers remain involved in the administration of 
their authority many years into hungness. Indeed, administrations formed by 
Conservative and Labour former rulers are far longer lasting than administrations 
formed by these parties in authorities in which they had formerly had an 
oppositional role. Perhaps experience of ruling and knowledge of the processes of 
government is important for effective and durable government in hung systems. 
The party dimension reveals, unsurprisingly given the findings discussed above, that 
SLD minority administrations are 'outlasted' only by Conservative/ Independent 
coalitions. The Conservative and Independent tradition of co-operation, and general 
closeness of ideology, offers a plausible explanation for the relative durability of 
such coalitions. The SLD's ideological position in the middle of the Iwo other major 
parties, offers the most plausible explanation for the relative longevity of their 
administrations, although their generally positive attitude to coalition politics will 
obviously reinforce this. SLD coalitions with Labour lasted longer than their 
coalitions with Conservatives. The former oppositional status in most councils of 
both parties helps to explain this, and Labour's ideological position may also be 
relevant; if Labour want a share of power they have little alternative but to support 
the SLD. The same factors may well be important if a future general election was to 
produce a hung parliament. 
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Factors connected with party system and electoral arithmetic formed the bulk of this 
chapter, and the examination of numerical factors in section two revealed a number 
of interesting findings. It certainly appears to be the case that small and pivotal SLD 
groups contribute to more unstable governments. Conversely, small and pivotal 
Labour groups appear to enable SLD minorities to rule for considerable periods of 
time, and the ideological positions of Labour and the SLD again offer plausible 
explanations for these findings. 
More stable administrations are in evidence when none of the parties is close to a 
majority than when one of them is close to obtaining overall control. The possibility 
of the situation changing as the result of an election or by-election is less likely in 
the former case, which may explain this. Parties in councils where no party is close 
to an overall majority may feel they have to work together for some time whatever 
their feelings about it, and this may produce more stable administrative 
arrangements than those in councils where one party can realistically feel a return 
to single party control is imminent. 
The number of parties in a political system has long been felt to be an important 
influence on administrative duration. However, the findings of this research have 
confounded the generally held notion that the more parties there are the more 
unstable a 'government' will be; multi-party councils appear to produce more 
durable administrations than 3-party councils, although the fact that 'multi-party' 
councils are predominantly composed of only 4 parties weakens one's confidence in 
this finding. This finding may be more convincingly explained by the far shorter 
time which local authorities with only three parties had, on average, been hung. In 
addition, one party was close to a majority in the majority of three-party systems, 
and such systems (see above) tend to produce less durable administrations. That said, 
a more sophisticated measure of party system size, utilising Rae's index of 
fractionalization. supported the above findings. Surprisingly, highly fractionalized 
systems produce longer lasting administrations, and it is difficult to find a 
convincing reason for this beyond those advanced above. 
The notion of 'minimal' or 'minimum winning' coalitions has dominated the 
development of coalition theory, and only recently have studies begun to escape the 
shackles of the minimising criterion, whether applied to numbers or ideology. 
Nevertheless, the connection between minimal status and administrative longevity is 
well established in coalition studies, and this research offers some further support 
for the thesis that as coalitions depart from minimum winning status their duration 
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decreases. While current minority administrations are the most durable of all 
administrations, an examination of all completed administrations demonstrates 
minimum winning coalitions (in the sense that they are the smallest possible 
legislative weight) are the most durable of coalition administrations. Minimal 
winning coalitions (in terms of the minimal number of parties) do not last as long, 
while surplus majority coalitions are the least durable of all administrations. 
Finally, again contrary to expectations, the differing electoral cycles of hung 
councils did not appear to make a significant impact on the duration of 
administrations; councils with a quadrennial electoral cycle did not have more 
durable administrations than councils electing by thirds. This may be partly 
explained by the larger number of minority administrations (which last 
considerably longer than coalitions) in councils electing by thirds. Likewise, the 
urban/rural dimension did not appear to be a factor in administrative duration. 
A number of potential influences on administrative durability have been examined in 
this section. Many hypotheses have received little support from the findings of this 
research. However, it must be understood that coalition politics in English local 
government is still in its infancy. If knowledge of the hung situation is essential to 
producing effective coalition strategies and durable government, which appears 
unarguable, then it is unsurprising if this research often fails to support the 
findings of many observers of coalition politics. Local councils are not European 
parliamentary democracies, and there will be different influences on local coalition 
actors. Also, while local actors exist in a shared national political culture, attitudes 
at local level will vary. Much more research is needed Into hung councils before 
general conclusions can begin to be drawn. 
We now move from an examination of the factors which might influence the 
formation and maintenance of 'coalitions' in hung local authorities, to an examination 
of the changes hungness brings to the working practices of authorities and the 
behaviour of the actors involved. Hung councils are manifestly not the same as those 
where one party has a working majority, and it would be unrealistic to expect that 
the practices which work well enough when one party is in control will suffice in the 
absence of a relatively disciplined party group which can formulate policy without 
worrying about its ability to carry a vote in committee or full Council. If this is so, 
then the sources of power in hung councils will probably be different to those in 
single party majority control councils. Chapter Seven will examine the changes 
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hungness brings to the working practices of hung councils, and Chapter Eight will 
study the effects of hungness on the actors involved. 
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Introduct ion 
As previous chapters have noted, the ability of hung councils to operate efficiently 
has been questioned by a number of observers. Hung councils have been characterised 
as, amongst other things, conflictual, disorganised, unstable, and uncertain (see 
Blowers. 1987; Mellors, 1984). For example. Blowers argues that a "climate of 
uncertainty" permeates hung councils leading to political instability and policy 
making which is characterised by "drift and impasse" (1987. p.32). If this view of 
hung councils is correct, then we would expect to find a predominantly negative view 
from the respondents to this survey. However, some observers have been more 
optimistic. 
For example, while Leach & Game (1989) admit that there are still some hung 
authorities "in which an atmosphere of mistrust and frustration prevails", they 
argue that the majority of hung county councils they surveyed demonstrate the 
fallacy of viewing hungness as an inevitable recipe for "confusion, delay, ad-hocery 
and inconsistency" (Leach & Game, 1989. p.59). Their view of hung councils is 
largely positive: 
"Hung authorities can work very effectively indeed, and in so doing 
typically generate a series of benefits in terms of the quality of 
democracy; more open government; more real debate in committee and 
council; more genuine inter-party discussions at an informal level; and a 
clarification of the guidelines governing member-officer relationships 
and the rights of all parties to a full involvement in the decision making 
process" (1989. p.59, emphasis in original). 
While Leach & Game's research was confined to the hung counties, their findings 
offer substantial evidence that the approach by the main actors to a hung situation is 
the significant determinant in whether the process of government is characterised by 
chaos or smooth running. That said, if organisational structures remain geared to 
majority party rule the best motives of actors may well be frustrated. Undoubtedly, 
the adoption (or not) of new conventions (which might also be seen as reflecting the 
attitudes of the actors involved) will greatly influence the functioning of hung 
councils. This chapter proposes to examine the changes hungness brings to the 
organisation of local authorities in England. 
Leach & Stewart (1988) argue that 'settled' hung authorities will be distinguished 
from 'unstable* authorities by, amongst other things, the introduction of new 
conventions, greater access for all party groups to chief officers, and equal briefing 
rights for party spokespersons (Leach & Stewart, 1988, pp.53-54). Leach & Game 
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(1989) go further in arguing that procedures which are often unclear or unfair in 
majority controlled councils "are invariably clarified (typically in the form of 
conventions) in hung authorities" (Leach & Game, 1989. p.38, my emphasis). Leach 
& Stewart (1988) had earlier pointed to a paradox about conventions, in that those 
authorities which introduce conventions are often least in need of them, while those 
in need of them the most are unlikely to introduce them (Leach & Stewart. 1988. 
pp.47-48), which suggests that 'unfair' procedures may not 'invariably' be 
clarified. 
There is one change, however, which might appear inescapable when no party has an 
overall majority. The introduction of proportionality for committee membership is 
often seen, for a number of reasons, as a necessity in hung councils. Section one 
compares the distribution of committee seats in hung and non-hung councils, and 
assesses the reasons for deviations from the principles of proportionality in both 
types of council. The thesis is advanced that certain deviations from proportionality 
can be best explained as examples of pay-offs for participation in a winning 
coalition, it appears probable that the widespread introduction of proportionality 
will not be the only 'deviation' from normality exhibited by hung councils, and 
section two looks at the introduction of other new conventions, in particular those 
involving the operations of committees and the process by which committee chairs 
are allocated. The effects of a number of variables, including the passage of time and 
the different electoral cycles, are examined. The form such new conventions take are 
detailed, and a number of possible reasons for the changes found are then advanced. 
Finally, section three takes a close look at those changes which will affect the 
officer-councillor relationship, in particular the factors influencing the access of 
party groups to chief officers. The most crucial time for such relationships is at 
budget making time, and this section also examines the thesis that there will, in 
particular, be much wider access to chief officers during the making of the annual 
budget. 
Section One: The Introduction of Proportional Representation 
This section will begin with a comparison of the distribution of committee seats in 
hung and non-hung councils, and then detail the factors which appear to be 
influencing the adoption of proportionality in both hung and non-hung councils. A 
number of hung local authorities have administrations in which one party will take a 
majority of committee seats despite its lack of an overall majority, and the factors 
which influence both this and other deviations from proportionality are assessed. 
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7.1.1, The 'Natural Solution'? 
As would be expected, previous research has indicated that whatever the type of 
authority or Its location, in councils In which a single party has overall control the 
majority party generally takes a majority of council seats. Although single party 
committees are rare, the majority of committees did not follow strict 
proportionality prior to the introduction of regulations requiring this (Widdicombe, 
1986, Research Volume. Table 2.8). Despite this, the Widdicombe Report has noted 
widespread acceptance of the general principle of proportionality on committees 
amongst local authorities, whether hung or not. Given this, and the general 
concurrence with government legislation for proportionality on council committees 
(in the Local Government Act. 1989; see Local Government Chronicle, 13/1/89. 
p.5), one would expect to find that proportionality on committees was an established 
feature in hung councils. Wendt calls proportionality the "natural solution" (Wendt, 
1986, p.373) and the evidence tends to support this. For example. Leach & Stewart 
report that "the vast majority" of hung counties they surveyed "operated the 
principle of p.r. on all committees and sub committees" (Leach & Stewart. 1988, 
p.46). Other research into committee composition has also proportionality is the 
norm: 
"On only one of the forty-two relevant hung councils were seats on the 
policy committee not given to all three of the main parties ... not only 
were all parties represented ... their representation was very close to 
proportional" (Laver, Railings & Thrasher, 1987. p.507). 
Therefore, the general hypothesis can be proposed that: 
4.1: HUNG COUNCILS WILL B E IVIORE L IKELY TO HAVE PROPORTIONAL 
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N FOR COIWIWITTEE fUlEMBERSHIP THAN NON-HUNG 
COUNCILS. 
This research asked chief executives to detail the membership of a number of 
committees in their local authority. For ease of analysis. Table 7.1 (below) details 
the assessment of the distribution of places in just one committee, albeit the 
committee usually seen as the most important, the policy and resources committee, 
which Widdicombe found occupied a central rote within the great majority of local 
authorities (Widdicombe, 1986, Research Volume 1. p.111). However, other 
committees were also checked for any deviance from proportionality, and. with the 
exception of the inevitable differences caused by the number of committee places not 
permitting strict proportionality, the general finding was that the committees of a 
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council share the same characteristics. That is, if the policy and resources 
committee has proportionality, so do the other committees.'' 
As Table 7.1 demonstrates, more than two-thirds of hung councils had 
proportionality for committee membership. In 34 of the 50 local authorities for 
which the information on committee places was available, the number of committee 
places alt the parties had received was according to its share of council seats. There 
were a few cases where strict proportionality was not possible for arithmetical 
reasons, but in those cases the party concerned usually received a redress in other 
committees. The findings shown in Table 7.1 raise a number of interesting points 
which will now be explored, beginning with an assessment of the distribution of 
committee places in non-hung councils. 
Table 7.1 Distribution of Committee Seats in Hung and Non-Hung 
C o u n c i l s 
Committee Seat Arrangements Hung Councils Majority Control 
(n=50) (n=19) 
Direct Proportionality 68% 31.6% 
Minority Party Given Majority 18% 
One Party Over-Represemed 14% 57 .9% 
One Party Takes All Seats - 10.5% 
Committee Seal Distribution in Non-Hung Counci ls 
In majority control councils, in not one case did the largest party receive less than 
its 'share* of committee seats, and in 10 of the 11 authorities where one party 
received significantly more committee seats than its 'entitlement' it was also the 
ruling party. In 8 of these 10 authorities, all the remaining party groups suffered a 
consequent loss in their entitlement under proportionality, while in the other 2 
cases, a Conservative group suffered at the hands of a Labour and a SLD 
administration respectively. In one of the 10 authorities where the largest group 
awarded itself more places than it was due proportionally, a Conservative 
administration which had one more seat than its entitlement also gave an extra seat to 
an eleven-strong Ratepayers group. It also gave a committee seat to the single Labour 
and single SLD councillors; an Independent group of 7 councillors paid for this 
^Obviously, those committees with co-opted members (such as many Education 
committees) did not follow the same pattern of seat distribution as the policy and resources 
committee. 
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benevolence. The remaining case was in another Conservative controlled 
administration, where another Ratepayers group was awarded 3 committee seats, one 
more than its entitlement proportionally; this was also at the expense of an 
Independent group. 
In two cases (a Conservative district council and a Labour metropolitan district) the 
largest party took all the seats. In the latter case. Labour had over 90 percent of the 
council seats, but in the former case the Conservatives had taken all committee 
places with only 57 percent of the councils seats; a substantial Labour group 
received no representation on the policy and resources committee. In both of these 
cases there was all party representation on the other main council committees, 
although the ruling group still took more seats proportionally than proportionality 
would have indicated. 
These findings appear to demonstrate that in the majority of cases the ruling party in 
a non-hung council could, before the 1989 Local Government Act which introduced 
proportionality on committees as a requirement, control the award of committee 
places without undue regard to notions of equity. Table 7.1 clearly demonstrates that 
in non-hung councils less than one-third (31.6 percent) of councils had 
proportionality on committees, in contrast with hung councils, where over two-
thirds (68 percent) of hung councils had proportionality for committee places. This 
indicates that a fairer attitude towards the distribution of committee seats prevails 
in hung councils, and is conclusive proof of hypothesis 4.1. The findings also fully 
support the observation that it is the "overwhelming norm" (Laver. Railings & 
Thrasher, 1987, p,8) for all-party representation on council committees, whether 
the council is hung or not. 
Committee Seat Distribution in Hung Counci ls 
However, two-thirds of councils allocating committee places on a proportionality 
basis is not the 'vast majority' found by Leach & Stewart (1988). An examination of 
those two-thirds reveals a variety of administrations, with no discernable pattern 
between party composition and proportionality on committees in the sample as a 
whole. 
However, 14 of the 15 county councils in the sample had proportionality on 
committees, a very high proportion. It may be that the higher profile of county 
councils with the electorate puts greater pressure on actors to be seen to be acting 
'fairly'. It may also be that the principle of proportionality in counties is more 
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firmly established than in district councils. For example, in Cheshire, 
proportionality "has been an accepted and understood feature ... ever since 1889. 
whatever the composition of the council" (Wendt. 1986. p.373). While these factors 
are almost certainly important, another explanation for the high proportion of 
county councils with proportionality may be the position of the SLD in those 
councils. In 8 of the 15 county councils the SLD was part of the administration. In 3 
it had previously been part of the administration, while in all 15 cases (including 
the remaining 4 county councils where it had never been involved In the 
administration) it was capable of forming a 'winning' administration with at least 
one other party. In such situations, the SLD will put great pressure on other parties 
for proportionality on committees, which it has seen as one of its prime objectives 
(see Clay. 1982. p.5). The SLD does not have the same hegemony in district 
councils, and it appears that its position as a major 'power-broker' in county 
councils offers the best explanation for the predominance of proportionality in 
committee membership. 
Perhaps the most interesting councils are the one-third of hung councils who do not 
have proportionality for committees. These local authorities beg a number of 
interesting questions. In particular, in what circumstances might a minority party 
be permitted to award itself a majority of committee places, and why might one party 
receive more than its 'fair share"? Inevitably, the desire to keep the Alliance from a 
share of power is seen by many writers as the driving force behind such tactics, and 
this proposition will now be investigated. 
7.1.2. The 'Unholy Alliance' 
As already mentioned, many observers saw the centre parties as being especially 
vocal in demanding representation. For example, Mellors (1989) argues that the 
pressure for proportionality will generally come from the Alliance parties, and that 
in some cases "the failure of the Liberals to achieve their due share of committee 
places caused considerable bitterness" (Mellors. 1989, p.103). Stewart (1985) 
also sees the Alliance in the vanguard demanding proportionality, pointing out that 
while "in some authorities, such demands have been conceded ... in others, the 
Conservative and Labour parties have united against them" (Stewart. 1985, p.5). 
While Leach & Stewart report the widespread practice of proportionality in hung 
councils, they note that the most significant exception to this practice occurs when 
one party is given the 'right to govern' by another. This may be because It holds 
nearly half the council seats, or because of: 
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"a strong desire by two of the three parties to exclude a third from 
significant influence. Typically this involves an understanding between 
Conservative and Labour groups to prevent an Alliance party group from 
fully exploiting its 'balance of power' position. It is often accompanied by 
an allocation of committee places giving the administration a bare 
majority on each committee." (Leach & Stewart. 1988. p.47) 
If the above observations are correct, we would expect to find that: 
4.2: WHERE ONE PARTY IN A HUNG COUNCIL IS GIVEN A MAJORITY IN 
COMI\/IITTEES, THAT PARTY WILL BE LABOUR OR CONSERVATIVE. 
Once again, Table 7.2 (below) demonstrates the difficulty of deciding what 
administrative arrangements are in place in hung councils, when there is no 
'cabinet' to give a clear and unequivocal statement of the distribution of office pay-
offs. The distribution of chairs corresponded to the stated administration in the only 
Labour minority administration and in one of the SLD minority administrations, 
where in both cases the party concerned held all the chairs. One of the two 
Conservative/ Independent coalitions also distributed the 'rewards of office' between 
the coalition partners. However, in the remaining cases there was no obvious 
relationship between the stated administration and the allocation of committee 
chairs. Whatever payoffs may have been made to coalition actors, they were not 
necessarily in the form of committee chairs or deputy chairs. 
Table 7.2 Characteristics of Single Party Majority Committees in 
Hung Councils 
Response of chief executives. (%) = % of council seats held 
Administration Party Given Majority on Policy Ctte Other Ctte 
Majority Other Cttes? Chair/Deputy Chairs 
Labour Lab (48%) yes Lab/Lab Lab Only 
SLD SLD (49%) no SLD/SLD SLD & Con 
SLD SLD (47%) yes SLD/SLD SLD only 
Con/Ind Con (49%) yes Con/Ind Con & Ind 
Con/Ind Con (46%) no Con/Con Con only 
Con/SLD/Ind Con (48%) yes Con/Con Con only 
Con/Lab/SLD/Ind Con (44%) yes Ind/Con Ind & Con 
No Admin'n SLD (46%) yes Ind/SLD Con, Ind, SLD & 
Other* 
No Admin'n Ind (37%) no Con/Ind Con. Ind.SLD & 
Lab 
Other= 7 councillors of 'undeclared allegiance' 
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Whatever the difficulties of deciding the precise nature of administrative 
arrangements, hypothesis 4,2 is not supported by the evidence. As hypothesised, in 5 
cases either Labour (once) or the Conservatives (four times) is the party taking a 
majority of committee seats. However, the SLD itself takes a majority on committees 
in 3 councils. In the 5 cases where either Labour or Conservative take a majority, 
the SLD is a small (but not pivotal) group in 2 councils, a large group (48 percent 
of council seats) in one council, a medium group (19 percent of council seats) in one 
council, while in the fifth case it has no councillors. The evidence does not suggest 
that either 'resentment' of the SLD's position, or the number of seats it holds, is a 
factor in Labour and Conservative assuming numerical control of committees. Leach 
& Stewart (1988) offer an alternative explanation which may offer a more 
plausible reason for one party being given the 'right to govern'. 
7.1.3. Poss ib le R e a s o n s for Minority Part ies Tak ing Committee 
M a j o r i t i e s 
The alternative reason offered by Leach & Stewart is that the party allowed to take a 
majority of committee seats held nearly half the council seats (1988. p.47), and 
this appears to be a convincing reason for the phenomenon. As Table 7.2 shows, in 7 
of the 9 cases the parly taking control has between 46-49 percent of the seats, and 
in another the party taking control has 44 percent of the council seats. 
In the remaining case, an Independent group with only 37 percent of councils seats 
was given a majority of places on the policy and resources committee but not on the 
other main committees. On the remaining committees, the other three parties 
(although none was given a majority) received larger shares to make up for their 
losses on the policy and resources committee, and as Table 7.2 shows, chairs were 
shared between all the groups on this council. The Independents were the largest 
group, which may be the reason they were given a majority on the policy and 
resources committee. However, overall the distribution of committee seats in this 
district council was close to proportional, and finding a convincing explanation for 
the Independent group being given a majority on one committee is difficult. As the 
large Independent group suggests, this district council had never had overall control 
by one party, so one would expect an equitable distribution of committee seats to be 
the norm. Perhaps the other councils in Table 7.2 will provide more clues to the 
problem of finding out under what circumstances minority parties assume overall 
control of the committee structure. 
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As noted, in the remaining 8 local authorities where one party took all the seats on 
the policy and resources committee it was close to a majority in 7 councils and had 
44 percent of the seats in the remaining council. ^ In 6 of these authorities it also 
took a majority of seats on the other committees. There is only one county council in 
these 8 local authorities (and see above for a discussion on the possible reasons for 
the large proportion of county counties with proportionality), with the remaining 7 
councils being district councils. While this suggests that the type of council may be 
significant, a more important factor after the closeness to a majority may be the 
electoral cycle. In 6 of these 8 councils the electoral cycle is quadrennial, and it may 
be the combination of electoral and arithmetical factors which provides the best 
explanation for one party taking control. As Mellors argues, when one party is close 
to a majority "morally, if not electorally" it may regard itself as having the right to 
form an administration (Meliors, 1989, p.85). 
In addition, all these 8 administrations, with the exception of the 'no administration' 
where no concrete information on administrative duration was available, had been in 
place at least since the 1987 district council quadrennial elections. When there are 
four years to go before another election parties may feel better placed to demand a 
'right to rule' which gives them greater control over the decision making process. 
Despite the possibility of certain decisions being overturned by the full council, 
committees have considerable discretionary powers. A majority in committee will, 
at the very least, enable a minority government to control the process of decision 
making and allow it to structure committee debates. 
However, these explanations are not very convincing, especially when it is realised 
that there is a much larger total of 30 councils where one party is close to a 
majority but does not take a majority on any committee. That said, the pressure for 
proportionality on committees in hung councils is considerable, and a relatively 
small number of deviations from this principle is not necessarily surprising. 
Intuitively, it certainly seems likely that large parties will be more likely to take a 
majority on committees, and the findings of this research support this. It may be 
that the high proportion of such councils which are also district councils and hold 
quadrennial elections is a less important factor, and that closeness to an overall 
majority is the important variable. 
2'Close to a majority' has been previously defined as having 45 percent or more of the 
council seats; see Chapter Four, section four. 
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7.1.4. Other Deviat ions From Proportionality: Off ice Payoffs In 
Opera t ion? 
Table 7.1 (see above) also shows another deviation from committee proportionality 
in hung councils. There are 7 examples of one or more parties receiving more than 
their 'fair share', but not to the extent of being given an overall majority in 
committee. Such a practice is widespread in non-hung councils, and almost 
invariably involves the controlling party giving itself more seats than 
proportionality would allocate. However, in hung councils the possibility exists that 
some sort of payoff is taking place, and this offer the best explanation for the 
deviations from proportionality. In 3 of the 7 examples the difference does not 
appear to be significant. That said, there is a minority Labour administration in 2 of 
these cases, and in both these councils the Conservatives received one extra seat at 
the expense of the SLD. This could offer a small measure of support to Leach & 
Stewart's assertion in support of hypothesis 4.2 (see above), that Labour and 
Conservative groups act to exclude the SLD from significant influence, although there 
may be other reasons specific to those councils. However, the evidence strongly 
suggests that in the remaining 4 councils the explanation for the deviation from 
strict proportionality is that one party is being rewarded for its participation in a 
winning coalition. 
In one case, a Labour/SLD/Green/lndependent coalition has 'over-rewarded* the 
Independent group, mainly at the expense of a large Conservative group (with 39 
percent of the council seats). The small Independent group could have formed a 
minimum winning coalition with the Conservative former rulers, so the extra 
committee seats given to the Independents may be to prevent its defection. The 
Independents have also been given the chair of the housing committee, and the deputy 
chair of the policy and resources committee, which might support this supposition; 
these are 'plum* appointments for a small group. 
In the second case, a small Conservative group have been given double their 
entitlement (at the expense of the SLD) in a majority Independent/ Conservative 
coalition; the Independent group has 43 percent of the council seats, and the pivotal 
Conservatives could have formed a majority coalition with the SLD. In the third 
example, another Conservative/ Independent majority coalition, the Conservatives 
have taken one less seat than their entitlement in order to give one extra seat to the 
small Independent group. In the fourth case, a large Conservative group (47 percent 
of council seats) receives one less seat than it should, to the benefit of the combined 
Labour/SLD coalition. All these 4 cases appear to indicate that the deviation from 
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proportionality is for political reasons , in the first 3 examples to reward an 
essential partner who might otherwise form an alternative coalition, and in the final 
example to ensure a minimum winning SLD/Labour coalition more than a bare 
majority of committee seats. 
As expected, it has been demonstrated that proportionality is more widespread in 
hung councils than in single parly majority control councils. The hypothesis that 
Labour and Conservative groups act to prevent the S L D from receiving their fair 
share of committee places has received little support. The main influences affecting a 
deviation from proportionality in committees appear to be (a) numerical, in that 
when one party is close to a majority it may be granted (or may demand) a majority 
on committee, or (b) a s a payoff for participation in a winning coalition. However, 
in the majority of c a s e s the principles of proportionality appear to be well 
established in hung councils. 
We now move to an examination of other changes introduced by hung councils to 
reflect and cope with the new demands placed upon actors by hungness. There are a 
variety of responses to no party having an overall majority, and the following 
section analyses some of those reactions. 
S e c t i o n T w o : T h e Introduction of New C o n v e n t i o n s 
This section will first examine the proposition that hung counci ls will tend to 
introduce new conventions for business, and then examine the effect of influences 
such as electoral cycle and the length of time the council has been hung on the 
propensity to introduce such changes . Following this, the forms s u c h new 
conventions take are a s s e s s e d . Most changes concern the composition of committees, 
and the reasons for such changes are discussed;for example, the phenomenon of 'one-
party' committees, not uncommon in non-hung councils, is addressed. Finally, the 
changes discovered in the way committee chairmanships are awarded are a s s e s s e d in 
detail, and some pointers for coalition bargaining when chairs assume a 'technical' 
role are drawn. 
7.2.1. T h e N e c e s s i t y for C h a n g e 
T h e widespread introduction of proportional representat ion for committee 
membership is not the only 'deviation' from the standard practices of English local 
authorities that has been noted by previous research into hung councils. It appears 
unlikely that practices which work well when a council is controlled by a single 
majority party will be equally suited to life in a hung council, and most students of 
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hung local councils have commented on the likelihood of new conventions being 
Introduced to cope with the changed circumstances. As Stewart (1985) argues, the 
renewed Importance of committee and council votes means that "standing orders are 
likely to be re-drafted" and new officer-councillor conventions introduced (Stewart, 
1985, p.9).3 Some changes may be minor, while others are more far-reaching in 
their implications. Mellors (1989) notes the introduction of new procedures is 
spreading: 
"the most formalised example of such procedures are found in Cheshire 
where the chief executive introduced a document 'Conventions Regarding 
Relations between the Political Parties Represented on the Council ' 
shortly alter Cheshire first became hung in 1981. Several other councils 
now follow similar practices and local government officers themselves 
have often been instrumental in Introducing such measures a s a means of 
allowing them to manage the council effectively" (Mellors, 1989, p.103: 
see also Wendt, 1983, for a first hand account of the development of what 
are commonly known as the 'Cheshire Conventions')'*. 
Leach and Game (1989) also note the spread of such 'conventions documents', in the 
hung counties, although they report that there is little evidence of majority control 
councils adopting such convention documents (Leach & G a m e , 1989. pp.44-46). 
However, despite their wide adoption in hung councils, Leach & G a m e found "there 
has been surprisingly little reference to Conventions documents after they have been 
agreed" for the reason that: 
"the informal norms of co-operation and equality of a c c e s s , which made 
the agreement of conventions possible in the first p lace, are in most 
circumstances adequate in themselves to keep the procedural aspects of 
business in hung authorities running smoothly." (Leach & G a m e , 1989, 
p.45, emphasis in original) 
•^ It must be noted that 'conventions* and standing orders' are not the same thing. Standing 
orders *are concerned with the formal operation of council and committee business, for 
example, referral procedures, (and) public question time" white 'conventions' cover the 
areas of council business "for which changes in standing orders are not seen as appropriate 
... (such as] ... the pattern of access of members to information and advice" (Leach & 
Stewart, 1988. p.47). However, the difference is not clear cut; some procedures, for 
example, those concerned with emergency business, "may appear in either form" (Leach & 
Stewart, 1988, p.47) and the distinction is unimportant for the purposes of this research. 
The *Cheshlre Conventions', discussed here, Include amendments to both 'conventions' and 
'standing orders'. Accordingly the term 'conventions' is used except when specifically 
referring to 'standing orders'. 
^ Indeed, the 'Cheshire Conventions' were singled out by the Widdicombe Report as the 
model for all councils to adopt, whether they were hung or not (Widdicombe, 1986, Report 
Appendix H. pp.292-297). 
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Of course , this implies that the authorities which might be most In need of 
conventions, those with a high degree of conflict, may be the least likely to introduce 
them, a paradox noted by Leach & Stewart (1988. pp.47-48). Whatever, it does 
appear likely that new practices will need to be introduced in some form when an 
authority becomes hung, and there is unanimous agreement from observers of hung 
councils on this. Accordingly, the general hypothesis Is proposed that: 
4.3: HUNG C O U N C I L S W I L L T E N D T O I N T R O D U C E N E W C O N V E N T I O N S F O R 
T H E C O N D U C T O F B U S I N E S S . 
Two related hypotheses can be proposed. It may be that there is initial resistance, 
from both officers and members, to the introduction of new conventions. Blowers 
(1987) s e e s conventions as being gradually Introduced "over time" (1987, p.47), 
and it would not be surprising if actors delayed making fundamental changes to 
council practices; if so, the passage of time will affect the introduction or otherwise 
of new conventions. L e a c h (1985) provides support for this, pointing out that 
"authorities in which hungness has become the norm tend to have developed a 
distinctive set of mechanisms" ( L e a c h , 1985, p.16). Robin Wendt, from his 
experience as chief executive of Cheshire, points out that: 
"it is clear ... that the dynamics of working life in a situation of no-
majority do, to a large extent, determine the procedural arrangements, 
and that working styles themselves change as time progresses" (Wendt, 
1986, p.387) . 
Wendt also notes that, while the new ways of working became "well established and 
understood'* after about 18 months of hungness, "the learning process lasted well 
beyond that and still continues" (Wendt, 1986, p.376). This Implies an increasing 
likelihood of new conventions being established the longer the council Is hung. 
Therefore, it is also proposed that; 
4.4: T H E L O N G E R AN A U T H O R I T Y IS HUNG, T H E M O R E L I K E L Y T H A T N E W 
C O N V E N T I O N S W I L L B E I N T R O D U C E D . 
A further point can be made here. If it Is the c a s e that time is influencing the 
Introduction of new conventions, it may also be that the anticipation of long-term 
hungness will affect the willingness of actors to introduce new practices. If hungness 
is seen a s long-term, which may be more likely in councils holding quadrennial 
elections, then the actors in such councils may view the introduction of new working 
practices a s more desirable than would actors in councils electing by thirds. I^ellors 
agrees, and points out that with a four year pattern of elections: 
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"it seems reasonable to assume that the incentive for party groups to 
come to a working arrangement with other groups, if only to organise the 
proceedings of the authority, is greater than in an authority where the 
power-balance might only last for twelve months." (Mellors, 1989, 
p . 7 6 ) 
Therefore, it appears tenable to propose that: 
4 .5 : C O U N C I L S H O L D I N G Q U A D R E N N I A L E L E C T I O N S W I L L B E M O R E 
L I K E L Y T O I N T R O D U C E NEW C O N V E N T I O N S THAN C O U N C I L S E L E C T I N G B Y 
T H I R D S . 
T a b l e 7.3: Introduction of Rule C h a n g e s by T i m e Hung a n d By 
E l e c t o r a l C y c l e 
All Councils {n=58) 
Long Term Hung (n=23) 
Short Term Hung (n=35) 
Quadrennial Elections (n=34) 
Annual Elections (n=24) 
Rule Change 
41 (70.7%) 
14 (60.9%) 
27 (77.1%) 
26 (76.5%) 
15 (62.5%) 
No Rule Change 
17 (29.3%) 
9 (39.1%) 
8 (22.9%) 
8 (23.5%) 
9 (37.5%) 
The results shown in Table 7.3 (above) quite clearly support the hypothesis that 
hung councils will introduce new conventions for the operation of council business. 
Only one chief executive in the control group of non-hung counci ls reported the 
existence of unusual committee arrangements in his authority, in that c a s e a two 
year time limit for council chairmanships. In hung councils 'unusual* committee 
arrangements abound, and a clear majority (70.7 percent) of chief executives 
answered that the council had introduced changes in the organisation of business 
since becoming hung. 
7.2.2 F a c t o r s Affect ing the Introduct ion of New C o n v e n t i o n s 
As hypothesis 4.5 proposed, councils holding quadrennial elections are more likely to 
have introduced changes to their operating procedures. It appears logical, a s Mellors 
proposes, that councils faced with a significant period before the possibility of a 
return to single party majority control will soon become aware that things need to be 
changed. The same pressures do not exist if an election only 12 months away could 
return the council to 'normality*. 
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It also appears 'logical' to assume, as hypothesis 4.4 does , that changes will be 
introduced over time, and that long term hung councils should therefore be more 
likely to have introduced new conventions. All the councils in the long term category 
(including those with a four yearly cycle) had experienced at least one election while 
they were hung, so all were aware that hungness might last longer than the next 
twelve months. Therefore, the findings shown in Table 7.3 are very surprising. Long 
term councils were less likely to have introduced new conventions; only three-fifths 
(60.9 percent) had, compared to nearly four-fifths (77.1 percent) of short term 
hung councils. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is difficult to explain, and goes 
against the expectations of previous research. An examination of the differences 
between the characteristics of councils which have introduced new conventions and 
councils which have not introduced new conventions reveals a number of other 
differences which may be significant. 
The finding that short-term hung councils are more likely to have introduced rule 
changes than long-term councils is surprising. However, other differences are more 
understandable. Table 7.3 has already shown that councils holding quadrennial 
elections are more likely to have introduced rule changes than those holding annual 
elections, and the reasons for this expected occurrence have already been discussed. 
As would also be expected, nearly three-quarters of councils (71.1 percent) where 
formal administrative arrangements have been agreed have also introduced changes 
to the operation of the council , compared to exactly half of those councils with 
informal administrative arrangements. Those local authorities with political parties 
who can agree to bestow official 'formal' status on an administration would seem to be 
more aware of the need for stable arrangements, and probably also more likely to 
recognise the need to introduce new ways of working. 
There also appears to be a political dimension at work. Only one of the 11 local 
authorities previously controlled by Labour had not introduced changes to their 
working practices, compared to 14 of the 42 former Conservative controlled local 
authorities. Again, quite what this indicates is uncertain. It may be that traditional 
Conservative rulers are more reluctant to agree to changes in working practices, but 
such reluctance cannot hold out against a majority of previous opposition parties who 
want new practices introduced. There was a wide variety of current administrations 
in these 14 councils, so these are not predominantly c a s e s of ex-rulers clinging onto 
power and vetoing suggested changes. Certainly, the current political composition of 
an administration, and whether it w a s a majority coalition or a minority 
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administration, made no discernable difference to the Introduction of new 
conventions. 
It must also be noted that councils which have not introduced rule changes might not 
necessari ly be councils which are opposed to change or character ised by low 
consensus and frequent conflict. Although Leach & Stewart posit that those councils 
most in need of new conventions may be the least likely to Introduce them (1988, 
p.47), It could be that the reason some councils have not Introduced new conventions 
Is because they already have many of the innovations Introduced by apparently more 
open councils. However, only 44.4 percent of the councils which said they had not 
introduced rule changes had proportionality for committees. As proportionality is 
commonly seen as an essential change to administrative practices is hung councils, 
this suggests that the majority of councils not introducing new conventions might be 
opposed to change. 
The difficulty of providing general and convincing explanations for some of the 
differences in the characteristics of councils introducing new conventions and those 
not introducing such changes must be admitted. While there Is a danger that all such 
differences could be 'explained away* in this manner, it must again be pointed out 
that local authorities in Britain are separate political s y s t e m s with different 
histories, cultures and politics. Given this. It would be unwise to expect them 
necessari ly to conform to an easily dtscernable pattern. This point will again be 
demonstrated when looking at the form such changes to previous conventions have 
taken. That is, there are a wide variety of solutions sought to the problems raised by 
hungness; the forms such new conventions take will now be analysed. 
7.2.3. T h e F o r m s New C o n v e n t i o n s T a k e 
An examination of the changes introduced in hung councils (see Table 7.4 below) 
raises one point which needs to be addressed before examining the findings in depth. 
Despite Leach & Game (1989, p.44)) noting the spread of conventions documents, 
the listing of the changes hung councils have Introduced shows that comparatively 
few chief executives have reported the introduction of major revisions to standing 
orders or the *formalisation' of new conventions. However, many of the councils had 
introduced a number of separate Innovations which, taken together, could be seen as 
being very major overhauls of the way they conduct their business. Also, chief 
executives were not asked the specific question 'have you Introduced a conventions 
document?'. If they had been asked this question, many more would have answered 
'yes', as it is highly probable that the changes chief executives and party leaders did 
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make to council practices were promulgated in the form of a document. Leach & 
Game's findings indicate that most hung counties have introduced such documents. 
Therefore, the relatively small number of counci ls who actually report the 
introduction of formalised conventions or major revisions to standing orders (only 8 
councils of the 41 introducing changes to their rules) is almost certainly not 
especial ly significant. What is clear from this research is that the majority of 
changes made concern the committee structures and the allocation of committee 
c h a i r s . 
T a b l e 7.4: C h a n g e s to C o u n c i l P r a c t i c e s 
Type of Change Number of Councils 
P.R. for Committees 22 
Formalised Conventions/Standing Orders 8 
Changes to Committee Structures 23 
Changes to System of Committee Chairs 23 
Public Oueslions Introduced 2 
All Party Briefings 2 
Most Senior Councillor Becomes Mayor 1 
'Minor Alterations (unspecified) 1 
An assertion that English local authorities are individual political systems with a 
variety of political and institutional responses to becoming hung needs little further 
evidence than the great variety of responses reported by chief executives. Table 7.4 
lists 23 changes to committee structure and 23 changes to the system of allocating or 
structuring committee chairs, and changes in both these categories were almost 
certainly instigated on the 8 councils who replied that conventions were formalised 
or new standing orders were instituted. These changes, together with the 22 c a s e s 
where proportionality was introduced, conclusively demonstrate the importance of 
committees in local government, especially when the council becomes hung. The 
findings broadly listed in Table 7.4 will now be examined in more detail. 
C h a n g e s to T h e Commit tee S t ruc ture 
An examination of the 23 specific changes In the organisation of committees, reveals 
a number of approaches to the 'problems' of hungness. The most frequent changes 
reported were the abolition of ex officio membership (with 6 citations) and the 
introduction of a substitute members scheme (5 c a s e s ) . Both of these changes 
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demonstrate the pressures on the ruling parly or parties in hung councils. Much 
greater pressure is placed on members to attend committees when a council is hung, 
and the introduction of substitute member schemes enables the ruling group to 
replace a member who is absent by a 'reserve'. As Wendt observes, in a hung council, 
"a single absentee from a committee meeting can make all the difference to the 
outcome of a decision", although in Cheshire only a 'few senior members are allowed 
to nominate substitutes at committee meetings" (Wendt, 1986, p.375). It c a n 
therefore make a great deal of sense to a ruling group or coalition to allow the 
substitution of members. 
The abolition of ex officio membership also makes sense in a hung council. Indeed. 
Clay (1982) in an Association of Liberal Councillors handbook, pointed out to 
Liberal councillors that "to make proportionality effective, you may also need to 
abolish ex officio places on committees, or at least remove their voting rights" 
(Clay. 1982, p.6). In a non-hung council, the introduction of ex officio m e m b e r s , 
whether partisan or not, is largely irrelevant, especially when the ruling party has 
given itself a comfortable majority in committee. As section one of this chapter 
showed, the ruling party in a non-hung council almost invariably gave itself more 
committee seats than its due. In a hung council the committees are finely balanced, 
and ex officio membership of committees is more problematic. The committee 
composition has almost certainly been the result of intense negotiations, and ex 
officio membership can easily wreck the delicate political balance introduced by 
many administrations. That said, one hung district council (with a coalition 
administration) gave the leader of the council ex officio membership of all 
committees. This may indicate nothing more than a desire by the leader to keep a 
measure of control, although it is difficult to imagine any leader being able to 
maintain 100 percent attendance at so many committee meetings. 
A number of other changes were made to the structure and operation of committees, 
including committee members being delegated by a vote of the full council, reductions 
in both the size and number of committees, and new emergency procedures. All these 
changes are unremarkable, and might be expected when a council becomes hung. For 
example, Wendt (1986) reported that the spread of party ' spokesmen ' on 
committees, with the spokesman working alongside the committee chairman in 
dealing with urgent business between meetings, means "virtually every member of 
the council ... except those who choose otherwise ... Is politically active and 
politically important in what they do" (Wendl , 1986. pp.374-375) . In such 
circumstances, cuts In the size and number of committees conserves manpower. 
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O n e - P a r t y C o m m i t t e e s 
Another change reported was the abolition of the 'chairman's committee', and this 
raises an important point. In majority control councils it is not unusual for one-
party committees to exist, and these will often be seen a s an unofficial 'cabinet*. In 
this way, formal recognition is given to the "reality of majority party control and to 
the collective party leadership" (Stewart, 1983, p.45). In some authorities this 
formal recognition is via a one-party policy and resources committee, often 
characterised a s the nearest thing in local government to a cabinet. In other 
authorities, a sub-committee of the policy and resources committee or a 'chairmans 
committee' fulfils the role (Laver, Railings & Thrasher. 1987. p.4; see also the c a s e 
study of Devon). Stewart maintains that these approaches "have developed to provide 
an official and recognised means of communication between the officer structure and 
the party leadership" (Stewart, 1983, p.45). It s e e m s unlikely that such 
committees could exist in hung councils a s . quite apart from the adverse reactions 
such a committee would generate in other party groups, any decisions or strategies 
decided therein would probably not stand up in a full council meeting. Therefore, one 
would expect to find that: 
4.6: O N E - P A R T Y C O M M I T T E E S W I L L E I T H E R B E D I S B A N D E D O R A D O P T 
P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y W H E N A C O U N C I L B E C O M E S HUNG. 
A s expected, this was indeed the c a s e ; in all c a s e s , one-party committees had either 
disbanded, adopted proportionality, or had multi-party membership in line with 
other council committees. However, only 8 of 62 chief executives (12.9 percent) 
admitted the previous existence of one-party committees, which were the policy and 
resources commitlee (2 c a s e s ) , finance sub-committee (2), chairmen and officers 
committee (1), staffing sub-committee (1), and a 'local issue' committee (1) (one 
chief executive gave no information on the nature of the committee). In addition, only 
a quarter of the 20 councils in the control group of non-hung councils replied that 
such a committee existed in their local authority. This appears to indicate that such 
one-party committees are not as widespread as observers have argued. 
However, these replies do not necessari ly mean that the remaining counci ls 
(whether hung or in the control group of non-hung councils) did not have such a 
committee, as the example of Devon shows. As discussed in more detail in the c a s e 
study of Devon County Counci l , the other party leaders, despite their long 
experiences as councillors, were totally unaware of the existence of the 'unofficial 
cabinet' of Conservative committee chairmen and leading officers which existed prior 
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to Devon becoming hung in 1985. The chief executive of the time did not Inform this 
survey of the previous existence of this committee, and it may be that the previous 
existence of such a committee is still a secret in other hung councils. Given the 
formal position of officers in local government as servants of the whole council, 
theoretically available to all councillors regardless of rank or parly, the oHicial 
existence of one-party committees may be difficult to acknowledge. If this is so . and 
Devon's c a s e provides evidence that opposition council lors (even with long 
experience) may be unaware of their existence, such committees may be more 
widespread than the responses to this research would initially appear to indicate. 
That said, there appear to be no such committees currently in hung councils, which 
is as would be expected. 
We have seen that there are a number of changes to the composition of committees 
and the award of committee places in hung councils. The abolition of the one-party 
committee, and in particular the disbanding of the 'unofficial cabinet' comprising 
committee chairmen, demonstrate that there will a lso be c h a n g e s in the way 
committee chairmanships are awarded and in the function of the chair. The award of 
chairs in single party majority control councils is confined to the ruling party. 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that is no longer the c a s e when a council 
becomes hung. 
7.2.4. C h a n g e s to the A l locat ion of Commit tee C h a i r s 
There were 23 reported changes to the process by which chairs are allocated. The 
most common change, reported by 6 councils, is that chairs are rotated between 
parties, usually from one committee meeting to the next. Th is might indicate a 
reluctance to assume control, if it were not that 'formal administrations' were just 
as likely to introduce such a measure as 'informal administrations' and that it was 
not necessari ly just members of the stated administration who took part in the 
rotating chair arrangement. Five councils report that the chairman a s s u m e s a 
•technical' role, merely concerned with the correct conduct of the meeting and 
presenting the committee decisions to the full counci l , rather than the more 
'ministerial' and policy controlling role chairmen in non-hung councils are usually 
associated with (see Wendt, 1986. p.374; Byrne, 1986, p.152). In a further 5 
c a s e s , arrangements were introduced whereby all the parties on the council took 
permanent chairs. Other changes included a two year time limit on chairmanships, a 
limit of one chair per councillor only, the allocation of the deputy chair to a different 
political party than the party allocated the chair, and chairs being appointed by the 
whole council. The chief executive who responded that 'no party takes the chairs' gave 
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no Idea how committee business was being run, although It may just have been that 
chairs were elected on a technical basis, meeting by meeting. 
The changes in the role of the chair, particularly those concerned with rotation and 
the introduction of a 'technical' function, indicate that chairmanships and deputy 
chairmanships might be less valued In hung councils. However, the findings shown In 
previous chapters indicate that white many group leaders do value chairs less highly 
In hung councils, at least half of those participating In government saw real worth In 
holding committee chairs. Whatever, in those councils which have Introduced a 
purely technical role for chairs or rotating chairs, it Is highly unlikely that 'office* 
payoffs, in the form of chairs would be sought by party groups. In such authorities, it 
would seem more rational for actors to pursue policy payoffs, another Indication of 
the effect institutional factors might have on the process of coalition formation. 
For example, the introduction of technical chair arrangements could well Inhibit the 
formation of formal coalitions. However, it must be pointed out that there was no 
discernable connection between the type of changes made and the type of authority. 
Its electoral cycle, or the type or formality of administrative arrangements. For 
example, formal coalitions were just as likely to have technical chairs as informal 
minority administrations. This might indicate that It is policy payoffs which Is the 
driving force behind coalition formation in hung councils. However, the caveats made 
above must be repeated, and the title of 'chairman' still carries great weight In local 
government circles. It must also be pointed out, as Chapter Four details (see Table 
4.7). that 40.7 percent of hung councils have administrations in which chairs are 
shared, and a majority of politicians actually participating in office value the chairs 
they hold (see Chapter Four. Table 4.8). Therefore, chairs can still be sought after 
rewards of office. 
What these findings do demonstrate is that most changes to the operations of hung 
councils concern committee chairmanships and the committee structure, and the 
changes demonstrate the need of participants to adjust procedures In the light of 
changed circumstances. One 'procedure' which might also experience difficulty in 
surviving the loss of one party control is the tight relationship chief officers have 
with the leaders of the dominant party. It appears highly probable that Institutional 
changes to increase the a c c e s s of other party groups to chief officers will be 
instituted when a council becomes hung, and this point will now be examined. 
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S e c t i o n T h r e e : Institutional C h a n g e s Affect ing the A c c e s s of A c t o r s 
Th is section opens with an examination of changes to institutional pract ices 
concerning a c c e s s to chief officers, and a s s e s s e s the responses of party leaders in 
hung and non-hung councils with regard to their contact with chief officers. Given 
the crucial importance of the local authority budget, a c c e s s to chief officers during 
budget making is then detailed and analysed. Finally, there Is a brief examination of 
possible changes to the public's participation in council and committee meetings. 
7.3.1. A c c e s s T o Chie f Of f icers 
A s already noted a number of times, most studies of local government have 
commented on the close relationship between the ruling party leaders and chief 
officers, those actors Stoker has called "the joint elite" (Stoker. 1988, p.85; see 
also Saunders , 1980; Alexander, 1982). While this relationship is rarely without 
tensions, and Widdicombe noted that the tensions had increased as councillors became 
"clearer about their political goals and priorities and more determined to ensure that 
these are implemented" (Widdicombe, 1986. p.125), there is an inevitable 
c l o s e n e s s between chief officers and controlling party leaders in a majority 
controlled council . Equally inevitably, the onset of hungness must affect this 
hegemony. Chief officers and a single party elite can no longer operate as a "tightly-
knit hierarchy" (Cockburn. 1977, p.6) controlling the operations of the council 
without regard to other party groups. The effects of hungness on the dynamics of the 
officer-councillor relationship are discussed in the following chapter, but hungness 
may well affect the institutional structure in which officers and councillors inter-
act. Carter (1986, p.15) found that officers and members in all the hung county 
councils he examined were aware of the particular importance of communications. 
There is considerable support for the belief that changes will be introduced to make 
a c c e s s to chief officers easier for all party groups a s decision making procedures 
become, of necessity, more open (Leach & Game, 1989, pp.38-39). For example. 
Leach & Stewart point out that: 
"in a majority controlled authority, it is unusual for anyone other than a 
committee chair (and vice-chair ) to be regularly briefed about 
committee agendas ... such exclusive briefing arrangements cannot 
survive in most hung authorities ... sooner or later, the right to 
confidential officer briefings for ail party groups is likely to be 
established" (Leach & Stewart, 1988, p,49; emphasis in original). 
Mellors (1989) supports this, and notes that "the introduction of briefing rights 
from officers for all parties and related procedural changes ... appear a s frequent 
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outcomes in hung councils" (Mellors. 1989, p.103). Accordingly, It might be 
expected that: 
4.7: E Q U A L B R I E F I N G R I G H T S F O R A L L P A R T Y G R O U P S W I L L T E N D T O 
B E E S T A B L I S H E D IN HUNG C O U N C I L S . 
However, as Table 7.4 (above) indicates, only 2 chief executives answered that they 
had introduced all-party briefings for council bus iness . While 'all-party briefings' 
are not necessarily the same thing as 'equal briefing rights', the lack of a response In 
this general area appears to disprove hypothesis 4.7. According to chief executives, 
most hung councils do not introduce briefing rights for all the parties on the council. 
However, the 'constitutionar position in British local government Is that a c c e s s Is 
already available for all councillors, whether in government or not. Therefore, it 
may be that (theoretically at least) chief executives felt that equal briefing rights 
already existed in their councils prior to them becoming hung. This does not mean 
that chief executives are unaware of the problems facing opposition party leaders. As 
one chief executive put it, while prior to his council becoming hung any group could 
have asked for a briefing: 
"only the controlling group would have asked for [a briefing], the others 
wouldn't have asked for it ... I think this perception that we were servants 
of the leading group [was] very widely held and therefore [other groups] 
probably expected to get a brush off. I suppose ... some of them may have 
been brushed off and I can't be sure about that." 
Therefore, the question of a c c e s s should really be addressed to politicians, who are 
more likely to note (or acknowledge) any improvements in a c c e s s than chief officers. 
It appears logical to assume that given the increased likelihood of more parties being 
involved in decision-making in hung counc i ls , there would be considerable 
differences in a c c e s s to chief officers between hung and non-hung councils. 
However, as Table 7.5 (below) shows, group leaders in hung and non-hung councils 
recorded very similar responses regarding a c c e s s to officers. Very high figures of 
94 percent of leaders on hung councils and 97.6 percent of leaders on non-hung 
councils reported that access was open or very open. 
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Tab le 7.5: A c c e s s of G r o u p S p o k e s m e n to 
C h i e f O f f i c e r s 
(n=117: n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
Hung Non-Hung 
Very Open 77.6% 68 .3% 
Open 16.4% 29 .3% 
Limited 4 .3% 2.4% 
No Access 1.7% 
Tab le 7.6: Difference In A c c e s s of Group S p o k e s m e n to Ch ie f 
Of f icers S i n c e B e c o m i n g Hung 
Response Total Con Lab SLD Ind 
n=l 17 n=37 n=30 n=40 n=8 
Much Improved 23.4% 5.7% 30 .9% 36 .1% 12.5% 
Improved 23.4% 5.7% 20.9% 47.2% -
No Difference 47.&% 74.3% 48.1% 16.7% 87 .5% 
Deteriorated 5.4% 14.3% - - -
Much Deteriorated _ 
(n.b. table excludes no response) 
Despite this, as Table 7.6 records, nearly half (46.8 percent) of group leaders in 
hung councils reported an improvement in their a c c e s s to senior officers since 
becoming hung. This suggests that there is a difference in the relative a c c e s s of 
councillors in hung and non-hung authorities. Perhaps the most likely explanation 
for the large number of councillors who saw a c c e s s as open in non-hung councils is 
that opposition leaders in non-hung councils are unaware of the degree of a c c e s s the 
ruling party in their authority ach ieves . It is certainly the c a s e that former 
opposition parties in hung councils overwhelmingly saw their a c c e s s to chief officers 
a s having improved since becoming hung, a s Table 7.6 indicates. A large majority of 
Conservative leaders reported no difference in their a c c e s s to chief officers, while 
all the politicians reporting a deterioration in a c c e s s were Conservat ive former 
rulers. As might be expected, the overwhelming majority of S L D leaders (83.3 
percent), none of whom had previously held office, saw their a c c e s s to chief officers 
as having improved. 
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For some actors in hung councils, the increased a c c e s s w a s of "limited value", with 
one Social and Liberal Democrat (SLD) leader reporting that the ruling group got 
"superior service". A number of party leaders replied that the openness of a c c e s s 
depended very much on the attitudes of individual chief officers towards the 
particular group seeking information. One Labour leader, replying that a c c e s s to 
officers was "limited", elaborated "we don't trust most of them a s they s e e part of 
their role as being to defend the ruling administration". Another Labour leader, who 
saw no difference in a c c e s s to officers since becoming hung, made a point echoed by 
some chief executives when he replied that, "it's the recognition and response of the 
officers that has changed...they now play the political game". 
The 'political game' is played most fiercely on local authorities at budget making 
time. Despite the improved a c c e s s reported by councillors in hung councils, equal 
briefing rights for all groups does not appear to be an established feature of officer-
councillor relationships in the normal course of events. However, it may be that 
there is one time above all when equal a c c e s s to officers is really important in hung 
councils, and that is when the annual budget is negotiated. The possibility of equal 
briefing rights concerning budgetary negotiations will now be examined. 
7.3.2. A c c e s s in Budget Making 
Given the importance of the annual budget in English local authorities, it appears 
likely that a s many groups a s possible will endeavour to make their influence felt. In 
order for this to happen, the expert advice of treasury officers is essential . Mellors 
(1983) notes that equal briefing facilities are an important "institutional pay-off" 
in hung councils, and that with the most crucial negotiations involving the annual 
budget, it would be expected that all parties would have a c c e s s to chief officers 
concerning budgetary negotiations (Mellors. 1983, p.244) . In single party 
majority control councils, the process of budget making is dominated by chief 
officers and the political elite of the dominant party (Rosenberg, 1989, pp.223-
225). It appears unavoidable that this narrow decision making process will be 
opened out when no party has an overall majority. 
Given that the "making of a budget and the fixing of the rate [is] the major moment of 
truth for hung authorities", a crucial time when an administration is perhaps most 
prone to collapse (Leach, 1985, p.22), it is vital that as many groups as possible 
feel involved in the decisions being taken. This need not be a recipe for protracted 
decision making. Leach & Game (1989) argue that it is a 'myth' that the budgetary 
process in hung councils is a time-consuming process . They maintain that the 
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Increase in informal and formal consultation prior to the council debate lays the 
groundwork and narrows down the area of disagreement (Leach & G a m e . 1989, 
pp.48-49). In some authorities this consultation process may be highly formal; for 
example, Cheshire has introduced an all-party budget sub-committee. It appears 
likely that other hung councils will eventually decide, either from choice or 
necessi ty , that some sort of all-party or multi-party forum where a degree of 
consensus can be established, is necessary to improve the budgetary process. 
At the very least, it would appear essential that wider consultation about the annual 
budget would need to be undertaken in hung councils. This may extend no further than 
offering officer advice to all the political groups while they attempt to make their 
own budget proposals. Whatever, it is clear that "negotiations over the budget are 
critical in hung authorities, both for the future of the current administration, and 
the policy priorities for the coming year" (Leach & Stewart, 1988, p.51). Given 
this, it appears likely that: 
4.7: B U D G E T A R Y P R O P O S A L S A R E MORE L I K E L Y T O B E D I S C U S S E D WITH 
A L L P A R T Y G R O U P S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S THAN IN NON-HUNG C O U N C I L S . 
There is no doubt that hypothesis 4.7 is correct. Party leaders were asked whether 
budgetary proposals were discussed with all groups on the council, and as Table 7.7 
conclusively demonstrates, this was more likely to occur in hung councils than in 
single party majority control councils. 
T a b l e 7.7: Extent of Budgeta ry D i s c u s s i o n s 
(n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
With All Groups? Hung (n=117) Non-Hung (n=42) 
Yes 54.5% 25.07o 
No 45.5% 75.0% 
While only a quarter of party leaders in non-hung counties replied that proposals 
were d iscussed with all groups compared to just over half (54.5 percent) in hung 
councils, there is a still a considerable minority of leaders in hung councils whose 
reply to the question was negative. However, quite a few of those who replied that 
there were not discussions with all the party groups gave details of just which 
groups were consulted. Their replies (detailed in Table 7.8) demonstrate that the 
consultation process in hung councils was more varied than in non-hung councils. In 
addition, some groups had taken a positive decision not to be involved by refusing to 
participate in the process, an option not open to groups in non-hung councils. 
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T a b l e 7.8: Fur ther R e s p o n s e of Party L e a d e r s 
A n s w e r i n g *No* to the Q u e s t i o n of Whether Budgetary 
P r o p o s a l s Were D i s c u s s e d With All G r o u p s 
numbers responding 
Response Hung Non-Hung 
With Administration Only 12 16 
Informal Talks Only With Other Groups 5 3 
With Other Groups in Budget Ctte Only 8 5 
Prepared Separate Budgets 7 -
Offered - But Other Groups Refused 5 -
With Policy & Resources Chair Only 3 1 
Only After Decision Taken - 1 
r^iscellaneous 3 -
Totals 43 26 
There were comparatively few c a s e s in hung counci ls where the budgetary 
consultations were exclusively with the administration; only 12 party leaders 
replied that this was the c a s e . Even if all parties were not formally involved, there 
were a number of examples of the willingness of actors to widen out the process of 
d iscussion. In both hung and non-hung councils there were authorities where all 
parties were involved in informal d iscussions and where the discussion process 
extended to other groups in the budget or finance committees. That said, there are 
also a number of examples detailed in Table 7.8 which show the reluctance of some 
groups to negotiate in hung councils, although a s already noted, opposition parties in 
non-hung councils do not have even this negative option. In 5 c a s e s , the involvement 
of all groups in budget discussions was apparently offered, but refused by other 
(usually unspecified) groups. In 7 c a s e s , the party groups produced separate 
budgets, which must presumably have then started a negotiating process; one 
respondent reported that the officers, rather than the party leaders, then negotiated 
a settlement. In another case , a Conservative leader answered *no' to the question of 
whether the budget was discussed with all parties, and continued: "each of the parties 
prepared their own budgets but after an impasse, the Conservat ives and S L D did 
agree a budget and carried it". These responses certainly suggest a 'dynamic' budget 
making process in hung councils, whatever the formal consultation process may be. 
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7.3.3. Greater O p e n n e s s in C o u n t y C o u n c i l s 
Generally, although there was little difference in the responses which could be 
attributed to either the political composition or the type of administration (that Is, 
whether a coalition or minority administration), there was one surprising finding. 
While all parties were involved in budgetary d iscuss ions in the majority (72 
percent) of Conservative and Labour minority administrations, those councils where 
the S L D or Alliance ruled alone were generally less open, with only 37.5 percent of 
actors responding that all parties were involved in budget negotiations. This goes 
against the 'popular image' of S L D councils as being more open in their decision 
making, it was also the c a s e that actors in county councils were far more likely to 
report that negotiations were with all party groups. Nearly three quarters (71.8 
percent) of party leaders in county councils reported this, while less than half the 
actors in district councils reported all party budget negotiations. Supporting this, an 
overwhelming majority of county councils have proportionality on committees (see 
Section One of this chapter), suggesting that actors in the county councils are more 
committed to 'all-party decision making'. 
The reason previously offered for the greater number of county councils with 
proportionality was that the S L D is more powerful in counties and its commitment to 
proportionality and 'fairness' will thus be more likely to prevail. This is a less 
seductive explanation for the greater openness in counties when the 'poor record' of 
S L D minority administrations regarding equal a c c e s s on budgetary negotiations is 
considered. However, it may be that 'resentment' at the S L D ' s prominent position, 
rather than S L D unwillingness to extend the negotiating process to all groups, offers 
a reason for the low number of S L D minority administrations where all parties are 
involved in budgetary negotiations. 
It may also be that the higher public profile of county councils and the longer 
tradition of non-partisan politics of some of them (see for example, Wendt, 1986, 
p.373) offer better explanations for the apparently greater o p e n n e s s of the 
structures of decision making than factors connected with the S L D ' s position in 
counties. County councils have much bigger budgets and take more important 
decisions than district councils, and this, combined with a tradition of, a s one county 
councillor said "judging the issues on their merits", may well persuade the actors 
that notions of 'fairness' should prevail. If so, they will need less persuasion to open 
up decision making procedures and introduce proportionality when their council 
becomes hung. 
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7.3.4. P u b l i c A c c e s s 
Finally, some observers have pointed to the possibility of increased a c c e s s for 
another group of actors, not often seen as important in the study of council practices, 
that is, the public. It has been suggested that certain types of policy connected with 
the principle of 'open government', for example, public a c c e s s to information and the 
right to raise questions at council and committee meetings, are more likely to 
introduced or strengthened in hung councils (Leach & G a m e . 1989, pp.55-56). 
Given the public commitment of the S L D to the principle of 'open government' (see 
•Alliance Action in Local Government', 1986. p.24), It may well be that their 
Influence in hung councils has succeeded in opening the doors to greater public 
participation. However, only a few local authorities reported allowing public 
questions during committee or council meetings. While those who commented on this 
agreed with the Conservative leader who felt that "in practice I don't honestly think 
it did achieve very much", one S L D leader also thought it was , "at the very least a 
good public relations exercise". However, it does not appear to have made much 
impact on the practices of hung local authorities, and in Devon the right for the 
public to ask questions, introduced in 1985 by the Al l iance/Labour 'working 
arrangement', w a s dropped when the Conservat ives returned to overall power in 
1 9 8 9 . 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
A number of points c a n be made from this examination of the c h a n g e s to 
organisat ional pract ices when single party majority government b e c o m e s 
impossible. It is clear that hung councils are more likely to have proportionality for 
committee membership than non-hung counci ls. However, the requirement for 
proportionality on all committees enshrined in the 1989 Local Government Act 
means that any future study will not be able to consider either the granting of 
proportionality or the manipulation of committee places as a possible sign of pay-
offs to actors. Whatever, the higher percentage of hung councils with proportionality 
for committee membership suggests that notions of 'fairness' are more likely to 
predominate in hung councils (or perhaps more likely to be unavoidable politically). 
Over two-thirds of all hung counci ls , and all but one county counci l , had 
proportionality on committees, compared to the same proportion of non-hung 
councils which did not have proportionality for committee membership. 
The one-third of hung councils which did not have proportionality for committee 
membership revealed some interesting findings. In most c a s e s where a minority 
parly took a majority of seats on the policy and resources committee, that party was 
c lose to an overall majority on the counci l . T h i s , rather than the political 
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composition of the council or the type of local authority, appears to offer the best 
explanation for the phenomenon. There were also local authorities where, although 
no one party was given a majority, the distribution of committee sea ts differed 
significantly from the principle of proportional representation. In most c a s e s where 
one party received more than its 'fair share' of committee places, this appears to be 
a s a pay-off for participation in a winning coalition. 
As expected, a majority of hung councils have introduced new conventions for the 
organisation of council business. However, there were some unexpected differences 
between such councils and those which had not introduced new conventions. 
Surprisingly, short-term hung councils were more likely to have introduced new 
conventions than long-term hung councils, and it is difficult to find any convincing 
reasons for this result, which goes against the findings of previous researchers. 
However, other differences were more understandable: for example, councils holding 
quadrennial elections, who might be expected to have at the very least 4 years of 
hungness in front of them, were more prone to introduce changes than those with 
annual elections, who might foresee an early return to 'normality*. 
A scrutiny of the changes made shows that most new conventions concerned changes to 
the structure of committees and the p r o c e s s of distributing committee 
chairmanships. Most changes made to committee membership, for example the 
abolition of ex officio membership and the introduction of substitute members 
s c h e m e s , were easily understandable in terms of the increased pressures on 
councillors when a council becomes hung. For example, substitute member schemes 
allow a degree of flexibility concerning councillor attendance. In addition, the 
abolition of ex officio membership, as well as reducing the pressures on leading 
parly members traditionally given committee p laces by virtue of their official 
position, removes the possibility of the balance of power on a committee being 
changed by non-council members whose political allegiance Is undeclared. Other 
changes, for example the abolition of one-party committees, appear inevitable when 
a council becomes hung. 
The committee chair also assumes a different role in many hung councils, and some 
changes could be crucial to the process of bargaining in hung councils. For example, 
•rotating' chairs or those which have merely a 'technical' status are unlikely to be 
seen as adequate rewards for office seeking politicians, and in such councils it may be 
that policy payoffs and informal administrative arrangements are prevalent (a 
possibility examined in Chapter Nine). Formal coalition administrations were just 
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as likely as informal administrations to have such limitations concerning the role of 
the chair, which offers a further indication that office payoffs may not be the 
motivation behind coalition formation for the majority of parties in local councils. 
Indeed, the majority of changes to the status of the chair involve just such a change of 
emphasis, towards a less political role for the chairman. This is accompanied by 
wider a c c e s s to chief officers, changes which may indicate a move to a more 
consensual form of decision making. 
However, although a substantial minority of party leaders report improved a c c e s s to 
chief officers when a council becomes hung, very few councils appear to have 
introduced formal improvements in a c c e s s . Th is may be b e c a u s e the official 
constitutional position in local authorities is that all groups already have equal 
rights of a c c e s s . Whatever, former opposition parties were more likely to see a c c e s s 
a s having improved, and former rulers were the only respondents who reported that 
a c c e s s had deteriorated since becoming hung. This improved a c c e s s extended to 
negotiations at budget making time. As might be expected, budgetary discussions are 
far more likely to involve all of the parly groups in hung councils than non-hung 
counci ls. Even in hung local authorities without all party budget negotiations, 
discussion was still wider than in non-hung councils. Also, just as county councils 
were more likely to have proportionality for committee membership, so they were 
more likely to have greater a c c e s s to chief officers and wider involvement in the 
process of budget making. This may be because of the higher profile of the S L D in 
county councils, although more convincing reasons may be the long history of non-
partisan politics and the much higher public profile of decision making in the 
counties. 
The findings of this chapter suggest actors in hung councils recognise the need for a 
greater fairness in the distribution of committee seats and display a willingness to 
come up with solutions to the administrative problems, particularly in the form of 
new committee arrangements and changes to the status of committee chairs. The 
increase in a c c e s s to chief officers, especially in budgetary matters, indicates that 
there will be a a wider involvement in the crucial decision making processes and 
suggests the possibility of a dissemination of 'power* when a council becomes hung. 
The nature of such changes in power relationships, however, is a matter of much 
conjecture, and the questions of where influence lies and the possibility of a re-
distribution of power in hung councils form the core of the following chapter. 
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Introduction 
The preceding chapter has looked at a number of arear vhere hung councils have 
adjusted their procedures in order to take account of the new problems which arise 
with hungness. It has been shown that structures geared to handle a situation where 
one party controls the process of decision making will need to be changed to 
accomodate the new relationships between actors. It appears common s e n s e to argue 
that if structures need to be changed when a council becomes hung, actors behaviour 
must also change to take account of this. Indeed, the mere fact that structures have 
been changed indicates that at least some actors have recognised the need for change. 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine some of the effects of such changes.on the 
behaviour and capabilities of actors in hung councils. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the most crucial factor actors in hung 
councils have to accept; there must be compromise between political parties, or 
there can be no decision making in hung councils. The process of decision making 
must change to accommodate this, and many observers have noted thai hungness 
brings more lengthy and unpredictable decision making procedures (see Blowers, 
1987, p.32). Accordingly, section one examines the views of the actors concerned on 
both the process of decision making, and on the policies that emerge from that 
process. A number of variables which may affect actors' perceptions of decision 
making (for example, their previous status in the council) will also be examined. If 
the process is perceived as having changed, and if (for example) the actors in hung 
councils perceive the decision making process as having improved when a council 
becomes hung, this might be an indication that political actors in hung councils see 
themselves a s more influential than their counterparts in non-hung counci ls. 
Section two will examine the perceptions of political actors in both hung and non-
hung councils concerning the level of influence they have over policy in a number of 
areas, in particular examining the influence over the annual budgetary process. If 
decision making structures do become more open, it may be that the leaders of 
'opposition* parties, who might be expected to be relatively powerless whether in 
hung or non-hung councils, will also become more powerful, and this will be 
a s s e s s e d . Finally, if there is more open decision making and if there are m o r e 
politicians in hung councils who see themselves as influential, it should also be the 
case that power becomes more widely distributed when a council becomes hung. At 
the very least, there will be some changes in the relationship of the various groups 
in the council. In particular, the dominant roles of the 'joint elite' of leading 
councillors and chief officers may be challenged by hungness. For example, the full 
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council meeting may become more influential when single party elites no longer 
control the decision making process, and section three, after testing the power 
relationships in non-hung councils against the conventional picture, will explore the 
nature of the new power relationships in detail. 
S e c t i o n One : T h e D e c i s i o n Making P r o c e s s 
Section one begins with a brief examination of the attitudes of British political actors 
towards coalition politics and tests the thesis that, at least initially, actors in hung 
councils will view both the quality of decision making and the quality of policies 
emerging from the new processes, in a negative manner. It is hypothesised that both 
group leaders and chief executives will s e e the process of policy making and the 
policies produced a s having deteriorated. One group in particular, those who 
previously controlled the council, is more likely to s e e decision making a s having 
deteriorated, and the views of former rulers are examined. A crucial factor 
influencing actors' perceptions of the process may be the p a s s a g e of time. It is 
hypothesised that politicians and bureaucrats in long term hung councils will be 
more positive about the changes to decision making brought about by hungness. 
because their greater experience of coping with the problems hungness c a n 
undoubtedly bring. If this is the c a s e , it may also be that former rulers will develop 
more favourable views towards decision making. 
8.1.1. T h e Deter iorat ion of D e c i s i o n M a k i n g ? 
For politicians and bureaucrats in most European c o u r c i e s , operating in a hung 
environment Is a relatively regular or even normal state of affairs. However, for 
many of the actors in British local government the change in the political 
environment from majority control by one party to hungness has been traumatic, 
and their response to such changes may well be different to the tactics continental 
actors pursue. The hostility and combativeness of British party politics Is well 
established, and partisanship is exhibited at the local as well a s national level (see 
Sharpe & Newton, 1984, pp.2l4-215).^ It will be difficult for politicians raised In 
such an 'adversarial* system to adapt to the changes In style which a need for 
cooperation will bring. It appears that, at least Initially, local politicians will react 
to hungness with a mixture of confusion and hostility, and early research into hung 
councils supports this view (see for example, Mellors. 1983, 1984: Rail ings & 
Thrasher, 1986). Such reactions are understandable, a s British local government 
^ The adversarial style of politics in Britain has been characterised as*more marked than 
in any other Western democracy" (Jordan & Richardson, 1979, p.43). Greenaway, Smith & 
Street (1992, pp.57-62) discuss the consequences of this for policy making in Britain at 
central and local level. 
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officers and politicians have been socialised in a political culture where any form of 
coalition politics is normally viewed with suspicion (see Bogdanor, 1983). A s 
previous chapters have shown, some party leaders refuse to countenance discussions 
with other political groups, even when such a refusal effectively debars them from 
at least a share in decision making. Often, those groups who do co-operate with other 
party groups are anxious to disassociate themselves from involvement in decision 
making.2 
Of course, it is not only politicians who have a poor opinion of 'coalition polities'; 
chief executives responding to this and earlier research (Rail ings & Thrasher . 
1986) often displayed a distaste for the tactics which negotiations between political 
groups entailed. Repl ies to Railings & Thrasher*s survey included severa l 
complaints of a lack of "clear political leadership" and a "lack of vision" in the 
council . 
Given the frequency with which such views have been expressed, especially among 
those groups used to governing alone, it is unsurprising that the ability of hung 
councils to operate efficiently has been questioned by a number of observers. 
Blowers, as previously noted, argues that a "climate of uncertainty" permeates hung 
councils leading to political instability and policy makinc vhich is characterised by 
"drift and impasse" (1987, p.32). Mellors s e e s hung councils as a good illustration 
of Harold Wilson's famous remark that "a week is a long time in politics", with the 
policy focus becoming "inevitably ... short-term, since uncertainty over council 
votes precludes longer term perspectives" (Mellors. 1984, p.179). Given the shock 
that such a change in the political environment will entail and the acknowledgment 
among students of coalitions that experience of coalitional activities is itself a factor 
in the durability of coalitions (for example, s e e Browne & Dreijmanis. 1982). It is 
hardly surprising if, at least initially, the actions of actors tend to contribute to an 
atmosphere of uncertainty. Previous research suggests that short term priorities 
are seen as overriding long term considerations, and hung councils are drifting or 
stuttering along (Mellors, 1984; Blowers, 1987). If this is s o , one would expect to 
find widespread dissatisfaction with the process of decision making and the direction 
of policy in hung councils, perhaps especially so in councils which had not been hung 
2 As previously detailed, one SLD group leader maintained that his council was effectively 
controlled by the Conservative minority group, and persisted with this claim even when his 
chief executive pointed out to him the recent occasions where the SLD had combined with 
the Conservatives in order to get major decisions on expenditure passed through the 
council. This response is perhaps untypical of SLD groups, who generally displayed a more 
positive attitude than Conservative and Labour groups lo cooperation, but it illustrates the 
fear many respondents had of becoming too closely associated with other political groups. 
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for long. Respondents to Railings & Thrasher's survey (1986) had mixed views, 
some feeling hungness had led to better and more consensual decision making, a 
similar number feeling the process had deteriorated and others noting no real 
difference before and after becoming hung. In general, however, respondents were 
less than enthusiastic about the changes hungness had brought. There are signs that 
this situation is changing. Some recent observers report a far more positive reaction 
from the participants in hung councils, citing a s 'myth' the view that long term 
planning was impossible and decision making fragmented.(Leach & G a m e . 1989. 
pp.48-49). Wendt (1986) was also positive about the process, pointing out that in 
Cheshi re , while outcomes were more uncertain and generally took longer to reach, 
"when they arrive (they) are credible and practicable" (Wendt, 1986. p.375). 
While Leach & Game (1989) admit that there are still some hung authorities "in 
which an atmosphere of mistrust and frustration prevails", they argue that the 
majority of hung county councils they surveyed demonstrate the "fallacy" of viewing 
hungness in British local politics as an inevitable recipe for "confusion, delay, ad-
hocery and inconsistency" (Leach & Game, 1989. p.59). Leach & G a m e ' s view of 
hung councils is largely positive, and their findings offer substantial evidence that 
hung governments c a n work extremely efficiently in Britain. However, their 
research was confined to a relatively small group of hung county councils, and other 
types of local authority may not demonstrate such a positive reaction to becoming 
hung. However.in general, if the findings of the majority of observers are correct we 
would expect to find that: 
5.1: A C T O R S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S W I L L S E E T H E P R O C E S S O F D E C I S I O N 
MAKING A S HAVING D E T E R I O R A T E D S I N C E BECOr\AING HUNG. 
5.2; A C T O R S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S W I L L S E E T H E Q U A L I T Y O F P O L I C I E S 
E M E R G I N G A S HAVING D E T E R I O R A T E D . 
Despite hypothesis 5.1 above, the responses of actors to this research offer support 
for the findings of Leach & Game, and indicate that the majority of actors in hung 
councils do not s e e the process of decision making a s characterised by 'drift and 
impasse'. Table 8.1 records the responses of chief executives and political leaders to 
the question of whether the decision making process and the quality of policies 
produced has improved, deteriorated, or remained the same since their authority 
became hung. 
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Tab le 8.1: Quali ty of D e c i s i o n Making a n d P o l i c i e s S i n c e B e c o m i n g 
Hung 
Quality- Decision Making Quality-Policies 
Respondent Deterior- Impr- Remained Deterior- Impr- Remained 
ated oved Same ated oved Same 
Chief executives 40.4% 17.3% 42 .3% 26.9% 26 .9% 46 .2% 
(n=62) 
Group Leaders 42.0% 43.8% 14.3% 31 .3% 53.6% 15.2% 
(n=117) 
Conservative 80.0% 8.6% 11.4% 70.6% 11.8% 17.6% 
(n=37) 
Labour. 31.0% 48 .3% 20.7% 20.0% 66 .7% 13.3% 
(n=30) 
SIX) 15.8% 76.3% 7.9% 7.9% 84 .2% 7.9% 
(n=40) 
Independent 37.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 37.55 50.0% 
(n=8) 
(n.b., Table excludes 'no response') 
Plainly, the politicians (with the exception of the Conservalives)were more likely to 
believe that the quality of decision making and the policies that emerged had 
improved. Even among chief executives a majority (59.6 percent) thought decision 
making had either improved or remained the same and an even bigger majority 
(73.1 percent) thought the quality of policies emerging was the same or improved.*^ 
One chief executive made the point that, although decision making had improved "in 
that information is more widely shared", the policies had deteriorated "in that 
coherence of policy decisions is reduced" and over a quarter (26.9 percent) of chief 
executives shared his view that policy coordination had suffered with the lack of firm 
political guidance. Despite this, most respondents gave a more positive rating to the 
quality of policies produced than they gave to the decision making process. In general, 
the findings of Leach & Game's survey of county councils are supported by the replies 
of all participants. Regardless of the type of local authority, the overall response of 
actors was that the policy process had either improved or remained the same. 
3 It must be noted that that this evidence could equally be presented, for example, in terms 
of "56.3 percent of group leaders thought that decision making had remained the same or 
worsenecf', as opposed to the use above of "remained the same or improve<f'. However, 
the hypothesis is that decisions/ policy making will deteriorate when a council becomes 
hung, and the combination of "remained the same" and "improved" is a rebuttal to this. 
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Without any previous input at all into the policy process for at least two-thirds of 
party leaders, perhaps it is not surprising that the overall response of councillors to 
the policies produced under this new situation was largely positive. Indeed, a 
substantial minority (43.8 percent) felt that the quality of decision making had 
improved, and a clear majority (53.6 percent) answered that the quality of policies 
being produced had improved. Former 'opposition* parties were largely enthusiastic 
about the changes, as might be expected. Despite the acknowledgment by many of them 
of the "drawbacks" of consultation and compromise, even a share of power after a 
number of powerless years will probably be eagerly embraced. It was acknowledged 
that decision making is more time consuming in a hung council , and one chief 
executive pointed out that a great disadvantage to speedy decision making was that It 
was "no longer possible" for him to obtain an "instant member reaction from a leader 
or chairman". Despite this, there w a s a general feeling that the policies finally 
decided upon were more likely to be representative of opinions within the council 
than when, as one Conservative leader put it, a "small cabal" had been effectively 
making policy. In a hung council it is possible, as a Labour leader remarked, for 
Ideas to be put forward "which might have been stifled by a one party majority", and 
there was a general feeling among those who reacted positively to the question of 
whether the policy process had improved that " issues are now discussed in greater 
depth". However, one particular group of party leaders might be expected to remain 
unenthusiastic about the changes produced by a hung council - those who had 
previously enjoyed a dominant role in the authority. 
8.1.2. At t i tudes of 'Tradi t ional R u l e r s ' to the new P o l i c y P r o c e s s 
In many of the local authorities surveyed (especially the traditionally Conservative 
controlled shire counties), one party had previously been in power for a long time. 
The traditional rulers were usually Conservat ives: nearly two-thirds of the hung 
authorities In this survey had previously been Conservative controlled. Carter's 
examination of three shire counties previously controlled by the Conservatives for a 
considerable time highlights the feeling of other political groups towards the 
"elitist" and "arrogant" manner of traditional Conservat ive rulers (Carter, 1986, 
p.10) and it appears likely that Labour traditional rulers will be just a s guilty of 
ruling in an arrogant way. Politicians with long experience of total control over the 
direction of policy in their council will almost certainly be unimpressed by the 
different forms of decision making which emerge in their former fiefdoms. 
Examining Table 8.1 (above), et certainly appears likely to be the c a s e . The high 
number of Conservative leaders who reported a deterioration in the quality of 
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decision making (80 percent) and policies (70.6 percent) may well be explained by 
the number of former rulers among their ranks; 25 of the 37 Conservative leaders 
who responded headed parties which had formerly ruled their authority, compared to 
only 4 of the 30 Labour leaders responding. Therefore, it can also be proposed that: 
5.3: F0Rr\1ER R U L E R S WILL B E IVIORE I N C L I N E D T O S E E T H E P R O C E S S O F 
D E C I S I O N M A K I N G A S H A V I N G D E T E R I O R A T E D T H A N O T H E R G R O U P 
L E A D E R S . 
There is very little doubt that hypothesis 5.3 is proven. Unsurprisingly, given that 
they had lost their domination over the policy process, previous 'rulers' were almost 
unanimously negative about the c h a n g e s in the political environment of their 
authorities. Over four-fifths (80.6 percent) of former rulers thought decision 
making had deteriorated; 73.3 percent also thought that the quality of policies has 
deteriorated. The acid comment of one Conservative leader that "the deterioration of 
decision making is amply demonstrated by the creation of 21 new committees and 
sub- committees" summed up the viewpoint of many former Conservat ive rulers 
watching the previous well-oiled machinery of decision making being replaced by 
political 'wheeling and dealing'. As the only Green 'spokesperson' to reply to the 
questionnaire put it. "historically, the Tories have attempted to limit a c c e s s [but] 
issues are now discussed in greater depth". 
Perhaps the views of traditional rulers might mellow over time. The longer a council 
is hung, the more they will have to come to terms with losing power, and perhaps 
they will also become less critical of the new policy processes. Of course, it may not 
be only traditional rulers who become more willing to accept the new situation. It 
appears probable that, if hungness persists for more than one full electoral cycle (4 
y e a r s ) , afl actors will have to demonstrate a more positive attitude or risk 
remaining on the sidelines. Such a possibility will now be examined. 
8.1.3. T h e Impor tance of T ime In Att i tudes to D e c i s i o n Making 
The importance of the passage of time, and the learning process which then takes 
place regarding the correct approach to coalition strategies, suggests that the more 
knowledgeable actors become about the politics of hungness, the more they will view 
the process of decision making favourably. As Mellors points out: 
"when a council becomes hung for the first time . . . the parlies may 
regard the situation as temporary and be unlikely to re-adjust either 
their attitudes or their procedures to this abnormal situation" (Mellors, 
1989. p.87). 
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However, if the hung situation becomes the normal stale of affairs, actors will have 
"come to terms with the consequences of their balance of power" (Mellors, 1989. 
p.83). This suggests that opinions on the process of decision making and the policies 
emerging from a hung council might become more favourable over time. However, it 
must be noted that a number of factors may affect the learning process, and there is 
no inevitability about a general improvement over time. As Leach & Stewart note: 
"the capacity for speedy organisational adjustment depends on both 
political relationships and attitudes, and the experience and skills of the 
chief officers and in particular the chief executive. There are certain 
political attitudes and scenar ios which make adjustment extremely 
difficult, particularly where inter-party conflict is paramount and at 
least two of the parties desire to show the impossibility of practical 
working in the hung situation. Equally, if the necessary officer skills are 
not present then potential opportunities for adjustment may p a s s 
unrecognised" (Leach & Stewart, 1988. p.54). 
Despite this necessary caveat, one would expect to find that the v iews of actors 
towards the quality of decision making and policies would become more favourable 
over time, as they learn how to cope with the necessity for compromise and become 
more experienced in the new political environment. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
5.4: T H E A T T I T U D E S O F A C T O R S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S T O W A R D S T H E 
P R O C E S S O F D E C I S I O N MAKING AND T O W A R D S T H E P O L I C I E S E M E R G I N G 
WILL B E C O M E M O R E F A V O U R A B L E T H E L O N G E R A C O U N C I L IS HUNG. 
The Attitudes of Officers to the Decision Making Process Over Time 
As Table 8.2 demonstrates, in those authorities which have been hung for a long time 
the chief executives are more positive about both the process of decision making and 
the quality of policies emerging.^ That said, even in short-term hung councils the 
majority of chief executives saw no deterioration in either the process or the quality 
of policies the new decision making arrangements were producing. While only a very 
low figure of 6.3 percent of chief executives in short term hung councils thought the 
process of decision making had improved, compared to 43.8 percent claiming a 
deterioration of the process, exactly half of this sample saw no difference. Given the 
undoubted difficulties which hungness brings, this is some indication that the 
bargaining between parlies which hungness inevitably produces is not seen by the 
majority of bureaucratic actors as a recipe for 'policy stagnation'. 
^ Section Three of Section Four has categorised 'long term* councils as those hung for more 
than 3 years, wfiile 'short term' are categorised as those hung for 3 years or less. All long 
term councils have had one full electoral cycle. 
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T a b l e 8.2: Quality of D e c i s i o n Making and P o l i c i e s By T i m e Hung 
(response of chief executives, n:=62) 
Decision Making Policies 
Deterior- Improved Remained Detertor- Improved Remained 
ated Same ated Same 
Short Term 43.8% 6.3% 50.0% 28.1% 18.8% 53 .1% 
(n=36) 
Long Term 35.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 40.0% 35.0% 
(n=26) 
(n.b. table excludes 'no response*) 
One problem of responding to this question in long term hung councils is that the 
actors may not have held their current high positions when their council originally 
became hung. As one chief executive of a district council which had been hung for 9 
years replied in answer to the question of whether decision making had improved 
since becoming hung, when his council had become hung was "loo long ago to make a 
valid judgement". This point must be kept in mind when considering these replies. 
Despite this caveat, chief executives displayed an undoubted increase in satisfaction 
with the decision making process and policies in those authorities classified as long 
term hung councils. However, the picture is a little more confused when the attitudes 
of politicians are examined. 
T h e Att i tudes of G r o u p L e a d e r s to the D e c i s i o n Making P r o c e s s O v e r 
T i m e 
Of course, the satisfaction expressed by chief executives about the decision making 
process may be an indication that officers are enjoying greater freedom in a hung 
council, relishing their role as "policy-brokers'. However, as Table 8.1 has already 
indicated, it is not just officers who express general satisfaction with the new 
structures of decision making. The responses of group leaders show that the majority 
either s e e no difference or s e e the process as improving after hungness. When the 
v iews of former rulers are removed, the r e s p o n s e of the politicians is 
overwhelmingly favourable. Given that more groups will be involved in decision 
making, and that knowledge of how to obtain the maximum returns from policy 
concessions should increase over time, it might be expected that hypothesis 5.4 
would be supported by the responses of group leaders. However, the replies of 
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politicians are less clear cut than those of officials. 
Table 8.3: Quality of Decision Making and Policies By Time Hung 
(response of group leaders; n=111) 
Quality of Decision Making Quality of Policies 
Deterior- Improved Remained Deterior- Improved Remained 
ated Same ated Same 
Short 42.0% 46.4% 11.6% 30 .4% 58.0 11.6% 
Term 
(n=70) 
Long Term 39.5% 42.1% 18.4% 26 .3% 50.0% 23.7 
(n=41) 
(n.b, *no response* not included) 
Table 8.3 shows the responses of the political elites by time hung, and reveals a 
more complicated picture than that presented by the replies of their chief 
executives. Contrary to the hypothesis, group leaders In short term hung councils 
were more likely to see both the decision making process and the policies emerging 
as having improved than group leaders in long term hung councils. This goes against 
expectations, and lends support to the point made by Leach & Stewart (1988. p.54); 
if the necessary skills are not present then there is no inevitability about a general 
improvement over time. If this Is so, then in such authorities the responses of 
political actors, who may still be excluded from decision making despite the 
apparently more open nature of their authority, will tend to reflect a general 
disenchantment. 
However, despite the lack of belief in an improvement over time, politicians In long 
term hung councils are also less likely to believe the process h a s deteriorated, than 
those In short term hung councils. This is explained by the fact that far more of them 
(23.7 percent) see no difference in the quality of policies than leaders in short term 
hung councils (11.6 percent). Again, this may support the idea of a general 
disenchantment with 'life in the balance'; that Is, a belief that while the political 
composition may have changed , the old 'joint elite' has merely been replaced by one 
which Is made up of the politicians of more than one party. The results shown in 
Table 8.3 may be a reflection of the feelings of an S L D leader who. while 
acknowledging the improvement in communication since becoming hung, qualified 
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this by saying that "the responses [of chief officers) are of limited value (as the) 
majority 'group' get superior service". 
The At t i tudes of Tradi t ional Rulers over T ime 
We have seen that the attitude of long term hung councillors is not necessarily more 
favourable to the policy process than those in relatively short term hung councils. 
However, one group of actors, former rulers, might have more need to become less 
critical of the changes with the passage of time. The responses to a testing of 
hypothesis 5.3 (see above) demonstrated that former rulers were overwhelmingly 
negative to the changes in decision making since their local authorities had become 
hung. Despite this, it was suggested that their views towards the new processes might 
become more favourable over lime; if they wish to have a share of power they must 
come to terms with the new situation. While they may still dislike the more 
prolonged process of negotiations hungness brings, at least some of them may also 
appreciate the more consensual nature of the policies emerging. 
There Is some evidence that this may be the case. Only 2 leaders of traditional ruling 
parties thought the process of decision making had improved since becoming hung, 
and both were in long term hung councils. Also, those 2 respondents, plus another 
leader of a former ruling party who saw 'no difference' in the quality of decision 
making, also answered that the quality of policies had improved. Although only 8 
former rulers in long term hung councils replied, compared to 25 former rulers in 
short term hung councils.^ this does indicate that the passing of time might make 
initially hostile actors see the changes more favourably, although half of these 
respondents still saw the quality of both decision making and policies as having 
deteriorated. Former rulers in short term hung councils were far more hostile to the 
changes. A total of 22 of 25 (88 percent) thought the quality of decision making had 
deteriorated, and 19 of 24 (79.2 percent) also thought the quality of policies had 
deteriorated. The remaining respondents saw no difference to either since becoming 
hung. These sort of responses appear to support the idea that even traditional rulers, 
who clearly are initially negative to hungness, may come to see benefits in a more 
consensual decision making process. 
^There are fewer 'traditional rulers' in the 26 long term hung councils (compared to 36 
short term hung councils), as 4 councils have been hung since local government re-
organisation in 1974. In addition, 5 councils have been hung for 9 years or more, and the 
concept of a 'traditional ruler* is therefore suspect. The 2 councils where a 'traditional 
ruler' responded that the quality of decision making had improved had been hung for 5,and 7 
years. 
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Generally, the responses of both bureaucratic and political actors to the changes in 
the policy process which hungness necessitates are not unfavourable. If the majority 
of chief executives did not see the process as having improved, the majority did not 
see the process as having deteriorated. "No change' may not indicate a more dynamic 
decision making process, but neither does it indicate a process characterised by a 
lack o l direction. Indeed, on the political side of the council, many actors appeared 
positively to relish the changes, and there was often a recognition that politics had 
become more of a 'game'. One Labour leader suggested that "in a hung council the 
achievement of policy objectives comes down to the skills of the individuals in 
playing chess for real". Others felt issues were discussed In more depth and that 
policies were likelier to represent more shades of opinion within the council. 
Although one chief executive bemoaned the "lack of vision", he was also aware of 
"greater member involvement" in policy making. 
Such 'greater member involvement' suggests that more political actors will see 
themselves as having some influence, over the policies emerging than their 
counterparts in non-hung councils. While around 30 percent of political respondents 
(the former rulers) are overwhelmingly against the new structures, the remaining 
group leaders are overwhelmingly in favour of the changes; actors previously 
excluded from the policy process are responding favourably to more open decision 
making. If the decision making process does become more open, then more party 
leaders should see themselves as influential in hung councils than in non-hung 
councils. Section two will now explore this possibility. 
Sect ion Two: Party Inf luence in Hung and Non-Hung Counc i ls 
The need to compromise with another political party is an essential element of 
politics in hung councils. Given this, it is probable that more parties will feel 
influential in hung councils, and this is the first area which Section Two will 
explore. On the other hand, groups from outside of the administration, whose input 
Is not needed to pass policy, should feel no more influential in hung than in non-hung 
councils. However, the findings of the previous chapter have suggested a more open 
and consensual approach to decision making might prevail in hung councils, and if 
this is so, then opposition leaders in hung councils might benefit to the extent of 
demonstrating more influence than their counterparts in non-hung councils. If it is 
the case that influence is more widely spread, whether such a spread of influence 
will survive the rigours of budget making is the next area this section will 
scrutinise. The making of the annual budget is perhaps the most crucial time in hung 
councils. It would be expected that, because of the need to compromise to enable any 
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proposal to go through, the process of making the budget would be far more 
conflictual in hung councils than in non-hung councils, where one party can be 
secure in the knowledge that its proposals will be ratified without the need to seek 
agreement with opposition groups. Given this, it would appear logical to assume that 
more groups in hung councils would see themselves as influential in the budget 
making process. Not only that, but more groups should also see themselves as 
influential over the final figure set for the authority's budget. All of these 
expectations will be examined. Again, the thesis that opposition groups will exhibit 
more influence (this time, on the budget) will be examined. Finally, the hypothesis 
that SLD groups will be more Influential on the budget set than other political 
parties (because of their cited central position in budgetary matters), will be 
appraised. 
8 .2 .1 . The Impor tance of Bargain ing 
The need to accept compromise is the first essential which both politicians and chief 
officers need to accept. As Leach & Stewart point out, hung councils are more likely 
to run smoothly when the actors involved "accept the reality of the new situation and 
acknowledge that it will involve inter-parly bargaining" (Leach & Stewart, 1988, 
p.42), however much the parly leaders would prefer to be in sole charge of the 
council. On the other hand, in hung authorities where the main actors are slow to 
accept the 'reality' of the new situation, a situation may well arise where inter-
party bargaining is all but impossible and the policy 'drift and impasse* identified by 
Blowers (1987, p.32) will predominate. In reality, most authorities will fall 
somewhere between the extremes of those where 'institutionalised bargaining' occurs 
and those where any form of inter-party cooperation Is viewed with universal 
suspicion (see Leach & Stewart, 1988, pp.41-42). 
Whatever, it appears inescapable that inter-parly bargaining over policy must 
occur in hung councils. Agreement between two or more parties is essential for any 
policy to receive council approval. It therefore follows that more parties should feel 
influential in hung councils than in non-hung councils. Given that more parties will 
be involved directly in the process of decision making, such a proposal Is hardly 
contentious. When those parties are part of the ruling administration.they will 
Inevitably feel more influential than when they were part of the 'opposition' before 
their council became hung. Even when there is a single party minority 
administration in place, at least some of the 'opposition' parties must be consulted 
and their views considered when forming policy; otherwise, the ruling party will 
lack a majority in the full council and be unable to enforce their policy preferences. 
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However, these are not the only reasons why more political actors will feel 
influential in hung councils. A vital point often made about hung councils is that the 
process of decision making moves away from the narrow confines of a ruling group's 
preferences, towards a more open and consensual method of decision making (see for 
example, Wendt. 1986). If this is the case, then not only should more parlies feel 
Influential, but parties outside of the administration should also feel more 
influential than their counterparts in non-hung councils. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
5.5: MORE PARTIES WILL SEE THEIVISELVES AS INFLUENTIAL IN HUNG 
COUNCILS THAN IN NON-HUNG COUNCILS. 
5.6: OPPOSITION PARTIES IN HUNG COUNCILS WILL SEE THEMSELVES 
AS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN 'OPPOSITION* PARTIES IN NON-HUNG 
COUNCILS. 
As expected, hypothesis 5.5 is supported by the responses of group leaders. However, 
as Table 8.4 shows, the expected differences between party leaders In hung and non-
hung councils who see themselves as 'very influential* were generally extremely 
small, and in some policy areas (housing, highways, and transport) more leaders in 
non-hung councils saw themselves as Very influential' than their counterparts in 
hung councils. On average. 30.2 percent of group leaders in hung councils saw 
themselves as 'very influential' in policy formation compared to 28.2 percent of 
leaders in non-hung councils. Such a slight difference, which shows that on average 
only one group leader sees him or herself as Very influential' whether a council is 
hung or not, could lead one to conclude that influence is no wider dispersed In hung 
councils than it is in those controlled by a single party. However, such a conclusion 
may be erroneous, as an examination of the other responses made to this question 
suggest. 
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Table 8.4: Party Inf luence in Pol icy Areas; 
Hung and Non-Hung Counci ls 
Very Quite Influential Not Very 
Influential 
39 .6% 37.5% 
Influential 
10.4% 
33.3% 
42.9% 
26.3% 
33 .3% 
35.1% 
26.8% 
26.2% 
18.4% 
27.3% 
20.0% 
20 .7% 
30.2% 
28.2% 
16.7% 
32.7% 
21.1% 
38.5% 
18.9% 
50.9% 
39.0% 
57.5% 
21.2% 
48.6% 
20.7% 
44.3% 
22.9% 
38 .9% 
14.3% 
42 .1% 
21 .8% 
32.4% 
17.9% 
24.4% 
17.2% 
36 .4% 
22 .9% 
37 .9% 
17.4% 
35 .5% 
Not at All 
Influential 
12.5% EDUCATION 
Hung 
EDUCATION 
Non-Hung 
SOC. SERVS 
Hung 
SOC. SERVS 
Non-Hung 
HOUSING 
Hung 
HOUSING 
Non-Hung 
PLANNING 
Hung 
PLANNING 
Non-Hung 
HIGHWAYS 
Hung 
HIGHWAYS 
Non-Hung 
TRANSPORT 
Hung 
TRANSPORT 
Non-Hung 
AVERAGE % 
Hung 
AVERAGE % 
Non-Hung 
(Response of group leaders. Hung councils, n=117; non-hung councils, n=42. Table excludes 
'no response'.) 
11.1% 
10.2% 
10.5% 
6.4% 
13.5% 
4 .5% 
9.8% 
6.9% 
15.2% 
8.6% 
20 .7% 
8.2% 
13.5% 
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While there is little difference between the proportion of leaders in hung and non-
hung councils who saw their parties as 'very influential', the crucial area which 
demonstrates the difference between influence in hung and non-hung councils is the 
column in Table 8.4 which lists the group leaders who see their parties as 'quite 
influential'. On average, nearly twice as many leaders in hung councils saw 
themselves as "quite influential' (44.3 percent compared to 22.9 percent); Three-
quarters of leaders (74.5 percent) in hung councils were 'very* or 'quite' 
influential, compared to half (51.1 percent) in non-hung councils who felt the same. 
In non-hung councils, nearly half of the group leaders (49 percent) saw themselves 
as 'not very' or 'not at all' influential, while only a quarter (25.6 percent) of 
leaders in hung councils felt this way. This strongly suggests that the hypothesis that 
more groups will see themselves as influential in hung councils than in non-hung 
councils is correct. As one Labour leader (who was otherwise unenthusiastic about 
the changes since becoming hung) replied: "at least in a hung council we have a 
chance of influencing decisions and getting some policies changed". 
This Labour leader felt this way despite not being a part of the ruling administration. 
This supports hypothesis 5.6 (see above), which proposed that 'opposition' parties 
in hung councils would be more likely to see themselves as influential than 
opposition parlies in non-hung councils. This hypothesis will now be tested against 
the available evidence. 
8.2.2. Oppos i t ion Inf luence in Hung and Non-Hung Counc i ls 
Table 8.5 (below) lists the influence opposition parlies in both hung and non-hung 
councils felt they had, and demonstrates quite conclusively that hypothesis 5.6 is 
supported by the evidence. Quite clearly, opposition leaders in hung councils 
perceive themselves as possessing more influence than their counterparts in non-
hung councils.^ In only one area (transport policy) did more leaders in councils 
controlled by a single majority party feel influential. On average, opposition leaders 
in hung councils were almost twice as likely to answer that they were Very 
influential' in a particular policy area, and also nearly twice as likely to answer that 
^As Tables 7.5 and 7.6 in Chapter Seven indicate, opposition group leaders in hung councils 
may be in a better position to judge the degree of influence they have than those in non-hung 
councils. Opposition actors in non-hung councils thought that their access to chief officers 
was very open. However, leaders in hung councils were able to see that their access 
greatly improved when their council became hung. In other words, it may be that those 
'opposition' leaders who saw themselves as 'very influential' in non-hung councils were 
fooling themselves as to the extent of their influence. Indeed, one Conservative opposition 
leader in a non-hung council answered that his parly was 'very influential' in every area, 
but responded to a later question that with only 6 Conservatives councillors their influence 
on the majority group was "very minimal'. 
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they were 'quite influential*. On average, a majority (66.1%) of opposition leaders 
In non-hung councils answered that they were 'not very' or 'not at all' influential. 
The average figures sum up the overwhelming Impression, that parties outside of the 
administration in hung councils still feel they possess some influence. 
Table 8.5: Opposition Party Influence in Policy Areas: 
Hung and Non-Hung Councils 
Very 
Influential 
25.0% 
Quite 
Influential 
33 .3% 
Not Very 
Influential 
16.7% 
45 .5% 
19.2% 
50.0% 
27 .3% 
47 .8% 
20.0% 
34 .6% 
17.1% 
42 .9% 
26 .5% 
42 .1% 
21 .2% 
42 .9% 
Not at All 
Influential 
25 .0% EDUCATION 
Hung 
EDUCATION 18.2% 18.2% 
Non-Hung 
SOC. SERVS 30.8% 30.8% 
Hung 
SOC. SERVS 8.3% 25.0% 
Non-Hung 
HOUSING 15.2% 42.4% 
Hung 
HOUSING 4 .3% 26 .1% 
Non-Hung 
PLANNING 14.0% 58.0% 
Hung 
PLANNING 7.7% 42 .3% 
Non-Hung 
HIGHWAYS 9.8% 61.0% 
Hung 
HIGHWAYS 4.8% 19.0% 
Non-Hung 
TRANSPORT 5.9% 52.9% 
Hung 
TRANSPORT 10.5% 15.8% 
Non-Hung 
AVERAGE % 15.4% 49.0% 
Hung 
AVERAGE % 8.0% 25.9% 
Non-Hung 
(Opposition leaders in hung councils, n=51; non-hung n=26; Table excludes 'no response') 
18.2% 
19.2% 
16.7% 
15.2% 
21 .7% 
8.0% 
15.4% 
12.2% 
33 .3% 
14.7% 
31 .6% 
14.4% 
23 .2% 
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Of course, it could be argued that politicians are poor judges of their own power, and 
are likely to exaggerate their own importance. However, group leaders in non-hung 
councils are generally quite open about their lack of power. Many of those who 
answered that they were *quite inftuentiaP in one area admitted their lack of 
influence in other areas. As one opposition Conservative leader in a non-hung council 
stated, "it (influence] is difficult to assess but the controlling group appears to heed, 
somewhat, any warnings by senior councillors". Another opposition leader (SLD) 
admitted his party's lack of influence, but pointed out that, despite this "we are able 
to raise questions/queries". Such diffident replies from councillors do not suggest 
local politicians in non-hung councils are generally unaware of their lack of power, 
and many of the replies from leaders in hung councils already quoted in this work 
suggest that local politicians are also well aware of the limits or otherwise of their 
group's power. 
It is not only that more politicians feel influential in hung councils, which might be 
expected given that more parties must be involved in decision making.^ It appears 
that the more open nature of decision making in a hung council also increases the 
power of those outside the ruling administration. If nothing else, opposition groups 
in hung councils feel they have a measure of influence. However, such feelings may 
not transfer to the time when political influence is most clearly felt in hung 
councils, the making of the annual council budget. As Blowers points out: 
"budget making is the central and most controversial activity of local 
authorities. It involves a clash of ideologies reflecting the central values 
of the political parties' (Blowers, 1987, p.33). 
Consequently, budget making lime is when political alliances in hung councils may 
come under their severest test (see Rosenberg, 1989, p.106), when even natural 
political alliances like those between the SDP and Liberals can break up in bitterness 
at "budget betrayal", as happened in Devon in February, 1988 (Western Evening 
News, February 20. 1988). The deals struck at this time are exposed to full public 
view, and actors may therefore be less willing to grant budget concessions. If so, the 
greater influence fell by actors in hung councils might not be felt at budget time, 
especially by groups from outside of the ruling administration. The influence of 
7 Section Four of Chapter Nine looks at the possible differences in influence of 'opposition' 
parties in councils ruled by a single minority party, to assess the possibility that some 
groups will be receiving policy pay-offs in order to sustain the minority administration 
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political groups concerning budgetary negotiations will now be examined. 
8.2.3. Local Au thor i ty Budget Making: The End of Incrementalism? 
Before examining the impact of hungness on political influence over the budget, we 
need to examine the nature of local authority budget making. Not only that, but It also 
has to be considered whether the budget making process is a suitable arena in which 
to examine political influence. It may appear 'obvious' that local authority budget 
making is a highly political activity, especially in hung councils. However, it may be 
that the majority of budgetary decisions have been taken by chief officers before 
political discussion even starts, or that central government restrictions on local 
authority spending have seriously reduced the role of local actors to one of merely 
seeking to fulfil their statutory requirements. Such considerations would have 
repercussions for political behaviour, and they need to be discussed before 
examining the distribution of budgetary influence in hung and non-hung councils. 
A number of writers have characterised the budgetary process as one of incremental 
decision making^ and as Rosenberg notes, there is a "broad consensus [that] 
incrementatism describes the behaviour of budget agents in a variety of contexts" 
(Rosenberg, 1989, pp.50-51). Greenwood, Hinings & Ranson's study of local 
authority budgeting agreed that the process of local resource allocation is "highly 
incremenial" (1977, p.27). An incremental process implies that the 'base' of a local 
government budget is unchallenged during negotiations and that discussion centres 
around the various actors pressures for increments to the budget. 
It might be thought that the greater central pressure on local authority spending (for 
example, the introduction of 'rale-capping') means such a process no longer 
dominates, but Elcock & Jordan's (1987) study of local authority budgeting found 
that, although the growth in local authority spending had decreased since 1979. the 
same process of incremental adjustments continued in all the authorities examined 
(Elcock & Jordan, 1987, p.255). Clements notes that while central government's 
influence on the resource side of Avon's budget was "enormous", this did not mean 
that cuts had to be implemented, but that the rate rise was much smaller than it 
would otherwise have been (Clements. 1987, p.34). While it could be argued that a 
combination of shifts in government grant, rate-capping, and inflation has meant 
rate rises have merely enabled authorities to maintain their present level of 
8 Perhaps most famously, Lindblom (1959), who memorably described incrementalism as 
"the science of muddling through" (1959. p.79), and Wildavsky in his classic study of 
central budget making in the United Kingdom (1964). 
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services (see for example, Blowers, 1987, p.35). the most far reaching study of 
individual local authorities budgeting has called the inability "to procure reductions 
in local authority spending" a central failure of the Thatcher governments from 
1979-1987 (Elcock & Jordan,1987. p.255).9 
While not denying the very real financial pressures on local government during the 
1980s, central government's ability to control local government spending may also 
have been overstated. There has always been conflict between central and local 
government over both the total and the distribution of the rate support grant (see 
Rosenberg, 1989, Chapter Three), although that conflict has certainly increased 
since 1979 (Rhodes. 1984, p. 261). However, as Rosenberg notes: 
"the limits to the power of central government over local governments is 
mediated by resources and ideology even in the 1980s. Central 
governments do not in themselves have the staff or the operational 
knowledge to run local services even of they desired it. Indeed, central 
government does not still have enough staff to police the full range of 
controls they formally have over local governments" (Rosenberg, 1989, 
p .73) . 
Given this failure to police local spending at all adequately, It is no surprise that, 
according to ElcocK & Jordan's authoritative study, incremental modes of decision 
continued to dominate in local authority budgeting. Even where more rigorous 
techniques such as 'zero-based budgeting' were adopted to cope with the new 
pressures on spending they were soon "abandoned", and the authors note that "none of 
[the local authorities] truly sought to scrutinise the entire 'base' anyway" (Elcock & 
Jordan. 1987. p.254). Such an incremental process has an effect on the ability of 
politicians to influence budgetary decisions."'° 
If incrementalism dominates, then most of the budget has already been decided. As the 
Alliance leader in Avon bluntly put it, "97 percent of the budget is made by officers" 
^ Travers (1986. xii) sees the failure of central government effectively to reform local 
finance as dating from at least the 1960s. A Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS or more 
popularly "Think Tank') study of central-local relations provides support for this view, 
finding the most common type of case one where the Treasury or Department of 
Environment would be pressurising councils to reduce spending at the same time as local 
authorities were being urged, "by other departments to expand one or other local authority 
service- (CPRS. 1977. p.43). 
^*^AIthough not denying "the well documented tendencies within organisations and 
departments to perpetuate existing policies and resist innovation and change*. Leach feels 
the changes in local government management introduced following Bains have meant a more 
corporate approach which may mean a "rational model" can act as 'a countervailing force* 
to incrementalism (Leach, 1982. p.7). Chapter Two contains a resume of the changes the 
Bains Report recommended. 
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(in Clements, 1987. p.26). However, white Clements (1987) agrees that "the mass 
of figures and commentaries were produced by officials" he argues that the "political 
parties set the pace; their decisions directly affected budgetary quantities and 
priorities, and they laid down guidelines and policy strategy" (Clements, 1987, 
p.26). Even if it is the case that the great majority of the budget is pre-determined, 
there will still be areas where politics comes Into play. As the former chief 
executive of Devon, David t^acklin. notes: 
"you have a budget of £500 million and you are talking about £5 million, 
and you wonder why you spend so much time sweating about the last bit, 
but the last bit is the political bit, the rest is about pay and "rations', 
money you have to spend." (interview with author, my emphases) 
It may well be the case that local government officers, whether in hung or non-hung 
councils, are the most influential actors concerning the final budgetary proposals. 
Such a proposal is almost impossible to verify (especially in a large-scale study 
such as this one), and as previous chapters have noted, the involvement of officers in 
the policy process is inevitable. Rosenberg calls it "a fact of organisational life" that 
local treasurers inhabit a role which is both shaped by politics and "in turn, shapes 
the politics in which it is located" (Rosenberg, 1989, p.160). Despite this, 
observers of local authority budget making argue that politicians still have a very 
significant input concerning budgetary decisions, and in hung councils such influence 
is "maximised" (Elcock & Jordan. 1987, p.243). The budgetary decisions that are 
made will therefore reflect the current balance of influence, and, moreover, the 
actors involved will have tangible evidence of their successes in influencing policy. 
The "balance of influence' between the politicians in both hung and non-hung councils 
will now be scrutinised. 
8.2.4. Counc i l lo r Inf luence Over Budgetary Matters 
In non-hung councils the process of budget making is fairly straightforward. The 
process is almost invariably controlled by "a small number of leading politicians and 
senior officers" who make the main decisions and: 
"conduct most of the negotiations required in small, informal groups 
rather than through formal committee and council meetings, whose role is 
usually confined to legitimising decisions taken elsewhere" (Elcock & 
Jordan, 1987, p.255). 
However, as Chapter Seven has already demonstrated, budgetary discussions are 
more open in hung councils (see Tables 7.7 & 7.8). This in itself might suggest that 
influence over the final outcome of the budget is more widespread in hung councils. 
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Although a more open decision making process does not automatically mean that 
influence is more widespread, it does appear logical to assume that when the 'joint 
elite' of majority group leaders and chief officers cannot control the process, more 
compromises will become essential. As Elcock & Jordan (1987) point out: 
"in no^majority councils, member influence is likely to be considerable 
because policy decisions cannot be made except by seeking coalitions of 
councillors willing to support the policy. Also, officers cannot assume 
that decisions are final until they have been ratified by the full councir 
(Elcock & Jordan, 1987. p.247). 
However, despite the greater influence of members in hung councils, this does not 
mean that all members will necessarily gain in influence. Councillors from outside 
of the small group of leading councillors at the head of every party are unlikely to 
suddenly acquire great power, especially in such a complicated and specialist area as 
local authority budgets. 'Backbench' councillors are not normally credited with very 
much political power, and the voting discipline of local parties will generally ensure 
that elite preferences dominate, even in hung councils. Their position in councils 
controlled by a single majority party is even more clearly.powerless. 
The Backbencher 
In non-hung councils, both opposition group leaders and ordinary councillors are 
effectively impotent in the development of the budget, with no more than the 
"symbolic influence on policy" afforded by the legitimising function of the full 
council meeting (Rosenberg, 1989, p.106). Indeed, the ordinary councillor may not 
even understand the processes taking place. This applies not only to the accounting 
problems, where councillors would not be expected to grasp the techniques necessary 
to balance a budget, but also to the political rationale of proposals, (see Rosenberg, 
1989, p.112). As Barlow (1987) comments, in the case of the hung Lancashire 
County Council, while the budget process was "policy driven", the assumptions which 
underpinned the budget were "not immediately obvious to the majority of 
councillors who are not centrally involved in the process" (Barlow, 1987, p.48). 
There is no doubt that, in general, the influence on budgetary policy of backbench 
council lors (of whatever party) is negligible in non-hung councils (see 
Widdicombe, Research Volume One). Even in hung councils, "the influence of the 
general body of members is usually marginal and exercised only in the closing stages 
of budget-making (Elcock & Jordan, 1987, p.255)"'^ 
^ 1 Despite this relative lack of influence by backbenchers in budgetary matters, in other 
areas of decision making many observers agree with Wendt (1986, p.375) that a hung 
council "enhances" the individual councillor's role in decision making (for example, 
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8.2.5. Budgetary Strategies in Hung Counci ls 
In non-hung councils, there appears little doubt that budgetary decisions are made 
by the joint elite of majority group leaders and senior officers (Elcock & Jordan, 
1987. p.255). However, it appears that this must change when a council becomes 
hung. While the ordinary councillor is unlikely to be influencing the shape of the 
budget (except marginally), the consensus is that more group leaders will become 
involved in the process. It must again be remembered that not all local authorities 
will display the same patterns, and what happens in the budgetary process will very 
much depend "upon the political climate of the hung authority" (Leach & Stewart, 
1988, p.44). 
A number of approaches to budget making are possible in a hung council, and the 
three described here appear to be the most common. Firstly. Leach & Game argue that 
an increasing number of hung councils are demonstrating that it is possible "to 
structure the whole budgeting process in a sensible way which actually facilitates 
genuine inter-party debate and leads to an outcome which reflects the kind of 
negotiation and compromise which is (almost) inevitable in a hung council" (Leach & 
Game, 1989, pp.53-54). In such authorities, a process of inter-party discussion 
will establish the "common ground"; with "agreement reached beforehand" a 
protracted and bitter budgetary process can be avoided (Leach & Stewart, 1988, 
p.44). Secondly, in some authorities, especially those with an informal 
administration in place, each parly produces its own budget proposals, and "the scene 
is then set for negotiation/bargaining and compromise, or stalemate." (Leach & 
Stewart, 1988, p.44). This was the pattern Blowers noted in Bedfordshire, which 
may account for his generally negative view of minority rule; such a budgetary 
process appears a recipe for chaos and uncertainty (Blowers, 1987. pp.33-36). 
Thirdly, in single party minority administrations a slightly different pattern may be 
followed. Elcock & Jordan argue that in such cases, it seems: 
"the party which assumes office will tend to determine the priorities and 
policies to be followed, in collaboration with the authority's officers and 
that other parties may alter the rale precept or the amount to be drawn 
from the balance, but not policies and priorities" (Elcock & Jordan, 
1987, p.247). 
The three approaches described appear to be the most common in hung councils, and 
at least the first and third suggest a more consensual manner of budget making. Even 
Blowers. 1987, p.32). 
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In councils where parties adopt the second approach, which indicates that budget 
making will be a protracted affair, the discussions cannot last for ever. 
8.2.6. Budgetary Inf luence in Hung and Non-Hung Counci ls 
Whichever process is followed, one of the three above or some other method of 
discussions about the annual budget,^2 gome form of compromise must be reached 
between at least two parties. A party whose co-operation in passing a budget Is 
requested is unlikely to accede without some form of payoff, and while an office 
payoff is not impossible, previous research suggests it will be a policy payoff (for 
example, see Laver, Railings & Thrasher, 1987). This chapter has already noted the 
greater spread of influence in hung councils over a range of policy issues, and the 
Introduction to this examination of budgetary matters has indicated a significant 
political input over budgetary decisions. Therefore it is proposed that: 
5.7: GROUP LEADERS IN HUNG COUNCILS WILL FEEL MORE 
INFLUENTIAL IN BUDGETARY MATTERS.THAN GROUP LEADERS IN NON-
HUNG COUNCILS. 
As Table 8.6 indicates this was indeed the case. A high number of respondents in 
majority control councils (43.9 percent) saw themselves as 'not at all influential' 
on the rale precept set by their authority, while only 16.8 percent of group leaders 
in hung authorities made that response. In addition, a question on general budgetary 
Influence produced similar responses to those in Table 8.6. Quite clearly, more 
group leaders feel influential In a hung council. The findings discussed in Section 
Three of the previous chapter, and detailed in Table 7.7. show that budgetary 
discussions are more widespread in hung councils, so.such a conclusion is 
unsurprising. 
Table 8.6: Party Influence On Rate Precept in Hung and Non-
Hung Counci ls : Response of Group Leaders 
Response Hung (n=117) Non-Hung (n=42) 
Very Influential 46.0% 29 .3% 
Quite Influential 15.9% 9.7% 
Not Very Influential 21.2% 17.1% 
Not At All Influential 16.8% 43.9% 
(n.b. Table excludes 'no response') 
^2 Table 7.8 in the previous chapter details some of the discussion procedures followed by 
actors in hung councils. 
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As mentioned above, in a number of local authorities all of the party groups prepared 
their own budget with the help of officers, which could mean fierce negotiations to 
reconcile what were often four conflicting budgets. Even in hung councils where an 
apparently more consensual method of achieving a budget is practised, the process 
will probably be more conflictual than in non-hung councils, and Table 8.7 supports 
this proposition. 
Table 8.7: Degree of Confl ict in Budget Making Process 
(response of group leaders) 
Degree of Connici Hung (n=117) Non-Hung (n=42) 
High 35.9% 12.1% 
Fair 30.8% 42.7% 
Small 28.2% 37 .7% 
None 5.1% 7.5% 
(n.b. Table excludes *no response*) 
As Table 8.7 demonstrates, there was a higher degree of conflict over the budgetary 
process within hung councils, indicating a more dynamic budget making process. That 
said, a majority of group leaders in non-hung councils (54.8 percent) also saw the 
budget making process as having a 'high' or 'fair' degree of conflict This 
demonstrates the problem of asking for actors perceptions; one person's "high degree 
of conflict' may be another's 'small degree of conflict'. The same problem also occurs 
when asking actors how influential they are. Without an in-depth study comparing 
policy preferences and policy oulputs (impracticable in a large scale study) such a 
problem cannot be avoided. However, in budgetary matters there is a measure which 
apparently offers some degree of objective assessment as to where political influence 
rests. As well as being asked how influential their party was on the rate precept set 
in their authority (detailed in Table 8.6 above), each political leader in both hung 
and non-hung councils was asked 'how close was the final rate precept for your 
authority to your own party's preferences?'. Of course, this question also has 
methodological problems. A party's proposal can be identical to the final figure set, 
yet have had no influence on the policy preferences the final budget represents; 
indeed, quite a few respondents answered that the final rate precept was identical to 
their preferences and also answered that their party had been 'not at all influential' 
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on the precept set. In addition, as a Labour leader noted, the only reason the ruling 
Conservative group's budget rise was identical to his preference, was that the rate 
precept set was "the maximum permitted without incurring penalties". Despite this, 
it does appear likely that actors in hung councils will be more likely to reply that 
the final precept is close to, or identical with, their own preferences. If so. this 
would offer further support for hypothesis 5.7 (above), that more politicians are 
influential in hung councils. 
Table 8.8: Closeness of Rate Precept To Own Party's Preferences 
Response Hung Non-Hung (n=42) 
(n=117) 
Identical 25.4% 34.1% 
Very Close 22.1% 12.2% 
Quite Close 26.3% 24.4% 
Quite Distant 16.0% 22.0% 
Very Distant 8 .3% 7.3% 
(n.b.. Table excludes 'no response') 
Table 8.8 confounds these expectations. Fewer leaders in hung councils answered that 
the final rate precept was identical to their preferences than leaders in non-hung 
councils. That approximately a third of group leaders in the control group of 
majority control councils answered this is not surprising, f^ost of the non-hung 
councils had a maximum of three parties, and with one of them the ruling party, any 
other result would have been surprising. Ruling parties in non-hung councils will 
automatically have their preference passed. A reasonable explanation for the lower 
number of party leaders in hung councils achieving their exact preferences is that 
they will have to make compromises with other parlies. Given this, the fact that only 
a quarter of actors achieve their exact preferences is unsurprising. The 
'methodological problem' mentioned above also means that even fewer than this 
25.4% are actually demonstrating any real influence; for some the 'identical' rale 
precept is not indicative of budgetary influence. Given this problem, a discussion of 
the remaining figures is probably pointless. What Table 8.8 does demonstrate, albeit 
in a roundabout way, is that compromise is a part of the budgetary process in hung 
councils, offering further support for the hypothesis that groups in hung councils 
are more influential than groups in non-hung councils. 
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Such findings are only to be expected. It would be very surprising to discover that 
there was less compromise in hung councils or that fewer groups felt influential. 
However, the thesis that even groups outside of the ruling administration will feel 
more influential, which the results listed in Table 8.5 (above) show Is the c a s e , is 
less obvious. Whether this general influence is also evidenced in budget making will 
now be assessed. 
8.2.7. O p p o s i t i o n Party Budgeta ry In f luence 
As the previous chapter has indicated, officers in hung councils were also more 
likely to discuss the budgetary proposals with the opposition political parties (see 
Table 7.7) than officers in non-hung councils. Although group leaders often 
expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of these discussions, it appears logical to 
assume that such discussions may facilitate a greater degree of influence. Overall, 
there was a definite feeling of greater influence concerning budgetary negotiations 
reported by actors in hung councils, as Table 8.6 (above) demonstrates. The findings 
already shown in Table 8.5 prove that even parties outside of the ruling 
administration feel more influential over the range of policy areas in hung councils. 
It appears common sense to propose that they will also feel more influential when the 
budget discussions are taking place. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
5.8: O P P O S I T I O N G R O U P L E A D E R S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S W I L L F E E L M O R E 
I N F L U E N T I A L IN B U D G E T A R Y M A T T E R S THAN T H E I R C O U N T E R P A R T S IN 
NON-HUNG C O U N C I L S . 
Tab le 8.9: Oppos i t ion Party Budgeta ry In f luence 
(response of group leaders) 
V e r y Quite Not Very Not At All 
Influential Influential Influential Influential 
Hung 3 0 . 6 % 1 6 . 3 % 1 6 . 3 % 3 6 . 7 % 
(n.=51) 
Non-Hung 8 . 3 % 4 . 2 % 3 7 . 5 % 5 0 . 0 % 
(n=26) 
As the results in Table 8.9 demonstrate, the hypothesis is supported by the opinions 
of opposition leaders in hung councils, when asked to rate their influence concerning 
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budgetary policy."'^ while a substantial minority (36.7 percent) still feel that they 
are not at all influential concerning the budget, nearly half (46.9 percent) felt very 
or quite influential, compared to only 12.5 percent of opposition leaders in non-
hung councils who fell the same. This supports the previous findings concerning 
opposition influence in hung councils. The comments of opposition group leaders in 
hung councils support the findings in Table 8.9. One Conservative leader replied that 
"on budget matters particularly, public policy dealing in committee has developed". 
For one S L D leader, while "the budget process is more complicated" there Is "more 
real debate". Some respondents who did not consider themselves part of the 
administration reported real success in changing details of the budget, although In 
the most striking case this was due to factors outside of the negotiating process. In 
that example, an S L D leader replied that the S L D proposal for a lower precept was 
supported by Labour and due to absentees from the ruling Conservative/Independent 
coalition was successful. 
However, while most opposition leaders In hung councils admit their lack of 
influence, as Table 8.9 shows a small minority still answer that they were very 
Influential. These include the leader of one Conservative minority group, who argued 
that "the majority party [Labour] greatly reduced the intended rate rise when they 
discovered that a joint meeting of all the opposition members had agreed to oppose 
their proposals". This might have been seen as wishful thinking were it not for the 
Labour leader's acknowledgment that there was no conflict over the budget his group 
had set because "there was all party support for the rate fixed". The narrow 
majority the Labour group held in this authority may have been responsible for this 
rare example of cooperation in a non-hung council. Another Conservative minority 
leader found his group's influence difficult to a s s e s s , "but the controlling group 
(again, Labour] appear to heed, somewhat, any warnings by senior councillors". In 
general, however, the figures support the perception of writers that opposition 
groups in non-hung councils lack the influence of their counterparts In hung 
councils. 
8.2.8. T h e S L D and Budgetary Inf luence 
Some opposition parties may be in a better position than others to exercise a degree 
of Influence. In general, one group in particular appears to be admirably suited to get 
13 This is not the same as asking leaders how influential they were over the rate precept. 
Leaders were asked to rate their influence in a number of policy areas (see Chapter Nine), 
and 'the budget' was listed as one of those general policy areas. No distinction is made here 
between opposition leaders in councils where 'coalition* or 'minority' administrations rule 
(but see Chapter Nine, sections 9.4.2. and 9.4.3,). 
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its proposals closely adopted, whether from within the administration or from an 
oppositional position. The Alliance parties strategic position in the middle 
(generally) appears to give them a considerable advantage over the two main parties. 
While Blowers (1987, p.34) implies that local Conservat ive par l ies c lose 
alignment with the new legislation from central government may give them an 
advantage in the budgetary negotiating stakes, it does appear intuitively likely that 
the Alliance's central position (not to mention their relative commitment to making a 
hung situation work) would make it easier for them to reach agreement with either 
Labour and Conservative, who in many c a s e s may be too far apart ideologically to 
reach agreement and are thus confined to obtaining Alliance support for their 
proposals. This is an argument supported by Leach & Stewart (1988), who find that 
"typically, though not invariably, the Alliance budget and proposed rate of precept 
falls between that of the Conservative and Labour proposals" (Leach & Stewart, 
1988. p.44); in such c a s e s the Alliance or S L D proposals can seem like a 'sensible* 
compromise. f\/lellors notes the "glaring" s u c c e s s of the Alliance in budgetary 
negotiations; in only one of the 20 county councils whose budgets he examined were 
they not involved, and "the increase proposed by the Alliance was the one accepted In 
no less than thirteen counties" (Mellors, 1989, p.107). Given the above, it appears 
probable that: 
5.9: A L L I A N C E P A R T I E S WILL S E E T H E M S E L V E S A S M O R E I N F L U E N T I A L 
IN T H E B U D G E T A R Y P R O C E S S THAN O T H E R P O L I T I C A L G R O U P S . 
f^ellors (1986) also notes a general closeness between Labour and the Alliance over 
"budgetary objectives", observing that the "tactical compatibility" of Labour and the 
Conservatives in some counties when committee chairs were being allocated "did not 
reappear at budget time"(Mellors, 1986, pp.18-21). If this is so , it may also be 
that: 
5.10: L A B O U R G R O U P s W I L L S E E T H E M S E L V E S A S M O R E I N F L U E N T I A L 
IN T H E B U D G E T A R Y P R O C E S S THAN C O N S E R V A T I V E G R O U P S . 
There is little doubt that both of the above hypotheses are supported by the evidence. 
Quite clearly, S L D groups feel more influential than other groups on the council, 
while the Labour party generally s e e s Itself as more influential than the 
Conservatives. Independent groups also report that they have been influential on the 
rate set, which given that 5 of the 8 respondents have 'governmental status' is only 
to be expected. 
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T a b l e 8.10: Inf luence On Rate Precept By Pol i t ical Party 
(responses of group leaders) 
P a r t y V e r y Quite Not Very Not At All 
Influential Influential Influential Influential 
Conserva t ive 2 9 . 4 % 8 . 8 % 2 9 . 4 % 3 2 . 4 % 
(n=37) 
Labour 4 0 . 0 % 2 3 . 3 % 2 6 . 7 % 6 . 7 % 
(n=30) 
S L D / A l l i a n c e 6 5 . 0 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 0 . 0 % 
(n=40) 
Independent 5 0 . 0 % 3 7 . 5 % 1 2 . 5 % 
(n=8) 
(n.b. table excludes 'no response') 
In further support of the proposal that the S L D will tend to exercise a greater degree 
of budgetary influence. 36.1 percent of S L D leaders reported that the rate set was 
Identical to their preferences, a far higher percentage than the other two main 
parties. Although the very high degree of Alliance s u c c e s s in relation to the rate 
increase reported by Mellors was not repeated, these findings support the general 
impression throughout this study that the S L D takes good advantage of the factors 
favouring its success in hung English councils. 
We have seen that political influence is felt by a greater number of political actors 
In hung councils. Even those parties which are not part of the administration have 
answered that they are more influential over a range of policy areas. That influence 
is also felt at budget making. However, the influence of a critical actor has yet to be 
fully addressed. On a number of occasions throughout this chapter, the role of chief 
officers in decision making has been discussed. Although the precise nature of the 
relationship between local politicians and bureaucrats is difficult to establish, it 
appears likely that the relationship will, like the structures of hung councils, 
undergo some significant changes when a council becomes hung. The final section of 
this chapter will explore the nature of the relationship, and attempt to discover the 
nature of such changes. 
S e c t i o n T h r e e : T h e D is t r ibut ion of P o w e r In Hung a n d N o n - H u n g 
C o u n c i l s 
The previous section has strongly suggested that more group leaders feel influential 
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in hung councils. The increase in influence felt by many political leaders in hung 
councils, including those who head 'opposition' groups suggests that the power of 
those actors normally seen as dominant in decision making will be affected when a 
council becomes hung, a point undisputed by students of coalition politics. The nature 
of such changes in power relationships, however, is a matter of much conjecture. 
Before examining the nature of power relationships in hung councils, a critical 
examination of decision making in majority control councils is necessary . Chapter 
Three has already detailed the power relationships in non-hung councils in great 
detail, and the picture painted by local government experts will be compared with 
the perceptions the respondents in the control group of non-hung councils. Following 
this, the nature of power relations in hung councils will be surveyed. Previous 
observers of hung councils have made a number of judgements on the nature of power 
relationships, many of them contradictory. The relative power of officers, party 
elites, committees, full council, local party organisations and central government 
will be a s s e s s e d , in an attempt to determine the new centres of Influence in hung 
councils. Finally, the effects of the passage of time are briefly considered. 
8.3.1. T h e C e n t r e s of Inf luence In Majority Cont ro l C o u n c i l s 
In the majority of c a s e s , we would expect to find from the picture painted by 
previous observers that, while the influence of chief officers would be seen by the 
actors in majority control councils as considerable, that of elected political elites 
would be seen as paramount. In comparison, the committee structure and meetings of 
the full council would be seen as relatively unimportant, merely the mechanisms by 
which the 'joint elite' exercise their dominance.'''* The replies of the control group of 
non-hung local aulhonties to the question of which groups are most influential over 
council policy support these arguments. 
All respondents were asked; "which of the following, in your opinion, is most 
influential in dictating the course of council policy'. They were asked to rank them in 
order of descending importance, and there was space for them to list other factors 
they considered important. Table 8.11 demonstrates that chief executives and party 
leaders show a remarkable unanimity a s to where they believe power lies in a 
council controlled by a single party. The only slight disagreement the two groups 
have is over just how unimportant the full council meeting and local party 
I^AIexander (1981) is more specific, arguing that it is the relationship between the leader 
of the dominant group and the chief executive which is "the most important interactive 
p rocess - (Alexander. 1981. p.35). Whatever, a s Chapter Two has detailed, the major 
studies into local government decision making recognise the elitist nature of decision 
making in the vast majority of councils (for an appraisal, see Temple. 1991). 
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organisations are in relation to the elites. 
T a b l e 8.11: T h e Distr ibut ion of Power In Non-Hung C o u n c i l s 
Response of Chief Executives (n=20) Response of Group Leaders (n=42) 
1. Elected Party Elites 1.Elected Party Elites 
2. Chief Officers 2.Chief Officers 
3. Central Government 3.Central Government 
4. Committees 4.Committees 
5. Full Council S.Local Party Organisations 
e.Local Party Organisations . 6.Full Council 
The actors surveyed believe that power lies quite clearly with the 'joint elite', but, 
just as democratic theory says they should be, elected party elites are supreme in 
the policy process. In one authority, the chief executive reported that the Labour 
controlling group had "political advisers" on "officer's working groups covering the 
main areas of council work", which must be a considerable means of control over the 
officers and, therefore, the direction of policy. The lack of power most studies 
attribute to individual councillors is partly demonstrated by the relative lack of 
influence of committee membership, the council meeting and local party 
organisations. Respondents generally saw these groups as less important than the 
activities of elected party elites and chief officers. 
However, this does not mean that the leaders of opposition party groups necessarily 
saw themselves as lacking influence, if not power, over the decision making process. 
The previous section has demonstrated that a few opposition leaders in councils 
controlled by a single party did see themselves as very influential In a number of 
policy areas. Even in budgetary matters, as the previous section has discussed, some 
opposition leaders argued that they had achieved "some measure of s u c c e s s " in 
"moderating" the ruling group's proposals. 
Despite this, the overall response of both political and bureaucratic actors supported 
one Consen/ative council leader's bold assertion that the influence in his council lay 
with a "small caucus of Chief Executive, party leader, some chairmen and chief 
officers", in other words, the 'joint elite' identified by Stoker (1988, p.85). The 
same leader minimised the importance of all other groups, with the exception of the 
rest of the Conservative group on the council. In general, the response of opposition 
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parly groups was that their influence was "very minimal". One Labour opposition 
leader pointed out that the opposition's presence on the Policy Committee and the 
Finance Committee did not ensure any real input into the policy process, a s he had 
"no doubt that the leader of the Council influenced the figures before they reached any 
committee". 
Although one respondent said it was "unfair" to place 'central government* in the list 
of factors influencing council policy "because all counci ls must carry out 
government policy", the impact of central government was felt by a number of 
actors, in particular the Labour council leader who placed central government first 
in influence; his authority had been rate-capped. One Conservative leader, while 
admitting that his group had been "not at all influential" over the budget, replied "the 
Conservative government forced the issue as we would wish it" by rate-capping the 
Labour controlled authority. The high ranking central government achieved in the 
list of influential actors demonstrated that many actors saw themselves operating 
"subject to central government constraints", although (unsurprisingly given the 
hostility between local Labour groups and the Conservative government) Labour 
leaders generally rated central government more influential than Conservative 
leaders did. A few respondents mentioned other influences. For example, one S L D 
leader rated the National Union of Public Employees as the third most important 
actor in his Labour controlled metropolitan district council. The majority agreed 
that the six groups they were presented with, whatever the order they chose, were 
the most important.''^ 
In general, the findings from the control group of majority control local authorities 
support the arguments put forward by many observers of British local government. 
The most influential groups on the council are perceived as party elites and chief 
officers, with the politicians holding the advantage. The influence of other groups is 
far less. Observers of hung councils, however, have portrayed a different picture of 
the spread of power, and it is to an examination of power in hung councils that we 
now turn. 
8.3.2. Power in Hung C o u n c i l s : T h e Dictatorship of the O f f i c i a l ? 
We have seen that the distribution of power in the single party majority control 
15 A ruling Labour leader put the 'elected party elite* a s number one. followed by his 'group 
meeting'. Another Labour leader also mentioned the Labour group meeting, a s did a 
Conservative opposition leader. The only other response from actors in non-hung councils 
which was outside of the norm was the Labour ruler who placed "Grant regimes. E E C . etc* 
at number six in his 'most influential' list. 
2 9 0 
councils in our sample conforms to the picture painted by students of English local 
government. According to the actors, although officer power is significant, supreme 
power rests with the elected party elite. However, the arrival of hungness appears to 
challenge the hegemony of the 'joint elite*. Observers of hung councils appear In 
little doubt that the power of chief officers, and in particular that of the chief 
executive, can be increased by hungness. and that the response of chief officers Is 
crucial to the political arrangements reached (see Leach, 1985 pp.17-20). Indeed, 
Mellors states that: 
"one of the clearest lessons to be drawn from the recent experiences of 
British non-majority councils is that power balances can easily elevate 
the role of professional officers ... how officers react to the political 
stalemate can have an important effect upon relationships between the 
political parties and between individual party leaders" (IVIellors. 1989, 
p .96 ) . 
While Blowers points out that hungness may well have the opposite effect. In that 
officers may become "unwilling to venture opinions or proposals that, if unheeded, 
will undermine their credibility", he is also aware that another possibility is that 
"officials will be able to fill the political vacuum created by political divisions and 
[the] resulting uncertainty" (Blowers, 1987, p.45). Moss notes that "hung councils 
provide an open invitation or temptation to chief officers to manipulate the political 
process and effectively exercise control" (fVloss. 1983, p.9). Many respondents to a 
previous survey into hung councils expressed this belief, with one chief executive 
replying (with surprising candour) that the main advantage of his council becoming 
hung was that: 
"From an officer's point of view, the knowledge that a particular policy 
you are pushing may win through even if opposed by the largest group, if 
the other two support it. In an authority with an overall majority, the 
majority group leader often acts as an effective veto in the early stages of 
policy formulation. This cannot happen in a hung council" (Railings & 
Thrasher, 1986, previously unpublished reply to their questionnaire). 
Other chief executives responding to Railings & Thrasher's survey agreed with this. 
One noted that "committees are more ready to listen to officer advice", and a chief 
executive whose politicians had been unable to agree on committee chair 
arrangements replied that this meant "chief officers have been obliged to reach their 
own decisions on a range of less important matters". Councillors who responded to 
this earlier survey, while often positive about the changes since becoming hung, 
were also aware of the dangers of hungness increasing officer power. A small number 
of respondents from all parties expressed concern at the possibility. Although 
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generally they were much less forthright than the chief executives, one Conservative 
leader noted that hungness had introduced "the ability of officers to 'play off one 
group against another". 
While it might be argued that politicians repeatedly demonstrate a capacity for self-
delusion about their own power, it appears highly unlikely that in the relatively 
well defined areas of local government responsibility they will fail to recognise 
shifts in influence. If the general impression is that officers have gained power, they 
must have gained it from somewhere. The evidence suggests that it is the political 
elites who lose power to officers when councils become hung. 
It is not only chief officers who have been perceived as gaining power at the expense 
of the political elite. One thing that obsen/ers are agreed upon is that the power of 
individual councillors is, as Blowers (1987, p.32) puts it. 'enhanced' by hungness. 
This suggests that the power of their leaders over them, and thus over the flow of 
policy, decreases : the viewpoints of individual councillors need to be considered 
when the council meeting ceases to be a purely 'ritualistic* occasion. Leach & Game 
report that chief executives frequently told them that prior to becoming hung they 
were usually able to write the minutes of council meetings before they took place, 
and often made the same claim about committee meetings and minutes (Leach & Game, 
1989, p.39). The possibility of writing minutes prior to meetings in most hung 
councils appears unlikely, to say the least. It must be noted that the suggestion that 
elected party elites surrender some control to individual councillors does not mean 
that "backbenchers' suddenly become more powerful than their leaders. What it does 
mean is that their views may need to be considered more carefully when all parties 
become minority parties; the lack of predictability of committee and council 
meetings means that "majorities have to be fought for and won, rather than taken for 
granted" (Leach & Stewart. 1988. pp.41 )16. 
With the shifts in power to individual councillors, some observers (for example. 
Blowers, 1987: f^ellors, 1983) argue that power shifts from the committees to the 
full council , as ruling elites are unable to control the committees in the way 
majority control parlies and their chief executives can . a s decisions taken in 
committee are often overturned in full council. If, as Blowers maintains, the full 
16 A s the investigation of power in non-hung councils (Chapter Three) has already noted. 
Widdicombe reported that the "spread and intensification" of politicisation has decreased 
tha importance of committees and councils "as arenas where policies and decisions are 
actually made apart from in Independent-dominated or hung councils" (Widdicombe, 1986. 
Research Volume One, p. 105). 
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council takes effective decisions "rather than simply endorsing proposals already 
agreed at the committee stage" (Blowers, 1987, p.32), then one would expect to find 
that the power of the full council increases while the power of committees decreases. 
The results from the control group of majority councils, however, suggests that 
committees in those councils are relatively unimportant (see Table 8.11 above), 
another mechanism by which the 'joint elite' keeps control. Wendt maintains that ij 
is undeniable from his experiences as Cheshire County Council's chief executive 
"that a no-majority council enhances the roles of individual council members In 
decision making" (V\/endt. 1986. p.375). This might suggest that committees could 
actually increase in importance when the elite can no longer control their decisions. 
Notwithstanding this. Wendt argues there are still dominating political figures in 
hung councils, but that political dominance is "no longer a function of membership of 
the largest political group" (Wendl. 1986. p.376). 
It is not only the power of internal council actors which is seen as being affected by 
hungness. Blowers argues that; 
"as central government imposes more restriction on local authorities so 
it provokes a reaction among authorities determined to resist control and 
so assert their independence and autonomy. As local opposition to 
government policies and expenditure cuts is asser ted so central 
government attempts to restrain local powers and resources. In many 
local authorities there is now the added dimension of minority government 
which may intensify the uncertainty and instability caused by greater 
central intervention in local affairs" (Blowers. 1987, p.47) 
Therefore, with their power over the rate making process seen as potentially 
threatening to a hung council struggling for a degree of budgetary agreement, central 
government might be perceived as more influential by the actors in hung councils. 
8.3.3. T h e C e n t r e s of Inf luence In Hung C o u n c i l s 
A number of potential changes in the distribution of power when a council becomes 
hung have been detailed above. If the findings of previous research into hung councils 
is confirmed, we would expect to find that the perception of our respondents is that 
the power of chief officers is enhanced and that of elected elites diminished. Also, the 
power of the council may be seen as increasing, perhaps at the expense of 
committees, when a council becomes hung. In addition, the pressures of hungness 
will exacerbate central-local tensions, causing actors in hung councils to see central 
government becoming more influential. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
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5.11: T H E P O W E R O F O F F I C E R S I N C R E A S E S IN HUNG C O U N C I L S . 
5.12: T H E P O W E R O F E L E C T E D P A R T Y E L I T E S D IM IN ISHES IN HUNG 
C O U N C I L S . 
5.13: T H E P O W E R O F T H E F U L L C O U N C I L I N C R E A S E S A T T H E E X P E N S E 
O F C O M M I T T E E S WHEN A C O U N C I L B E C O M E S HUNG. 
5.14: C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T IS S E E N A S M O R E I N F L U E N T I A L IN HUNG 
C O U N C I L S THAN NON-HUNG C O U N C I L S . 
This survey asked party leaders and chief executives in both hung and non-hung 
councils to a s s e s s the relative influence of six groups of actors; the full council, 
committees, chief officers, elected party elites, local party organisations, and 
central government, and to rank them in order of descending importance. There was 
also an opportunity for them to mention and rate other influences they considered 
important. Table 8 .12 details the responses from the actors in hung councils; the 
responses of actors in non-hung councils, detailed in Table 8.11 (above) are shown 
in brackets. 
T a b l e 8.12: T h e Distr ibution of Power in Hung C o u n c i l s 
Response of Chief Executives (n=62) Response of Group Leaders (n=117) 
1. (4) Committees =1.(4) Committees 
2. (2) Chief Officers =1(3) Central Government 
3. (5) Full Council 3.(2) Chief Officers 
4. (1) Elected Party Elites 4.(6) Full Council 
5. (3) Central Government 5.(1) Elected Party Elites 
6. (6) Local Party Organisations 6.(5) Local Party Organisations 
Figures in brackets = ratings given by actors in non-hung councils (see Table 8.11) 
n.b. table excludes 'no response*. 
Controlling for party identification, there was only one significant change to the 
rankings in Table 8 . 1 2 . Both Labour and SLD/Al l iance leaders rated central 
government as the biggest influence on policy, with 60 percent of Labour leaders and 
5 7 . 5 percent of SLD/Al l iance leaders citing central government a s the main 
influence on council policy compared to only 5.4 percent of Conservative leaders. 
Hypothesis 5.14 posited that central government influence would be seen as having 
increased in hung councils, and despite the lower rating it receives from chief 
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executives, the majority of "non-Conservative" political actors were quite certain 
that this was so . Despite this judgement, perhaps natural given a Conservative 
central government and the current climate in central- local relations, the 
assessment by all party leaders and chief executives in hung councils clearly places 
the committees as the major internal factor in the direction of council policy. 
The contrast in opinion of both group leaders and chief executives In hung councils 
with their counterparts in non-hung councils is striking. Whereas elected party 
elites and chief officers are perceived to be controlling policy in majority control 
councils, the perception of where power lies in hung councils focuses more on the 
role of committees and the continuing influence of chief officers. Hungness is not seen 
to have affected the power of chief officers, but political power Is perceived as 
fragmented. Quite clearly, in full support of hypothesis 5.12, elected political elites 
are thought to suffer a considerable loss in influence when a council became hung, 
and the rise in importance of committee and council meetings indicates that the 
power of other party groups and individual councillors is seen to be increased as the 
ruling parly elites can no longer force an issue through 'on the nod'. This supports 
the findings of the Section Two of this chapter, in that more parties feel Influential 
when a council becomes hung. 
8.3.4. T h e I n c r e a s e d Importance of C o u n c i l a n d Commi t tee Meet ings 
Hypothesis 5.13 proposes that the power of the full council increases at the expense 
of committees when a council becomes hung. The response of one chief executive 
supports this, arguing that a major disadvantage of hungness for the officers is: 
"the impossibility of delegating anything to committees. The council 
meeting itself is the effective decision making body and will frequently 
overturn committee decisions, even with the same members attending". 
A Labour leader supports this, complaining of the constant need to "refer decisions to 
full council". Despite these responses, hypothesis 5.13 is not proven by the 
majority of responses to this question. On the contrary, it appears that the 
importance of both committee meetings and full council meetings is increased when a 
council becomes hung. One group leader replied that hungness had led to "real debate" 
and "real decision making in public" rather than by a "small party caucus" as 
previously occurred, a feeling evident in a number of replies. While not all 
respondents were enthusiastic about the changes, those who were claimed a real 
improvement in the openness of decision making when the old 'joint elite' could no 
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longer railroad policy through the council. The expected increase in the power of 
chief officers (proposed by hypothesis 5.11) is not immediately apparent. Although 
the power of chief officers (as seen in the responses to the questionnaires) is still 
seen as considerable, it does not appear to have been enhanced at the expense of 
politicians as a whole. It appears that elected party elites lose power to the body of 
councillors while officer power remains relatively constant when a council becomes 
hung. 
However, while the committees are recognised as the most important arenas in hung 
councils, some actors clearly attached consequence to them for the power they 
believed the committee structure gave to officers. One Labour group leader described 
his strategy for coping with the new importance of committees, indicating that a 
clever politician could still, at least with the cooperation of his officers, manipulate 
the decision making process to his party's advantage even without a voting majority: 
"The key appears to be to get the officers to include the points you want in 
their reports. This generally gets accepted by the other two groups then 
as they do not recognise the political connection. Officers reports are 
rarely changed by committee and committee decisions are rarely changed 
by full council". 
For this respondent, both committee meetings and the full council appeared to 
function in essentially the same manner as when a single parly controlled the 
council. Committee decisions appear to be less set in concrete in many authorities, 
with Blowers maintaining that one of the enduring characteristics of minority rule 
is that the full council "takes effective decisions rather than simply endorsing 
proposals already agreed at the committee stage" (Blowers, 1987. p.32). 
However, as the findings above indicate, many respondents to this survey, saw 
committee debates assuming new significance in the policy process. The large 
number of changes to committee structures noted in Chapter Seven indicate that, for 
most local authorities, committees seem to assume new importance as forums of 
decision making. Committee debates become more important in a hung council, a 
place where policies are "initiated" and hammered out rather than just superficially 
discussed. However, in such circumstances resolution is not easy, and there appear 
to be more occasions when the full council meeting has to attempt to resolve the 
conflict over policies (see Blowers, pp.44-45). 
Other influences were also seen as important by a few actors. One chief executive and 
one group leader mentioned "working groups' as having a small degree of influence. 
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and two politicians mentioned 'political groups', although neither was more specific. 
Blowers has suggested that when a council is hung "organised interest groups . . . 
recognise that lobbying can be effective" and are therefore more likely to attempt to 
mobilise support for their "policy preferences" (Blowers, 1987. p.46). While it 
was the case that the other influence most commonly cited by actors in hung councils 
were local pressure groups, only two actors (one political, one bureaucratic) 
actually mentioned them, so Blowers contention must remain interesting but 
unproven. ' '^ In general, most actors, despite being given the opportunity to list 
other factors they considered important, chose to rank the factors given (as did 
actors in non-hung councils). 
The responses of actors in hung councils appear to indicate quite clearly that very 
significant changes in power relationships occur when a council becomes hung. 
However, the responses of chief executives in hung councils where one party rules 
alone appear to contradict this. 
8.3.5. Minority G o v e r n m e n t s and P o w e r Dist r ibut ion 
The replies from chief executives in authorities where one party attempts to rule 
alone without a formal or informal arrangement with another party group are shown 
in Table 8 .13 . and they appear to indicate that it may not necessarily be hungness 
which is the significant variable affecting the distribution of power in the council. 
Chief executives in hung councils under a minority administration assign the same 
importance to the various groups as their counterparts in majority control councils, 
which implies that it is the nature of political control which is the important factor 
as to who governs, rather than the composition of the council.''^ The political elite in 
minority control councils are clearly, like their counterparts in non-hung councils, 
in control of the policy process according to their chief executives. 
One chief executive did mention that 'public opinion' was important, but ranked it last of 
7 factors. Pride of place must go to the Independent leader who ranked 'common s e n s e ' 
fourth in his assessment of where power resided in a hung council. 
18 Despite this finding, the type of administration (whether coalition or single party 
minority) made no discernable difference to political responses concerning openness and 
a c c e s s to officers (see Chapter Seven, section 7.3.3.). 
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T a b l e 8.13: T h e Distr ibution of Power In Hung 
C o u n c i l s With Minority A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
(response of chief executives) 
1. (1) Elected Party Elites 
2. (2) Chief Officers 
3. (4) Committees 
4. (5) Full Council 
5. (3) Central Government 
6. (6) Local Party Organisations 
Figure in brackets is the rating given by chief executives in non-
hung councils.(n.b Table excludes 'no response*) 
However, it must be noted that there was no divergence of opinion among group 
leaders in hung councils. They had much the same opinion as to where influence lay 
whatever the administrative arrangements in their local authority. Therefore, it 
may well be that Table 8 .13 demonstrates that in hung councils with a minority 
administration, officers are still largely dealing with the political elite of that party 
and are less likely to note any changes in the balance of influence between political 
actors."" 9 
One factor which does not seem to affect the relative power of actors in hung councils 
is the length of time a council has been hung. While there was a slight indication that 
politicians In long term hung councils saw the power of officers as having slightly 
decreased over lime and. conversely, officers were more pessimistic about their own 
influence in the early stages of hungness, the responses from both officers and group 
leaders showed no clear pattern of differences in influence over time. It appears that 
the length of time a council has been hung is not a crucial factor in the balance of 
influence.between political and bureaucratic actors. Given that chief officers and 
group leaders are both gradually learning and adapting to the changed circumstances, 
such a finding is to be expecled.^o 
It must also be pointed out that not all the party leaders in those councils which chief 
executives described as under 'minority conlroP agreed with that assessment ; 5 of the 36 
party leaders responding in the 24 councils detailed in Table 8.13 maintained there was a 
coalition administration in place. 
20 Although Widdicombe (1986) found that compared to the Robinson Report (1976) leaders 
were getting younger, it is still the c a s e that high office is associated with age and 
experience (Widdicombe. 1986, R e s e a r c h Volume Two, pp.36-37). Therefore, some of the 
advantages the national 'Mandarin' has over a minister (short time in office, comparative 
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C o n c l u s i o n s 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented in this chapter. 
Overal l , neither officers nor councillors s e e the decision making process a s 
characterised by policy drift and impasse. While a considerable minority of both 
political and bureaucratic actors do feel that the policy process has deteriorated, a 
majority answer that both the quality of decision making and the quality of policies 
has either improved or remained the same since their council became hung. When the 
largely negative responses of the former ruling parties are removed from the 
analysis, a different view of the decision making process emerges. The majority of 
political actors then reply that the process has improved since hungness. 
Despite the hostility expressed by traditional rulers to the new decision making 
processes which emerge, there is some evidence that they will look more favourably 
upon the process with the passing of time. Chief executives, who are initially less 
enthusiastic than group leaders, will also display more enthusiasm for working in a 
hung council over time. Conversely, other political groups in long term hung 
councils are iess likely to view decision making favourably, which may indicate 
growing feelings of disenchantment;. Over a period of years, it may become apparent 
that opposition groups in hung councils are still only on the fringes of the policy 
making process. 
There appears to be a more open decision making process in hung councils. Many 
political respondents to this survey were enthusiastic about the increased 
importance of debate, and this is reflected in the greater influence that political 
groups in hung councils feel they possess . This is hardly surprising, as compromise 
is an essential fact of life for all actors in hung councils, and the necessity of 
coalition building automatically means more party groups will exercise influence. 
However, it does seem as if decision making is genuinely more consensual in many 
hung counci ls . On average, a substantial majority (nearly 65 percent) of 
'opposition' groups report that they are very or quite influential in several key 
policy areas. These are groups who are not part of the ruling administration, the sort 
of groups who from the responses of the control group certainly do not p o s s e s s a 
great deal of influence in non-hung councils. 
lack of knowledge of subject area) do not apply in local government, and there is no reason 
to suppose that officers and councillors are not equally advantaged or disadvantaged by the 
passage of time. 
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The same spread of influence was also reported by both administration and opposition 
groups during the crucial budget making process. The need for compromise was 
indicated by the more conflictual nature of budget making in hung councils. It was 
also shown not only by the fewer number of group leaders who achieved 100 percent 
s u c c e s s with their budgetary aims, but also by the greater number who reported a 
degree of closeness to their own preferences when the final budget figure was set. As 
the findings of previous chapters have indicated, the S L D was more likely to achieve 
its budgetary aims than either of the two main parties, although the often perceived 
closeness of the S L D and Labour was also demonstrated by the good performance of 
Labour groups. 
In general, this survey supports the observations of students of majority control 
councils as to where power lies. The 'joint elite* quite clearly control policy in those 
counci ls. Equally clearly, the influence of elected party elites is dramatically 
decreased by hungness, and the greater influence given to the full council meeting and 
the committees suggests that the power of the individual councillor increases. The 
increased influence often attributed to officers when a council becomes hung is not so 
apparent. That said, committees are seen by both politicians and officers as the most 
important factors in hung councils. Officers will largely control the flow of 
information into the committee, and it may well be that the paramount importance of 
committees and chief officers in hung councils indicates an increase in the power of 
chief officers. However, as noted earlier, the tendency for committees to accept 
officer recommendations may be subject to manipulation by astute politicians. 
In addition, officer power over information might be offset by the increase in 
openness reported by group leaders and detailed in Chapter Seven. The greater 
number of political actors who feel influential in hung councils may also be an 
indication that officer influence does not increase when a council becomes hung, it 
may be harder for officers to hide their input into the policy process when more of 
the political actors are determined to have a say in the direction of policy, although 
this is obviously difficult to establish, fyiost hung councils have introduced 
improvements to the access politicians get to chief officers, which also suggests that 
the loss of power by the former political elite is at least partly offset by the greater 
a c c e s s of the majority of political actors. 
Overall, it is clear that decision making processes become more open and that 
consensus becomes a guiding principle of most hung councils. The general enthusiasm 
displayed by local politicians does not indicate that hung councils become moribund, 
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nor does it indicate a policy process dominated by officers. Decision making becomes 
closer to the 'official' description of local democracy, with the full council assuming 
new importance and officers moving closer to their formal roles as servants of the 
whole council. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
We have already seen that theories of coalition behaviour which stress the primacy 
of office are Inadequate explanations for the behaviour of actors in hung councils. 
While when current administrations are examined minority governments are no 
longer the most common form of arrangement, nearly half (48.8 percent) of all the 
121 outcomes in our main sample of 62 councils are minority administrations. Even 
in the coalition administrations which form, many actors do not take office in the 
form of committee chairs."' Therefore, it would be surprising if the theories of 
early theorists, which concentrate on office-seeking explanations for coalitional 
behaviour, supply a reasonable explanation for local coalition building. However, 
given their importance to the more sophisticated models which followed, the models 
need to be a s s e s s e d . This chapter, the final one utilising the questionnaire data, will 
broadly adopt the temporal framework of Chapter One to test the predictive 
capabilities of some of the theories offered by observers of coalition behaviour. 
Some theories cannot be effectively tested with this data; for example, theories of 
proto-coalition formation such as Grofman's require a close analysis of the process 
of coalition formation and a model of the policy space which a study such as this 
cannot achieve. Recent game theory solutions demand more than sophisticated models 
of policy spaces; the competitive solution requires a knowledge of payoffs beyond the 
capacity of this work (see Chapter One, 1.4.1). 
However, there are a number of theories associated with coalition formation which 
can be tested with the data at our disposal. The early theories, with their simplistic 
numerical assumptions, can easily be tested, and provided we can construct an 
acceptable unidlmensional ideological scale, so can other office-seeking models such 
as Axelrod's idea of minimum winning connected coalitions. If we can place parties at 
a particular point along that scale , rather than a simple ordinal scale such as 
Axelrod utilised, we can also test de Swaan's idea that parties seek alliances with 
other parties as close as possible to them in policy terms, although de Swaan's thesis 
that coalitions are created 'Incrementally' cannot be tested here. We can certainly 
test the predictive performance of the c lass ic early propositions of coalition 
formation in a local context. 
No apologies are offered for this concentration on models which tests such as Taylor 
& Lever 's (1973) have proved deficient in explaining the formation of national 
^ Full details of all these findings are given in Chapter Four, and discussed throughout this 
thes is . 
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coalitions. Again, it must be reiterated that the purpose of this study is primarily to 
gather information. Chapter Six's findings that minority administrations are the 
most durable in hung English councils Is a counter-intuitive finding, and contradicts 
both the propositions of formal theories and the results of most research Into 
national coalitions; the findings of this chapter may also reveal some surprises. We 
have 121 administrations forming In our 62 local authorities, and with such a large 
number of governments to test in political sys tems which share common 
characteristics, the results of this testing will surely not be without interest. 
We begin by scrutinising the usefulness of early theories of coalition formation, 
which stressed the single notion of winning office as the sole concern of political 
actors. After addressing some of the problems of attempting to 'test' coalition 
theories, section one briefly considers the frequency of minimal and minimum 
winning coalitions in our universe of administrations. Minimal and minimum 
winning theories are based on simple mathematical criteria, and all we need to 
a s s e s s their predictive adequacy is the council composition at the time they formed.^ 
However, a scrutiny of other approaches requires rather more Information about 
the actors involved. In order to address some of the inadequacies of the early 
approaches, coalition theorists attempted to specify the majority criterion more 
tightly by the inclusion of a notion of 'connectedness' along a simple ideological scale. 
Section two addresses the problems of constructing such a scale for an English local 
government system which might justifiably claim to be 403 different political 
s y s t e m s . ^ Using recent studies of policy positions in the British national political 
system, a unidlmensional ideological/ policy scale is constructed. Section three 
utilises the scale to test theories of ideological connectedness relating to coalition 
formation. Chapter Six has already a s s e s s e d the effect of minimal and minimum 
winning status to duration, but those findings are briefly a s s e s s e d here along with 
the impact of connected status on administrative duration. Finally, section four 
explores the thesis that closeness of policy preferences will be more important than 
2 As an examination of the questionnaires will reveal (see Appendix) the council 
composition given by the chief executives was that of Summer, 1988. However, it was not 
necessari ly the composition at the time when either the current or a past administration 
formed. Therefore, in 35 of the 62 local authorities some further research had to be 
carried out to check the council composition In the year when an administration formed. In 
one c a s e 8 different composliions were utilised for one metropolitan council which had had 
9 different administrations since becoming hung. It must be noted that these figures are 
used throughout this research (when necessary ) in order to ensure that the correct 
composition at the time a coalition formed was used. 
^ There are 39 county councils, 296 district or borough councils, 32 London borough 
councils, and 36 metropolitan district councils, a total of 403 local authorities in England, 
all with different political cultures. 
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simple connectedness to the coalitions which form. The unidimensional local scale we 
have constructed also takes some account of the 'policy distance' between the parties, 
and by comparing the ideological position of a local party with Its national party we 
can further modify the position of local parties on the policy scale . Therefore, not 
only can we examine office based theories to a s s e s s the relevance of a further 
modifier in the form of "minimum winning connected policy-distance minimising 
coalitions", but also, we can examine minority governments and a s s e s s whether 
policy concessions made to other parties, particularly those closest on the policy 
scale , offer a reasonable explanation for both their formation and greater longevity. 
Given the possibility of testing for policy concessions, we do not need to regard 
minority governments as irrational; the existence of policy pay-offs can explain 
their formation quite easily. 
S e c t i o n O n e : The Pr imacy of Off ice 
Section one commences with an admission of the inadequacies of attempting to 'test' 
coalition theories. It is not only the inevitable caveat that models based on laboratory 
games can never explain the intricacies of coalition politics in the 'real world', it is 
also that testing the predictive performance of coalition theories is not the same 
thing as testing the rationale underlining the theories. They may be successful at 
predicting which coalitions form, but that does not mean that the reasons they 
advance for coalitions forming in a particular way are the right ones; as is pointed 
out below, they may be right for the wrong reasons. "Really testing" the theories 
may be beyond the capacity of this research, but that does not mean its findings 
concerning the predictive capabilities of various theories are without interest. For 
example, the examination of the frequency of minimal and minimum winning 
coalitions reveals that minimising coalitions may be important despite the apparent 
lack of office at local level. 
9.1.1. T h e I n a d e q u a c i e s of 'Tes t ing ' 
Before commencing this examination of some theories of coalition formation and 
duration an important point needs to be made. The word 'test' implies that we can 
subject certain theories to a rigourous analysis, an implication which the claims of 
much coalition theory encourages. After all, coalition theorists usually make a 
specific prediction that the coalition which forms will belong to a 'solution set' 
which, typically, comprises a small number of the arithmetically possible 
permutations. Testing the predictive s u c c e s s of s u c h a theory appears 
straightforward. However, Laver & Schofield (1990) sound a note of considerable 
caution: 
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"we should not get too bowled over by the possibility of 'testing' coalition 
theories on data from European coalition governments.. .coalit ion 
bargaining in Europe is often constrained by a wide range of institutional 
and behavioural factors. As a consequence, it is simply not the c a s e that 
all arithmetically possible coalition cabinets may form. Some are likely 
to be ruled out quite categorically by these Internal constraints on 
bargaining ... Coalition bargaining in Europe, in short, does not take place 
in the sterile conditions of a laboratory; it takes place in the dirt of a real 
political world in which all things are never equal. This means that we 
should not expect too much from the confrontation between theories that 
deal with coalition formation and the formation of real government 
coalitions in Western Europe. S u c h a confrontation is far more 
productive if it is seen as a heuristic exercise rather than as a scientific 
test ... Thus , while we do not attempt to 'test' theories of coalition 
formation...we do set out to juxtapose the theory and the reality of 
coalition bargaining in an attempt to expand our appreciation of both." 
(Laver & Schofield, 1990, p.90). 
If we substitute 'English local government' for "European governments' in the 
extract above, and add the further qualification that the lack of a cabinet and 
equivalents to ministerial portfolios probably means that local government is even 
further removed from laboratory coalition g a m e s , then Laver & Schofield's 
qualification of their testing as a 'heuristic exercise' sums up the aim not only of 
this chapter, but of the whole of this research. 
Another vital caveat is also made by Laver & Schofield who, reporting Browne, 
Gleiber & Mashoba's (1986) finding that there is little connection between minimal 
connected winning coalitions and lower levels of 'conflict of interest','* specify the 
danger of confusing predictive success with high scientific status. They point out that 
such findings indicate minimal winning connected theory (commonly found to be the 
most successful predictive theory) may be predicting the right coalitions for the 
wrong reasons: 
"that is why we do not present the empirical findings that we review...as 
'tests' of coalition theories. Really testing these theories, as the Browne 
et al treatment of minimal connected winning theory shows, is a much 
more demanding task than most authors have hitherto attempted" (Laver 
& Schofield, 1990. p.102). 
Laver & Schofield's criticism of most tests is accepted, and therefore, while the 
word 'test' is used, it is acknowledged that all that is being tested is the predictive 
ability of the theories examined below, and that even that is constrained by certain 
^ Minimising 'conflict of interest* was the reason given by Axelrod (1970) for minimal 
winning connected coalitions forming (Axetrod, 1970. p.,167). 
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limitations (which are addressed below).^ We begin by examining the earliest 
explanations offered for coalition formation. 
9 .1 .2 . Min imum a n d Minimal Winn ing T h e o r i e s of Coa l i t ion F o r m a t i o n 
Both Chapter One (1.2.1.) and Chapter Six (6.2.1.) have already gone into the 
'minimal' and 'minimum' distinction in some depth, but a brief recap may still be 
useful. Minimal winning coalitions are coalitions which will be rendered losing* if 
they lose one of their members. However, in most c a s e s , there are a large number of 
outcomes which could be described as 'minimal winning'. Any two-party coalition in 
a hung three-party system is 'minimal winning', so it is hardly surprising if 
minimal winning solutions, which in large party systems usually generate a large 
number of possible solutions, are relatively successful , despite their inability to 
predict minority governments. Minimum winning coalitions are a far more specific 
proposal; they are a 'subset' of minimal winning coalitions, and can be considered as 
'bare majority coalitions' which comprise the smallest total weight of members in 
the legislature (see Laver & Schofield, 1990, pp.92-94). For example, in a 100 
seat legislature, with competing winning coalitions of a total weight of 51 legislators 
and 58 legislators, both of which will be losing if one party group leaves, although 
both of them are minimal the former will be predicted to form by minimum winning 
theory, 
fyiinimal and minimum theories of coalition formation assume that 'winning' is the 
only consideration of actors, and winning is generally seen as holding governmental 
office. The absence of ideological considerations means that parties will construct a 
coalition which contains no unnecessary partners. It must be noted that because 
minimum winning coalitions are a subset of minimal winning coalitions, they will 
be included in the total of minimal winning coalitions; obviously, there will be at 
least as many minimal connected winning as there are minimum connected winning 
coal i t ions.^ Tables 9.1 and 9.2 detail the status of all governments and current 
governments, respectively.^ 
^ Given the limitations of this exercise, this chapter will dispense with the construction of 
the formal hypotheses the previous five chapters have utilised; as the following analysis 
will demonstrate, such hypotheses would generally be straw men. 
6 In order that the differences in duration between minimal and minimum winning connected 
coalitions can be easily s e e n , this aggregation does not occur in Table 9.6 (below) 
examining coalition durability. 
7 The findings shown in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 are subject to one significant caveat. Again, it 
must be noted that without a 'cabinet' to indicate clearly the administration in place, the 
answers chief executives gave to the question, "which parlies comprise the administration 
in your auihority" will often depend on the subjective assessment of the chief executive, it 
may be that one person's 'no administration' is another's 'coalition', another reason not to 
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T a b l e 9.1: Administ rat ive S ta tus of All G o v e r n m e n t s 
(number of councils=62; number of administratlons=121) 
Status of Government number of 
admins (%) 
Minimal Winning Coalitions 32 (26.4%) 
Minimum Winning Coalitions 21 (17.4%) 
Minority Administrations 59 (48.8%) 
Minority (Largest Parly) Administrations 40 (33.1%) 
Minority (Not Largest Party) Administrations 19 (15.7%) 
Minority Coalitions 6 (5.0%) 
Surplus Majority Coalitions 12 (9.9%) 
No Administration Formed 12 (9.9%) 
[n.b. S u m s to more than 121 (and more than 100%) because administrations 
can belong to more than one category: response of chief executives] 
T a b l e 9.2: Adminis t ra t ive S ta tus of Cur ren t G o v e r n m e n t s 
(number of councils and administrations=62) 
Minimal Winning Coalitions 17 (27.4%) 
Minimum Winning Coalitions 12 (19.4%) 
Minority Administrations 24 (38.7%) 
Minority (Largest Party) Administrations 19 (30.6%) 
Minority (Not Largest Party) Administrations 5 (8,1%) 
Minority Coalitions 3 (4.8%) 
Surplus Majority Coalitions 9 (14.5%) 
No Administration Formed 9 (14.5%) 
[n.b. Sums to more than 62 (and more than 100%) because administrations 
can belong to more than one category: response of chief executives] 
The findings of previous chapters have already told us that minority administrations 
are the most common form of administrative formation in the history of our 62 local 
be over-critical of the performance of any theory. Some chief executives almost certainly 
do not include informal support as meriting inclusion in an 'administration' (although 
verification of this is not possible), while others showed in their answers that they quite 
clearly did. 
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authorities. However, while Tables 9.1 and 9.2 confirm other findings that minority 
administrations are becoming less common, they also show that this is not because 
minimal or minimum coalitions are becoming more popular as politicians acquire 
greater knowledge of working in hung councils and learn the value of minimising 
benefits. The main differences in the status of past and previous administrations is 
that more surplus majority coalitions are formed and that there are more instances 
where there is 'no administration' in place. 
Quite clearly, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show that neither minimal nor minimum theories 
appear to be particularly successful in predicting which administration will form; 
minority administrations comprise nearly half (48.8 percent) of the whole sample. 
In fact, a case could be made for formulating a new hypothesis of administrative 
formation for English local government; when an English council becomes hung, the 
largest party will form a single party minority administration. Just over a third of 
all administrations forming would meet this extremely specific prediction. Although 
there are a few c a s e s where there are two joint leading parties, in most c a s e s a 
single party would be predicted to form a government. A slightly less specific 
proposition, that one of the two largest parties will form a minority government, 
would produce a very high success rate, as this applies to all but 2 of the minority 
administrations forming. Although Table 9.2 shows fewer current examples of 
either minority administrations or the largest party forming a minority 
government, it Is a remarkably successfu l prediction rate when a specif ic 
prediction, that the largest party will form a minority government, is right one in 
three times, given all the possible outcomes.^ 
As has previously been suggested, what this may indicate is that when one party is 
close to an overall majority, it is more likely to attempt to rule alone because there 
is more likely to be a by-election in local government when it could then regain sole 
control. The party may also feel that as the largest single party it has a 'right to 
rule'. It is almost certainly not a conscious coalitional tactic by rational actors 
aware that legislative coalitions are a different ball-game to executive coalitions, 
although this possibility cannot be overlooked. 
An attempt to specify the minimal winning criterion further was made by 
Leiserson's (1968) 'bargaining proposition', which suggests that the fewer parties 
^ Laver & Schofield point out that, albeit in a 'very complicated bargaining situation' of 
coalition formation in the Tweede Kamer in the Netherlands, for a less specific theory like 
minimal winning to succeed in selecting the right coalition 'once in three trials is by no 
means a poor achievement" (Laver & Schofield, 1990, pp.92-93). 
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there are in a proposed coalition, the easier it is to reach agreement. Leiserson 
therefore proposes that two-party coalitions are likelier to form than three-party 
coalitions, and so on {Leiserson. 1968, pp.70-87). This prediction Is no more 
success fu l than any other, as the large number of minority and oversized 
administrations demonstrates. There are 26 current winning coalitions, of which 9 
are surplus majority coalitions (see Table 9.2), which indicates that limiting the 
number of parties In a coalition is not an especially important consideration for 
local politicians. As many of the coalitions which form are in what are effectively 
'three-party systems', where two party coalitions more naturally form, there are 
also very few c a s e s where the proposition can be adequately tested. However, the 
slightly longer duration of coalitions with few partners (see Table 6.6, Chapter Six, 
Section 6.2.5.) does suggest that minimising the number of parties in a coalition 
will be beneficial in terms of durability. 
The failure of minimal and winning theories at predicting administrative formation 
is expected; both previous research and the previous chapters in this thesis have 
already shown their inadequacies.^ Despite this, two-thirds of minimal winning 
coalitions are also minimum winning, which tentatively suggests there may be some 
pressure on local actors to minimise the weight of a winning coalition (a thesis 
examined below, in Section 9.3.1.). 
However, the failure of an extremely non-specific proposal such a s minimal 
winning implies that introducing a further modifier to an office based theory in the 
form of an ideologically connected criterion may improve the explanatory value of 
such a theory only marginally. If this is the c a s e , then constructing an ideological 
scale upon which the parties can be placed might appear to be a waste of effort. 
However, constructing such a scale may have benefits beyond testing the predictive 
shortcomings of minimum winning connected theories. 
It may be that the formation of so many minority governments (59) in the 121 
administrations reflects the absence of a cabinet, and that informal coalitions based 
on policy concessions rather than formal office-sharing coalitions better reflects 
the reality of hung English councils. Therefore, if we can construct a reasonable 
representation of the policy positions of parties, perhaps it will be possible to 
9 Previous research has generally suggested that, of these simple office-based theories, 
the minimal winning criterion is the best predictor of which coalition will form, the 
bargaining proposition is next best, and the minimum winning criterion is the least 
successful (see Franklin & Mackie, 1984. for an analysis of previous tests). 
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search for policy payoffs^ ° in councils ruled by minority governments and a s s e s s 
whether payoffs between ideologically connected parties offer a good explanation for 
both the formation and greater longevity of minority administrations. The task of 
constructing such a scale, and whether a single national scale can cope with what are 
effectively 62 different local political systems, will now be addressed. 
S e c t i o n T w o : C o n s t r u c t i n g a U n i d i m e n s i o n a l (and U n i v e r s a l ) P o l i c y 
S c a l e for E n g l i s h L o c a l Government 
Since the seminal study of Axelrod (1970), the ideological diversity of a coalition 
has been frequently cited as an influence on administrative formation and 
duration.''! Before we can a s s e s s the significance of this thesis we are faced with a 
problem; how does one construct an accurate representation of the policy positions 
of the parties in a political system? All such judgements are subjective and liable to 
a substantial amount of disagreement. However, we are fortunate in that two recent 
studies utilising expert judgements have attempted this task for Britain. The more 
recent (Laver & Hunt, 1992, forthcoming) has sought a number of judgements from 
political scientists on a wide range of policy scales, and promises to present students 
of 25 countries with an authoritative study of the policy positions of political actors 
and voters in those political systems. However, the British political system during 
the 1980s poses some difficult problems for an exercise of this kind. 
9.2.1. T h e Po l icy P o s i t i o n s of Br i t i sh Nat ional P a r t i e s 
In a study which attempts to construct left-right policy sca les for a number of 
political systems, Cast les & Ivlair (1984)^2 highlight one recurring problem for 
assessments of the position of parties in the British political system: 
"the present confusion in the British party system has perhaps been 
mirrored here in the very wide-ranging scores for each of the parties. 
This was particularly evident for the newly emerged Social Democratic 
Party, which some ten respondents saw as being to the Left of the 
Liberals, three as being to the Right, and three as the same position as the 
Liberals" (Castles & Mair, 1984, p.83). 
! 0 Group leaders were asked to make a number of declarations of granting or receiving 
minor or major policy payoffs, and asked to a s s e s s their influence in a number of key 
policy areas . 
1 ^ It is not proposed to re-discuss the factors leading to the introduction of an ideological 
dimension in theories of formation and duration (see Chapter One, 1.2.3. and 1.2.4.}. 
^2 In the Cast les & MaIr (1984} study, political scientists who were knowledgeable about 
particular political systems were required to place the parties in that system on a left-
right sca le , which was graded; ultra left (0), moderate left (2.5), centre (5), moderate 
right (7.5}, ultra right (10}. 
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The confusion in the British party system to which Cast les & Mair allude had not 
abated by 1988, when this survey of hung councils took place. If anything, the 
situation was even more confusing as the middle ground disintegrated during the 
movement towards merger of the former 'Alliance' parties throughout 1987 and 
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However, it may not be only the undoubted confusion within the party system during 
the 1980s which is responsible for the wide-ranging differences in the scores for 
each party in Britain. Largely because of the electoral system, which tends to work 
against smaller parties achieving representation, the two major parties in Britain 
have to embrace a wide constituency. In a proportional representation (p.r.) 
system, parties can target a particular constituency and direct a fairly specific 
electoral message; consequently, classification on a simple left right scale may well 
be easier in countries with a p.r. system. Despite the undoubtedly more 'serene' 
nature of British national politics by the end of the d e c a d e , L a v e r & Hunt's survey 
(d iscussed below), carried out in 1989, still revealed quite wide differences of 
perception concerning the correct place of the major parties. This, together with 
Castle & iviair's observations, suggests that British political parties occupy large 
policy spaces and precise placement may be more difficult than for continental 
parties. Conversely, it must be acknowledged that the specific message of small 
continental parties may make it very difficult to place them on thesoc/o-econom/c 
policy scale usually employed. 
Indeed, critics of theories which utilise unidimensional scales have often noted (for 
example, Norpoth, 1982) that representing parties on a left-right policy scale fails 
to take into account that parties will have different positions depending on the policy 
dimension being measured. However, no serious student of the British political 
system would argue with a simple left-right ideological scale which put Labour on 
18 Particularly at local level, committed groups of Liberals and Social Democrats opposed 
to merger were not uncommon, a s Devon illustrates. A s Chapter Three h a s already 
detailed, one chief executive responding to this survey had no idea how to identify the 
"fragments" of the Alliance in his authority. 
14 With the Labour ideological struggles of the early 1980s, the battle for the central 
ground between the Liberals and the S O P , and the radical polices of the Conservative 
government, the early to mid 1980s were undoubtedly a time when politics w a s 
characterised by greater uncertainty over the precise ideological positions of the parties. 
Labour has moved during the 1980s to present a more 'moderate' and cohesive face to the 
electorate (on the whole successful ly) , the 'Alliance' parties have merged remarkably 
painlessly, and the Conservat ives, with the aid of an almost universally Conservative 
press, have been able to present a 'united' front even during a leadership battle between 
the two wings of the party. 
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the left, the Conservatives on the right, and the S L D in the middle. There is evidence 
that such a scale would be equally applicable in local government, as three-quarters 
of political respondents to this survey saw their local party a s "roughly similar" to 
the national party (see Table 9.6 below). The problem is where on that scale to place 
the parties. 
This study proposes to use the findings of Laver & Hunt (1992, forthcoming) and 
Cast les & Mair (1984) as a basis for a unidimensional policy scale for English local 
government. Laver & Hunt have carried out a detailed study of the role of policy in 
party competition in 25 countries, using the judgements of political scientists in 
those systems. Amongst other judgements they were asked to make, the experts were 
asked to place the political parties on a left-right scale of 1 to 20. in 8 different 
policy areas . Those areas were (1) Taxes Versus Public Serv ices , (2) Foreign 
Policy, (3) Public Ownership (4) Social Policy, (5) The Religious Dimension, (6) 
Urban Versus Rural Interests. (7) Centralisation of Decision Making, and (8) 
Environmental Policy. There are considerable problems in attempting to combine all 
of the variables into a single scale, especially given the lack of relevance of many of 
them to specific local political issues; the appropriate weighting of dimensions is 
also problematic."*^ The "taxes versus public services" policy area was "assessed as 
the most salient in most countries by the expert observers, and also loads at the head 
of the main factor in the British principal components analysis".*'^ It is proposed 
that the placing of the parties on this scale will be utilised. This places the three 
major parties, from left to right, at: L a b o u r 5.4; S L D 8.2; C o n s e r v a t i v e 
17 .2 . On Cast les & Mair's rating, also using the judgement of political scientists, 
Labour were further to the left than this. In fact; 
"the average score of the Labour party make it. astonishingly in light of 
its history and origins, the most left wing Social Democratic party in our 
sample" (Castles & Mair. 1984, p.83). 
^5 It is recognised that local actors have views in the areas not included in the aggregate 
which wilt probably affect their overall ideology, and that a local party's ideological 
position is not only determined by specific local factors. It is also appreciated that the 
uniqueness of Laver & Hunt's multi-policy dimensions offers a far fuller picture than 
Cast le & Mair's less sophisticated policy scale , and that a full utilisation of alt the policy 
dimensions would be essential to any authoritative analysis of national politics. 
^® Michael Laver, in communication with the author. Professor Laver offered some 
solutions to the best use of his and Hunt's raw data in a study of this sort, and suggested 
that he would adopt "one of the s c a l e s a s an indicator variable for the left-right 
dimension'. Accordingly, that is the approach this research will take. 
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Such a perception reflects the common view of a Labour party which was dominated 
by its left wing during the late 1970s and early 1980s . a s the 'L imehouse 
Declaration' and the creation of the SDR indicates.''^ 
When Cast les & Mair's judgements are converted from a ten point scale to a twenty 
point scale, they show a slightly more 'balanced* political system than that presented 
by Lever & Hunt (1992). The figures from Cast les & fVIair are; L a b o u r 4,6; S L D 
10.0; C o n s e r v a t i v e 15.6. However, the difference in the later placings of Laver 
& Hunt, where Labour and the S L D are much closer, can be explained by Labour's 
movement towards the ideological centre and the merger of the Liberals and the 
marginally more left wing SDP. ' ' ^ The Conservatives' more right wing positioning 
In the later survey may reflect a further 5 years of Thatcherite policies. There is no 
reason to suppose that either survey is substantially incorrect in its assessment 
given the political situation at both times."* ^ However, quite apart from the 
difficulty of adapting a national scale to describe local politics, our examination 
cannot identify completely with either of these surveys. We will now try to resolve 
these problems, and attempt to utilise these scales for our purposes. 
9.2.2. T h e P lac ing of Loca l Part ies on a Pol icy S c a l e 
This examination of hung local councils took place at a different time from either 
Castle & Mair's or Laver & Hunt's surveys, and selecting one of these national scales 
for the basis of our local study is difficult. Neither of these surveys can be seen as 
adequately reflecting British national politics, let alone English local politics during 
that time. Cast les & Mair's assessment occurred, a s they acknowledge, at a time of 
"confusion", while Laver & Hunt's took place when the centre party struggle was 
effectively resolved. However, this study's initial collection of data was carried out 
in June 1988, which could be seen as in the centre of these two surveys, not 
chronologically but in terms of the regrouping of the centre and the left. Therefore. 
^ ^  Whether such a perception reflects a realistic analysis of the Labour party at that time 
is debatable, but some analysts clearly believe that "the degree of the ideological shift in 
1979 had made it virtually impossible for many on the right of the parly...to remain within 
the Labour fold" (Peele, 1990. pp.77-78). 
"^ 8 In Cast les & Mair's survey, the Liberals were precisely at the midpoint of 5, with the 
S O P slightly to the left on 4.6. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a more accurate representation than that of Laver 
& Hunt could be reached. Given the scope of its questioning and the relatively objective 
expertise of the political scientists responding, it must be seen as the most authoritative 
analysis ever of the policy positions of parties in the British political system. Despite this. 
Laver & Schofield argue that expert judgements are likely to be "conditioned by historical 
experience" and that "the analysis of electoral policy documents. . .seems likely to provide 
the most genuinely independent 'fix* that we are likely to get on the policy positions of 
political parties" (1990, Appendix B. p.245). 
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and while accepting this is not the ideal solution, perhaps the best approach is to 
combine the results of the two policy scale surveys. For ease of representation, we 
will also convert them back to the ten point scale used by Cast les & Mair. If we do 
that, then the final ideological position of the main parties is, again from left to 
right on a scale of 1-10: 
L a b o u r 2.5; S L D 4.6; C o n s e r v a t i v e 8.2. 
This does not appear to be an unreasonable assessment of the placing of the three 
major parties in English politics. The places of local parties on the scale can be 
further modified by the answers political actors give to the final question on the 
questionnaires they filled in: 
Q u e s t i o n : " W h e r e would you place your local party, ideologically, in 
relation to your national party?" (please tick one box): A n s w e r : To the 
'Right', To the 'Left', Roughly Similar. 
In order to accommodate the answer to this question, if we give each party three 
spaces within the ten point scale Labour will be able to move between 1.5 and 3.5, 
the S L D from 3.6 to 5.6. and the Conservatives from 7.2 to 9.2. Therefore, a right 
wing Labour party and a left wing S L D party will be in almost exactly the same 
position on the ideological scale, which both observation and the detailed findings of 
Laver & Hunt would suggest was not Improbable.^o The Conservatives would always 
be the party furthest to the right. 
It is recognised that there must be considerable methodological reservations in 
combining the results of two different surveys separated by a number of years, and 
which ask different questions about what is after all a different political system. 
Taking measurements designed to represent the national party system and applying 
it en bloc to a far from uniform local government party system is admittedly far 
from ideal.2^ However, this exercise is designed only to carry out general tests 
20 As recent history (the Lib/Lab pact} and the pronouncements of Liberal/ S L D / Alliance/ 
Liberal Democrat leaders Indicates (for example, s e e "LibDems put faith in deal with 
Labour" by Patrick Wintour, The Guardian. 29/7/91). Labour and the S L D are closer 
nationally than the S L D and the Conservatives. Bogdanor (1992, p.19} argues that "the 
main policy differences between the two parties now lie in the area of constituional 
reform...from the electoral point of view, [they] are perfectly compatible". 
21 Denters (1985} confronting similar problems in an examination of coalition formation in 
Dutch local government, makes a number of assumptions (such a s unitary actor status (or 
local parties) but notes that the most "heroic additional assumptions" are those concerning 
the placement of the Dutch local parties on "an ideological (policy) continuum". Denters 
makes no allowance for local deviance from national policy positions, and a s s u m e s that 
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related to the ideas that parties connected on an ideological scale will be more likely 
to form coalitions than those not connected on that scale, and that policy closeness 
might have some relevance to the payoffs made. No special claims will be made for 
this exercise, and given the likelihood that there will be some cases where the policy 
positions will be inaccurate, it would be of doubtful value to test for statistical 
significance. It is realised that an analysis of every separate local authority system 
would be necessary for these findings to be compared seriously with the testing of 
national systems carried out by, for example, Taylor & Laver (1973). 
However, if (allowing for the inevitable reservations) we can place the three major 
parlies on a unidimensional scale, the placing of minor parties is potentially more 
problematic. Some local groups can be easily dealt with for our purposes. The SDP is 
only listed as a separate parly group in a handful of local authorities, and the 
judgement of the respondents to Castles & Mair, which placed it slightly to the left of 
the Liberals, is as good as any other assessment 22 The Greens are a factor in only 
one council, and other small groups (such as Ratepayers) are rare enough that 
councils with such groups can be excluded from any analysis of ideological 
connectedness. The Independent groups, which as previous chapters have Indicated 
are significant forces in quite a number of councils, pose more complications. The 
majority of councils have Independent members, and the involvement of an 
Independent group in 15 current administrations (Table 5.2; see 5.1.2.) 
demonstrates their importance to local administrative formation. 
The rise of politicisation and the movements towards uniformity mean that, while 
there will still be reservations about using national data to place the local Labour. 
SLD, and Conservative parties, we are reasonably sure of their place on an ordinal 
left-right scale. Decisions about where to place Independent groups have a greater 
need to be informed by a close examination of (for example) manifestos and voting 
records, but that is not an option. Placing them somewhere close to Conservatives 
would also be ascribing a degree of homogeneity to Independent politics which would 
"the socio-economic left-right [dimension] will adequately account for local coalition 
behaviour". He admits the "plausibility of these assumptions is hard to evaluate" (Denters, 
1985, p.301), and accepts that "actual assessments' of all municipalities would have been 
preferable. The requirement of "extensive and costly research in about 150 municipalities" 
(Denters, 1985, p.302) means such a preference was beyond the scope of his research, as 
much as assessing policy positions in 62 hung councils is (unfortunately) beyond the scope 
of this study. 
22 Castles & Mair placed the SOP on 4.6 to the Liberals on 5.0. Our aggregate puts the SLD 
on 4.6, so an admittedly arbitrary rating of 4.3 for the SDP groups in our sample seems a 
not unreasonable assumption. The SDP was 'a dead party' when Laver & Hunt carried out 
their sun/ey, so they do not have a rating for it. 
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not reflect reality 23 Denters (1985) faced witfi the same problem when analysing 
Dutch local governments, removed all municipalities with an Independent group off 
more than 5 percent from his study, therefore excluding some 30 percent of his 
sample (Denters. 1985, pp.301-302). If we exclude independents from analyses 
concerning ideological connectedness a considerable number of Interesting cases will 
be lost, but unfortunately, as Denters also concluded, that loss seems unavoidable. 
Councils with significant Independent groups will therefore be excluded from an 
analysis of theories related to connectedness on a ideological scale or minimising 
policy differences. 
We will have to be stricter than Denters with our exclusion rule, as In some cases 
one Independent member is a significant coalition actor. For example, in one small 
district council a Conservative group with 16 members allied with a single 
independent to leave a Labour group of 2 and an SLD group off 14 outside off the 
administration, and there are cases where a very small group of 2 or 3 Independent 
councillors is part of a winning two-party coalition. Some multiparty coalitions also 
have a small Independent presence. Accordingly, we will exclude all councils with 
Independent groups, except where the Independent group is irrelevant to any 
strategy other parties may pursue and can be excluded from the policy scale without 
undue concern.24 Excluding councils with all but an 'irrelevant' Independent group 
leaves 31 local authorities with which to test ideology or policy based theories off 
formation and duration. 
The removal of most 'multiparty' systems from the sample testing ideologically 
connected theories means that such theories have an easier task in predicting which 
coalition will form, as in most cases only 3 party groups will be left. For example, 
any coalition of the SLD and one of the main parties will automatically be winning 
and connected (unless there is an SDP group which is excluded), although off course 
it may not necessarily be of minimum weight. Such factors must be kept in mind 
23 Despite the findings of Widdicombe that 26 percent of Independents were also members 
of the Conservative parly, they also found Independents who were members of Liberal, 
Labour and Nationalist parties. Furthermore, Widdicombe also found that "almost two-
thirds of Independents were not members of any political party" (Widdicombe, 1986, 
Research Volume Two, p.37). The example of Cornwall demonstrates that not all 
Independents are Tories, with the strong Independent Liberal tradition apparent from the 
large numbers of previously Independent members who are now, with the arrival of 
politicisation to the Duchy, Liberal Democrats. 
24 That does not mean thai such Independent groups are not important actors, as the 
discussion below reveals. 
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when assessing the predictive performance of the minimum winning connected 
theory which will now be appraised in section three. 
Sect ion Three: Ideological ly Connected Theories 
We begin by examining the frequency of minimal and minimum connected coalitions 
in hung councils. While this chapter has already demonstrated that less specific 
office-seeking theories are not especially good predictors of which administration 
will form, and therefore not a great deal should be expected in predictive terms, 
ideologically connected theories are a significant theoretical advance on the 
simplistic assumptions of early theories of coalition formation. The main purpose of 
the first part of this section is to examine whether the coalitions which do form are 
both minimum winning and ideologically connected. Section One has indicated that the 
majority of coalitions which form minimise the weight of the coalition, and the same 
finding emerges here; possible reasons for the emphasis on minimum rather than 
minimal coalitions will be assessed. Finally, ideologically connected coalitions have 
often been seen as more durable, and this possibility is also investigated. 
9.3.1. Government Format ion and Min imal and IVIinimum W i n n i n g 
Connected Coal i t ions 
We know that nearly half of the local governments that form are minority 
governments, and we are already aware that minimal and minimum winning theories 
are unsatisfactory explanations of government formation. Therefore, this section 
will be looking more to see if connectedness is a feature of the coalitions which form 
rather than 'testing' its greater predictive capability. However, before we examine 
whether the coalitions which form tend to be ideologically connected, a problem of 
definition must be addressed; again, it concerns the use of the terms 'minimal' and 
minimum'. These terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably, especially when 
looking at the connected criterion (for example, see Laver & Schofield, 1990, 
p.97). However, a minimal winning connected coalition is winning in that it holds a 
majority of seats in a legislature, minimal in the sense that it cannot lose a member 
and remain winning, and all its members are connected ideologically. A minimum 
winning connected coalition is all of these things but also it is the smallest such 
coalition in terms of legislative seats. For example, in a local authority of 100 seats 
where Labour has 30 seats, SLD 34, and Conservative 36, there are two minimal 
winning connected coalitions (Labour/SLD and Conservative/SLD) but only one 
(Labour/SLD) is minimum, winning and connected. Therefore, minimum winning 
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Table 9.3: Council Composition, Current Administration and Status 
(number of councils=31) 
l.a. LAB SDP SLD OON IND Administration Status 
0100 35 . 9 31 Conservative/SLD minimum w.c. 
1501 20 9 13 No Administration 
5302 26 10 18 Labour min'y-larqest party 
0500 21 24 31 1 Labour/SLD minimum w.c. 
0600 32 1 1 27 1 Labour minV-larqest party 
1506 9 23 24 4 SUD min'y-not largest 
0602 5 2 22 1 6 . SLD min'yiarqest party 
1100 10 8 26 39 2 No Administration 
1500 29 24 44 1 Conservative min'v-larqest party 
1600 13 23 24 3 Labour/SLD minimum w.c. 
2603 24 1 23 Labour min'y-larqest party 
1900 27 1 4 36 Labour min'y-not larqest 
2000 35 4 35 Labour/SLD minimum w.c. 
5303 33 1 5 23 1 Labour min'y-Iarqest party 
2300 48 9 42 Labour min'yiarqest party 
0702 27 7 26 Conservative/SLD minimum w.c. 
2207 8 23 22 2 SLD mrn'y-larqest party 
0403 1 8 1 3 1 3 2 Conservative/SLD minimum w.c. 
0203 13 1 4 25 1 Labour/SLD minimum w.c. 
3100 20 18 31 1 No Administration 
0505 23 1 4 20 . Labour min'y-larqesl party 
4904 24 3 1 5 27 Labour min'y-not larqest 
1906 7 25 24 . SLD min'y-larqest party 
3204 1 7 9 1 9 2 Labour min'y-larqest partv 
3300 6 27 24 SLD min'y-larqesl party 
1511 5 1 8 1 6 - SLD min'y-larqesl parlv 
4807 14 24 22 3 SID min'y-larqest partv 
3507 21 4 22 1 Labour/SLD/Ind surplus maiorily 
4905 27 1 0 29 . Conservative/SLD minimal w.c. 
1809 10 1 6 1 3 3 SLD min'y-larqest partv 
0200 29 1 1 30 Labour/SLD minimum w.c. 
The number in the column l.a. (local authority) is the distinguishing code given by this 
research; it is used here for ease of referral, rather than naming the council, in order 
that the requests of confidentiality made by the great majority of respondents can be 
respected, (n.b. "w.c."=winning connected, "min'y'ominority) 
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connected coalitions are a very specific proposition, with In most cases in our 
sample of 31 councils only one coalition fitting that precise description. 
Table 9.3 shows the party political composition when the current administration 
formed of the 31 councils without a 'significant' Independent group. As an 
examination of Table 9.3 indicates (and Table 9.4 which aggregates the status of past 
and previous administrations In those 31 councils confirms) minimal and minimum 
winning connected coalitions, while not unusual, are not the likeliest outcome. 
l\/linority administrations are the most common outcome of hungness, as Tables 9.1 
and 9.2 have already shown for the whole sample of 62 local authorities and 121 
administrations. However, we have already noted that it is the composition of the 
coalition administrations forming which is of most interest here, and it is clear that 
connectedness is an important consideration in which coalition will form. 
As Table 9.4 (below) shows more clearly than Table 9,3, all but one of the coalitions 
listed in Table 9.3 is a minimal winning connected coalition, and 8 of the 9 minimal 
winning connected coalitions have minimum status. This indicates that both 
minimum status and connected status appear to be an influence on local coalition 
formation. The relationship is not only applicable to current administrative 
formations. Including previous administrations in the 31 councils listed in Table 
9.3, there are 21 coalitions. Given the effective three party system in most cases, 
the fact that 17 of the 21 coalitions forming are minimal winning is unsurprising; 
of the other 4, one is a minority knife-edge coalition and 3 are surplus majority 
coal i t ions. However, in an effective three party system any two party coalition 
which forms will be minimal winning, and given the absence of a cabinet one might 
expect that the relative weights of the parties would be unimportant. It Is therefore 
quite surprising that 14 of the 17 minimal winning connected coalitions are 
minimum. As the previous section tentatively proposed, this suggests that 
minimising the total number of councillors in a coalition has some significance at 
local level despite the apparent lack of a need to conserve office benefits. It may even 
be that a greater knowledge of some of the administrations not classified as minimum 
or connected would increase the already high percentage of coalitions which are 
minimal/ minimum winning and connected. Section 9.3.3., examining ideologically 
connected coalitions and duration, examines this point further. 
3 2 0 
Table 9.4: Status (Aggregated) of Past and Current 
Administ rat ions 
(response of chief executives) 
Status of Administration Current Previous Total 
(n=31) (n=35) (n=66) 
minority-largest party 16 12 28 (42.4%) 
minority- not largest party 2 9 11 (16.7%) 
minimum winning coalition 8 6 14 (21.2%) 
minimal winning coalition 9 8 17 (25.8%) 
surplus majority coalition 1 2 3 (4.5%) 
minority coalition - 1 1 (1.5%) 
no administration 3 3 6 (9.1%) 
(n.b. totals exceed 31 and 35 because minimum winning coalitions are also included in 
minimal winning totals) 
The surplus majority coalition administration in Table 9.3 demonstrates quite 
clearly that even when an Independent group is not 'significant* numerically, it may 
still be significant administratively. The solitary Independent councillor is 
apparently 'irrelevant' to any successful strategy. A minimal winning connected 
theory would predict a Labour/SLD or Conservative/SLD coalition, but the actual 
administrations that had formed during the lifetime of hungness were an initial 
Conservative/ SLD/ Independent coalition, followed by a Conservative minority 
administration, with the current administration comprising Labour/ SLD/ 
Independent, a surplus majority coalit ion. Despite his or her theoretical 
irrelevance, this Independent councillor was obviously an important actor in this 
council. It may well be that his or her ideological position is the key factor here. If 
the Independent's policy position was actually between the SLD and the 
Conservatives, the coalition of these two groups and the Independent would be a 
minimum winning connected coalition, and the current Labour/ SLD/ Independent 
administration, while still surplus would be ideologically connected. Such 
speculation demonstrates the danger of reading too much into the administrative 
formations when a major group is not able to be ideologically 'generalised'. 
However, despite this caveat it is apparent that both size and ideology are important 
when coalition agreements are entered into. 
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9.3.2. The C o n t i n u i n g Impor tance of S ize? : O f f i ce Pay -O f f s In 
Min imum Winning Connected Coal i t ions 
The connectedness of coalition partners along the ideological scale is understandable. 
We know that parties will find it easier to make deals with parties close to 
themselves politically. Because of the limitations of the sample of councils whose 
parties we can place on the policy scale, in most cases there are only the three 
major parties as significant actors. The knowledgeable observer of the British 
political scene would not need coalition theory to tell her that both Labour and 
Conservative will be more likely to seek a compromise with the SLD than with each 
other.25 Indeed, previous chapters have already commented widely on this, and 
Table 9.3 shows quite graphically the power that the SLD possesses as the middle 
parly in most of these systems. There are 9 minimal and minimum winning 
connected coalitions, and the SLD, with either Labour or the Conservatives as a 
partner, is a member of all of them. In fact, there is no winning connected coalition 
in any of these 31 local authorities that can exclude them. This gives the SLD 
extraordinary bargaining power if connectedness is important, as it seems to be.26 
However, the emphasis on minimum winning strategies might suggest that the SLD is 
selective in its choice of partner. 
The large percentage of minimal winning connected coalitions which are the 
minimum weight (14 of 17 cases, or 82.4 percent) indicates the importance of 
keeping the coalition as small as possible in hung councils. However, when there is 
no cabinet why should actors be minimising the size of the coalition? When in most 
cases there are only three relevant actors in the political system any two party 
arrangement will win. With no central decision making posts to allocate, it does not 
appear to make sense that actors work to keep a two-party winning coalition as 
small a weight as possible. The answer might lie in the finding that, despite previous 
research which indicates that pay-offs in the form of committee chairs are not 
sought by the actors in hung councils (Laver, Railings & Thrasher. 1987), Chapter 
Four has demonstrated that two-thirds of the actors in coalitions will take chairs. 
Even more importantly, those chairs appear to be valued by government actors (see 
4.2.3.). Therefore, we would expect to find that the parties in minimum winning 
connected coalitions will be more likely to share committee chairs. 
25 Although it is a not infrequent complaint thai Labour and Conservative groups work 
tacitly together to freeze out small groups (see Leach & Stewart, 1988, p.41). Chapter 
Five's investigation (see section 5.2.6.) found little substantive evidence to support this. 
26 If resentment of the SLD's undeniably powerful position is a factor in hung councils, as 
has often been suggested, this may explain the large number of minority administrations 
which form. 
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We have full information on the allocation of chairs and deputy chairs in 5 of the 8 
current minimum winning connected coalitions.27 Unfortunately for the explanation 
offered above, only 2 of the 5 coalitions share chairs. In the other 3 cases, although 
there are policy pay-offs to coalition actors, one party takes all the chairs and 
deputy chairs. Therefore, it appears highly unlikely that the minimising of coalition 
weight is being achieved in order to conserve benefits in the form of committee 
chairs. 
The significant variable may be unconnected with minimising size. It may be that 
party politics is the answer. In 6 of the 8 cases the coalition partners were 
formerly in opposition together, so it may be nothing more than former opposition 
parties working together against the traditional rulers. Given the small number of 
administrations we have detailed information for, it may also be that it is merely 
coincidence that 8 of the 9 connected coalitions forming are minimum winning. 
However, in the whole sample of 32 minimal winning coalitions (which Includes 
these 8 connected coalitions) 21 are also minimum winning, slightly less than two-
thirds. Of those 21 minimum winning coalitions, 14 are formed by *ex-opposition' 
parties, which suggests that political reasons may be a more important reason for 
the minimum winning coalitions which have formed than a desire to preserve 
benefits. 
Like most theories of coalition formation, minimal winning connected status has also 
been used to explain cabinet durability, and has frequently been associated with 
greater administrative longevity (see Schofield, 1985). The following sub-section 
examines its value in explaining greater duration in local government coalitions. 
9.3.3. Ideological ly Connected Coal i t ions and Government Durat ion 
For a number of reasons which are explained there. Chapter Six has already 
examined the most common explanations for administrative durability offered by 
theorists. Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 in Section Two of Chapter Six list the 
detailed findings. The resulls have suggested that what often appear to be powerful 
predictors of durability for cabinet coalitions in parliamentary democracies may be 
less relevant when applied to the largely legislative coalitions which dominate hung 
English local government. f\/linority administrations are the most durable of all local 
governments, which contradicts most research into durability. 
27 Details of the parties holding chairs and deputy chairs are only available for current 
administrations. 
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To repeat some of those conclusions, very briefly, this research offers a modicum of 
support for the thesis that as coalitions depart from minimum winning status their 
duration decreases. While it must again be stressed that current minority 
administrations are the most durable of all administrations, an examination of all 
completed administrations demonstrates minimum winning coalitions are the most 
durable of all coalition administrations. Minimal winning coalitions do not last as 
long, while surplus majority coalitions are the least durable of all administrations. 
There is a connection here, in that as the nature of the coalition becomes closer to 
minimum winning, so the duration increases. Given this, although research into the 
stability of European cabinets has found no clear relationship between ideologically 
connected coalitions and cabinet stability (Warwick, 1979),28 we might expect to 
find that hypotheses of greater durability for minimal or minimum connected 
winning coalitions are supported. However, as Table 9.5 shows, this is not the case. 
The findings of Table 6.7 (from Chapter Six) are included in Table 9.5 (below) and 
demonstrate that, contrary to expectations, minimum winning connected coalitions 
do not appear to last as long as 'ordinary' minimum winning coalitions. 
However, an important point must be made about the figures in Table 9.5.29 AH ^ut 
5 of the 19 minimum winning coalitions with an average duration of 23.8 months 
are included in the smaller sample of 14 connected coalitions. It is perfectly feasible 
that the 5 remaining minimum winning coalitions are also connected, because they 
are 3 Conservative/ Independent coalitions, a Conservative/ SLD coalition, and a 
very durable (72 months) Labour/ Independent administration. They were excluded 
from the sample of 31 councils used to examine the relationship between formation, 
duration and ideological connectedness because the Independent group in each council 
was a possibly significant actor in winning strategies. All of them may be connected 
ideologically, and it may therefore be that minimum winning connected coalitions 
are the longest lasting of all administrative types. 
2^ Although no study has found "any sustained evidence of a systematic relationship 
between the ideological diversity of a coalition and its life expectancy" (Laver & Schofield, 
1990. 155), it is difficult to compare different findings, largely because definitions of 
government termination often differ and "the change of definition affects results' (see 
Budge & Keman. 1990. pp.l65-l66). 
29 The caveat against reading too much into these figures, especially extant 
administrations, has already been gone into in depth at numerous places in Chapter Six 
examining administrative durability. Chapter Three (see 3.2.1.) also deals with these 
problems. 
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Table 9.5: Administrative Duration By Administrative Status 
Average Duration in Months 
Current Completed 
Administrations Administrations 
Type 
Status of 
Administration 
Single Party 27.6 (n=24) 19.6 (n=35) 
Minority 
Minority 1.0 (n=3') 21.0 (n=2) 
Coalition 
Minimum Winning 23.2 (n=12) 24.9 (n37) 
Coalition 
Minimal Winning 22.8 (n=5) 17.4 (n=8) 
Coalition 
Minimum Winning 22.6 (n=8) 17.2 (n=6) 
Connected Coalitions 
Minimal Winning 13.0 (n=1) 12.0 (n=2) 
Connected Coalitions 
Surplus Majority 16.4 {n=9) 12.0 (n=4) 
Coalition 
'all 3 current minority coalitions had been in place for just one month 
(n.b. see also Table 6.7) 
Aggregate 
23.0 (n=59) 
9.0 (n=5) 
23.8 (n=19) 
19.5 (n=:13) 
20.3 (n=14) 
12.3 (n=3) 
15.0 (n=13) 
We have scrutinised a number of theories which assume that the primary motivation 
of political parties is office. The goal of actors in minimum winning connected 
coalitions, despite the inclusion of ideological considerations, is still assumed to be 
office. Policy or ideological considerations exist only to specify further the 'winning' 
coalition which will take office and distribute the rewards of office (usually 
ministerial portfolios) between the office-motivated members of the coalition. The 
existence of so many minority governments warns us against accepting such theories 
as adequate representations of coalition behaviour. The final section of this chapter 
examines a perspective which is potentially capable of explaining minority 
governments, as well as giving us a possibly more accurate guide to the parties who 
be most likely to form majority coalitions. 
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Section Four: Policy Closeness and Coal i t ion Formation and Durat ion 
This section initially attempts to place local parties more accurately along the policy 
scale constructed in Section Two. We then examine coalition administrations for 
evidence of policy pay-offs between coalition partners. Earlier chapters have 
already demonstrated that single party minority governments in hung councils do not 
share committee chairs, but there must be some pay-off to allow them to remain in 
power. The evidence of policy pay-offs is examined, to assess the nature of any such 
pay-offs. For example, are the pay-offs made to parties which are close to the 
ruling party on the policy scale we have constructed for local government? This 
assessment notes the extraordinary amount of power that one particular party seems 
to possess, and the reasons for the SLD achieving such success in gaining policy pay-
offs are examined. Finally, the durability of both coalition and minority 
administrations is assessed, to check whether the existence of policy pay-offs is a 
contributory factor in administrative duration. 
9.4.1. Further Speci fy ing the Policy Posi t ion of Local Part ies 
Section Three of this chapter has noted that the majority of minimal winning 
coalitions which form, indeed the majority of coalitions which form, are minimum, 
winning, and connected. However, while they may be connected, this does not mean 
that parties are making deals with a party that is close to them. For example, using 
the unidimensionai policy scale adopted above, a right wing Conservative party and a 
left wing SLD group will be 5.6 points apart, almost at opposite ends of a 10 point 
scale. This would actually classify these two supposedly ideologically connected 
parties as extreme right and extreme left on the ideological scale of many countries 
(see Laver & Schofield. 1990, Appendix B). So. although two local parties situated 
thus may form an ideologically connected coalition, such an outcome would perhaps 
be unexpected. In order to enable local policy positions to be more closely specified, 
local leaders were asked where their local party stood ideologically in relation to the 
national party. 
Table 9.6: Local Party Ideological Position 
Comparison With National Party 
Local Parly To The Right To The Left Roughly Similar 
Conservative 1 1 34 
Labour 0 7 23 
SLD 2 12 25 
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Table 9.6 shows the ideological position of local parties compared to their national 
party, and demonstrates that Consen/ative local groups are remarkably consistent; 
only two Conservative leaders perceived their local party as significantly different 
ideologically from the national party. On the other hand, while no local Labour group 
saw itself to the right of the parliamentary party's position, 7 off them thought they 
were to the left of that position. The SLD were the least uniform ideologically, as 
might be expected given the tradition of non-conformism within the Liberal parly. 
While 2 leaders saw their local party as more right wing, by far the largest total off 
"ideological dissidents" were the dozen SLD local parties to the left of the national 
leadership. 
The significance of such a 'deviance' from the national position, as noted above, is 
that this may mean that in some of the ideologically connected coalitions, parties may 
be so far apart on the scale thai the notion of connectedness loses relevance. For 
example, on an ideological connectedness criterion, the SLD can form a coalition or 
exchange policy pay-offs with either of the major parties. Indeed, Chapter Five has 
already detailed that the SLD is just as likely to do a deal with either party, and the 
previous section of this chapter shows the universal involvement of the SLD in 
ideologically connected coalitions. However, we would expect that a 'left wing' SLD 
party is more likely to do a deal with Labour than the Conservatives. In addition, 
despite the fact that the SLD is closer to Labour on the policy scale, it does not follow 
that it cannot do a deal with Conservatives. If local parties are searching for a party 
with similar policy preferences we would not always have Labour/ SLD coalitions 
because a 'right wing' SLD could go to 5.6. and a 'left wing' Conservative to 7.2 on 
our policy scale; in such cases we would expect Conservative/ SLD coalitions to 
form. 
We do not need to rely on the small number of coalitions in our sample of 31 
councils.'^'^ Policy pay-offs allow us to see if 'coalitions' are forming even when 
there is ostensibly a minority administration ruling. We will examine pay-offs in 
both coalition and minority administrations in order to assess the relevance off the 
co-operating parties position on the policy scale. We begin with an examination of 
the 9 minimal winning connected coalitions in our sample. 
30 It must be remembered that ihe limited number of councils we can test ideologically 
connected and policy minimising proposals on is because it is not possible to place 
significant Independent groups on the policy scale. 
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9.4.2. Pol icy Pay-Offs in Connected Coal i t ions 
It must be noted that opposition actors in non-hung councils are nearly as likely to 
claim they have obtained policy concessions as those in hung councils, which the 
discussion of decision making in non-hung councils in Chapters Two and Eight would 
indicate was unlikely. All the evidence suggests that opposition parties in non-hung 
councils are effectively powerless.^^ Therefore, it is stressed that considerable 
caution must be exercised in assessing a result which appears to indicate policy 
payoffs are occurring. The 'policy pay-offs' which are utilised are derived from a 
request to groups leaders to detail the concessions they made or received in 6 policy 
areas.^2 while this does not tell us that specific deals were made between various 
groups, it does give some indication of greater influence which may reveal patterns 
of support. 
Table 9.7 (below) examines the arrangements in the one minimal and 8 minimum 
winning connected coalitions, and reveals a number of interesting findings. However, 
there is little evidence for the proposition that local parties will attempt to 
minimise policy distance when forming coalitions. In only 5 of the 9 councils is the 
coalition between the closest parties on the policy scale. However, in 2 of the 
remaining 4 local authorities there had previously been a coalition of the parties 
apparently closest on the ideological scale, which would mean that 7 of the 9 local 
authorities had experienced a coalition government which minimised the policy 
distance between the partners.^^ However, it must be noted that the fact that an SLD 
group was to the left of its national party, placing it very close to Labour on our 
policy scale, did not deter a Conservative/SLD coalition from forming in one case, 
which suggests that minimising policy distance is not always uppermost In the plans 
of local coalition actors. Certainly, minimum winning status is a more 'accurate' 
predictor of which coalitions will form in hung local authorities, although it is also 
less specific than predictions based on minimising policy positions. Given that 4 of 
31 This is certainly the opinion of alt the former opposition party leaders in Devon. 
32 See Questions 6 and 15 in Questionnaire Two (Appendix) lo group leaders in hung 
councils. Unfortunately, the general nature of these questions means that it is not possible 
to decide definitively that pay-offs are occurring between specific actors. Because the 
questions were asked of leaders in current administrations about their current 
arrangements, it is not possible to test the closeness or otherwise of previous 
administrations and this examination is confined to assessing payoffs in the current 
administrations for which we can place the major actors on the policy scale, that is, the 
31 councils listed in Table 9.3. 
33 Again, it must be pointed out that these apparent divergences from the principle of 
minimising policy differences may be cases where the local SLD and Conservative groups 
are closer than the SLD and Labour group. Equally, the use of a national scale means that 
some cases where 'policy minimising' appears to occur may not be what they seem. 
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the 9 current coalitions have not formed between the closest parties, it does not 
appear to be the case that minimising policy distance is a significant influence on 
coalition formation strategies. 
Table 9.7: The Relevance of Policy Closeness to Pay-Offs In 
Minimal/ fVl inimum Connected Coa l i t i ons 
(n = 9) 
l.a. Administration Closest Policy Office Comments 
(lw=left winq) Party? Payoff? Payoff? {w.c,=winninq connected) 
0100 CON/IwSLD no yes no info agreement despite 'left 
winq* SLD. 
0500 IwLAB/SLD yes yes yes 
1600 LAB/SLD yes yes no Conservatives and 
Independents act as united 
qroup 
2000 IwLAB/lwSLD yes yes no previous Con/SLD coalition 
0702 CON/SLD no yes no left wing Labour group and 
previous Lab/SLD coalition 
0403 CON/SLD no yes yes 
0203 LAB/lwSLD yes yes no info 
4905 CON/SLD 
(minimal w.c.) 
no no no info also previous Lab/SLD 
minimum w.c. coalition. 
0200 LAB/lwSLD yes yes no info 
n.b.: all but .a. 4905 are minimum winning connected coalitions 
An examination of the parties receiving policy pay-offs reveals some interesting 
findings. Table 9.7 shows that, with the exception of the solitary minimal winning 
connected coalition, policy pay-offs are made or received by the coalition parties in 
all these councils. This might prove nothing, as we have already seen (Chapter Eight, 
Table 8.5) that the majority of parties in hung councils report feeling more 
influential. However, it is important to note (as Table 9.7 shows) that in no case 
does a group outside of the ruling coalition answer that it has received either policy 
or office pay-offs. This strongly suggests that the responses of coalition partners 
are fairly conclusive evidence of policy deals being made which exclude actors not in 
the coalition. 
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As section three's examination has already shown (see 9.3.2.) and Table 9.7 
confirms, in only 2 of the 5 cases for which we have the relevant information do the 
coalition partners also share chairs.This supports most of the findings of this 
research that office pay-offs, while not considered unimportant by all actors, are 
relatively unvalued by many, especially by opposition groups In minority control 
councils. Office pay-offs do not explain the formation and longevity of minority 
control administrations; we now examine whether policy considerations can provide 
the answer for this phenomenon. 
9.4.3. Pol icy pay-Offs in Minor i ty Admin i s t ra t i ons 
It appears likely that an examination of minority administrations will reveal that 
parties close on the policy scale are co-operating on a policy rather than an office 
basis. As has already been detaiied.^"^ there is no evidence of office pay-offs outside 
of coalition administrations, so any pay-offs to 'support' parties by minority 
administrations must be sought in policy concessions. IVIinority administrations may 
be possible because crucial 'opposition' actors are receiving benefits in the form of 
policy pay-offs. Indeed, it seems highly probable that this must be the case. While 
minority administrations may be viable in the short term because they are 
preferred by enough actors to another administration that would otherwise form, 
this does not seem a basis for a long term arrangement. Minority administrations in 
hung councils are so durable that it appears likely to be the case that policy pay-offs 
are being made. 
It has been noted that office pay-offs in the form of committee chairs are not a 
significant factor in the 9 connected coalitions examined above. We already know that 
off ice pay-offs are not a factor in the deals finally made in minority 
administrations. However, to reiterate, policy pay-offs of some sort must figure in 
any long term minority administration. Table 9.8 looks at the policy profile of the 
18 current minority administrations for which we can place the significant parlies 
on an ideological scale. 
3^ * See Chapter Four (4.2.3.), Table 4.7. which details office pay-offs in hung councils. 
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Table 9.8: Policy Pay-offfs In 
(n = 18) 
IVIinority Administrations 
I.a. Admin Nearest Policy Payoff Comments 
Party Party to Nearest 
Party? 
5302 Lab SLD no information 8 previous minority admins in 9 years 
0600 Lab rw SLD yes Conservatives also receive pay-offs 
1506 SLD Lab no SLD rulers say 'no deals', but Cons say 
they have received pay-offs 
0602 SLD SDP no information Cons say Con/SLD coalition rules (with 
SDP excluded)-chairs support this 
1500 Con SLD yes Labour do not receive pay-offs 
2603 Lab SLD no information Labour 'knife-edqe* minority admin 
1900 Lab SLD yes 
5303 Lab Iw SLD yes _ 
2300 Lab SLD no Information Cons do not receive pay-offs 
2207 SLD Iw Lab no All 4 parties say 'no deals' 
0505 Lab SDP no information SLD receives pay-offs 
4904 Lab SDP no information Cons and SLD receive pay-offs 
1906 SLD Lab no information _ 
3204 Lab SLD yes _ 
3300 IwSLD Lab yes 
1511 Iw SLD Lab yes Cons do not receive pay-offs 
4807 SLD Lab no 3 parly system-Labour and Cons both 
say 'no pay-offs', but SLD says it has 
made concessions. 
1809 SLD Lab no Independents receive pay-offs 
Table 9.8 contradicts the notion that policy deals are being made between a minority 
government and the party closest to them on the policy scale. The table shows that 
while in 7 councils the party closest on the policy scale is receiving policy pay-offfs, 
in 4 councils the closest party is not . However, there is reason to believe that the 
questions about policy concessions are not producing a true picture of the deals made 
in hung councils. As the 'comments' column in Table 9.8 details, there are some 
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differences of opinion concerning the deals made between political parties In 3 of the 
4 councils run by a minority administration. Differences of opinion are of course 
inevitable; what are major policy concessions for some may be not worth mentioning 
for others. It is also recognised that it may be difficult for leaders to admit to making 
deals which may have been secret, even when confidentiality is assured. 
This may be the case in l.a. 2207, when all four group leaders say that there have 
been no concessions, and yet the same minority administration has lasted for 49 
months. There are 4 occasions when at least 2 of the groups in the above authority 
must have reached some sort of compromise; the process of making a budget.^^ in 
non-hung councils, opposition group leaders have no more influence on budgetary 
decisions than the "symbolic influence on policy" which the full council budget 
meeting gives all councillors (Rosenberg, 1989. p.106). However, in hung councils 
the annual budget cannot be passed unless there is some degree of consensus. A party 
whose co-operation in passing a budget is requested Is unlikely to accede without 
some form of payoff, and while an office payoff is not impossible, the minority 
administrations in our survey do not share chairs. The budget making process had 
taken place in the six months or so before the leaders in this survey filled In the 
questionnaires. Provided that the minority administration had been in place for six 
months, at least one group in each of these minority administrations must have made 
a deal with it, and the deal must have concerned policy.^^ 
Table 9.9 catalogues the answers to more specific questions about influence by party 
in each of the minority administrations. As well as being asked a number of questions 
about influence in a range of policy areas, group leaders were also asked both to 
a s s e s s their influence on the budget and the specific question of the degree of 
influence they had on the rale set.^^ The same 18 minority councils form the basis 
for Table 9.9, which examines the possibility of budgetary pay-offs. We have no 
information on these questions from 3 of the 18 minority administrations, so Table 
It is just conceivable thai the last four budgets in this council have got through on the 
principle of 'Hobson's Choice*. However, it appears unlikely that politicians with policy 
objectives will miss the opportunity to get at least some of their preferences adopted, and 
196 weeks {49 months) "is a long time in politics". 
36 There are of course other pay-offs beside office and policy. Money and sex are two that 
have occasionally been associated with political decision making, but it is assumed that 
local leaders, however charismatic, will be unable to carry their members without more 
'respectable* pay-offs. 
3^ It was also hoped thai group leaders' answers to a very specific question concerning the 
c loseness of the rate precept set to their own preference would provide a clear indication 
of their group's influence. Unfortunately, for reasons d i s c u s s e d in Chapter Eight, this 
expectation was flawed (see Chapter Eight, Section Two, Table 8.8). 
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9.9 has replies from the opposition parly groups who answered these questions in 
15 minority administrations. Where a party which is not the closest in policy terms 
is omitted from the table, this is because no questionnaire was returned by that 
group; the party closest on the policy scale is included even when no questionnaire 
was received, in order that other replies from that council can be more clearly 
a s s e s s e d . Parties were asked to rate their influence in six different policy areas 
(education, social services, housing, planning, highways, transport), on the budget, 
and on the rate precept, as either "very influential", "quite influentiar. "not very 
influential", or "not at all influential". The rates for the policy areas were averaged 
to produce a single rating, listed in the column heading 'level of influence on policy'. 
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Table 9.9: Opposition Party Influence In Minority Administrations (ns15) 
level ol inlluence on 
l.a admin opp'n payolls policy budqel precept Comments 
0 6 0 0 Lab SLD' yes very very very Lob-rale set 'quite close-
Con yes quiie not at atl nol at all to their preferences: rate set 
'identical' to SLD'8 wishes. 
1 5 0 6 SLD Lab- n/i n/l n/i n/i Cons answered that thoy 
Con yes quile not at all nol very were 'not influentiar In the council. 
0 6 0 2 SLD SDP' n/i n/i n/i n/l Cons say Con/SLD coalition 
Con yos quile nol very nol very rules (with SDP excluded) 
1 5 0 0 Con SLD- yes quiie very very -
Lab no quile not very not very 
1900 Lob SLD- yos n/i n/i n/l -
Con no quite not at all not at all 
5 3 0 3 Lab SLD- yes not very very very 
2 3 0 0 Lab SLD- n/i n/i n/i n/I -
Con no quite quile nol at all 
2 2 0 7 SLD Lab* no quite n/i n/i Despite all 4 groups saying 
tnd no not very very very there were 'no pay-oils', their 
answers on Ihe budget 
Con no n/i n/i very suggest otherwise. 
0 5 0 5 Lab SDP' n/i n/i n/i n/i SLD may be closest party to 
SLD yes quiie quile very Lab: SDP (one member) may have 
allied with SLD 
4 9 0 4 Lab SDP- n/i n/i n/i n/i Again-SLD may be closest to 
SLD yos quite very very Lab: SDP has only 3 members. 
Con yes quile not at all nol very and may be allied with SLD 
3204 Lab SLD- yos quile very quite 
3 3 0 0 SLO Lab- yos very very very 
1511 SLD Lab* yes quile not at ell not at all Both Con & Lab have little inlluence. 
Con no quile not very not very but Lab gets some concessions 
4 8 0 7 SLO Lab- no very quile quite Contused answers from Lab & 
Con no very very not very Con-difficult to decipher. 
1 8 0 9 SLD Lab* no n/i n/i n/i -
Ind yes quile very quite 
(n/i B no inlormailon: - signllies closest opposition party on the policy scale) 
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A close examination of Table 9.9 reveals some very interesting findings. Quite 
plainly, the questions of budgetary influence and influence on the rate precept 
produce, in general, much greater perceptions of influence from the parties closest 
on the policy scale to the ruling party than the general questions about concessions. A 
slight adjustment in two c a s e s , will produce an even clearer indication of the 
importance of policy c loseness to the ruling party In terms of opposition party 
influence. There are two councils where the S D P is the closest party on the scale to 
the ruling group. We have no replies from those two S D P groups (of just 1 and 3 
members) and the only reason they appear in Table 9.9 is because of their supposed 
status as "closest in policy terms" to the ruling Labour group. However, in both 
c a s e s the S L D party leader has answered, and in both c a s e s he/she a s s e s s e s S L D 
influence in these crucial budgetary matters as very high. In most councils with an 
S D P group, the S D P members are included by the chief executive in the total of S L D / 
Alliance councillors. It appears not improbable that these very small S D P groups 
may also be 'subsumed' within the S L D group on the council. If this is the case , then 
the S L D would be the closest party on the council to the ruling Labour group in both 
c a s e s , which would support the general findings of Table 9.9 that the most 
influential opposition parties appear to be those closest on the policy scale. Including 
these two S L D groups,^8 we have information on budgetary/rate precept influence 
from 9 of the 15 parties closest on the scale. 
T a b l e 9.10: Oppos i t ion Party In f luence in Minority 
Admin is t ra t ions By Pol icy Pos i t ion to Ru l ing Party 
Closest Opposition Party Other Opposition Parties 
Response Pol icy Budget Rate Set Pol icy Budget Ra le Set 
Very Influential 3 6 6 1 3 2 
Quite Influential 6 2 2 9 1 1 
Not Very Influential 1 0 0 1 3 5 
Not At All Influential 0 1 1 0 4 4 
(n.b. numbers in columns sum differently because some respondents did not answer all 
questions regarding influence) 
38 It is important to note that re-classifying the two S L D groups as "closest" in policy 
terms does not alter the general findings of Tables 9.9 and 9.10. It reinforces the 
impression given by other respondents who are the closest in policy terms to the ruling 
party . 
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Table 9.10 aggregates some of the findings of Table 9.9, and shows the major points 
very clearly. The specific questions of budgetary influence produces much clearer 
responses than the general questions about policy concessions.which had been 
granted or received. Quite clearly, c loseness in policy terms is connected with 
greater influence during the key budgetary negotiations. With just one exception 
(local authority 1511, where neither opposition group feels influential, although 
Labour receives policy concessions) all the leaders of parties close to the party 
heading the minority administration report thai they are 'very' or 'quite* Influential 
over the budget and rate precept set; most of them reply that they are v e r y 
influential. This contrasts with other opposition parties, the great majority of whom 
reply that they are "not very' or 'not at all' influential concerning the budget. 
Budget making time is the key time in hung local authorities; the business of the 
council can proceed fairly smoothly for most of the year, but budget making is when 
alliances came under most threat (see Leach, 1985). Therefore, parties which have 
not been influential for most of the year might be able to exert more pressure 
during this period. Supporting this, it is apparent that in some councils parties do 
not feel very influential in a number of policy areas but feel that they exercise 
considerable influence over the setting of the annual budget. The answers about 
influence in a number of policy areas (shown in the column in Table 9.9 labelled 
'level of influence on policy) often differ from the more specific question on how 
influential the party is in setting the budget rate. 
It is also clear that, in the council where all 4 party groups reply that there is no 
'logrolling' in the form of policy concess ions , at least two groups are very 
influential over the rate precept set. If this is the c a s e then some form of 
concessions would have to have been made. As Table 9.9 indicates, in some councils 
the answers are difficult to understand. The Conservative who replied that his/her 
group is very influential concerning budget negotiations but not very influential 
over the rate set contrasts with the Labour leader in the same authority (4807) 
who. despite being closest in policy terms, is less influential in influencing the 
budget but more influential in influencing the precept. It is difficult to know how to 
interpret these answers. However, in most c a s e s the pattern of influence is 
straightforward, and it reveals that one party in particular, the S L D , exercises 
great influence. The reasons for this will now be examined. 
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9.4.4. T h e Power of the Centre Party in a Three -Par ty S y s t e m : Pol icy 
P a y - O f f s A b o u n d 
Labour's dependence on the S L D as a coalition partner has already been noted (see 
Chapter Five, sections 5.2.4. and 5.2.5). An examination of Tables 9.3 and 9.7 
shows that in the councils where we can place the parties on an ideological scale, that 
is, those without a significant Independent group, the S L D is a member of all the 
current coalitions. Of course, this is hardly surprising, as the absence of a 
'significant* Independent presence means that 'alternatives' such as a Conservative/ 
Independent arrangement are unable to form either a coalition or allow a 
Conservative minority administration to form with Independent support (or vice 
versa) . Given the problems of Conservative/ Labour coalitions being able to form 
(although two previous coalitions in our sample of 121 administrations were 
Consen^ative/ Labour agreements) this suggests that the S L D will be very powerful 
in three-party systems, whether a minority administration or majority coalition 
forms. 
As previous chapters have related, the power of central parties in the coalition 
formation process is recognised by the majority of writers. Some acknowledge the 
ability this gives centre parties to influence the direction of policy in hung 
legislatures. For example, Laver (1981) argues that parties at the centre are more 
likely to join coalitions, and that therefore the adoption of more central policies is a 
likely outcome. Laver termed this process "the centripetal ideological tendencies of 
coalition policy" {Laver , 1981, pp.148-149).'^^ Whether this is the c a s e is 
difficult to establish, but it appears to be the case that the S L D , the central party in 
most English local authorities, wields enormous influence in hung councils. We have 
already seen that in our 31 'policy testing* councils, there is no winning connected 
coalition that can form without the participation of the S L D , and that the S L D is a 
member of all the coalitions which form. However, Table 9.9 reveals that the S L D ' s 
influence extends into all the minority administrations for which we have the 
information on policy position. 
89 However, while in any unidimensional policy continuum the median party might appear 
'unbeatable' . Budge & Laver (1987) say there Is evidence of both the multi-dimensionality 
and differential sa l ience of i s s u e s (Manifesto R e s e a r c h Group,1986) , and posit that 
coalition policy bargaining "may well take the form of logrolling across bundles of issues 
rather than compromise, issue by issue" (Budge & Laver. 1987. p.29). In opposition to 
Laver 's earlier position, they argue that logrolling generates "centrifugal' rather than 
'centripetal" pressures on policy outputs, and that if parties feel most strongly about their 
most extreme policies [which is not proven] then "logrolling should produce policy 
packages located well away from ihe centre, with no pivotal role for the median legislator" 
(Budge & Laver, 1987,pp.29-30). The clear importance of the S L D suggests this thesis 
does not apply in English local government. 
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There are 15 minority administrations in Table 9.9; the S L D is the minority ruler 
in 7 of them, and the most influential (and closest) actor In 6. In the remaining 2 
authorities we have no information about the SLD 's success in influencing the budget 
and the rate precept, but we do know that the other opposition party (in both c a s e s . 
Conservative) considers itself 'not very' and 'not at all' influential. Given this, it 
would not be surprising if the S L D was also influential in these two councils and 
gaining budgetary concessions from the minority 'rulers' as it does in the rest of the 
councils listed in Table 9.9. In all the minority administrations for which we can 
place the significant parties on our policy sca le , the S L D is either the ruling 
minority party or the most influential opposition party.'*^ 
We have examined 9 minimal connected coalitions and 18 minority administrations. 
In the remaining 4 of our 31 authorities there is one surplus majority coalition and 
3 c a s e s of 'no administration'. The S L D is one of the partners in the oversize 
coalition (and reports that it is 'very influential'), and is also very influential in 
one of the c a s e s of 'no administration'. It is only in the 2 other 'no administrations' 
that an S L D group sees itself as lacking influence; both S L D group leaders report 
that they are 'not at all influential' concerning the rate set. S o , in 25 of the 31 
administrations, we have information concerning the level of influence felt by the 
S L D , and in 23 of those 25 the party is either in government it is the most 
influential actor in opposition. An examination of the answers of other groups in 
these administrations provides significant support for the feelings of S L D leaders. 
This does not appear to be a case of party leaders exaggerating their own importance. 
On the specific question of how much influence their party had over the rate set in 
their authority, we do not see the pattern of claims made for policy concessions and 
general policy influence, that is, all groups claiming they were influential. Other 
parties report far less influence than the S L D . and their level of influence accords 
with their administrative status.^^ Whatever, the replies in Table 9.9 indicate that 
the power of the S L D is quite considerable when there are only 3 significant groups 
in the council. However, we need to see if this is a departure from its influence in 
other councils with more than 3 significant groups. 
^0 Mailers (1989, Table 4.5, pp.103-107) has also noted the power of the Alliance parties 
in budgetary matters; in 19 of 20 counties the Alliance was a member of the budgetary 
coalition. 
The importance of policy c loseness might also suggest that when the SLD forms a 
minority administration, it may be that Labour is the party most likely to benefit in the 
form of policy pay-offs, although the evidence in Table 9.9 is ambiguous on this. 
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Unfortunately, we only have information on S L D budgetary influence in 11 of the 
other 31 councils where we cannot place the parties on the policy scale, but they do 
indicate that its influence is not as great when there are more than 3 significant 
groups on the council. Of the 24 current minority administrations. 18 are in our 
'policy scale ' sample. We only have information from one S L D group in the 
remaining 6 minority administrations, and it answered that it was 'quite Influential* 
on the rate set in its authority. In the remaining 10 councils for which we have 
Information on the influence of the S L D , which comprise 2 S L D coalitions, 4 non-
S L D coalitions, and 4 'no administrations', the pattern of response was mixed, with 
answers evenly distributed in the four categories of influence ranging from 'very' to 
'not at air influential. Unfortunately, we lack sufficient Information to test the 
responses of Independent leaders in those councils, to check if their influence is 
greater when the S L D is not very influential. However, S L D involvement, and 
influence, is less in the councils with more than 3 significant groups, strongly 
supporting the idea that the results listed in Table 9.9 do indicate the powerful 
position it holds in smaller party systems. 
9 .4 .5 . T h e E f fec t of P o l i c y C l o s e n e s s a n d Pay-Offfs on C o a l i t i o n 
D u r a t i o n 
This section has already shown that policy positions affect coalition formation in a 
number of ways. It may also be logical to suppose that administrations where parties 
are both close on the ideological scale and co-operating in policy terms will be more 
durable than administrations where such pay-offs are not evident. Unfortunately, 
we do not have a large universe of c a s e s with which to test such an hypothesis. There 
are 5 coalitions in Table 9.7 which are between the closest (rather than 'connected') 
parties on the policy/ ideological scale and 8 minority administrations in Table 9.9 
where we can detect that the opposition party closest to the ruling party is the most 
influential over the rate set. In the other 7 minority administrations in Table 9.9 
such parties may also be the most influential but we lack the necessary information. 
In one of the current minority administrations we do not know how long it has lasted. 
Therefore, we have only 12 current administrations with which to tentatively 
examine the thesis that policy pay-offs to policy close parties may lead to more 
stable administrations. The lack of completed administrations is unavoidable here, as 
we have no information on policy pay-offs other than for current administrative 
arrangements. 
There is some theoretical support for the belief that policy c loseness will contribute 
to government longevity. Budge & Keman's (1990) general theory of party 
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government makes the assumption that parties seek to form a government "capable 
of surviving" and enabling them to "carry through their declared policy 
preferences" (Table 2.1. Assumption 2, p,34). One implication of this Is that "the 
less governments agree over policy, the more likely they are to terminate for 
involuntary internal reasons" (Budge & Keman, 1990, Table 2.4, Implication 5 
(i). pp. 50-52). They report that their: 
"findings here broadly confirm our reasonings about the effects of 
Ideological homogeneity (and, by inference, policy agreement) in 
producing more stable and long-lived governments" (Budge & Keman, 
1990, p.172). 
Budge & Keman's notion of policy agreement is defined by the ideological homogeneity 
of a coalition in systems characterised by a bourgeois-socialist cleavage, a division 
w^hich may not be applicable in British politics (see Budge & Keman, 1990, Table 
6.5, p.173). The inference that, for example, "bourgeois hegemony" is necessarily 
the same thing as policy agreement might also be debated. However, what clearly 
emerges from the sheer scope of their research is that minimising policy 
differences, however characterised, is an important contributor to administrative 
duration. Therefore, we would expect to find that our 12 administrations will last a 
long time, although comparing them favourably against other current 
administrations which have nol lasted a long time would of course be meaningless.'*^ 
T a b l e 9.11: Average Duration of Current Admin is t ra t ions of 
Par t ies C l o s e s t on Pol icy S c a l e 
status deals by closest all current admins 
part ies with same status 
minimum winning connected 25.4 (n=5) 22.6 (n=8)* 
minority administrations 31.6 (n=7) 27 .6 (n=24) ' 
• S e e Table 9.5 
Table 9.11 shows that the average duration of the 5 coalitions between the parties 
closest on the policy scale is 25.4 months, compared to the average of 22.6 months 
for all minimum winning connected coalitions we have information for. Similarly, 
the average duration of minority administrations with evidence of deals between 
^2 The same caveats about extant administrations must be made again, and any findings 
emerging from this examination must therefore be treated with caut ion; current 
administrations may go on to last a considerable period. 
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parties closest on the policy scale is longer than the general average of minority 
administrations (31.6 months to 27.6 months). While neither of these figures is 
proof of the thesis, it does tentatively support that idea that when parties with close 
policy preferences are co-operating administrations will be more durable. The 
pressures which policy compromise brings are less, and agreement should be easier. 
If agreement is easier, then the process of maintaining the administration in power 
should also be less traumatic. However, further exploration of a greater 
sophistication is necessary before more definite conclusions of a relationship 
between policy c loseness , policy pay-offs, and administrative duration can be 
drawn. 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
Chapter Nine has examined a number of theories about the factors impinging on 
coalition formation and duration. Despite the admitted limitations of attempting to 
test merely the predictive capacities of the theories, a number of interesting 
findings have emerged. For example, the powerful position of the S L D in three-party 
systems emerged from an examination of policy pay-offs after constructing the 
unidimensional policy scale. 
As expected given the large number of minority administrations in hung councils, 
office-based theories of coalition formation do not perform well in predictive terms. 
Neither minimal nor minimum winning theories are successful in predicting which 
administration will form. In fact, it appears thai by far the most successfu l 
hypothesis would be that "when councils become hung, the largest single party will 
form a minority administration".''8 A third of all administrations forming fit this 
extremely specific prediction. 
In order that theories positing the importance of a lack of ideological diversity in 
formation and duration can be tested, it is essential that the relative position of the 
political parties, ideologically speaking, is a s s e s s e d . The construction of a 
unidimensional policy/ ideological scale for English local authorities is not without 
considerable difficulties and a number of compromises need to be made. Existing 
models of the position of national parties have been adapted to suit local politics, and 
while there are reservations about many of the adaptations, the resulting scale has 
enabled us to test ideologically connected theories and policy c loseness proposals 
with a certain degree of accuracy. 
A finding not dissimilar to Taylor & Laver's (1973) discovery of so many minority 
administrations in European parliaments. 
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Although the difficulty of placing Independents on a 'universal' local policy scale 
means the exclusion of local councils with a significant Independent group from the 
examination of the importance of ideological connectedness, we are still left with a 
total of 31 councils in which such theories can be scrutinised. Despite the large 
number of minority administrations, it appears that both minimum and connected 
status have a significance when coalitions are being formed. All but two of the 10 
current coalitions in this sample of 31 administrations are minimum winning and 
connected ideologically, which suggests that both are important to coalition 
formation. 
However, it may be that the importance of ideological connectedness is exaggerated in 
the 31 administrations where we can place the local parties on the policy scale that 
has been constructed. B e c a u s e of the exclusion of councils with significant 
Independent groups, most of the councils are effectively three-party systems. In 
s u c h s y s t e m s , any two-party coalition apart from Conservat ive / Labour is 
connected (and all are minimal), so perhaps the high incidence of connected 
coalitions is only to be expected. The apparent importance of minimising the total 
weight of the coalition may also not be what it seems. 6 of the 8 minimum winning 
connected coalitions are also examples of former opposition parties uniting against 
the traditional ruler, and two-thirds of all minimum winning coalitions were 
between ex-opposition parties; such political considerations may be more important 
than a concern with minimising the weight of the coalition that forms. 
While the importance of connectedness may be exaggerated in this selection of 
administrations, the importance of closeness in policy terms is demonstrated by the 
distribution of policy pay-offs in minority administrations. Quite clearly, the 
closest party on the policy scale to the single ruling party displays greater influence 
on the key budgetary decisions that have to be made than other opposition parties. 
The differences are very apparent. While, when coalition administrations are 
formed, it is ideological connectedness rather than the closest party in policy terms 
that matters, an examination of single party minority administrations reveals that 
it is the party closest in policy terms which is most influential when crucial 
decisions have to be made. Given its position in the middle of the two major parties, 
the S L D is in the ideal position to exploit that, and all the evidence indicates that S L D 
groups take full advantage of their opportunities. 
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One of the clearest things to emerge from the examination of policy pay-offs is the 
powerful position of the S L D ; the party appears to have a quite extraordinary degree 
of influence in the 31 councils for we have been able to a s s e s s policy c loseness. In 
the overwhelming majority of these counci ls, which are mostly three-party 
sys tems , the S L D is either the ruling minority party, a member of a winning 
coalition, or the most influential opposition party in a minority administration. 
Again, a general hypothesis of greater S L D influence in three-party systems could 
be proposed; the supporting evidence is overwhelming. 
Finally, policy closeness also seems to be one of the important factors affecting the 
duration.of administrations in hung councils. Although the evidence is by no means 
conc lus ive , when parties with c lose policy preferences are co-operat ing, 
administrations appear to be more durable. Policy c loseness appears to be a greater 
influence on duration than ideological connectedness or coalition s ize. IVIinimum 
winning connected coalitions, while more durable than the overall average for 
coalition administrations, are apparently no more durable than minimum winning 
coalitions, but it is difficult to advance more than the most tentative proposals for 
the factors affecting administrative duration 
The major points that emerge from this chapter are the dominance of the S L D when 
there are only three major parties, and the apparent relationship between policy 
c loseness and budgetary influence in minority administrations. Throughout this 
thesis, the role of the SLD has often appeared crucial in hung local government, and a 
number of possible reasons have been advanced for this. It may be that their 
dominant role in three party administrations offers the most potent explanation of 
their greater involvement. In such c a s e s , it is not only Labour groups who have 
little choice, as Chapter Five suggested. Conservative groups, unless they can bridge 
a large ideological divide and come to an arrangement with Labour, also have no 
alternative if they wish to have some influence. 
The significance of all of these findings for coalition theory is not only that policy 
pay-offs need to be integrated into any successfu l theory. Theories which 
concentrate on policy c loseness , rather than ideological connectedness or a 
minimising criterion, may be more accurate reflections of the coalition process. Not 
only does policy c l o s e n e s s appear to explain the vast majority of local 
administrations which form (whether coalition or minority governments), it may 
also be offered (more tentatively) as an explanation for greater administrative 
duration. Although this evidence only holds for three-party local systems, the 
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numbers of Conservative/ Independent coalitions which form in four-party systems 
may indicate that, given a more accurate assessment of each local authority's 
political system, notions of policy closeness may be a powerful explanatory tool at 
local level. 
3 4 4 
C H A P T E R T E N 
D E V O N C O U N T Y C O U N C I L : A C A S E S T U D Y O F A HUNG C O U N C I L 
Introduction 
Section One: The Formation Process 
10.1.1. The Years Before Hungness 
10.1.2. The Liberals and S D P : Proto-Coalition Formation 
10.1.3. The Initial Steps in Building a Majority Coalition 
10.1.4. The Distribution of Pay-Offs 
Section Two: The Maintenance of the 'Working Arrangement' 
10.2.1. The Working Arrangements of the 'Working Arrangement' 
10.2.2. The First Year: Budget Making and Consolidation 
10.2.3. The End of the Working Arrangement 
Section Three: From Breakdown to Betrayal 
10.3.1. The Vote of No Confidence 
10.3.2. The Collapse of the Alliance 
10.3.3. Budget Betrayal 
Section Four: The Aftermath 
10.4.1. The Power of Officers 
10.4.2. Four Years Of.. . .? 
Conclusions 
3 4 5 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In May 1985, to the surprise of all knowledgeable opinion, the Conservatives lost 
overall control of Devon County Council. In the run-up to the election, the prevailing 
opinion had been that "there is no doubt whatsoever that they will remain in control" 
(Western Morning News [WMN], 8/2/85). Accordingly, the shock for the long-term 
rulers was great. For the next 4 years, Devon became a place where, according to 
some of the participants, "debate mattered" and politics became "more interesting, 
and more exciting", before the almost inevitable return of Conservative rule in 1989 
restored the "total predictability" to decision making that single party majority 
government usually ensures. 
This case study scrutinises the events of the 4 years when Devon was hung using the 
insights of the participants. The leaders of all of Ihe 4 main party groups were 
interviewed. David Morrish (Liberal). Arnold Sayers (Conservative), Saxon Spence 
(Labour) and Harold Luscombe (Social Democrats) all gave long interviews in which 
they talked very freely about the problems and opportunities afforded by a situation 
where one party can no longer rule alone without regard to the views of other party 
groups. As well as the political leaders of the council, the chief executive for most of 
the period from 1985-1989, David Macklin. was also interviewed at length. The co-
operation and openness of the 'actors' during what was perhaps the most fascinating 
period in Devon County Council's history is much appreciated, and their recollections 
of the period and their opinions of the relationships between themselves and the other 
actors provide a unique insight into life in a hung council. 
Previous chapters have looked in detail at a number of hypotheses concerning 
coalition behaviour. Some have been taken from formal coalition theory, some from 
descriptive accounts of coalition politics, and others from earlier studies of 'life in 
the balance' in English local authorities. A number of general findings for coalition 
behaviour in English local government have been generated by this study. While this 
c a s e study of Devon politics will illustrate a number of points which the various 
approaches to the study of coalition have indicated are important in coalition politics 
(and note their occurrence), a different approach to that of previous chapters will be 
taken here. It is not the intention of this study to attempt to illustrate the truths or 
otherwise of the earlier findings of this thesis, by setting up some crucial hypotheses 
and examining their tit with Devon's experience. It will soon become apparent to the 
reader that, as would be expected, the responses of the actors involved are a complex 
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mixture of factors. The intention of this study is to try and understand what made the 
actors in Devon respond in the way that they did. 
We will concentrate on the interaction of the actors involved and garner their 
impressions of a few crucial events of the 4 years when Devon was hung. It is not 
proposed to provide a blow-by-blow account of all the 'battles' of the period. It would 
be impossible to cover all the events between 1985-1989 in a short study such as 
this, even if this was what one desired to do. It is the process of coalition formation 
and maintenance that is of most interest to this study. Therefore, section one wilt 
concentrate on the initial process of coalition formation between Labour and the 
Alliance. Section two will detail the maintenance of the "working arrangement", and 
section three the breakdown of that arrangement. Finally, section four will briefly 
examine the aftermath, a long period of no administration in place, and a s s e s s the 
views of the actors involved concerning those four years of hungness. 
S e c t i o n O n e : T h e Format ion P r o c e s s 
This section begins with a brief examination of the experiences of Devon County 
Council prior to the crucial election of 1985. Following this, the 'pre-coalition' 
phase is examined, before evaluating the forces leading to the construction of a 
majority coalition. 
10.1.1. The Y e a r s Before H u n g n e s s 
For most of the period since its formation in 1889, Devon County Council has known 
little of party conflict. Although there has always been both a Conservative and a 
Liberal presence in Devon politics, the county council has historically been run in a 
•non-partisan' manner. Apart from a brief spell after the Second World War when the 
Labour party held 8 seats, the apparatus of modern party politics in the form of 
whipping and standing orders was unknown. Members were usually unopposed, and 
could continue in post, if they so wished, for life. Party politics was not a feature of 
Devon. 
However, the increased politicisation nationwide following local government 
reorganisation in 1973 brought party politics into the county council, and perhaps 
revealed the true nature of Devon's previous 'independence' and 'non-partisanship'. 
The Conservatives dominated the first three terms of government (1973-77, 1977-
81, 1981-85). The insistence of the major parties in contesting as many seats in 
local elections as possible (whether there was a chance of winning or not) has been 
one factor in ensuring that the full panoply of party machinery dominated in Devon as 
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elsewhere. After 1973, the possibility (if it ever existed) of anyone from outside the 
ruling caucus influencing a debate became negligible, and the Conservative domination 
of Devon (with 66 of 88 seats before the 1985 election) appeared inevitable. 
In the year leading up to the 1985 council election, there was no sign that the 
Conservatives would lose control. However, just a few weeks before the election, 
Michael Heseltlne announced the Conservative government's plans to privatise 
Devonport Dockyard, which was by far the biggest employer in Plymouth. There was 
considerable opposition to this from Plymouth and the surrounding district, as it was 
made clear that there would inevitably be a significant number of jobs lost, and a 
spate of mass public meetings made the scale of local opposition to privatisation 
apparent.'' 
Despite this, local Conservatives were still buoyant about their chances in the county 
council elections. Conservative leader Arnold Sayers confidently dismissed the 
national polls showing a rise in Liberal/Alliance support, later conceding that he had 
not taken the privatisation issue into account as a factor in the local election. After 
all. most local Conservatives, whether in or out of office, had attacked the decision, 
and apparently did not expect to be punished by the electorate for a decision they 
neither made nor agreed with. Accordingly, the trauma of losing was considerable. 
Sayers admitting he had "never dreamed we would lose control" (WMN. 4/5/85). The 
shock for the opposition parlies was probably just as great, as many of the newly-
elected Liberal and SDP councillors had never expected to be victorious. Not only that, 
Harold Luscombe admits that some SDP councillors, "had only agreed to stand on a 
commitment from me that they wouldn't get elected". 
Prior to the election, the composition of the council had been: Conservatives 66 seats, 
Labour 16, Liberals 11, and Independents 5 seats. Following the election the 
standings were: Conservatives 37, Labour 10, Liberals 23, SDP 13. Independents 2. 
The immediate question became, 'who will run Devon County Council?' The Labour 
leader Saxon Spence sounded more like the 'traditional Liberal' when she remarked, 
"we clearly hold the balance of power and our objectives will be to achieve as much of 
our programme as possible" (Wt^N, 4/5/85). The chairman of Torbay Liberals, who 
remarked (before any discussions had taken place) "a pact with Labour now seems 
inevitable" (WMN, 4/5/85), was jumping the gun. Although it may have seemed a 
^ Other local issues may also have weakened Conservative support, in particular, 
reductions in milk quotas, which caused widespread opposition in mid and north Devon. 
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formality, the two parties of the Alliance had still to agree to work together In the 
new council. That process of agreement will now be examined 
10.1.2. The Liberals and SDP: Proto-Coal i t ion Format ion 
Unsurprisingly, given that neither had remotely considered the possibility that they 
would have any influence at all after the election, while they had a "campaigning 
consensus" (Morrish), there was no prior agreement between the Liberals and the 
SDP.that they would work together in government. Not only that but. as David 
Morrish admits, they "had not in any way worked through how [they] were going to 
work together on the county council" as two small groups of councillors, let alone in 
the situation of vying with the Conservatives as the largest 'group' on the council. The 
SDP leader Harold Luscombe "didn't even know the names" of some of his newly 
elected councillors. 
However, the campaign as 'The Alliance' did mean that they had already made 
considerable compromises over two conflicting programmes. As Luscombe notes, the 
process of "dovetailing" the two manifestoes produced "no real acrimony". This is 
unsurprising, as the two leaders thought that it was effectively a "meaningless 
exercise". They were convinced there was no possibility of power, and even 
fundamental disagreements over nuclear issues were easily papered over. When they 
did arrive at County Hall, Exeter, to find that students from Exeter College of Art had 
hung a banner over the entrance proclaiming "UNDER NEW MANAGEiyiENT". the first 
decision the two parties had to come to "was whether in fact we were actually going to 
work together" (Morrish). 
The two leaders have a slightly different perspective on the process. Morrish says it 
took very little time for them to come to an agreement, "within about half an hour or 
so", but Luscombe remembers differently. He feels that the Liberals seemed to take it 
for granted that the SDP would fall into line behind them, but Luscombe reveals some 
doubts about working with the Liberals, doubts that would become more concrete over 
the following 18 months. He briefly took his SDP group out of the joint meeting, and 
upon returning: 
"we tried to create the impression we were struggling...to get agreement 
on this alliance ... because when we looked around some of the Liberals 
that were there and when we talked to various people we realised that a lot 
of the Liberals were mavericks...so we wanted to be satisfied in our minds 
that if we were going into this partnership that David IMorrish) was 
going to deliver the goods because he had several people, what I call the 
beard and sandal brigade...Liberals are all independent minded people 
[who] wanted to do their own thing" {Luscombe). 
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Luscombe was clearly concerned about the unity of the Liberal group. He could 
"deliver" his members, and he was determined to make sure that Morrish had a 
similar mandate from his group. Eventually, as both men knew they had to. they 
agreed to work together, with Morrish as leader of the Alliance and Luscombe as his 
deputy. However, given the hostility of some Labour members to the SDP. it was not 
at all certain they could build a majority coalition. Any hope of building a majority 
relied on a pact with Labour, because the Conservatives were effectively excluded 
from the process.^ 
What all the opposition parties agreed upon was that whatever happened the 
Conservatives should not be allowed to continue in power. Despite being aware of the 
feeling against them, the Conservatives still made contact with other groups in an 
attempt to remain in control. Labour leader Saxon Spence clearly shows the feelings 
of all the other groups on the council to the thought of the Conservatives remaining in 
power: 
"Whatever the problems of being hung for four years there was no way we 
would have done a deal with the Conservatives, and I had the very 
interesting and entertaining experience of having Ted Pinney ^ and Arnold 
Sayers in my office to plead with me that it would be much better to let 
then stay and this was never even considered" (Spence). 
Arnold Sayers says that, "I don't remember us ever offering to lake control", although 
the discussions did take place about whether the two groups could have worked 
together; chief executive David Macklin is "certain that the Conservatives approached 
the Labour party" to see if they could agree an arrangement. David fyiorrish 
remembers that it was "perfectly apparent that the Conservatives expected to carry 
on" and that there were even "vague" talks about grand coalitions. However. Alliance 
agreement was essential to any Conservative minority administration, and as Morrish 
maintains that "I can't foresee the situation that I'd do a deal with the Conservatives 
for a variety of reasons", such Conservative hopes were futile. It Is apparent from 
talking to the long term opposition leaders that they were determined the 
Conservatives would have no role in running the council.'* 
2 This process of coalition building conforms in many respects to Grofman's thesis of 
a "dynamic model of proio-coaliiion formation". Chapter O n e , (section 1.4.3.) 
descr ibes this 'step-by-step' process of gradually building a winning coalition (see 
Grofman, 1982, pp.77-78). 
3 A senior Conservative councillor. 
^ The research outlined in Chapter Five, section three, does not support the 
hypothesis that former rulers are excluded from administrations. However, a s 
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Within a day or two of the result, chief executive David Macklin rang an 
"uncomfortable" George Creber (a defeated Conservative candidate but still 
technically Chairman of the Council) and suggested that he would have to gel together 
with the group leaders and attempt to sort the situation out. A number of senior 
councillors had a meeting in Macklin's room ("as soon as the meeting began I left them 
to it") and within ten minutes the Conservatives had departed, "and left David 
Morrlsh and Saxon Spence to sort out how they were going to deal with the 
administration" (Macklin). 
10.1.3. The Init ial Steps in Bui ld ing a Major i ty Coal i t ion 
The only possibility of a majority coalition lay in a Labour/ Alliance coalition of some 
sort. Publicly, Labour were careful to make it clear that they could not enter into any 
formal pact (WfVlN, 11/5/85), but privately there was a realisation that this was 
too good an opportunity to let pass. Not even the national Labour party's disapproval of 
agreements with other parties In hung councils could be allowed to interfere with the 
chance: 
"I suddenly became a member of the Association of County Councils [and] I 
went up to a meeting and actually told Neil Kinnock that you've got to accept 
that there was no way you could put Tories in...this opportunity had to be 
taken, and they accepted that there had to be a local interpretation" 
(Spence)^. 
The personal relationship between Spence and Morrish (who both worked in the 
School of Education at Exeter University) was important in establishing the first 
contacts between Labour and the Liberals;® geography helped in other ways. Morrish 
is quite certain that: 
"had Devon County Council met in Plymouth...the chemistry of Plymouth 
would.have made it quite impossible, and several people remarked it was 
one of the wonders of the world that people who weren't speaking to each 
Carter 's (1986, p. 10) research shows, where the Conservative former rulers have 
ruled in an arrogant manner, the opposition to them remaining in power will be 
considerable. This may help to explain the universal opposition to the Consen/at ives in 
Devon. 
5 As Chapter Two (section three) argues, this is an indication that local groups can 
override central party objections to coalition agreements. The agreement on a 'local 
interpretation' might also indicate that central party opposition might be more for 
public consumption, and that pragmatism will usually triumph. 
^ The importance of personal relationships Is continually made by the multi-
dimensional approach (see Pridham, 1986, pp.24-29) . Metlors c i tes personal 
relationships as Important at local level In a number of dimensions, including the 
historical and motivational dimensions (Mellors, 1989, p.7). 
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other in Plymouth were outwardly prepared to actually work together in 
Exeter...Distance enabled people to co-exist in a way that perhaps they 
found far more difficult had they been in Plymouth under the constant gaze 
of Plymothians and the Plymouth press" (Morrish). 
Morrish's comments indicate the difficulties of an agreement with the Plymouth based 
SDP and the Plymouth Labour party members. There were voices within the local 
Labour party who echoed the feelings of many Labour members at Westminster 
concerning the possibility of doing a deal with the SDP. only even more vehemently. 
Plymouth Devonport was the SDP national leader David Owen's seat, and the 
bitterness felt locally at what was seen as treachery by former colleagues was 
heartfelt. David Morrish notes the "downright hate" that existed between some people 
in the groups, exemplified by veteran Labour councillor Reg Scott, who declared 
openly that a pact was out of the question with "the traitors and rats of the SDP" 
(WMN, 7/5/85). 
However, the Liberals had already agreed to work with the SDP, and if Labour wanted 
a share of power it therefore had to bury those disagreements. Saxon Spence admits 
that "it did add a problem to our working any sort of agreement which would not be 
there in other counties". In fact, Labour at first refused to talk to the SDP, conducting 
their coalition discussions with Morrish alone, until Luscombe refused to agree to any 
deal which did not involve him taking part in the discussions. He told Morrish that 
Spence "has got to realise that whether she likes me or she doesn't, she has got to talk 
to me" and Labour "reluctantly" agreed to allow Luscombe to be a part of the 
discussions (Luscombe). 
Despite the bitterness between the SDP and Labour they were close enough in enough 
policy areas to make agreement relatively easy. Labour found enough "common ground 
between the Labour manifesto and that [of] the Alliance" (Spence). Luscombe notes 
that while Labour had a whole host of demands, the Alliance "had no difficulty with 
supporting much of what she was saying", a point confirmed by Morrish. The Liberals 
and Labour have always tended to side together in Exeter,^ and the disagreements 
between the SDP and Labour were felt most in Plymouth. The fact that the dealing with 
the Alliance was orchestrated by Spence, a "lady from Exeter" who "clearly had seen 
this as a golden opportunity for her to stamp her thinking on the county of Devon" 
(Luscombe). may have helped the deal to go through despite the opposition of 
Plymouth's Labour councillors. It must also be remembered that the possibility of 
7 Morrish and Spence have both served on Exeter city council; again, the importance 
of past experiences and personal relationships are apparent. 
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power after years of impotence is a powerful incentive to agree, and as Morrish 
notes. Luscombe, Spence and himself had "been around for a bit". They were already 
aware that this was almost certainly a "one-off" and that in four years they would be 
out of power again; they had "to make an impact" (Luscombe). The pressures for 
agreement were so great that the issue of personality clashes and old sores had to be 
overlooked. As Saxon Spence points out: 
"every four years since 1973 [Labour] have produced a manifesto and I 
usually end up putting it together and you think 'why am I spending all 
these hours producing this document, it's pointlessl', and suddenly it 
mattered and that was actually what held us together. All these 
personalities were in a sense not what mattered, what mattered was 
actually trying to make some progress on the things we believed in" 
(Spence). 
One can readily understand the pressures on these three experienced councillors to 
reach agreement; the years between 1985-89 would probably be the only chance 
they would ever have to influence Devon politics. However, the process of what form 
the agreement was to take, and in particular the allocation of chairs, demonstrates the 
dangers of minimising the importance of personalities to maintaining political 
agreements. The parties had come to some surprisingly painless agreements on 
policy, concentrating on the abolition of the grammar schools and eleven-plus, an 
agreement that was to lead to problems not unconnected with the selection of the 
education chairman. The allocation of that office, in particular, was to be a major 
factor in ending the agreement between Labour and the Alliance, and the process by 
which the chairs were distributed will now be examined. 
10.1.4. The Dis t r ibut ion of Off ice Pay-Offs 
Despite Saxon Spence's successful appeal to Neil Kinnock that they must be allowed to 
make a deal with the Alliance, Clause Six of Labour's standing orders for local groups 
comes close to forbidding local Labour groups from forming "local pacts" with other 
party groups. This meant that Spence still had to be careful over the way her 
relationship with the Alliance was portrayed. The deal between Labour and Alliance 
was called by David Stanbury (Luscombe's SDP deputy) the "working arrangement", a 
deliberately ambiguous title, later described by Stanbury as "less than a coalition but 
more than a vague understanding" (Western Evening Herald [WEH], 8/4/86). All 
parties were aware that "it had to be loose so that everybody could live with it" 
(Morr ish).® 
® S u c h ambiguity may have been necessary in a number of local authorities, one 
indication of why differences of opinion between the actors occasionally existed over 
the administration in place (see Chapter Three, section 3.1.2.). 
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For Spence, the 'working arrangement' was that "we identified common policies and 
therefore we agreed to a working arrangement to achieve those policies". Labour 
refused to enter into any formal alliance and refused the offer of committee chairs, 
but supported Alliance nominations for the chairs. However, the way in which chairs 
were allocated demonstrates the importance of political know-how and perceptions to 
such deals, and as we shall see, how important such deals can be to administrative 
longevity. Harold Luscombe was determined that the SDR would get its fair share of 
committee chairs and vice-chairs, although he admits that "many times I had my 
tongue in my cheek as to the ability of some of my members" (doubts that, he asserts, 
were assuaged by the "excellent job" his inexperienced colleagues performed). 
However, the decision that was to cause the most acrimony did not concern Luscombe's 
SDP appointments. 
David Morrish offered Labour the chair of the social services committee, and the 
vice-chair of education. Although Spence had agreed with Labour colleagues from 
other areas at the Association of County Councillors meeting (see above) that "it 
would be a mistake to actually take any office", she says that if that offer had been 
changed around it would have "tempted us enough" to take the chairs. However, 
Luscombe believes that "if she had forced the issue we would have given her the 
[education] chairmanship, and I would have been quite happy for that to have 
happened". The decision by Spence not to force the issue and to settle for policy 
concessions was to be a major contributory factor to the break-up of the working 
arrangement. 
When Saxon Spence was told who was getting the chair of the education committee she 
says she "nearly had a fit". A new member, Margaret Rogers was given the chair of 
the committee responsible for the major part of Devon County Council's expenditure. 
Spence says that Morrish saw Rogers as: 
"the only person who can sort out Ted Pinney [which] must be the most 
amazing error that David Morrish has ever made in his whole life, 
because that's not the way to deal with Ted Pinney...that was what he told 
me, she can deal with him" (Spence). 
Pinney, the current (1992) chairman of the council, is a tough, long-serving 
politician with great experience in education matters, who Spence believes "would 
have been delighted' to have given a newcomer some help, a view with which Arnold 
Sayers concurs. Spence still finds Morrish's decision difficult to fathom, noting that 
In "confrontation with Ted Pinney you are on a hiding to nothing". 
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Whatever the troubles that this decision would bring, the mood was one of confidence 
among what a leading Tory dubbed the "Triple Alliance" (WMN. 25/3/86). Within a 
few weeks of the 1985 election, Morrish was able to announce a one year pact 
between Labour and the Alliance parties based on "a number of shared policy 
objectives" and with Labour supporting Alliance nominations for the committee 
chairs (WMN, 17/5/85). Despite the reservations now expressed by Luscombe and 
Spence about some of the appointments made, the mood was optimistic. 
Sect ion Two: The IVIaintenance of the Working Arrangement 
This section begins by examining the organisational form which the 'working 
arrangement' between Labour and the Alliance took. The process of making the first 
budget will then be assessed. Finally in this section, the forces which led to the end of 
the working arrangement are scrutinised. 
10.2.1. The Work ing Arrangements of the 'Work ing Ar rangement ' 
Having reached agreement, the Alliance and Labour had to decide just how the council 
was going to be run. A surprise awaited the victorious leaders of the 'working 
arrangement'. David Morrish details his introduction to a hidden side of Devon's 
pol i t ics: 
"I only discovered where the power was in Devon County Council after the 
election...David Macklin came up to me...and said 'Mr Morrish. I'd like to 
discuss the date on which we are having the chairman's meeting', so I said, 
"well, what's that?'. 'Well', he said, 'the regular monthly meeting [of] all 
the committee chairs and the chief officers.,.l have got a draft agenda 
here*, he said. 1 looked at it and it was set out on the County Council's 
agenda paper and it was essentially the agenda of what one might normally 
expect to be coming out of the Policy Committee...I said 'well, what it 
seems to me is what you have got here is the Policy Committee minus the 
opposition members'. 'Well, you could say that' he said...I had no idea that 
there was this monthly cycle of meetings of the chairmen of committees 
and that in effect it was a cabinet...and I said "I am not having 
one'...because 1 thought it was a dangerous model of having essentially a 
meeting of the Policy Committee behind closed doors. And it seemed to me 
to give a level of concentration of power at the top which I personally as a 
Liberal would find unhealthy. I had no idea it was meeting" (Morrish). 
Saxon Spence and Harold Luscombe were also unaware of the existence of what was in 
effect a formal and secret cabinet.^ Arnold Sayers introduced the chairman's meetings 
® S u c h committees are not uncommon in majority control councils (see Stewart, 
1983. p.45). Chapter Seven (section 7.2.3.) has already shown that, a s in Devon, 
such one-parly committees do not survive the arrival of hungness. The removal of 
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when he became leader in 1981, and sees good reasons for the secrecy of the 
discussions: 
"it was a sort of cabinet at which we discussed matters and tried to thrash 
out our policy and I found it extremely helpful because, inevitably, when 
you are taking decisions you have to discuss the options. If you say you are 
going to shut, for the sake of argument, 50 primary schools as being one 
of the options, almost certainly you are going to chuck it out of the window 
but you want to consider it. and you can raise a whole lot of [issues] 
which if you ventilated them in public, would cause mayhem. So from that 
point of view it was very helpful" (Sayers). 
For chief executive David Macklin "this was part of a cabinet government", and he was 
surprised to discover that senior opposition councillors had not: 
"been conscious that it had been going on...it was called the 'committee 
chair'. In fact it was of course the leading people of the Conservative 
party, but it was very clearly called a meeting of the committee chairs so 
that there was no difficulty about officers being present" (Macklin). 
While Sayers maintains that David Macklin was at pains to stress that in local 
government the chief executive had a responsibility to all members, the existence of 
this "cabinet*, attended by officers and unknown to three long-serving opposition 
leaders, suggests that these meetings may have remained secret because of the clash 
with the ethos that local government officers have a duty to provide information to all 
members. Officers discussing policy initiatives in, for example, education, without 
the knowledge of opposition education committee members does mean that those 
excluded are severely hampered In terms of the policy debates. 
Whatever the rationale for the chairman's committee, Morrish (with the agreement 
of Spence) was determined that this arrangement would not continue, and he also did 
not want chairman's briefings from officers just before a meeting, which "might 
enable officers, if they wanted to, to bounce initiatives on me in a space of time where 
I couldn't discuss with anyone else whether these were acceptable or not" (Morrish). 
He introduced 'agenda meetings* where party spokespersons and chairpersons from 
the administration: 
"could meet with the chief officers when the agenda was being put together 
for the [committee] meeting...It seemed to me [that] if you are trying to 
run a council it was better in fact to be in on that stage one, and to be well 
Informed about what's coming through the pipeline" (Morrish). 
such committees will also be a factor in the loss of power of elected political elites 
noted in section three of Chapter Eight. 
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Morrish admits "there were some committees [where the agenda meetings] didn't 
work very well", because of personality clashes. David Macklin feels that the real 
problem was that Morrish's disapproval of the committee chairmen meeting meant 
"that officers really weren't able to be at the meeting at which the issues were being 
discussed" and were therefore ill-informed about the administration's preferences. 
As well as officers being less able to run things smoothly, the abandonment of tlie 
'cabinet' meetings may not have brought any improvements in openness. Saxon Spence 
recalls that Labour spokespersons "started going to briefing meetings and that was 
stopped very quickly", to be replaced by agenda meetings, which Morrish admits were 
"patchy" in their workings. David Macklin feels that: 
"quite a lot of significant decisions...would disappear from our view and 
emerge out of whatever discussion took place between the Alliance and 
Labour and I am not conscious that much of that was public open debate. In 
fact, in a sense it was no less closed than it had always been; to [the 
officers), of course, it was more closed" (Macklin). 
This does not suggest a more open decision making process than the previous 
chairman's committee, and Morrish himself notes that when his party took over. "I 
suppose the working arrangement was a new kind of member elite"."" ° 
Other changes were made organisationally, with the Alliance (with Labour support) 
cutting the number and the size of committees. For the Alliance, the stated reason was 
to cut bureaucracy, but for the Tories it was because they couldn't guarantee 
attendance (WEH, 24/5/85). During the summer of 1985 the business of the county 
council was relatively uncontentious. However, the administration was still working 
to a Conservative budget. Any divisions would not be expected to come to the surface 
until budgetary negotiations had to be undertaken in the New Year. The one year 
agreement between Labour and the Alliance seemed to guarantee a measure of 
stability. That first year will now be investigated. 
10.2.2. The First Year: Budget Making and Consol idat ion 
The Conservatives were out of power for the first time, and there is no doubt that they 
found it hard to cope with. Sayers notes that his party were "shell shocked...because 
we weren't used to being in opposition, so it took us several months to get used to 
Chapter Eight (see section 8.3.2.) has suggested that the increased importance of 
committees in terms of relative power, might indicate an increase in officer 
influence, b e c a u s e officers will control the flow of information to committees. 
Macklin's response suggests that officer power is partly dependent on organisational 
structures, and might actually diminish in hung councils. 
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that". For Luscombe, they were a "laughing stock", who "didn't even know how to move 
an amendment". Macklin notes that their reaction in debate as opposition members 
"distorted the whole process". Whatever the decision, they were always trying to 
display the Alliance as committed to big budgetary increases, which: 
"knocked on the head the possibility of having a rational open debate about 
where the priorities lay...the Tories...were in a state of such dismay. I 
don't know whether they really organised themselves" (Macklin). 
The dispirited Conservatives were the least of the administration's worries during the 
opening months of the working arrangement. 
The problems of the Liberal's refusal to have a party whip meant that "there were 
quite a number of votes...when some Liberal members didn't vote the agreed line" 
(Morrish). In November, 1985, the tendency of some Liberals to go their own way 
after hearing Tory counter-arguments (as Harold Luscombe Incredulously notes, 
"there were some shockers like that!") put the pact in danger of collapsing. Several 
Alliance members voted with the Conservatives against plans, proposed by Labour 
with Alliance group support, to "tighten up grammar school entry"; the loss of a 
motion to ban the eleven-plus led several Labour members to question the validity of 
the working arrangement. Following this, some Labour members voted with the 
Conservatives to allow mining at Hemerdon, which was opposed by the Alliance."'^ 
Labour members publicly argued that unless the Alliance pushed through the abolition 
of the grammars the deal would be over, but despite Spence claiming "the pact is near 
breaking point" (WEH, 1/11/85) the problems were smoothed over.*'^ 
The first budget was also remarkably easy to agree to, and the discussion procedures 
generally "worked well" (Spence). By the end of January, 1986. the working 
arrangement had agreed a "budget for jobs", with a rate rise of 19.8 percent which 
created 400 new council jobs. The Conservatives pointed out that this was the biggest 
increase since reorganisation. Harold Luscombe remembers that Labour: 
11 Given such voting behaviour, the difficulty of automatically regarding parties as 
unitary actors, especially at local level, is apparent. As Chapter Three (section 
3.1.3.) points out, the Liberals are the least disciplined of the three major parties at 
local level. However, despite Luscombe's comments, it must be noted that the Liberals 
usually voted the agreed line, and when they did not, Morrish s a y s he w a s usually 
aware "in advance" and would "moderate my speech accordingly". He w a s "quite 
prepared to accept that some members of the group after fair argument would not 
accept our view, but t don't like to be up front arguing and then when I turn round to 
see the vote being counted find half the group voting against me". 
^2 The grammar schools were not abolished in Devon. 
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"obviously wanted to put more money in...but at the end...they backed off 
that...We made a number of modifications, and in some senses that was 
very helpful to us because we were having some difficulties with our own 
people and so [David Morrish and I] were able to turn around and [say to 
our members] 'well, I'm sorry, but you can't have that because the 
Labour party are demanding this'...so it was a helpful thing in some ways 
that we could sort of play one against the other" (Luscombe).*'^ 
David Morrish describes the excitement of putting the first budget together: 
"[It] proved to be quite a cliff-hanger budget, and we had tea-break 
adjournments and all the rest, it was good exciting...Boys Own stuff, and 
the Express and Echo gave terrible headlines...all about chaos in the city, 
county council big rows, bust-ups, collapse, mayhem, you name It. In 
actual fact...Devon County Council did not adjourn one single meeting 
because it couldn't reach a decision...through the whole of that period. We 
spent less time putting our budget through than many other councils...I 
was quite happy about that first budget exercise" (Morrish). 
Despite Morrish's satisfaction with the budget, and Luscombe arguing that, apart 
from those of a long term nature, most of the 'working arrangement's' policy 
objectives had been delivered. Labour members were discontented, both with what had 
been achieved and with the lack of credit they had been given for what had been 
achieved; Labour also complained of a lack of consultation. Luscombe agrees that 
Spence never achieved the recognition she deserved for what happened, noting that the 
Alliance usually took credit for policy initiatives which were really pushed for by 
Labour." ' '* It was not surprising that, during March and April 1986, reports 
appeared regularly in the local press of the problems the Alliance and Labour were 
having in agreeing to a continuation of the working arrangement. The Conservatives 
had also "started to get their act together" (Luscombe), and Arnold Sayers was 
offering to talk to the Alliance if they dropped their plans to abolish the grammar 
schools and curbed their spending (WMN, 25/3/86).''^ 
Despite the problems, they reached agreement to continue the arrangement, with 
Labour still refusing to take chairs. Accordingly, Morrish and Luscombe had to decide 
^3 This demonstrates one way in which the party elites can maintain some of their 
power, especially if the backbench councillors of the coalition partners, as in Devon, 
regard each other with suspicion. 
1^ Labour's decision not to take chairs may have been one factor working against 
them achieving the recognition Luscombe admits they deserved. The importance of 
holding the chair to achieving policy objectives has been recognised as important by 
those leaders who are actually participating in government (see Chapter Four, Table 
4.8 and discussion). 
^5 The importance of time to the process of learning has been d iscussed throughout 
this work, and Arnold Sayers admits it took them some time to get used to the new 
situation. 
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whether to keep the chair appointments as they were. Luscombe says that they decided 
that there had to be a number of changes to eradicate the "weak links", and: 
"that's when the problems started because we had to agree that as far as 
the SDP was concerned there was no real weak link...The only people he 
wanted to move were going to be Liberals, and that was his problem, 
because when he started to sound various people out about changing these 
people around he came up against an awful lot of argument." (Luscombe). 
For Spence and Luscombe, one post in particular was causing problems. Margaret 
Rogers, allegedly put in by Morrish to handle Ted Pinney, was not a popular choice as 
education chairperson. Arnold Sayers notes that: 
"Margaret Rogers' inexperience didn't help her...because she wasn't sure 
of her ground she was all the more dogmatic and I think it made her life 
very difficult. I think on a personal level a number of us found her very 
difficult to cope with and let's face it...there has to be behind the scenes an 
understanding between opponents and personal relations do count for a 
great deal" (Sayers). 
For Spence "she got across everybody", and Luscombe is forthright: 
"she upset everybody, she upset her own people, she upset the officers...it 
wouldn't have been so bad if, at the end of the day she had produced the 
goods in terms of policy decisions, because she didn't" (Luscombe). 
Despite this, no changes were made; the same people continued in the same posts. 
Luscombe thinks this was because the Alliance were having enough trouble keeping 
the Labour party happy without rocking their own boat. Disagreements concerning 
Mrs Rogers would eventually be a major factor in depriving the county council of any 
political leadership, but other factors connected with education were more pressing. 
The difficulty of satisfying Labour demands on the grammar schools issue,in 
particular, was soon to lead to more problems. 
10.2.3. The End of the Work ing Arrangement. 
Saxon Spence made it plain that the Labour party would pursue a more independent 
line in the new arrangement (WMN, 12/4/86). Despite the Liberals relinquishing 
the chairmanship a year ahead of schedule to allow the first ever Labour chairman of 
the council (Bill Evans), the Alliance "wavering" on abolishing grammar schools, 
with conflicting statements about intentions coming from Liberal and SDP 
spokespersons {Spence. WMN, 7/7/86), led to an early finish to the working 
arrangement within six months of the new one year deal being agreed. In October, 
1986, Labour pulled out of the arrangement because "there was no longer the unity of 
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purpose in the Alliance groups to justify its continuance" (Spence, WMN, 
1 6 / 1 0 / 8 6 ) . 1 6 
Morrish believes that, while it was true "that there had been various hiccups in the 
Alliance", the stated reasons were merely a pretence.He believes one factor was the 
the forthcoming district elections in Plymouth and Exeter, a belief shared by David 
Macklin: 
"the trouble was that we were coming up to the city elections and the 
Labour party weren't prepared to work with the Liberals at County Hall 
and fight them in the streets...they couldn't be seen to be too cosy with the 
Liberals/SDP " (Macklin).1 7 
Spence agrees that this was part of the reason, but felt that there was by then 
considerable resentment at the Alliance owing its position to Labour; especially, 
"there was a bitterness [between Labour and the SDP] which made a happy working 
relationship quite difficult" (Spence). She feels Labour got very little out of the re-
negotiated working arrangement, and the arrangement became harder to sustain as the 
district elections approached, "so the logic of not being linked in any formal way was 
almost irresistible" (Spence). 
However, Morrish thinks the main reason it broke up was that it was going too well, 
and the two major parties could not afford to see the Alliance showing they could 
govern. Therefore: 
"Labour...were looking for a way out and the Conservatives were looking 
for a way which they could trigger off the mayhem and-chaos...which 
would enable them to ride back next time as the people...to manage things" 
( M o r r i s h ) . 
David Macklin also feels that, not in any coherent or orchestrated sense, but "in the 
negative sense". Conservative and Labour were "both united in the desire to denigrate 
the efforts of the Liberal/ Social Democrats.,.to see these people off".""® 
A demonstration of the importance of discipline between coalition partners, a s 
well a s another indication that had S p e n c e demanded the education chair her 
frustration at failing to achieve policy objectives might have been avoided. 
17 Another indication of the importance of factors that formal theory might have 
difficulty in incorporating. The existence of elections at other levels of local 
government appears to be a significant influence on local coalitional behaviour. Saxon 
Spence also notes that the forthcoming general election played a part in ending the 
working arrangement. 
I S While it may have been the c a s e in Devon that the two established parties were 
working together behind the scenes to minimise the influence of the S L D (see Leach & 
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However, the "mayhem and chaos", if that was indeed what the Conservatives really 
wanted, appeared some way off. Morrish and Luscombe decided to carry on as an 
Alliance minority administration without agreement with another party, and despite a 
great deal of "rates brinkmanship on the county council" (WMN. 9/2/87) this 
arrangement successfully negotiated a second budget with Labour; "we pushed them 
there and they didn't like that very much, but we did get our way" (Spence). Ted 
Pinney congratulated Spence and Morrish on "eating dirt" in public, and a leader in 
the following day's Western Morning News rather piously noted "party politics was 
the name of the game at yesterday's budget meeting until, surprise surprise, the 
Alliance and Labour decided to split their differences and join forces to fix the rate" 
(WMN. 20/2/87). 
The Alliance was governing alone, without any agreement with another party, but 
despite the inevitable uncertainty this could produce during votes, the arrangement 
appeared relatively stable. Alliance party policy was close enough on many issues to 
make agreement with Labour relatively easy, and despite the difficulties the two 
groups had come to an agreement on the budget. However, according to David 
Stanbury, the 4 months from March to July was a period of "phoney peace", while 
behind the scenes Labour and the Conservatives were forging links to topple the 
Alliance (WMN. 29/7/87). The day following Stanbury's comments in the Western 
Morning News, a successful vote of no confidence would leave Devon "leaderless", a 
situation that would prevail effectively until the next county council elections. In 
addition, it would eventually contribute to many Liberals sharing the bitterness 
already felt against the SDP by Labour. The processes leading to the vole of no 
confidence and more alleged SDP "treachery" will now be assessed in section three. 
Sect ion Three: From Breakdown to Betrayal 
As the previous section has shown, the Alliance was able to continue effectively 
running the council even after the end of the 'working arrangement' with Labour. 
David Macklin feels the council was "effectively run" by the two groups, and although 
it was more difficult after the collapse of the formal agreement (Macklin) the groups 
were still close enough together to make agreement relatively easy. As we have seen, 
they successfully agreed a budget in February. 1987. but just five months later the 
tensions between Labour and the Alliance ended any hope of future co-operation. A 
Stewart, 1988; Leach & Game, 1989), Chapter Five found no evidence of this in the 
wider study. The findings in Chapter Nine (section four) of the great influence wielded 
by the S L D in policy terms, is also evidence that. In general, if the 'unholy alliance' is 
trying to minimise S L D power, it is falling. 
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successful Conservative vote of no confidence in the Alliance minority administration 
was supported by their former allies, the Labour party. This section will chart the 
movement from the breakdown of the relationship between Labour and the Alliance, 
towards the breakdown of trust which was eventually to occur between the former 
Alliance partners. 
10.3.1. The Vote of No Confidence 
As would be expected, opinions differ as to the reasons for the collapse of the Alliance 
minority administration in July. 1987. following a Conservative motion of no 
confidence. For Saxon Spence, the reasons go back to the appointment of the education 
chair: 
"I was rung up at ten to eight one morning by a colleague, who said, 'have 
you heard what Mrs Rogers is saying on the radio, she is blaming the 
other groups, the officers, everyone but herself for the budget problems 
she [is] having', because she was in a budget crisis in education, so I rang 
up the press and [got a tape]. I listened to it and I was very affronted 
because it was a very nasty attack on the chief education officer...we were 
so incensed...there was a vendetta between the chair of the committee and 
the chief officer, she tried to get him the sack and that's the beginning and 
end of it, it was disgraceful" (Spence). 
With the support of Ted Pinney she moved a vote of no confidence in Mrs Rogers at the 
education committee meeting, which was unsuccessful, but the Alliance group felt that 
more was to follow. In the week before the council meeting, David Morrish warned 
both David Macklin and his Alliance group meeting that a vote of no confidence could be 
coming, and got his group's agreement that if a successful vote did come they would 
resign. He saw Arnold Sayers on the day of the council meeting, and challenged him as 
to: 
"whether there was any other business that he was going to bring up this 
afternoon other than that which he had told us about. I was told there was 
not...the chief executive had also sounded him out and had got nothing to 
indicate that there was anything else coming up [but] the manner in 
which the denial was given wasn't the way I expected had It been the case. 
But there was this denial right up to the last minute" (Morrish). 
When the education committee's minutes came to the council Arnold Sayers moved a 
vote of no confidence in terms Spence says she had no option but to support: 
"we were very concerned, not only about the education budget, but [also] 
social services...we kept saying it was in a mess and they wouldn't listen 
to us and our particular strength is in social services" (Spence). 
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Inevitably, there were allegations of a *pact' between Labour and Conservat ive, after 
what the press cal led "an extraordinary al l iance" against the rul ing L iberal / SDP 
Al l iance (WMN, 31/7/87). Both Saxon Spence and Arnold Sayers say this was quite 
u n t r u e : 
"I can assure you there was absolutely no pact. We d id hear on the 
grapevine that we might be supported in that vote by the Labour par ly, 
but there were no discussions beforehand as I remember it" (Sayers). 
Spence says not only was there no pact, she did not know there was going to be a vote 
of no confidence in the administration. She assumed it was going to be a vote of no-
confidence in Margaret Rogers, but the Conservative leader Sayers: 
"made it more general , a vote of no confidence in the administrat ion, but 
in fact he did it in terms which summar ised our own growing anxiet ies 
about social services and educat ion. . .how you can show it wasn' t a 
consp i racy was because we were all total ly unprepared for what 
happened" (Spence). 
To support her argument that there was no 'secret a l l iance; Spence points out that, 
perhaps surprisingly given the ser iousness of any motion of censure, not only was 
there no pre-group meeting of Labour members before the council meeting to discuss 
a vote of no confidence, but also that "it wasn't a unanimous vote on our side". David 
Mackl in also doubts if there was any "secret deal" , and whi le fvlorrish says 'it never 
surprises me to see it when the Conservatives and the Labour party get together", he 
does not seem to feel that there was any prior agreement. Harold Luscombe puts it 
down to clever politics by the Conservatives: 
"after the first 12 months, the idea that they were in opposit ion...al l of a 
sudden began to gel, and they started to get their act together. And getting 
their act together, of course, it meant that they could flex their muscles a 
little bit. They knew the relat ionship with [the Al l iance] and the Labour 
party was not good and therefore they took a chance on a vote of no 
confidence, and Saxon got on its coat tails" (Luscombe). 
There was a great deal of crit icism about Morrish's decision to resign, a decision he 
feels was unavoidable: 
"Maybe I've got an old fashioned view about polit ical convent ions but a 
vote of no confidence doesn't come up very often...l have a clear indication 
what it means, it means you have got no confidence in the people who are 
running it and you want them to step aside for somebody e lse. B u i for 
[Conservat ive and Labour] to go 'round af terwards saying that 'wel l , of 
course you should have stayed there' and. *you were really rather spoiled 
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chi ldren-by going'... l think indicates that we are deal ing with people who, 
should I say, seem to have different principles and standards In polit ics 
than I have got" ( l^orr ish). 
Spence.feels that "the daftest thing they ever did was resign, they didn't have to. they 
just took the huff" and regards Morr ish's reasons for resigning as a s ign that "he 
l ikes the high moral ground". She feels that if he had adjourned and taken notice of 
Luscombe things would have been different. Certainly, for Luscombe. it was a "very 
bad decision.., l would have put two fingers up to them and just carr ied on..irs no good 
being upset". For Harold Luscombe the resignation decision by f^orr ish was a crucial 
factor In their cont inuing relat ionship, and "from that point on we s tar ted to drift 
apart". Despite his obvious admiration for David Morr ish. Luscombe sees him as not 
hard enough at such times: 
"you're a pol i t ic ian, whi le you can have very strict mora ls in your 
personal life, when it comes to arguing pol icy.. .you've got to use every 
opportuni ty you can to get the the object ive you want.. . I f that means 
youVe got to be a bit naughty from time to time then you've got to be a bit 
naughty-.pollt ics is a hard game" (Luscombe). 
It Is impossible to imagine Morrish agreeing with such sent iments. He genuinely felt 
he had no alternative but to go."'^ and argued that the All iance now regarded Sayers as 
de facto leader of the counci l , an honour Sayers dec l ined ( W M N , 4 /8 /87) . For 
Mackl in and his of f icers, the summer months were as good a t ime as any to be 
leader less because of the relative lack of commit tee activity (WIVIN, 1/8/87). For 
the remainder of 1987, the counci l dri f ted along from meet ing to meet ing with no 
admin is t ra t ion, heading inevitably towards more prob lems when the 1988 budget 
meet ing arr ived. 
10.3.2. T h e C o l l a p s e of the A l l i a n c e 
The six months between the vote of no conf idence and the 1988 budget were 
character ised by numerous problems, in some of which (for example , a monetary 
1^ In British national politics, a successful vote of no confidence has been established 
by constitutional convention as requiring the government's resignation followed by a 
general election (as in 1979). In German national politics a successful vote of no 
confidence requires an alternative and viable government proposal (as in 1982). No 
such requirements exist at local government level, and Morrish would have been 
perfectly correct in remaining in office, given that there was no opportunity of 
dissolution, and as subsequent events demonstrate, no viable alternative 
administration. In such circumstances, Luscombe's response is probably the most 
sensible. More seriously, what this incident does demonstrate is the importance 
institutional factors (which vary from country to country) can have on coalition 
formation and maintenance. A successful coalition theory will have to be capable of 
adapting to take account of such important variables. 
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crisis in social services) off icers recommendat ions were fo l lowed. Mackl in feels that 
"uncer ta inty deve loped because there were no powerbrokers react ing wi th any 
conf idence", and Sayers remembers David Mackl in: 
"coming here on one or two occasions when the All iance had abandoned 
control , urging us to take control, because it would have meant f rom the 
off icers point of view that they would have felt that the thing was running 
coherently.. it was all very cumbersome and not very good" (Sayers) 20 
Other voices, notably David fVlorrish and Independent member fvlary Turner, also felt 
the Conservat ives, as the largest group, had a duty to take responsibi l i ty. Turner 
feel ing the counci l had become "a laughing stock" ( W M N , 8/1/88). Sayers argued 
that there was no way that they would have taken what "would only have been a form 
of nominal cont ro l " (Sayers) . Throughout this t ime accusat ions of pacts between 
l-abour and Conservative were made and denied, but Sayers' defence that "Conservative 
and Labour are trying to act in a responsible way so that the county can continue to do 
its business" (WMN, 8/1/88) was not enough to s lop the rumours. 
However , Spence had al ready ins is ted that her party wou ld not suppor t the 
Conservat ives (WEH, 4/8/87) and had called on the All iance to join in the running of 
the counci l ( W M N , 9/9/87). However, national party pol i t ics, in the shape of the 
movement towards a merger of the Liberals and SDP. were beginning to affect the 
ability of the Al l iance to deliver a coherent response to such requests. As Morr ish 
notes: 
"clearly the events that were going to lead to the break-up of the All iance 
and to the establishment of new parties and goodness knows what , were 
already in fact casting a shadow on the relationship between the SDP and 
the A l l iance" (Morr ish) . 
By the end of 1987, the 34 existing All iance members , al though still just together, 
were ef fect ively 3 fact ions, compr is ing (1) the suppor ters of the merger , wh ich 
included both Liberals and SDP members, (2) SDP members opposed to the merger, 
dubbed 'Owenites ' , and (3) Liberals, including Morr ish, opposed to merger, dubbed 
• fundamenta l i s t L ibera ls ' ( W E H , 2 8 / 1 2 / 8 7 ) . W i th in a few w e e k s of 1988 
commencing, the seven Owenites (a group which included Luscombe) pulled out of the 
Al l iance cit ing "di f ferences of opinion which could not be reconc i led" (Luscombe. 
W M N , 23/1/88). Morr ish, still the leader of the Al l iance despite his opposi t ion to a 
20 Another indication that, despite the greater power officers may have had without 
a coherent political response, good officers may be more concerned with ensuring 
effective and efficient government. 
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merger supported by the majority of his members , remarked, "we go our separate 
ways with good fr iendship" (WMN, 23/1/88) 21 The revised party posit ions on the 
85 -member counc i l were : Conservat ives 38 , A l l iance 27 . Labour 10, S D P 7. 
Independent 3, with one of those Independents short ly to jo in the Tor ies ( W E H , 
2 3 / 1 / 8 8 ) . 
10 .3 .3 . B u d g e t B e t r a y a l 
Luscombe's decis ion to go it alone preceded the making of the annual budget In 
January/ February, 1988. Some of the dif ferences of opinion ci ted by Luscombe for 
leaving the Alliance were budgetary and the SDP produced their own budget, as did the 
other 3 party groups. I^acklin recalls that time as: 
"pol i t ical ly ext raordinar i ly di f f icul t [with] corr idor d iscuss ions [go ing] 
on to produce some compromises.. the treasurer was doing most of the 
draft ing.. .you hoped there would be one of the budgets that wou ld be 
ca r r i ed " (IVIacklin). 
However, one by one, all of the four budgets were voted down. Luscombe recalls the 
Labour, All iance and SDP group leaders and their secretaries getting together "to see 
If there was any common ground", but there was not enough to reach agreement. Then 
Luscombe received a "complete surprise": 
"Arnold Sayers and Ted Pinney came and said, 'is there any chance we 
might come and talk to you?'...l was absolutely amazed. I met them, said 
'these are our proposals, take them or leave them'...the amazing thing was 
how easy the Tories caved in...there was no common g round at a l l " 
( Luscombe) . 
Unsurpr is ingly, the Conservat ives remember being rather c loser in genera l terms 
than Luscombe remembers. Arnold Sayers recollects that the council had: 
"reached a stalemate...and my pragmatic approach was that the SDP budget 
was closest to ours and, therefore, we ought to get our heads together...and 
I shall never forget, however many, six of us, gett ing together in a smal l , 
not part icularly smoke-f i l led room...on our side it was.. .mysel f . Graham 
Andrews, [who] was spokesperson on the finance commit tee on our side, 
and there was Harold Luscombe from the SDP and David Stanbury [SDPJ 
whom I always got on with very wel l , and then the treasurer came In with 
his adding machine, purely to make sure that the figures matched. It's pot 
21 The simultaneous break-up and merger of the Alliance demonstrates most 
graphically the impact of external political forces beyond the control of local actors 
(see Pridham. 1987; Mellors. 1989). The particular nature of Devon's response, with 
a longer tradition of Liberal politics than most areas of the country, and an important 
position in the SDP's short history, meant such forces were even more turbulent 
there than in other regions. 
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good government, because you are trying to thrash out a compromise, and 
I was very conscious of the fact that there were people hanging around 
outside and we had to come to a very quick compromise. [It took] inside of 
an hour [to come to an agreement]" (Sayers). 
Luscombe recalls that: 
"In a very short period of t ime Arnold Sayers said...'if you're prepared to 
do a little bit of manipulat ing'. . . i t was very insignif icant amoun ts , we 
were talking about one hundred, or whatever, two hundred thousand.. .we 
said 'okay'. We didn't cut any money off our budget or increase it...we just 
swapped the headings" (Luscombe). 
In the "most bitter and acr imonious budget debate seen In the main chamber for 
years" (WMN, 19/2/88), Harold Luscombe moved the "compromise dea l " as an SDP 
budget with Conservative support. In fairness to the Conservat ives, and in response to 
Luscombe's memory that nothing was cut off his original proposals, the agreed rate 
increase was 11.27 percent as against the SDP's original proposal of 11.75 percent 
( W M N , 18/2/88 and 19/2/88) so the Conservat ives may have ach ieved more than 
Luscombe credits. The Western Evening Herald listed a number of county projects it 
says the SDP "sacri f iced...by throwing in their lot with the Conservat ives" ( W E H . 
19/2/88). Even so, Sayers conceded that some Tories were unhappy with the deal 
( W M N . 19/2/88). The Al l iance and Labour were certainly upset, a l though Spence 
thought the SDP "were being very clever...using their new role as powerbrokers" . 
The SDP's movement across the political spectrum inevitably brought renewed calls 
of t reachery, and Luscombe recalls being cal led "a traitor and a Tory" by other 
counc i l lo rs . David Morr ish told the SDP counci l lors , "you have abandoned the 
pr inciples on which you were e lected" (WEH, 19/2/88). However, Luscombe feels 
that he did try to reach agreement with Labour and the remains of the Al l iance, but 
when Saxon Spence's belief that "you can't do anything without me" gave way to the 
real isat ion that they cou ld , because the Tories "would support you if your pol ic ies 
were r ight" (Luscombe) , his pragmat ism t r iumphed. The bit terness which he feels 
had resurfaced between the SDP and the Labour party may have hardened Luscombe's 
resolve fur ther.22 
22 Throughout this study, the power of the middle party has been demonstrated. What 
the SDP's ability to forge alliances with all three parties on the council may also show 
is the power of a centre party with an 'ambiguous* ideological position, even in an 
effective 'four-party system' like Devon. The wide ranging responses of experts to 
Castles & Mair's (1984) survey concerning the ideological position of the SDP (see 
Chapter Nine, section 9.2.1.) may be evidence not of the ignorance of respondents, but 
of the SDP's particular ideological mixture of, crudely speaking, to the left on social 
issues and to the right on economic issues (see Owen, 1986). 
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From that moment , Devon dr i f ted " rudder less" , awai t ing what was seen as the 
Inevitable return of the traditional rulers. The urgings of Luscombe and David Owen 
for the ex-Al l iance partners to reach an accord to prevent a "Tory landsl ide" in the 
for thcoming county council elect ions, were rejected by Morr ish as "point less" g iven 
the SDP's vote with the Conservat ives (WEH, 21/11/88) , and fo l lowing merger 
between the Liberals and 'non-Owenite ' SDP counci l lors, Morr ish and two LIberaJs 
resigned from the new party. The 'Al l iance' was over, and the Social and Liberal 
Democrats (later renamed the Liberal Democrats) rose from the ashes. 
What the Western Morning News called the " impossible dream" was soon to be over, 
as "rel iable sources" in formed the paper 's reporter that the Conserva t ives had 
already selected their chairpersons in anticipation of returning to power in the May 
elect ions ( W M N , 7/4/89). Sect ion four of this chapter briefly cons iders that f inal 
year . 
S e c t i o n F o u r : T h e A f t e r m a t h 
This f inal sect ion wil l examine the role of counci l of f icers in the decis ion making 
process during the final year or so, and then briefly assess the impressions the actors 
Involved now have about the period between 1985-89, when the process of decision 
making was no longer a formality and debate mattered. 
10.4.1. T h e P o w e r of O f f i c e r s 
Fol lowing the Conservat ive/ SDP budget of February 1988, for the remainder of the 
per iod of hungness the council lacked polit ical leadership. There were no permanent 
chairs, and some committee meetings were abandoned because no one would take the 
chair. Urgent business was dealt with by council officers "after discussion with group 
leaders" ( W M N , 31/3/88) , and the fol lowing year 's budget decis ions were off icer-
led. A senior official was quoted as saying "nobody has the courage to take unpopular 
dec is ions" (WMN, 4/3/88), whi le another un-named off icer remarked : 
"having no leadership means enormous problems. Because there is no 
corporate dr ive within the part ies, they are breaking down into purely 
tr ibal fact ions. Tr ibal ism is a good descr ipt ion of what is go ing o n " 
( W M N . 4 / 3 / 8 8 ) . 
This fact ional ism may be one reason for the Liberal counci l lor John Walker 's claim 
that in the last 15 months of Devon's period of hungness. power was "handed over to 
the off icers" (WEH, 21/8/89). The opinions of the main actors regarding that claim 
are contrary. 
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Arno ld Sayers is in no doubt that Walker 's asser t ion is t rue, but fee ls It is 
understandable: 
"I think undoubtedly the officers had to assume more power, because the 
governmenta l machine had to gr ind on and th ings had to be done . 
Inevitably, [officers] had to do things that in normal c i rcumstances they 
wou ld have put to the leader of the counci l or the cha i rman of the 
commi t tee" (Sayers) . 
Harold Luscombe.agrees with Sayers, but is more forthright, bel ieving that: 
"the off icers were more or less running the show. They were decid ing 
what was going on the agendas. It was fairly obv ious It was being 
orchestrated...off icers were al lowed to get on with it" (Luscombe). 
However , Dav id Morr ish , who "couldn' t have w ished for bet ter o f f i ce r /member 
relat ionships" throughout the 4 years of life in the balance, disagrees with Sayers and 
Luscombe: 
"At the end of the day, what was decided, of course, was decided by the 
elected members whatever the officers might want to do. What I think was 
lost was the momentum of bringing in new init iatives. I don't think power 
shi f ted to the off icers, I just think power dra ined a bit" (Morr ish). 
Like fVlorrish. Saxon Spence has "a more favourable view than some of my col leagues" 
about the role of off icers in policy making during that t ime: 
"I think if you've got good off icers they play a major part in your affairs, 
and the one characterist ic of Devon is that we have never appointed 
polit ical off icers. We have always had all part ies sitting on appointments 
and we will disagree or agree across parties" (Spence). 
For Spence, polit icans should do the politics and officers should serve them. Spence's 
comments concerning good officers are demonstrated by the respect the group leaders 
had for their chief execut ive, a respect he returned. Before the end of 1988. David 
f^acklin had retired, and he was not in position for the final ten months of hungness. 
However , he sti l l ta lks knowledgeably about the idea that o f f icers were then 
control l ing the counci l , and the final authoritative word on this must be his: 
"wel l , I wasn't there, but I think that there Is a great myth about the 
officers running the council...in a sense it always happens because we are 
fu l l - t ime.. .and so the off icer 's job is to provide leadership. . . I actual ly 
think it ought to be like that, that you employ professional people to know 
about things who put up proposals and perhaps alternative proposals and 
make a decision. If you are in a position where you are not going to get a 
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decision at all...you should never just say, 'the commit tee must decide' , 
you should say, 'here are the alternatives and I think you should do this 
and the best chief officers always do. And in a sense, I think they always 
should have been running the counci l , but the members make the decision. 
The fact that members are indecisive means that the off icer 's advice is 
more likely to be taken, because you have got to make a decision and there 
is one in front of you" (Mackl in). 
The pol i t icans are in d isagreement about the role of of f icers dur ing that per iod. 
However, it is inevitable that local professionals are involved in decision making, and 
Mackl in 's analysis perfect ly sums up the c lassical v iew of the of f icer-counci l lor 
re lat ionship, whi le taking into account the problems that a lack of pol i t ical control 
wil l bring to that relat ionship.23 
10.4.2. F o u r Y e a r s Of . . . .? 
Finally, how do the actors concerned look back now on those 4 years? Inevitably, 
whi le the parties who had their only taste of power at county level dur ing that t ime 
are sad those days are gone, the Conservative tradit ional rulers exhibit relief that it 
is all over.24 Arnold Sayers is unequivocal: 
"I actually hated it, because you never knew where you were going and 
everything was open to question of one sort and another...! don't think it 
was good government... [ i t was] incompetence and extravagance.. .people 
thought the county council was a shambles" (Sayers). 
However, Sayers' crit icism that "everything was open to quest ion" would undoubtedly 
be seen by David Morrish as a positive rather than a negative characterist ic of that 
per iod . For Morr ish, "the commit tees became more interest ing and more exci t ing, 
deba te mat te red , people l is tened to it. Everyth ing is total ly pred ic tab le now" 
(Morr ish) . Luscombe also agrees that "it was very excit ing... i t was a very good 
23This range of responses to the question of officer influence reflects the diversity 
of opinion already discussed concerning the officer-councillor relationship in hung 
councils (see Chapter Eight, section 8.3.2.). Moss (1983, p.9) notes the possiblities 
hungness gives to officers "to manipulate the political process and effectively 
exercise control", while on the other hand, Blowers sees that officers may become 
reluctant to venture proposals (Blowers, 1987, p.45). The responses of officers does 
not suggest that officers enjoy a lack of political leadership. 
2^ The responses of Devon's leaders support the findings in Chapter Eight concerning 
attitudes to the policy process (see for example, section 8.1.2., hypothesis 5.3). 
Former rulers were overwhelmingly against the new decision making processes, 
while former opposition parties were largely in favour. 
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pe r i od " (Luscombe) . Unsurpr is ing ly , Saxon Spence agrees wi th Mor r i sh and 
Luscombe: 
"it was great fun. I enjoyed it, I mean it is the concern that majori ty 
part ies have that the...small minority can actually cal l the tune, and it is 
quite excit ing but you try and use it to achieve your polit ical pol icies and 
that's what we d id" (Spence) 
Even for those who enjoyed the exper ience, not everything was posit ive about that 
t ime. For Spence, one negative factor was that: 
"what you don't get as a minority group is any credit, as you realise when 
you talk to everyone. We were seen as the people who ruined everything 
for the Al l iance, or on the Tory side al lowed to ruin everything, but we 
d id our best. . . l certainly wouldn' t mind [going back] to be ing hung" 
(Spence) . 
The final words go to David Morrish. and they give some hint as to what an exciting 
t ime it must have been for the polit lcans involved: 
'nobody could give us a textbook as to how to run a balanced counci l ; we 
were writing it ourselves as we went along". 
The conclusion of the ' textbook' came on May 4th , 1989, when the Conservat ives, 
under the new leadership of Ted PInney (replacing the ret ir ing Arno ld Sayers) , 
easily won back control of Devon. The newly formed Social and Liberal Democrats lost 
16 seats, and were left with only 11 council lors. Only 2 SDP counci l lors, one of them 
Harold Luscombe, retained their seats. Still standing as a Liberal, David Morrish also 
retained his seat, as did Labour leader Saxon Spence. 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
Throughout this case study, the importance of personal relat ionships to forming and 
maintaining political coalit ions has been apparent. It is also clear that both off ice and 
pol icy considerat ions are important, and that the fai lure to del iver crucia l pol icy 
objectives will lead to pressure to break up an otherwise successful coal i t ion. 
The lure of achieving policy pay-offs to coalit ion formation is apparent in Devon. Not 
even having to deal with a party they regarded as 'traitors' was enough to prevent 
Labour from reaching agreement. However, the understandable wish to be a part of 
the pol icy process after years of opposi t ion may have cont r ibu ted to the later 
problems of maintaining the coalit ion. Perhaps a more reflective approach would have 
avo ided the mistakes that were made in al locat ing commi t tee chai rs . Wi th more 
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poli t ical know-how, the appointment of a novice to the most crucial chair, both in 
budgetary importance and in terms of the coalit ion's cohes ion, would not have been 
made. In addi t ion, a dif ferent leader than David Morr ish might have been more 
ruthless when it became clear that some appointments were unsatisfactory. Not only 
that, wi th more determinat ion Labour could probably have at ta ined the educat ion 
chair. If they had done, the failure of the All iance to tackle the grammar school issue, 
and the Inevitable frustration of that failure combined with an unsympathet ic chair, 
might welt have been avoided. 
The potential importance of holding off ice to achieving policy pay-of fs , noted in the 
empir ical chapters , is apparent here. However, some of the behaviour pat terns in 
D e v o n , for examp le , the exc lus ion of t rad i t ional ru lers f rom Init ial coa l i t ion 
format ion, have not been demonstrated in the larger sample of hung counci ls , which 
I l lustrates the importance of not reading too much into the f indings of descr ipt ive 
studies with few cases. However, the reverse is that a deeper study of a hung council 
l ike this demonst ra tes both the complexi ty of the re lat ionships, and the di f ferent 
ways equally honourable people will interpret the same events. 
The potent ial importance of institutional structures and convent ions is Indicated in 
this case study in a number of ways. Morrish's decision to resign after the vote of no 
conf idence was const i tut ional ly unnecessary , and most pol i t icans (and certainly 
Spence and Luscombe) would have acted differently. However, other systems, with 
di f ferent inst i tut ional requirements, would have given pol i t ic ians like Spence and 
Luscombe no opportunity to remain in power. David Morr ish wou ld probably have 
acted the same whatever the convent ions, a demonstrat ion that character is ing all 
pol i t icans as "off ice-dr iven" is inaccurate. If that had been the case, Morr ish would 
surely have held on to the rewards of off ice; Morrish's whole approach stamps him as 
a "po l icy-pursu ing" pol i t ican. Other inst i tut ional factors have been h igh l ighted in 
this chapter, most notably the importance of struture to control . The abandonment of 
the one-party chairman's commit tee, and the decision not to replace it wi th a more 
open 'adminis t rat ion ' commi t tee, d id not result in greater openness , as Morr ish 
admi ts . Chief execut ive David Mackl in felt that this dec is ion resu l ted in the 
bureaucracy's knowledge of what was going on decl in ing, which suggests that officer 
power is partly dependent on organisat ional structures, and might actually diminish 
in hung councils without such coordinating committees.. 
Throughout this thesis, it has been noted that factors beyond the scope of a large-scale 
questionnaire based exercise will be influences on coalit ional behaviour. This chapter 
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has h igh l ighted a number of those areas, especia l ly those involv ing persona l 
relat ions. The personal and geographical c loseness between Spence and Morr ish 
contr ibuted to the format ion of the work ing ar rangement . Var iables not normal ly 
ment ioned have been seen to be inf luential; for example, even the locat ion of the 
council off ices has been convincingly cited as a factor in coalit ion format ion. Once the 
init ial coal i t ion had fo rmed, a better relat ionship between certain crucial actors in 
the coalit ion could have saved the working arrangement, and may have prevented the 
vote of no conf idence. The hostil ity between the SDP and Labour, a feel ing that 
probably ran much deeper in Devon because of David Owen, also played a part in the 
polit ics of that per iod. 
However, despite all the undoubted insights into life in a hung council this chapter has 
g iven, this analysis has demonstrated the problems of trying to ascribe ' reasons' for 
the polit ical behaviour of the actors involved. For example, was the col lapse of the 
working arrangement because of the All iance's failure to del iver its policy promises, 
or was it because of the forthcoming elections? Was the vote of no conf idence mainly 
inspired by Mrs Rogers ' a l leged treatment of her o f f icers , because Labour and 
Conservat ive had a vested interest in demonstrat ing the lack of ability of the All iance 
part ies, or because the Conservat ives wished to create the condit ions favourable for 
their return to power? What were the SDP's motives in agreeing a budget with the 
Conservat ives, when an exper ienced polit ician like Luscombe must have realised it 
wou ld effectively mean the end of any hope of future co-operat ion with part ies the 
SDP's electoral future probably depended upon? 
The real isat ion that this sort of ind iv idual study sti l l leaves many impor tant 
quest ions unanswered reminds the observer of the complexity of polit ical behaviour. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it also reminds one of the value of formal theory. What this 
study indicates is that knowledge of the peculiarit ies of a part icular polit ical system 
and the personal i t ies involved may be essential to an understanding of strategies 
pursued by the actors involved. This does not mean that an at tempt at genera l 
explanations is pointless; it means that general explanations will need to be modif ied 
by knowledge of the system involved. However, even such knowledge is incapable of 
explaining all the motives and tactics of polit ical actors. Thanks to formal theorists, 
we know the impor tance of of f ice and pol icy , and fo rmal theory p rov ides a 
fundamental core from which more accurate assessments of political behaviour can be 
made. 
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C H A P T E R E L E V E N 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
This study has been a continuation of Laver & Schofield's (1990) effort to br idge the 
gap between the different approaches to coali t ion studies. Throughout , the 'mult i -
method approach' has enabled a number of different perspectives to be util ised in the 
task of understanding what happens when a local council becomes hung. The analysis 
has had no particular theoretical or methodological axe to gr ind; its main purpose 
has been to understand the polit ics of hung counci ls . The results detai led in this 
thesis show that the approach has succeeded in throwing new light on the phenomenon 
of Engl ish hung local governments . The f indings have suppor ted some prev ious 
supposit ions, and confounded others, in the areas of both coalit ion studies and local 
government studies. 
A great many areas have been covered in this examination of 'life in the balance', but 
It is not proposed to re-address all the findings here."" This conclusion wil l assess 
the general f indings of this thesis in three particular areas. First, we scrutinise the 
effects of hungness on the location of power, and assess attitudes to the new process of 
decision making. Second, the strategies of the major polit ical part ies.are examined. 
Finally, the consequences of some of our f indings for the possible construct ion of a 
formal theory applicable to local government coalit ions are assessed. 
T h e E f f e c t s of H u n g n e s s o n the Power o f Loca l A c t o r s 
One of the most important quest ions that this research has asked is. "where does 
power lie in hung counci ls?" Previous wri ters, relying largely on evidence from a 
smal l number of hung local author i t ies, have posi ted that party el i tes may lose 
power to the body of council lors as a whole and that off icers can assume a more 
inf luential role as 'power-brokers ' . However, this research Is the first large scale 
explorat ion of the location of power inside hung counci ls , and can of fer a more 
authoritative v iew than those previously advanced .2 
1 The conclusions at the end of each of the empirical chapters (Chapters Four to Nine 
inclusive) go into considerable detail on the results of testing the many hypotheses 
generated during this study, and it is not proposed to go over much the same ground as 
those conclusions here. For specific conclusions in each of the areas examined by the main 
body of this work, the reader is referred to the relevant chapters. 
2 The findings have been published in Temple (1991). 
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It is very clear that the location of inf luence shifts considerably when a counci l 
becomes hung. The findings from the control group of non-hung counci ls support the 
widely held v iew that a 'joint elite' of leading counci l lors and of f icers control the 
d i rect ion of pol icy in Engl ish local government , with the e lec ted political elite 
supreme in the policy process when one party has an overall majority. However, the 
dist r ibut ion of inf luence is radically di f ferent when a counci l is hung , with both 
pol i t ic ians and bureaucrats regarding commit tees as the most inf luent ial bodies. 
From their dominant posit ion in non-hung counci ls, elected party el i tes become only 
the fourth most powerful body of influence in hung counci ls. Whether such a loss of 
power means that 'backbench' council lors gain power is more difficult to decide, but 
the greater influence ascribed to the full council meeting and the commit tees suggest 
that the power of the individual council lor is i nc reased . 
The commi t tees , relatively unimportant as arenas of po l icy-making in non-hung 
counci ls, become the new focus of the decision making process. This is contrary to 
the f indings of many previous observers (for example , B lowers. 1987, Mel lors , 
1983), who have argued that it is the full council which gains power at the expense 
of the commit tees. While the full council meeting also assumes new signif icance, it is 
in committee that both chief executives and party leaders see power as concentrated. 
The vast majority of institutional changes introduced in hung counci ls concern the 
compos i t ion of commi t tees, with innovat ions such as the abol i t ion of ex officio 
m e m b e r s h i p , the in t roduc t ion of p ropor t iona l i t y for c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s h i p , 
rotating chai rmanships, and substi tute member schemes, all indicat ing the central 
role of committees In the conduct of local authority business. 
The responses of pol i t ical actors concerning their inf luence over speci f ic pol icy 
areas also indicates a more diffuse form of decision mak ing. It is clear that many 
more feel inf luent ial in hung counci ls than in non-hung counc i ls . Th is greater 
influence extends to the process of budget making, and the contention that there is a 
more open and consensual form of decision making in hung counci ls appears to be 
suppor ted by this research . For many local pol i t ical ac tors , deba te b e c o m e s 
impor tant for the first t ime in their pol i t ical exper ience . Commi t tee dec is ions 
become uncertain, and the full council meeting achieves a new importance when votes 
can no longer be taken for granted. As the responses of Devon's party leaders 
indicates, leading counci l lors become unsure of just wh ich way their t roops wil l 
vote. All this appears to support the contention that backbencher council lors become 
more inf luent ia l . 
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The Increased influence often attributed to off icers when a counci l becomes hung Is 
less apparent than the loss of power of the elected polit ical el ite. That sa id, off icers 
wi l l largely cont ro l the flow of in format ion to commi t tees , and the premier 
importance of committees in hung councils may indicate a policy process dominated 
by off icers. However, the general enthusiasm displayed by local poli t icians towards 
the new style of decision making does not indicate a policy process dominated by 
off icers. Most hung counci ls have introduced improvements to the access polit icians 
get to chief off icers, which suggests that the loss of power by the former polit ical 
elite is at least partly offset by the greater access all polit icians get to chief off icers. 
The example of Devon County Counci l , where the previous unoff icial 'cabinet* was 
d isbanded upon the arrival of hungness in 1985, also offers an indication that officer 
power might actual ly decrease in hung counci ls . Commi t tee structures general ly 
change to reflect the more open process of decision making, and the previous close 
re lat ionship be tween the 'joint el i te' can d isappear , with of f icers no longer as 
closely involved in day to day policy mak ing. Conversely , the f inal 15 months of 
hungness in Devon (before the 1989 elect ion re turned overa l l cont ro l to the 
Conservat ives) i l lustrates the possibi l i ty that, when there is no administ rat ion in 
place, decision making power could pass over to the off icers. 
However, in the majority of hung counci ls, decision making becomes closer to the 
'of f ic ial ' descr ipt ion of local democracy, with the full counci l also assuming new 
Importance and officers moving closer to their formal roles as servants of the whole 
counc i l . Whi le many chief execut ives see the new processes unfavourab ly , the 
majori ty are either favourably inclined or see no dif ference in either the quali ty of 
decision making or the quality of the policies which emerge from the new structures. 
Given the upheaval hungness brings to the smooth routine establ ished by officers and 
the previous political elite, such responses are surprising. The extra demands placed 
upon off icers are considerable at t imes; for example, being required to produce three 
or four separate budgets , and then co-ordinat ing the inevitable compromises , is 
extremely t ime-consuming. The response of political actors to the changes hungness 
br ings is largely favourable, with the except ion of those who formerly ruled a lone. 
However, in long term hung counci ls, even tradit ional rulers become more likely to 
see virtue in the processes of consensual decision making. 
Overal l , the responses of actors to this research suggest that the dominant view of 
coal i t ion pol i t ics in Bri t ish pol i t ical cul ture as leading to uncer ta in ty , loss of 
pr inc ip les, and instabil ity needs to be modi f ied, if not completely changed. Hung 
counc i ls can work extremely eff iciently in Eng land, even wi thout a tradi t ion of 
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coal i t ion or minority administrat ions. However, not all actors support this v iew. As 
sugges ted above, tradit ional rulers (predominant ly Conservat ives) are general ly 
opposed to the new decision making structures. Therefore, the polit ical part ies wil l 
have di f ferent v iews of coal i t ion pol i t ics, wh ich wi l l af fect the s t ra teg ies they 
favour . 
T h e T a c t i c s o f t h e P o l i t i c a l Pa r t i es 
Th is study indicates that the four major party g roups at local level (Labour , 
Conserva t ives , SLD, and Independents) wil l adopt d i f ferent s t rategies in hung 
counci ls . This is partly due to the v iews of national part ies. The two major part ies 
are obsessed by the need to win a majority at national level, and effective coali t ion 
polit ics at the local level may set an unwelcome precedent. Indeed, in support of the 
idea that national views will prevail, there is a distinct tendency for both Labour and 
Conservat ive groups to form minority administrat ions, and Labour is less involved 
in coalit ions than any of the other three groups. However, as Devon shows, national 
party views are capable of being ignored if local needs demand it. 
Whi le it might be accurate to say that the political strategies adopted will depend on 
local factors, reducing all differences to local factors is to fall into the same trap as 
the 'mult i-dimensional ' approach. To have some value in comparat ive terms, we need 
to establish some general 'truths'. For example, connectedness on an ideological scale 
has been shown to be an important factor in the format ion of durab le cabinet 
coalit ions in most western European democracies, and the same constraints appear to 
apply in English local government. 
The construct ion of a unidimensional policy scale (see Chapter Nine, sect ion two) 
was beset by a number of diff icult ies, but it did provide some evidence that, to a 
large extent, local party strategies appear to be dictated by the ideological posit ion of 
the part ies. When majori ty coalition administrat ions are formed, it is ideological 
connectedness rather than the closest party in policy terms that matters. However, 
an examinat ion of single party minority administrat ions reveals that it is the party 
closest to the single ruling party in policy terms which is almost a lways the most 
inf luential opposi t ion group when key decisions have to be made. When minority 
administrat ions form, the closest party on the policy scale to the single ruling party 
displays greater influence on the crucial budgetary decisions that have to be made 
than other opposit ion parties. The differences are very apparent.^ 
3 See Chapter Nine, Section Four. 
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After the construction of the policy scale, an examination of policy pay-offs indicated 
the powerful posit ion of the SLD, especially in three-party systems. Given its policy 
posit ion in the middle of the two major part ies, the SLD is in the ideal posi t ion, and 
all the evidence indicates that SLD groups take full advantage of their opportunit ies. 
In the great majority of three-party systems, the SLD is either the rul ing minority 
par ty , a member of a winning coal i t ion, or the most inf luent ial opposi t ion party 
where a minor i ty admin is t ra t ion ru les. A genera l hypothes is of greater SLD 
inf luence in three-party systems (where the part ies are Conservat ive. Labour, and 
SLD) cou ld be proposed; the support ing evidence is overwhe lming. The apparent 
re la t ionsh ip be tween pol icy c loseness and budge ta ry in f luence in minor i ty 
administrations gives the centre party an advantage, and the SLD's influence over the 
budget is considerable. It is more likely to achieve its budgetary aims than any of the 
other party groups.'* 
The SLD is not favourably disposed towards any particular party. Whether payoffs 
are commit tee chairs or budgetary concessions, the party will deal with any of the 
other groups, al though its deal ings with Independents are less common than its 
agreements with Labour or Conservat ive.^ The wil l ingness of SLD parties to make 
deals with all other party groups has led to frequent accusat ions of 'opportunism' 
(see Blowers, 1987, p.42). Such accusat ions, usually made against smal l SLD 
groups at local level, receives some support from the ev idence of this research. 
Smal l and pivotal SLD groups appear to be a contr ibutory factor to administrat ive 
Instabi l i ty, with the SLD apparent ly wi l l ing to swi tch suppor t in order to ga in 
maximum polit ical advantage. On the other hand, when a large SLD group forms a 
minority administrat ion, such governments are very durable. 
The stability of SLD minority administrations may be connected to the presence of 
smal l and pivotal Labour groups. It seems that such groups, too small to govern 
effectively as a minority administrat ion, have little choice but to support the SLD if 
they wish to have some policy influence. Ideological proximity has been shown to be 
important to the format ion of coali t ion administrat ions, and pol icy c loseness has 
been shown to be important to achieving policy payoffs from a ruling minority party. 
This study has indicated that Labour's ideological posi t ion, out on the left of the 
4 As Mellors (1989, p. 107) also demonstrates. 
5 Although a number of multi-party coalitions involved both SLD/Alliance groups and 
Independents, there was only a single case of an Alliance/Independent coalition in the 
universe of 121 administrations. 
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political spectrum, means It has little choice of partner. In the majority of c a s e s , 
Labour's only ideological neighbour is the S L D . 
There are a few c a s e s where Labour has reached agreement in a two-party coalition 
with Conservative or Independent groups, but such c a s e s are rare.^ None of the other 
groups is as constrained as Labour in its choice of partner. The evidence suggests 
that, in the initial stages of hungness, Labour groups will shy away from agreements 
with other parties, but that continued exclusion from power will force Labour to 
modify this strategy. However, the Labour party is probably the most disadvantaged 
of the three major parties when it comes to achieving its policy goals in hung 
councils. If a local Labour group wants a share of power, it is virtually forced to deal 
with the S L D . 
Despite the Conservative position on the far right of the ideological spectrum, the 
party usually has two potential partners to choose from, and the evidence suggests It 
will form coalitions with either Independent or S L D groups. The general c loseness of 
Conservat ives and Independents is indicated by the longevity of Conservative/ 
Independent coalitions, which last longer than any other type of government. 
Conservative involvement in hung councils is considerable, and when all 121 
administrations which formed during the lifetime of hungness are examined, it is the 
Conservatives who have been involved in more administrations than any other party 
group. This is partly explained by the large number of councils where they formerly 
ruled, and their attempts to continue ruling alone after the arrival of hungness. 
Although some of these minority administrations lasted a considerable amount of 
time, this attempt to rule alone appears to have meant that Independent groups were 
largely excluded from power during the early stages of hungness. The increase in 
Independent involvement is explained by Conservative willingness to deal with 
Independent groups, and all the two-party coalitions Independents were currently 
involved in were with a Conservat ive group. While this implies (probably 
correctly) that most Independent groups are close ideologically to Conservatives, the 
involvement of Independents with both Labour and the S L D Is a warning that 
Independents cannot be automatically treated as *closet Conservatives'. 
Before addressing the final part of these conclusions, some general points about the 
administrations which form must be made. Previous research into hung councils has 
^ There are two c a s e s where Labour formed a coalition with just the Conservat ives, and 
one Labour/ Independent administration, although there may be l e s s overt c a s e s of co-
operation between Labour and either Conservatives or Independents. 
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usually noted that administrations tend to be informal and single party7 Both of 
those conclusions have been challenged, with majority coalitions (albeit, generally 
informally constituted) now the most common form of administration. Whether this 
indicates a learning process is debatable, as long term hung councils are less likely 
to generate coalition administrations than short term hung councils. Where minority 
administrations do form, they are overwhelmingly formal arrangements. The high 
number of minority administrations which are formally constituted may help to 
explain their greater durability; they are the longest lasting of all types of 
administration in hung councils. In the minority administrations in councils where 
we can place the parties on an ideological scale, policy pay-offs to the nearest party 
on the scale help to explain such longevity. 
In fact, c loseness in policy terms seems to be a greater influence on administrative 
duration than either ideological connectedness or coalition s i ze . However, 
arithmetical factors are clearly important. When one party is close to an overall 
majority it tends to form a minority administration, and, despite the c loseness to a 
majority, such administrations tend to be short-lived. Conversely, when no party Is 
close to a majority, coalition administrations are the norm, and such coalitions tend 
to last longer than the average. Formal coalition theorists would not be surprised by 
such findings, which are easily explained (see the conclusions to Chapters Four and 
Six) . However, a number of the findings of this research would have specific 
consequences for a successful theory of local coalition formation, and the final task of 
this thesis is to address those issues. 
S o m e C o n s e q u e n c e s for a Theory of Loca l Coal i t ions 
Although this study has not been intended as an attempt to formulate a theory of local 
coalitions, many of its findings could have consequences for such an endeavour. The 
difficulty of including particular local factors in a formal theory is apparent, and 
whether the construction of a specific theory of English local government coalition 
formation Is a useful task is open to debate.^ Certainly, the construction of a general 
theory of local coalitions, capable of explaining local coalitional behaviour in a 
variety of sub-national systems, is highly problematic. For Laver: 
7 For example. Laver. Railings, & Thrasher (1987), Leach & Stewart (1988), and Mellors 
( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
® We must assume that local parties generally act in a cohesive manner, and have specific 
and definable goals; nothing in this research has suggested those assumptions are too far-
fetched. 
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"it seems unlikely that theories of local coalitional behaviour will develop 
In the image of theories of national coalitional behaviour. The single 
biggest reason for this ... is that national politics in any given system 
provides a range of particular constraints on local politics. T h e s e 
constraints force us, from a theoretical as well as an empirical point of 
view, to tailor each analysis to a specific system and militate against the 
development of general theories of local coalitional behaviour" (Laver, 
1989. p,31). 
However, it must be the case that such constraints have repercussions for any 
general theory of coalitional behaviour. The different constitutional rules and 
conventions practised by different national political systems surely militate against 
a general theory of coalitions in national legislatures, in much the same way as Laver 
argues the different constraints placed by national legislatures on local governments 
conflict with the notion of a general explanation of local coalitions. Despite this, 
Laver does not argue against attempting to produce a general theory of coalitional 
behaviour from "the universe of national governments in post-war Europe" (see 
Laver , 1989, pp. 16-17). Whatever the capability of achieving a general 
explanation, this study is solely concerned with English local government, and any 
attempt to build a model of the political processes in English hung councils will need 
to consider the following points. 
At the very heart of local coalition studies, there are a number of definitional 
problems which ideally need to be addressed. Comparison between studies is 
hampered by the different ways writers approach key definitions, a difficulty this 
study has often noted.^ In any general explanation of English hung councils, it Is 
important for comparative purposes that a common definition is found for crucial 
terms and concepts such as "coalition", "administration", "formality", and 
"duration". Deciding when a 'formal coalition administration* is in place, and just as 
important when it has terminated, is obviously dependent on the criteria adopted by 
the writer(s) in question. As already noted, the findings of this research on the 
increasing prevalence of 'coalition administrations', for example, may be partly an 
artefact of the definitions adopted. Such a caveat applies to much research, but a 
common definition of what constitutes a 'coalition administration' would enable a 
more accurate historical perspective to be taken. 
Given the relatively small world of writers on hung English councils, it does not 
appear beyond the bounds of possibility for some agreement on common definitions to 
^ Studies of national coalitions are just as hampered by the problem of contrasting 
definitions of key variables such as government termination, as previous chapters of this 
thesis have demonstrated. 
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be reached among researchers. Such an agreennent does not prevent researchers from 
adopting their own criteria, but it would lead to a core of studies which are truly 
comparable, an invaluable aid for future research. It would also provide newcomers 
to the field with a ready made source of definitions drawn by experienced observers 
of hung councils. It is unlikely that new researchers would Ignore such a source, 
thus perpetuating a series of comparable studies. However, it is probably unrealistic 
to believe that such problems can be clarified easily. Researchers will define their 
terms in the light of their specific requirements, and may be reluctant to accept a 
common definition. That said, it is difficult to believe such a basic problem Is 
insurmountable. 
An important set of factors that a theory of English local government coalitions needs 
to take into account are institutional. To begin with, most theories assume the 
existence of a central government 'cabinet' where ministerial office payoffs, the 
reward for participation in a winning coalition, can be easily observed. While such a 
body is common in non-hung councils, its existence is unofficial, and all the 
available evidence suggests that it does not survive the arrival of hungness. Perhaps 
largely because of the absence of a cabinet, the majority of 'coalitions' at local level 
are legislative, rather than executive. Future studies will need to concentrate on 
effective ways of assessing legislative co-operation, rather than the much simpler 
task of detailing clearly discernible ministerial portfolios. Therefore, increased 
attention must be paid to the problem of measuring policy concessions in hung 
councils. While voting records would provide fairly precise details of any legislative 
co-operation, from parties voting together to tactical abstention by 'support* 
parties, the task of compiling such a record over the lifetime of each administration 
Is daunting. Perhaps confining this task to certain key times, such as budget making 
and voting concerning the allocation of chairmanships, provides the most practical 
such way of measuring support. 
Although a clear finding is that policy, rather than office, pay-offs are sought by 
local coalition actors, those parties which are participating in government are aware 
of the potential usefulness of office for achieving policy objectives. However, despite 
the Increased sharing of committee chairs found by this study.^° this cannot 
substitute for the sharing of portfolios In cabinet coalitions. Ministerial office is 
different from, and endows much more power than, a committee chair. Too many 
parties which are openly co-operating in the running of a council do not share 
chairmanships, and in many hung councils the distribution of committee chairs fails 
""^ A s against, for example. Laver. Railings. & Thrasher (1987). 
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to reflect the nature of political control. Also, changes are often made to the role of 
the chair, notably an apparent movement towards a 'technical' rather than a 
•political' role. Therefore, in many hung local authorities the possession of chairs 
may be seen as more of a duty than as a payoff for participation in a winning 
coalition, and theories which stress office-seeking as a primary motivation will 
struggle to explain local coalitional behaviour. 
Given the finding of this research that policy closeness is important for local parties 
in achieving their policy objectives, the need to construct a realistic representation 
of policy positions is apparent for any convincing theory. This presents some 
problems for large-scale surveys. We can arguably place the major national parties 
fairly accurately on an ideological sca le , and despite regional differences, local 
parties are generally close to their parent party. The position of local parties can be 
further specified by assessing the relative position of the local party against the 
corresponding national party, as this survey did. However, the importance of 
Independent groups at local level (under many appellations), means that a significant 
local actor often has to be excluded. One way future studies could tackle the problem 
would be to ask the main local party groups in each authority to a s s e s s the Ideological 
positions, on a left-right policy scale, of both themselves and their opponents. After 
all, local political actors are probably the best judges of the relative policy positions 
of themselves and their rivals. Although the many flaws of such a proposal are 
acknowledged. 11 an aggregate of such responses could produce a workable policy 
scale for each party group in a local authority, and allow a wider assessment of 
policy preference/ ideological connectedness theories than this study has managed. 
Other institutional factors may also need to receive special consideration in any 
theory of local government formation. It appears the differing electoral cycles in 
English local government tend to produce different coalitional strategies. Local 
authorities with a quadrennial electoral cycle are more likely to generate coalition 
administrations than counci ls holding elections by thirds, where minority 
administrations are the norm. If such results are reproduced by other studies, any 
predictive theory would have to consider the possiblity, for example, that the 
application of a majority criterion might be more appropriate for councils with a 
quadrennial electoral cycle. 
^ 1 For example. Conservatives (and similar motives apply to the other parties) may have a 
vested interest in portraying Liberal Democrats and Labour groups as occupying essentially 
the same policy space, or as being more 'left wing' than they actually are. 
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From the type of administrations forming and the type of payoffs made, we already 
know that local politicians cannot be adequately seen as predominantly 'office-
driven'. The tactics adopted in Devon offer support for the contention that many local 
groups will be more interested in policy payoffs, and that the failure to deliver 
policy expectations can lead to the breakdown of agreements. The expectation of 
achieving policies can lead a party to overlook its antipathy towards another party, 
even when the bitterness is as deep as that felt by many in the Devon Labour party 
towards the "traitors and rats"^^ QI |he Social Democrats. 
The c a s e study of Devon highlights a number of important points. The tactics of 
Labour in Devon demonstrate that national party constraints may affect the longevity 
of a coalition. Aware of the negative view of Walworth Road, Labour was reluctant to 
take chairs, and this general reluctance probably meant that the one post they would 
have taken (education), was never offered to them; their coalition partners were 
also cognisant of the local Labour party's position with their national party. If 
Labour had got the education chair, the coalition might have lasted much longer. 
Devon also illustrates that future electoral consequences will affect coalitional 
behaviour, even when forthcoming elections are not for the local authority in which 
parties are co-operating. The breakdown of the Labour/ All iance 'working 
arrangement' was largely because of forthcoming district and general elections. After 
their initial attempt to form a minority government. Conservat ive tactics were 
clearly driven by a belief that the county council elections in 1989 would bring a 
return to "sanity", that is. Conservative rule, and that the best electoral strategy 
was to avoid any direct involvement in government. 
The Importance of personal relationships is clearly demonstrated by the initial 
process of coalition formation in Devon, and personal c loseness between politicans 
from opposing parties is probably more likely in the smaller environment of local 
politics. The personal characteristics of politicians will also be important, and a 
different type of personality to Liberal leader David Morrish would have meant a 
much longer lasting Alliance minority administration. There was no constitutional 
requirement for Morrish to resign after the successfu l vote of no confidence 
(another institutional factor which any theory would need to take into account), and 
S D P leader Harold Luscombe would have carried on. Different politicians will 
respond differently to the same stimuli, a 'fact' which any theory of politics will 
have difficulty integrating into a realistic representation of political behaviour. 
^2 The description of veteran Labour councillor. Reg Scott (Western Morning News, 
7 / 5 / 8 5 ) . 
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Of course, many of these assertions concerning local tactics also apply to national 
government coalition formation. For example, while the past behaviour of 
'traditional rulers* may well mean their exclusion from local c o a l i t i o n s , ^ t h e same 
stricture could (and probably does) apply to national party politics. The historical 
dimension is obviously important to present day coalitional activity In whatever 
forum It occurs. The multi-dimensional approach pioneered by Pridham (heavily 
Influenced by Groennings) has a huge list of such potentially crucial variables. 
However, expecting the multiple dimensions of politics to be successfully tackled by 
a theory of local coalitions is unrealistic, when most such variables have yet to be 
considered, yet alone incorporated, by formal theorists examining parliamentary 
democracies. It may be the case that specific local factors are crucial to the tactics of 
political and bureaucratic actors, and an approach such as Pridham's may well 
attempt to model a more accurate reflection of the real world than coalition theory's 
often simplistic assumptions. However, formal theory allows the observer of 
coalitions to build on a well proven framework that stresses the central importance 
of office and policy goals to most politicians. 
Formal theory does not argue that office or policy pursuit can explain all coalitional 
behaviour, but it does recognise their centrallty to political behaviour, providing a 
solid base from which to modify generally well-proven assumptions of their 
Immense importance. That solid base has provided a platform from which this 
empirical examination has built. While the importance of factors such as personal 
relationships, past history, and national party views cannot be denied, this study of 
hung councils has confirmed the primary motivations of office and policy offered by 
coalition theory. It is policy goals which drive local politicians, and office is seen as 
important to achieving those goals. The achievements of formal theory have been 
greater than its critics allow, and this analysis would have been less informative 
without Its utilisation of formal theory's considerable contribution to our 
understanding of the basis of all political behaviour, the formation and maintenance 
of coalitions. However, theorists can also learn a great deal from empirical studies 
of hung councils, and recent studies acknowledge that hung councils "provide an 
invaluable test-bed for the study of coalition theory" (Leach & Stewart 1992, p.3; 
s e e also, f^Iellors, 1989. p.17). There is a real need for a process of Interaction 
between the many ways of studying coalition politics. 
13 Although this was the c a s e in Devon, the survey responses showed little general 
evidence of such a strategy by former opposition parties. 
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Hopefully, future coalition studies from all approaches will adopt a wider base of 
knowledge than hereto, continuing the vital process of bridge building commenced by 
Laver & Schofield. That process of bridge building has been continued here, and 
whatever their methodological approach, students of coalition behaviour should find 
the results of the multi-method approach adopted in this thesis relevant. 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE ONE 
QUESTIONNAIRE TWO 
QUESTIONNAIRE THREE 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOUR 
Q U . l 
The Local Government Chronicle is continuing its efforts to provide a comprehensive 
review of local government. To this end, we are following up our survey of two years ago 
into the operations of councils in which no party has overall control. At that time, many of 
the councils surveyed were new to this situation, and we are keen to discover how the 
passage of time has affected their attitudes to working in a 'balanced* local authority. In 
addition, we are attempting to discover the ways in which political parties in such a 
situation react to the need to co-operate with other parties, in order that their own policies 
can be passed. 
We would, therefore, be gratef\il if you could answer the attached questionnaire in order to 
enable us to compile a more accurate picture of the current political and administrative 
arrangements. We intend to publish the results of this survey in a future issue of Local 
Government Chronicle. We believe the findings will be of interest and value to our readers 
in the local government community. 
NAME 
A D D R E S S 
L O C A L A U T H O R I T Y 
1. Please state the present party political composition of your council. 
C O N S E R V A T I V E 
L A B O U R 
S.L.D 
S.D.P 
INDEPENDENT 
O T H E R 
(please specify) 
2. Which parties comprise the current administration? 
3. Is this a formal or informal arrangement? 
4. Is there any time limit on this arrangement? 
How long has your council been hung? 
6. Have the same parties formed the administration for this duration? 
(If NO, please give the details of former political arrangements and their duration) 
7. Before your council became hung, which political party(ies) formed the 
administration? 
8. Where applicable, please indicate on the list of committees below (a) their party 
political composition and (b) which party holds the Chair and Deputy Chair. 
PARTY PARTY HOLDING 
COMMITTEE CON LAB S.L.P S.D.P INDT OTHERS CHAIR DEPUTY 
CHAIR 
POLICY & RESOURCES 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
FINANCE SUB-CTTE 
(or other budgetary cominee) 
11 
9. If there are any unusual committee arrangements in your authority, for example 
rotating chairmanships, please specify: 
10. (a) Prior to your council becoming hung, were there any one-party committees or 
sub-committees? 
(b) If Y E S , please specify and detail the present composition of the committees. 
11. (a) Have the rules and practices of the local authority with regard to committee 
structure and composition been amended in any way since your authority 
became hung? 
(b) If Y E S , please specify the changes made. 
12. Since your authority became hung, has the quality of decision-making, in your 
opinion: (please tick one box) 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
I M P R O V E D 
R E M A I N E D T H E S A M E 
13. Since your authority became hung, has the quality of policies, in your opinion: 
(please tick one box) 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
IMPROVED 
R E M A I N E D T H E S A M E 
111 
14. Which of the following, in your opinion, is most influential in dictating the course 
of council policy? {please rank in order of importance: ie, I, 2, 3, 4 ...) 
F U L L C O U N C I L 
C O M M I T T E E S 
C H I E F O F F I C E R S 
E L E C T E D P A R T Y E L I T E S 
L O C A L P A R T Y ORGANISATIONS 
C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T 
OTHER (please specify) 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
If you wish your answers to be treated in confidence, please tick the box. 
IV 
Q U . 2 
The Local Government Chronicle is continuing its efforts to provide a comprehensive 
review of local government. To this end, we are following up our survey of two years ago 
into the operations of councils in which no party has overall control. At that time, many of 
the councils surveyed were new to this situation, and we are keen to discover how the 
passage of time has affected their attitudes to working in a 'balanced' local authority. In 
addition, we are attempting to discover the ways in which political parties in such a 
situation react to the need to co-operate with other parties, in order that their own policies 
can be passed. 
We would, therefore, be grateful if you could answer the attached questionnaire in order to 
enable us to compile a more accurate picture of the current political and administrative 
arrangements. We intend to publish the results of this survey in a future issue of Local 
Government Chronicle. We believe the findings will be of interest and value to our readers 
in the local government community. 
N A M E 
T I T L E and P A R T Y 
L O C A L A U T H O R I T Y 
1. Which parties comprise the current administration? 
2. Is this a formal or informal arrangement? 
3. Is there a time limit on this arrangement? 
In relative terms, how important were considerations of office (for example -
committee chairmanships) rather than policy considerations (for example -
budgetary concessions) to your party during the negotiations for the formation of an 
administration? (Please tick one box) 
P O L I C Y MOST IMPORTANT 
P O L I C Y G R E A T E R I M P O R T A N C E 
OF E Q U A L I M P O R T A N C E 
O F F I C E G R E A T E R I M P O R T A N C E 
O F F I C E MOST IMPORTANT 
NOT P R E P A R E D T O N E G O T I A T E 
P L E A S E ANSWER THIS QUESTION O N L Y IF Y O U R P A R T Y IS PART OF 
T H E ADMINISTRATION. 
In your opinion, have the benefits to your party been mostly in terms of office, of 
policy, equally from office and policy, or have you obtained no benefits since your 
authority became hung? {Please tick one box) 
F R O M P O L I C Y 
F R O M O F F I C E 
E Q U A L 
NONE 
6. Where applicable, how would you assess your party's influence in the following 
policy areas since your authority became hung? 
(Please tick one box for each policy area) 
POLICY AREA V E R Y 
INFLUENTIAL 
QUITE 
INFLUENTIAL 
NOT V E R Y 
INFLUENTIAL 
NOT AT A L L 
INFLUENTIAL 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
T H E BUDGET 
V I 
7. Where applicable, how would you access (in percentage terms) your party's 
influence since your authority became hung, in the policy areas below? 
(Please enter % for each policy area) 
P O L I C Y A R E A 0 - 1 0 0 % 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
In your opinion, which of the following best describes the access of your group 
spokemen to Chief Officers? {Please tick one box) 
V E R Y O P E N 
O P E N 
L I M I T E D 
NO A C C E S S 
In your opinion, which of the following best describes the differences in the access 
of your group spokesmen to Chief Officers since your authority became hung? 
(Please tick one box) 
MUCH I M P R O V E D 
I M P R O V E D 
NO D I F F E R E N C E 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
MUCH D E T E R O R I A T E D 
V I I 
10. Were the initial budgetary proposals for 1988/89 (as prepared by officers) 
discussed with representatives of all party groups? {If NO. please specify) 
11. How would you assess your party's access to officers concerning the initial 
budgetary proposals since your authority became hung? {Please tick one box) 
MUCH I M P R O V E D 
I M P R O V E D 
NO D I F F E R E N C E 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
MUCH D E T E R I O R A T E D 
12. How would you characterise the recent process of budgetary decision-making in 
your authority? Did it display a: {please tick one box) 
HIGH D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
FA IR D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
S M A L L D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
NO C O N F L I C T 
13. How close was the final rate precept for your authority to your own party's 
preferences? 
{Please tick one box) 
I D E N T I C A L 
V E R Y C L O S E 
Q U I T E C L O S E 
Q U I T E D ISTANT 
V E R Y D ISTANT 
V l l l 
14. How would you assess your party's influence on the rate precept set for your 
authority? {Please tick one box) 
V E R Y I N F L U E N T I A L 
Q U I T E I N F L U E N T I A L 
NOT V E R Y I N F L U E N T I A L 
NOT A T A L L I N F L U E N T I A L 
15. In order that the budget could be passed, please indicate whether your party made 
or obtained concessions with respect to another party(ies) in the following policy 
areas. 
{Please tick one box each side for each policy area, where appropriate) 
CONCESSIONS 
MADE 
P O L I C Y A R E A MAJOR MINOR NONE 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
CONCESSIONS 
O B T A I N E D 
MAJOR MINOR NONE 
16. Since your authority became hung, has the quality of decision-making, in your 
opinon: 
{Please tick one box) 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
I M P R O V E D 
R E M A I N E D T H E S A M E 
I X 
17. Since your authority became hung, has the quality of policies, in your opinion: 
{Please tick one box) 
D E T E R I O R A T E D 
I M P R O V E D 
R E M A I N E D T H E S A M E 
18. Which of the following, in your opinion, is most influential in dictating the course 
of council policy? (Please rank in order of importance, ie. 1, 2, 3, 4...) 
F U L L C O U N C I L 
C O M M I T T E E S 
C H I E F O F F I C E R S 
E L E C T E D P A R T Y E L I T E S 
L O C A L P A R T Y ORGANISATIONS 
C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T 
O T H E R {please specify) 
19. Where would you place your local party, ideologically, in relation to your national 
party? {Please tick one box) 
T O T H E ' R I G H T 
T O T H E ' L E F T ' 
R O U G H L Y S IMILAR 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
If you wish your answers to be treated inconfidence, please tick the box, 
QU.3 
The Local Government Chronicle is continuing its efforts to provide a comprehensive 
review of local government. To that end, we are repeating a survey we undertook in 1986 
into hung councils, with the addition of selected single-party administrations. We would, 
therefore, be grateful if you could answer the attached questionnaire, which is intended to 
discover some of the differences between local authorities where one party controls the 
administration (as in your local authority) and those in which no party has an overall 
majority. 
We intend to publish the result of this survey in a future issue of Local Government 
Chronicle. We believe the findings will be of interest and value to our readers in the local 
government community. 
NAME 
T I T L E and P A R T Y 
L O C A L A U T H O R I T Y 
1. Please state the present party political composition of your council, 
C O N S E R V A T I V E 
L A B O U R 
S.L.D. 
S.D.P 
I N D E P E N D E N T 
O T H E R (please specify) 
XI 
Where applicable, please indicate on the list of conunittees below: 
(a) their party political composition, and 
(b) which party holds the Chair and Deputy Chair. 
P A R T Y P A R T Y 
HOLDING 
C O M M I T T E E CON LAB S.L.D. S.D.P I N D T OTHERS CHAIR DEPUTY 
CHAIR 
POLICY & RESOURCES 
EDUCATION 
S O C U L S E R V I C E S 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
FINANCE S U B - C I T E 
(or other budgetary 
committee) 
3. If there are any unusual committee arrangements in your authority, for example 
rotating chairmanships, please specify: 
4. (a) Are there any one-party committees or sub-committees in your authority? 
(b) I f Y E S , please specify: 
X l l 
5. Which of the following, in your opinion, is most influential in dictating the course 
of council policy? {Please rank in order of importance, ie. J, 2, 3, 4...) 
F U L L C O U N C I L 
C O M M I T T E E S 
C H I E F O F F I C E R S 
E L E C T E D P A R T Y E L I T E S 
L O C A L P A R T Y ORGANISATIONS 
O T H E R S {please specify) 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
If you wish to be treated in confidence, please tick the box. 
X l l l 
QU.4 
The Local Government Chronicle is continuing its efforts to provide a comprehensive 
review of local government. To that end, we are repeating a survey we undertook in 1986 
into hung councils, with the addition of selected single-party administrations. We would, 
therefore, be grateful if you could answer the attached questionnaire, which is intended to 
discover some of the differences between local authorities where one party controls the 
administration (as in your local authority) and those in which no party has an overall 
majority. We intend to publish the results of this survey in a future issue of Local 
Government Chronicle. We believe the findings will be of interest and value to our readers 
in the local government community. 
NAME 
T I T L E and P A R T Y 
L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T 
1. Which party(ies) comprise the current administration? 
2. Where applicable, how would you assess your party's influence in the following 
policy areas? {please tick one box for each policy area) 
POLICY AREA VERY 
INFLUENTIAL 
QUITE 
INFLUENTIAL 
NOT VERY 
INFLUENTIAL 
NOT AT ALL 
INFLUENTIAL 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
THE BUDGET 
xiv 
Where applicable, how would you assess (in percentage terms) your party's 
influence during the current administration in the policy areas below (please enter 
% for each policy area) 
P O L I C Y A R E A 0 - 1 0 0 % 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
4. In your opinion, which of the following best describes the access of your group 
spokesmen to the Chief Officers? (please tick one box) 
V E R Y O P E N 
O P E N 
L I M I T E D 
NO A C C E S S 
Were the initial budgetary proposals for 1988/89 (as prepared by officers) 
discussed with representatives of all party groups? {If NO, please specify) 
6. How would you characterise the recent process of budgetary decision-making in 
your authority? Did it display a: {please tick one box) 
HIGH D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
FA IR D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
S M A L L D E G R E E OF C O N F L I C T 
NO C O N F L I C T 
X V 
7. How close was the final rate precept in your authority to your own part/s 
preferences? 
{Please tick one box) 
I D E N T I C A L 
V E R Y C L O S E 
Q U I T E C L O S E 
Q U I T E D ISTANT 
V E R Y D ISTANT 
How would you assess your party's influence on the rate precept set in your 
authority? 
{Please tick one box) 
V E R Y I N F L U E N T I A L 
Q U I T E I N F L U E N T I A L 
NOT V E R Y I N F L U E N T I A L 
NOT AT A L L I N F L U E N T I A L 
During the recent budgetary procedure, please indicate whether your party made 
policy concessions to, or obtained policy concession from another party(ies), in the 
following policy areas. {Please tick box on each side for each policy area) 
CONCESSIONS 
MADE 
P O L I C Y A R E A MAJOR MINOR NONE 
EDUCATION 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
HOUSING 
PLANNING 
HIGHWAYS 
TRANSPORT 
CONCESSIONS 
O B T A I N E D 
MAJOR MINOR NONE 
X V I 
10. Which of the following, in your opinion, is most influential in dictating the course 
of council policy? {Please rank in order of importance, ie. I, 2, 3, 4 ...) 
F U L L C O U N C I L 
C O M M I T T E E S 
C f f l E F O F F I C E R S 
E L E C T E D P A R T Y E L I T E S 
L O C A L P A R T Y ORGANISATIONS 
C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T 
O T H E R {please specify) 
11. Where would you place your local party, ideologically, in relation to your national 
party? {Please tick one box) 
T O T H E BRIGHT' 
T O T H E T E F T ' 
R O U G H L Y S IM ILAR 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
If you wish your answers to be treated in confidence please tick the box. 
X V I I 
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